Congressmayproposeamendments,\"whenevertwo-thirdsofbothhousesshalldeemitnecessary.\"ThissecurestheStatesagainstanyactionuponthesubjectbythepeopleatlarge.Inlikemanner,Congressmaycallaconventionforproposingamendments,\"ontheapplicationofthelegislaturesoftwo-thirdsoftheseveralStates.\"Itisremarkablethat,whetherCongressortheStatesactuponthesubject,thesameproportionisrequired;notlessthantwo-thirdsofeitherbeingauthorizedtoact.Fromthis,itisnotunreasonabletoconclude,thattheconventionconsideredthatthesamepowerwouldactinbothcases;towit:thepoweroftheStates,whomighteffecttheirobjecteitherbytheirseparateactionasStates,orbytheactionofCongress,theircommonfederativeagent;but,whethertheyadoptedtheonemodeortheother,notlessthantwo-thirdsofthemshouldbeauthorizedtoactefficiently.
Theamendmentsthusproposed\"shallbevalidtoallintentsandpurposes,aspartofthisConstitution,whenratifiedbythelegislaturesofthree-fourthsoftheseveralStates,orbyconventionsinthree-fourthsthereof,astheoneortheothermodeofratificationmaybeproposedbyCongress.\"Itistheactofadoptionorratificationalonewhichmakesaconstitution.
Inthecasebeforeus,theStatesalonecanperformthatact.ThelanguageoftheConstitutionadmitsofnodoubt,andgivesnopretextfordoubleconstruction.ItisnotthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesintheaggregate,merelyactingintheirseveralStates,whocanratifyamendments.Three-fourthsoftheseveralStatescanalonedothis.Theideaofseparateandindependentpoliticalcorporationscouldnotbemoredistinctlyconveyed,byanyformofwords.IfthepeopleoftheUnitedStates,asonepeople,butactingintheirseveralStates,couldratifyamendments,thentheverylanguageoftheConstitutionrequiresthatthree-fourthsofthemshallconcurtherein.
Isitnot,then,trulywonderfulthatnomodehasyetbeenprescribedtoascertain,whetherthree-fourthsofthemdoconcurornot?Bywhatpowercanthenecessaryarrangementuponthispointbeeffected?Inpointoffact,amendmentshavealreadybeenmade,instrictconformitywiththisprovisionoftheConstitution.Weaskourauthor,whetherthree-fourthsofthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesconcurredinthoseamendmentsornot;
andiftheydid,whencedoeshederivetheproofofit?
IfJudgeStory,andthepoliticiansofhisschool,becorrectintheidea,thattheConstitutionwasformedby\"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,\"
andnotbytheStates,assuch,thisclauserelatingtoamendmentspresentsasingularanomalyinpolitics.TheirideaisthattheStatesovereigntiesweremerged,toacertainextent,inthatact,andthatthegovernmentestablishedwasemphaticallythegovernmentofthepeopleoftheUnitedStates.Andyet,thosesamepeoplecanneitheralternoramendthatgovernment.
Inordertoperformthisessentialfunction,itisnecessarytocallagainintolifeandactionthoseveryStatesovereigntieswhichweresupposedtobemergedanddead,bytheveryactofcreatingtheinstrumentwhichtheyarerequiredtoamend.Toalteroramendagovernmentrequiresthesameextentofpowerwhichisrequiredtoformone;foreveryalterationoramendmentis,astosomuch,anewgovernment.And,ofallpoliticalacts,theformationofaconstitutionofgovernmentisthatwhichadmitsandimplies,themostdistinctlyandtothefullestextent,theexistenceofabsolute,unqualified,unconditional,andunlimitedsovereignty.Solong,therefore,asthepowerofamendingtheConstitutionrestsexclusivelywiththeStates,itisidletocontendthattheyarelesssovereignnowthantheywerebeforetheadoptionofthatinstrument.
TheideawhichIamendeavoringtoenforce,ofthefederativecharacteroftheConstitution,isstillfartherconfirmedbythatclauseofthearticleunderconsideration,whichprovidesthatnoamendmentshallbemadetodepriveanyStateofitsequalsuffrageintheSenate,withoutitsownconsent.SostronglyweretheStatesattachedtothatperfectequalitywhichtheirperfectsovereigntyimplied,andsojealousweretheyofeveryattackuponit,thattheyguardedit,byanexpressprovisionoftheConstitution,againstthepossibilityofoverthrow.Allotherrightstheyconfidedtothatpowerofamendmentwhichtheyreposedinthree-fourthsofalltheStates;butthistheyrefusedtoentrust,excepttotheseparate,independentandsovereignwillofeachState;givingtoeach,initsowncase,anabsolutenegativeuponalltherest.22
TheobjectoftheprecedingpageshasbeentoshowthattheConstitutionisfederative,inthepowerwhichframedit;federativeinthepowerwhichadoptedandratifiedit;federativeinthepowerwhichsustainsandkeepsitalive;federativeinthepowerbywhichaloneitcanbealteredoramended;
andfederativeinthestructureofallitsdepartments.Inwhatrespect,then,canitjustlybecalledaconsolidatedornationalgovernment?Certainly,themerefactthat,inparticularcases,itisauthorizedtoactdirectlyonthepeople,doesnotdisproveitsfederativecharacter,sincethatverysovereigntyintheStates,whichaconfederationimplies,includeswithinittherightoftheStatetosubjectitsowncitizenstotheactionofthecommonauthorityoftheconfederatedStates,inanyformwhichmayseempropertoitself.NeitherisourConstitutiontobedeemedthelessfederative,becauseitwastheobjectofthosewhoformedittoestablish\"agovernment,\"andoneeffectiveforallthelegitimatepurposesofgovernment.
Muchemphasishasbeenlaiduponthisword,anditevenhasbeenthought,byonedistinguishedstatesmanofJudgeStory\'sschool,thatoursis\"agovernmentproper,\"whichIpresumeimpliesthatitisagovernmentinapeculiarlyemphaticsense.IconfessthatIdonotveryclearlydiscernthedifferencebetweenagovernmentandagovernmentproper.Nothingisagovernmentwhichisnotproperlyso;andwhateverisproperlyagovernmentisagovernmentproper.Butwhetheroursisa\"governmentproper,\"oronlyasimplegovernment,doesnotprovethatitisnotaconfederation,unlessitbetruethataconfederationcannotbeagovernment.
Formyself,IamunabletodiscoverwhyStates,absolutelysovereign,maynotcreateforthemselves,bycompact,acommongovernment,withpowersasextensiveandsupremeasanysovereignpeoplecanconferonagovernmentestablishedbythemselves.Inwhatotherparticularoursisaconsolidatedornationalgovernment,Ileaveittotheadvocatesofthatdoctrinetoshow.CHAPTERIX.EXTENTANDLIMITSOFTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHESUPREME
COURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES.Wecomenowtoamoreparticularanddetailedexaminationofthequestion,\"Whoisthefinaljudge,orinterpreterinconstitutionalcontroversies?\"
ThefourthchapterofthisdivisionofJudgeStory\'sworkisdevotedtothisinquiry;andtheelaborateexaminationwhichhehasgiventothesubject,showsthatheattachedajustimportancetoit.Theconclusion,however,towhichhehasarrived,leavesstillunsettledthemostdifficultandcontestedpropositionswhichbelongtothispartoftheConstitution.Hisconclusionis,that,\"inallquestionsofajudicialnature,\"theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesisthefinalumpire;andthattheStates,aswellasindividuals,areabsolutelyboundbyitsdecisions.Hisreasoninguponthispartofthesubjectisnotnew,anddoesnotstrikemeasbeingparticularlyforcible.Withoutdeemingitnecessarytofollowhiminthepreciseorderofhisargument,Ishallendeavortomeetitinallitsparts,intheprogressofthisexamination.Itsgeneraloutlineisthis:Itiswithintheproperfunctionofthejudiciarytointerpretthelaws;theConstitutionisthesupremelaw,andthereforeitiswithintheproperfunctionofthejudiciarytointerprettheConstitution;ofcourse,itistheprovinceofthefederaljudiciarytointerprettheFederalConstitution.
AndasthatConstitution,andalllawsmadeinpursuancethereof,arethesupremelawoftheland,anythinginthelawsorconstitutionofanyStatetothecontrarynotwithstanding,therefore,theinterpretationsofthatConstitution,asgivenbytheSupremeCourt,areobligatory,finalandconclusive,uponthepeopleandtheStates.
Beforeweenteruponthisinvestigation,itispropertoplacethepropositiontobediscussedintermssomewhatmoredefiniteandprecisethanthosewhichtheauthorhasemployed.What,then,ismeantby\"finaljudgeandinterpreter?\"Intheordinaryacceptationoftheseterms,weshouldunderstandbythematribunalhavinglawfulcognizanceofasubject,andfromwhosedecisionsthereisnoappeal.Inthisviewofthequestion,therecanbenodifficultyinadmittingthatthedecisionsoftheSupremeCourtarefinalandconclusive.Whatevercomeswithinthelegitimatecognizanceofthattribunal,ithasarighttodecide,whetheritbeaquestionofthelaworoftheConstitution,andnoothertribunalcanreverseitsdecision.
TheConstitution,whichcreatestheSupremeCourt,createsnoothercourtofsuperiororappellatejurisdictiontoit,and,consequently,itsdecisionsarestrictly\"final.\"Thereisnopowerinthesamegovernmenttowhichthatcourtbelongstoreverseorcontrolit,norarethereanymeansthereinofresistingitsauthority.Sofar,therefore,astheFederalConstitutionhasprovidedforthesubjectatall,theSupremeCourtis,beyondquestion,thefinaljudgeorarbiter;andthis,too,whetherthejurisdictionwhichitexercisesbelegitimateorusurped.
Theterms\"constitutionalcontroversies\"arestillmoreindefinite.
Everycontroversywhichissubmittedtothedecisionofajudicialtribunal,whetherStateorfederal,necessarilyinvolvestheconstitutionalityofthelawunderwhichitarises.Ifthelawbenotconstitutional,thecourtcannotenforceit,and,ofcourse,thequestionwhetheritbeconstitutionalornot,necessarilyarisesineverycasetowhichthecourtisaskedtoapplyit.Theveryactofenforcingalawpresupposesthatitsconstitutionalityhasbeendetermined.Inthissense,everycourt,whetherStateorfederal,isthe\"judgeorarbiterofconstitutionalcontroversies,\"arisingincausesbeforeitandiftherebenoappealfromitsdecision,itisthe\"final\"
judgeorarbiter,inthesensealreadyexpressed.
Letusnowinquirewhat\"constitutionalcontroversies\"thefederalcourtshaveauthoritytodecide,andhowfaritsdecisionsarefinalandconclusiveagainstalltheworld.
ThethirdarticleoftheConstitutionprovidesthat\"thejudicialpowersshallextendtoallcasesinlawandequity,arisingunderthisConstitution,thelawsoftheUnitedStates,andthetreatiesmade,orwhichshallbemade,undertheirauthority;toallcasesaffectingambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsulstoallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictiontocontroversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty;tocontroversiesbetweentwoormoreStates;betweenaStateandcitizensofanotherState;
betweencitizensofdifferentStates;betweencitizensofthesameState,claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentStates;andbetweenaStateandthecitizensthereof,andforeignStates,citizensorsubjects.\"
Theeleventhamendmentprovidesthat\"thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuitinlaworequity,commencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheUnitedStatesbycitizensofanotherState,orbycitizensandsubjectsofanyforeignState.\"
Itwillbeconcededonallhandsthatthefederalcourtshavenojurisdictionexceptwhatishereconferred.Thejudiciary,asapartoftheFederalGovernment,derivesitspowersonlyfromtheConstitutionwhichcreatesthatgovernment.Theterm\"cases\"impliesthatthesubjectmattershallbeproperforjudicialdecision;andthepartiesbetweenwhomalonejurisdictioncanbeentertained,arespecificallyenumerated.Beyondthese\"cases\"andthesepartiestheyhavenojurisdiction.
ThereisnopartoftheConstitutioninwhichtheframersofithavedisplayedamorejealouscareoftherightsoftheStates,thaninthelimitationsofthejudicialpower.Itisremarkablethatnopowerisconferredexceptwhatisabsolutelynecessarytocarryintoeffectthegeneraldesign,andaccomplishthegeneralobjectoftheStates,asindependent,confederatedStates.ThefederaltribunalscannottakecognizanceofanycasewhateverinwhichalltheStateshavenotanequalandcommoninterestthatajustandimpartialdecisionshallbehad.AbriefanalysisoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionwillmakethissufficientlyclear.
Cases\"arisingundertheConstitution\"arethoseinwhichsomerightorprivilegeisdenied,whichtheConstitutionconfers,orsomethingisdonewhichtheConstitutionprohibits,asexpressedintheConstitutionitself.Thosewhicharise\"underthelawsoftheUnitedStates\"aresuchasinvolverightsorduties,whichresultfromthelegislationofCongress.
CasesofthesekindsaresimplythecarryingoutofthecompactoragreementmadebetweentheStates,bytheConstitutionitself,and,ofcourse,alltheStatesarealikeinterestedinthem.Forthisreasonalone,iftherewerenoother,theyoughttobeentrustedtothecommontribunalsofalltheStates.Thereisanotherreason,however,equallyconclusive.Thejudicialshouldalwaysbeatleastco-extensivewiththelegislativepower;foritwouldbeastrangeanomaly,andcouldproducenothingbutdisorderandconfusion,toconferonagovernmentthepowertomakealaw,withoutconferringatthesametimetherighttointerpretandthepowertoenforceit.
Casesarisingundertreaties,madeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates,andthose\"affectingambassadorsandotherpublicministersendconsuls,\"couldnotproperlybeentrustedtoanyotherthanthefederaltribunals.TreatiesaremadeunderthecommonauthorityoftheStates,andall,alike,areboundforthefaithfulobservanceofthem.AmbassadorsandotherpublicministersandconsulsarereceivedunderthecommonauthorityofalltheStates,andtheirdutiesrelateonlytomattersinvolvingaliketheinterestsofall.Thepeaceofthecountry,andtheharmonyofitsrelationswithforeignpowers,depend,inapeculiardegree,onthegoodfaithwithwhichitsdutiesinreferencetothesesubjectsaredischarged.
Henceitwouldbeunsafetoentrustthemtoanyotherthantheirowncontrol;
andevenifthiswerenotso,itwouldbealtogetherincongruoustoappealtoaStatetribunal,toenforcetherights,theobligationsorthedutiesoftheUnitedStates.Forlikereasons,casesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictionareproperlyentrustedtothefederaltribunals.
ControversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeapartyshould,upongeneralprinciples,belongonlytoherowncourts.TherewouldbeneitherproprietynorjusticeinpermittinganyoneStatetodecideacaseinwhichalltheStatesareparties.Inlikemanner,thosebetweentwoormoreStates?betweenaStateandcitizensofanotherState,wheretheStateisplaintiff?(itcannotbesued)?andbetweencitizensofdifferentStates,couldnotbeentrustedtothetribunalsofanyparticularStateinterested,orwhosecitizensareinterestedtherein,withoutdangerofinjusticeandpartiality.Jurisdictionisgiventothefederalcourts,inthesecases,simplybecausetheyareequallyinterestedforalltheparties,arethecommoncourtsofalltheparties,andthereforearepresumedtoformtheonlyfairandimpartialtribunalbetweenthem.ThesamereasoningappliestocasesbetweencitizensofthesameState,claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentStates.CasesofthissortinvolvequestionsofthesovereignpoweroftheStates,andcouldnot,withanyshowofpropriety,beentrustedtothedecisionofeitherofthem,interestedasitwouldbetosustainitsownacts,againstthoseofthesisterState.ThejurisdictioninthiscaseisgivenuponthesameprincipleswhichgiveitincasesbetweentwoormoreStates.
ControversiesbetweenaStateorthecitizensthereof,andforeignStates,citizensorsubjects,dependonadifferentprinciple,butoneequallyaffectingthecommonrightsandinterestsofalltheStates.AforeignStatecannot,ofcourse,besued;shecanappearinourcourtsonlyasplaintiff.Yet,inwhateverformsuchcontroversies,orthoseaffectingthecitizensofaforeignState,mayarise,alltheStateshaveadeepinterestthatanimpartialtribunal,satisfactorytotheforeignparty,shouldbeprovided.Thedenialofjusticeisalegitimate,andnotanunfruitfulcauseofwar.AsnoStatecanbeinvolvedinwarwithoutinvolvingalltherest,theyallhaveacommoninteresttowithdrawfromtheStatetribunalsajurisdictionwhichmaybringthemwithinthedangerofthatresult.AlltheStatesarealikeboundtorenderjusticetoforeignStatesandtheirpeople;andthiscommonresponsibilitygivesthemarighttodemandthateveryquestioninvolvingitshallbedecidedbytheircommonjudicatory.
ThisbriefreviewofthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates,asgivenintheConstitution,isnotofferedasafullanalysisofthesubject;
forthequestionbeforeusdoesnotrenderanysuchanalysisnecessary.
Bydesignhasbeenonlytoshowwithwhatextremereservejudicialpowerhasbeenconferred,andwithwhatcautionithasbeenrestrictedtothosecases,only,whichthenewrelationbetweentheStatesestablishedbytheConstitutionrenderedabsolutelynecessary.Inallthecasesabovesupposed,thejurisdictionofthefederalcourtsisclearandundoubted;andastheStateshave,intheframeoftheConstitution,agreedtosubmittotheexerciseofthisjurisdiction,theyareboundtodoso,andtocompeltheirpeopletolikesubmission.Butitistoberemarked,thattheyareboundonlybytheiragreement,andnotbeyondit.TheyareundernoobligationtosubmittothedecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,onsubjectmatternotproperlycognizablebeforeit,nortothosebetweenpartiesnotresponsibletoitsjurisdiction.23Who,then,istodecidethispoint?ShalltheSupremeCourtdecideforitself,andagainstalltheworld?Itisadmittedthateverycourtmustnecessarilydetermineeveryquestionofjurisdictionwhicharisesbeforeit,and,sofar,itmustofcoursebethejudgeofitsownpowers.Ifitbeacourtofthelastresort,itsdecisionisnecessarilyfinal,sofarasthoseauthoritiesareconcerned,whichbelongtothesamesystemofgovernmentwithitself.
Thereis,infact,noabsoluteandcertainlimitation,inanyconstitutionalgovernment,tothepowersofitsownjudiciary;for,asthosepowersarederivedfromtheConstitutionandasthejudgesaretheinterpretersoftheConstitution,thereisnothingtopreventthemfrominterpretinginfavorofanypowerwhichtheymayclaim.TheSupremeCourt,therefore,mayassumejurisdictionoversubjectsandbetweenparties,notallowedbytheConstitution,andthereisnopowerintheFederalGovernmenttogainsayit.Eventheimpeachmentandremovalofthejudges,forignoranceorcorruption,wouldnotinvalidatetheirdecisionsalreadypronounced.
Isthere,then,noredress?TheConstitutionitselfwillanswerthisquestioninthemostsatisfactorymanner.
ThetentharticleoftheAmendmentsoftheConstitutionprovidesthat\"ThepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheConstitution,norprohibitedbyittotheStates,arereservedtotheStatesrespectively,ortothepeople.\"Thepowersthusreserved,arenotonlyreservedagainsttheFederalGovernmentinwhole,butagainsteachandeverydepartmentthereof.ThejudiciaryisnomoreexceptedoutofthereservationthanisthelegislatureortheExecutive.Ofwhatnature,then,arethosereservedpowers?Notthepowers,ifanysuchtherebe,whicharepossessedbyalltheStatestogether,forthereservationisto\"theStatesrespectively\";
thatis,toeachStateseparatelyanddistinctly.NowwecanformnoideaofanypowerpossessedbyaStateassuch,andindependentofeveryotherState,whichisnot,initsnature,asovereignpower.Everypowersoreserved,therefore,mustbeofsuchacharacterthateachStatemayexerciseit,withouttheleastreferencetoresponsibilitytoanyotherStatewhatever.
WehavealreadyseenthattheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswasformedbytheStatesassuch,andthereservationabovequotedisanadmissionthatinperformingthatwork,theyactedasindependentandsovereignStates.
Itisincidenttoeverysovereigntytobealonethejudgeofitsowncompactsandagreements.NootherStateorassemblageofStateshastheleastrighttointerferewithit,inthisrespect,andcannotdosowithoutimpairingitssovereignty.TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisbuttheagreementwhicheachStatehasmade,witheachandalltheotherStates,andsodistinguishable,intheprincipleweareexamining,fromanyotheragreementbetweensovereignStates.EachState,therefore,hasarighttointerpretthatagreementforitself,unlessithasclearlywaivedthatrightinfavorofanotherpower.Thattherightisnotwaivedinthecaseunderconsideration,isapparentfromthefactalreadystated,thatifthejudiciarybethesolejudgesoftheextentoftheirownpowers,theirpowersareuniversal,andtheenumerationintheConstitutionisidleanduseless.Butitisstillfartherapparentfromthefollowingview:
TheFederalGovernmentisthecreatureoftheStates.ItisnotapartytotheConstitution,buttheresultofit?thecreationofthatagreementwhichwasmadebytheStatesasparties.Itisamereagent,entrustedwithlimitedpowersforcertainspecificobjects;whichpowersandobjectsareenumeratedintheConstitution.Shalltheagentbepermittedtojudgeoftheextentofhisownpowers,withoutreferencetohisconstituent?
Toacertainextent,heiscompelledtodothis,intheveryactofexercisingthem,butthisisalwaysinsubordinationtotheauthoritybywhomhispowerswereconferred.Ifthiswerenotso,theresultwouldbe,thattheagentwouldpossesseverypowerwhichtheconstituentcouldconfer,notwithstandingtheplainestandmostexpresstermsofthegrant.Thiswouldbeagainstallprincipleandallreason.Ifsucharulewouldprevailinregardtogovernment,awrittenconstitutionwouldbetheidlestthingimaginable.
Itwouldaffordnobarrieragainsttheusurpationsofthegovernment,andnosecurityfortherightsandlibertiesofthepeople.IfthentheFederalGovernmenthasnoauthoritytojudge,inthelastresort,oftheextentofitsownpowers,withwhatproprietycanitbesaidthatasingledepartmentofthatgovernmentmaydoso?Nay,itissaidthatthisdepartmentmaynotonlyjudgeforitself,butfortheotherdepartmentsalso.Thisisanabsurdityasperniciousasitisgrossandpalpable.IfthejudiciarymaydeterminethepowersoftheFederalGovernment,itmaypronouncethemeitherlessormorethantheyreallyare.ThatgovernmentatleastwouldhavenorighttocomplainofthedecisionsofanumpirewhichithadchosenforitselfandendeavoredtoforceupontheStatesandthepeople.Thusasingledepartmentmightdenytoboththeotherssalutarypowerswhichtheyreallypossessed,andwhichthepublicinterestorthepublicsafetymightrequirethemtoexercise;oritmightconferonthempowersneverconceded,inconsistentwithprivateright,anddangeroustopublicliberty.
Inconstruingthepowersofafreeandequalgovernment,itisenoughtodisprovetheexistenceofanyrule,toshowthatsuchconsequencesasthesewillresultfromit.Nothingshortoftheplainestandmostunequivocallanguageshouldreconcileustotheadoptionofsucharule.NosuchlanguagecanbefoundinourConstitution.Theonlyclause,fromwhichtherulecanbesupposedtobederived,isthatwhichconfersjurisdictionin\"allcasesarisingundertheConstitution,andthelawsmadeinpursuancethereof\";
butthisclauseisclearlynotsusceptibleofanysuchconstruction.Everyrightmaybesaidtobeaconstitutionalright,becausenorightexistswhichtheConstitutiondisallows;and,consequently,everyremedytoenforcethoserightspresents\"acasearisingundertheConstitution.\"Butaconstructionsolatitudinouswillscarcelybecontendedforbyanyone.Theclauseunderconsiderationgivesjurisdictiononlyastothosematters,andbetweenthoseparties,enumeratedintheConstitutionitself.Wheneversuchacasearises,theFederalcourtshavecognizanceofit;buttherighttodecideacasearisingundertheConstitution,doesnotnecessarilyimplytherighttodetermineinthelastresortwhatthatConstitutionis.IftheFederalcourtsshould,intheveryteethoftheeleventhamendment,takejurisdictionofcases\"commencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheStatesbycitizensofanotherState,\"thedecisionsofthosecourts,thattheyhadjurisdiction,wouldcertainlynotsettletheConstitutioninthatparticular.TheStatewouldbeundernoobligationtosubmittosuchadecision,anditwouldresistitbyvirtueofitssovereignrighttodecideforitself,whetherithadagreedtotheexerciseofsuchajurisdictionornot.
Consideringthenatureofoursystemofgovernment,theStatesoughttobe,andIpresumealwayswillbe,extremelycarefulnottointerposetheirsovereignpoweragainstthedecisionsoftheSupremeCourtinanycasewherethatcourtclearlyhasjurisdiction.Ofthischaracterarethecasesalreadycitedatthecommencementofthisinquiry;such,forexample,asthosebetweentwoStates,thoseaffectingforeignministers,thoseofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction,&c.Astoallthesesubjectsthejurisdictionisclear,andnoStatecanhaveanyinteresttodisputeit.
ThedecisionsoftheSupremeCourt,therefore,oughttobeconsideredasfinalandconclusive,anditwouldbeabreachofthecontractonthepartofanyStatetorefusesubmissiontothem.Thereare,however,manycasesinvolvingquestionsofthepowersofgovernment,Stateandfederal,whichcannotassumeaproperformforjudicialinvestigation.Mostquestionsofmerepoliticalpowerareofthissort;andsuchareallquestionsbetweenaStateandtheUnitedStates.Astothese,theConstitutionconfersnojurisdictiononthefederalcourts,and,ofcourse,itprovidesnocommonumpiretowhosedecisiontheycanbereferred.Insuchcases,therefore,theStatemustofnecessitydecideforitself.Buttherearealsocasesbetweencitizenandcitizen,arisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates,andbetweentheUnitedStatesandthecitizen,arisinginthesameway.
Sofarasthefederaltribunalshavecognizanceofsuchcases,theirdecisionsarefinal.Iftheconstitutionalityofthelawunderwhichthecasearises,shouldcomeintoquestion,thecourthasauthoritytodecideit,andthereisnorelieffortheparties,inanyotherjudicialproceeding.Ifthedecision,inacontroversybetweentheUnitedStatesandacitizen,shouldbeagainsttheUnitedStates,itis,ofcourse,finalandconclusive.Ifthedecisionshouldbeagainstthecitizen,hisonlyreliefisbyanappealtohisownState.Heisundernoobligationtosubmittofederaldecisionsatall,exceptsofaronlyashisownStatehascommandedhimtodoso;
andhehas,therefore,aperfectrighttoaskhisStatewhetherhercommandsextendtotheparticularcaseornot.Hedoesnotaskwhetherthefederalcourthasinterpretedthelawcorrectlyornot,butwhetherornotsheeverconsentedthatCongressshouldpassthelaw.IfCongresshadsuchpower,hehasnorelief,forthedecisionofthehighestfederalcourtisfinal;ifCongresshadnotsuchpower,thenheisoppressedbytheactionofausurpedauthority,andhasarighttolooktohisownStateforredress.
HisStatemayinterposeinhisfavorornot,asshemaythinkproper.Ifshedoesnot,thenthereisanendofthematter;ifshedoes,thanitisnolongerajudicialquestion.Thequestionisthenbetweennewparties,whoarenotboundbytheformerdecision;betweenaStateandtheUnitedStates.Asbetweenthesepartiesthefederaltribunalshavenojurisdiction,thereisnolongeracommonumpiretowhomthecontroversycanbereferred.
TheStatemustofnecessityjudgeforitself,byvirtueofthatinherent,sovereignpowerandauthority,which,astothismatter,ithasneversurrenderedtoanyothertribunal.Itsdecision,whateveritmaybe,isbindinguponitselfanduponitsownpeople,andnofarther.
Agreatvarietyofcasesarepossible,someofwhicharenotunlikelytoarise,involvingthetrueconstructionoftheFederalConstitution,butwhichcouldnotpossiblybepresentedtothecourts,inaformproperfortheirdecision.Thefollowingareexamples:
Bythe4thsectionofthe4tharticleitisprovidedthat\"CongressshallguarantytoeveryStateintheUnionarepublicanformofgovernment.\"Whatisarepublicanformofgovernment,andhowshallthequestionbedecided?Initsverynature,itisapolitical,andnotajudicialquestion,anditisnoteasytoimaginebywhatcontrivanceitcouldbebroughtbeforeacourt.SupposeaStateshouldadoptaconstitutionnotrepublican,intheopinionofCongress,whatcoursewouldbepursued?
Congressmight,byresolution,determinethattheconstitutionwasnotrepublican,anddirecttheStatetoformanewone.AndsupposethattheStateshouldrefusetodoso,onthegroundthatithadalreadycompliedwiththerequisitionsoftheFederalConstitutioninthatrespect?CouldCongressdirectanissuetotrythequestionatthebaroftheSupremeCourt?Thiswould,indeed,beanoddwayofsettlingtherightsofnations,anddeterminingtheextentoftheirpowers!Besides,whowouldbepartiestotheissue?atwhosesuitshouldtheStatebesummonedtoappearandanswer?NotatthatoftheUnitedStates,becauseaStatecannotbesuedbytheUnitedStates,inafederalcourt;notatthatofanyotherState,norofanyindividualcitizen,becausetheyarenotconcernedinthequestion.
Itisobviousthatthecasedoesnotpresentpropersubjectmatterforjudicialinvestigation;andevenifitdid,thatnopartiescouldbefoundauthorizedtopresenttheissue.
Again,Congresshasauthority\"toprovidefororganizing,arminganddiscipliningthemilitia,andforgoverningsuchpartofthemasmaybeemployedintheserviceoftheUnitedStates;reservingtotheStates,respectively,theappointmentoftheofficersandtheauthorityoftrainingthemilitiaaccordingtothedisciplineprescribedbyCongress.\"SupposethatCongressshouldusurptherighttoappointthemilitiaofficers,ortheStateshouldinsistontrainingthemilitiaintheirownway,andnot\"accordingtothedisciplineprescribedbyCongress.\"HowcouldthismatterbebroughtbeforetheSupremeCourt?Andevenifproperlybroughtthere,howcoulditssentencebeexecuted?
Again,supposethatCongressshouldenactthatalltheslavesofthecountryshouldimmediatelybefree.Thisiscertainlynotimpossible,andIfearnotevenimprobable,althoughitwouldbethegrossestandmostpalpableviolationoftherightsoftheslaveholder.ThiswouldcertainlyproducethemostdirectconflictbetweentheStateandFederalGovernments.
Itwouldinvolveamerequestionofpoliticalpower?thequestionwhethertheactofCongressforbiddingslavery,orthelawsandConstitutionoftheStateallowingit,shouldprevail.Andyetitismanifestthatitpresentsnosubjectmatterproperforjudicialdecision,andthatthepartiestoitcouldnotbeconvenedbeforetheSupremeCourt.
Theseexamplesaresufficienttoshowthatthereisalargeclassof\"constitutionalcontroversies,\"whichcouldnotpossiblybebroughtunderthecognizanceofanyjudicialtribunal,andstilllessunderthatofthefederalcourts.Astothesecases,therefore,eachStatemust,ofnecessity,forthereasonsalreadystated,beitsown\"finaljudgeorinterpreter.\"
Theyinvolvethemerequestionofpoliticalpower,asbetweentheStateandFederalGovernments;andthefactthattheyareclearlywithheldfromthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt,goesfartoprovethattheStatesinframingtheConstitutiondidnotdesigntosubmittothatcourtanyquestionofthelikekind,inwhateverformorbetweenwhateverpartiesitmightarise,exceptsofaronlyasthepartiesthemselveswereconcerned.
JudgeStoryhimselfdoesnotcontendthattheSupremeCourtisthe\"finaljudgeorinterpreter\"inallcaseswhatsoever;he,ofcourse,admitsthatnocourtcandecideanyquestionwhichisnotsusceptibleofaproperformforjudicialenquiry.Buthecontendsthat,inallcasesofwhichtheSupremeCourtcantakecognizance,itsdecisionsarefinal,andabsolutelybindingandconclusiveinallrespects,toallpurposes,andagainsttheStatesandtheirpeople.Itisthissweepingconclusionwhichithasbeenmyobjecttodisprove.Icanseeinthefederalcourtsnothingmorethantheordinaryfunctionsofthejudiciaryineverycountry.Itistheirproperprovincetointerpretthelaws;buttheirdecisionsarenotbinding,exceptbetweenthepartieslitigantandtheirprivies.Sofarastheymayclaimtheforceofauthority,theyarenotconclusive,evenuponthosewhopronouncethem,andcertainlyarenotsobeyondthesphereoftheirowngovernment.AlthoughtheJudiciarymay,andfrequentlydo,enlargeorcontractthepowersoftheirowngovernments,asgenerallyunderstood,yettheycanneverenlargeorcontractthoseofothergovernments,forthesimplereasonthatothergovernmentsarenotboundbytheirdecisions.Andsoinourownsystems.
Thereisnocaseinwhichajudicialquestioncanarise,beforeafederalcourt,betweenaStateandtheFederalGovernment.Uponwhatprinciple,then,aretheStatesboundbythedecisionsofthefederaljudiciary?Uponnoprinciple,certainly,exceptthat,astocertainsubjects,theyhaveagreedtobesobound.ButthisagreementtheymadeintheircharacterofSovereignStates,notwiththeFederalGovernment,butwithoneanother.
AssovereignStates,theyalonearetodeterminethenatureandextentofthatagreement,and,ofcourse,theyaretodeterminewhetherornottheyhavegiventhefederalcourtsauthoritytobindtheminanygivencase.ThisprinciplehasfrequentlybeenassertedbytheStates,andalwayssuccessfully.24
Butthesemeretechnicalrules,uponwhichwehavehithertoconsideredthesubject,arealtogetherunworthyofitsimportance,andfarbeneathitsdignity.Sovereignnationsdonotasktheirjudgeswhataretheirrights,nordotheylimittheirpowersbyjudicialprecedents.Stilllessdotheyentrusttheseimportantsubjectstojudicialtribunalsnottheirown,andleastofall,tothetribunalsofthatpoweragainstwhichtheirownpowerisasserted.ItwouldhavebeenagrossinconsistencyintheStatesofourUniontodothis,sincetheyhaveshownineverypartoftheircompactwithoneanother,themostjealouscareoftheirseparatesovereigntyandindependence.Itistruetheyhaveagreedtobeboundbythedecisionsoffederaltribunalsincertainspecifiedcases,anditisnottobedoubtedthat,solongastheydesirethecontinuanceoftheirpresentunion,theywillfeelthemselvesbound,ineverycasewhichcomesplainlywithintheiragreement.ThereisnonecessitytocallintheaidoftheSupremeCourttoascertaintowhatsubjects,andhowfarthatagreementextends.Sofarasitisplain,itwillbestrictlyobserved,asnationalfaithandhonorrequire;thereisnootherguarantee.Sofarasitisnotplain,orsofarasitmaybethewillandpleasureofanyStatetodenyortoresistit,theutterimpotencyofcourtsofjusticetosettlethedifficultywillbemanifestedbeyondalldoubt.Theywillbeadmonishedoftheirresponsibilitytothepowerwhichcreatedthem.TheStatescreatedthem.TheyarebutanemanationofthesovereignpoweroftheStates,andcanneitherlimitnorcontrolthatpower.
Ordinarily,thejudiciaryaretheproperinterpretersofthepowersofgovernment,buttheyinterpretinsubordinationtothepowerwhichcreatedthem.Ingovernmentsestablishedbyanaggregatepeople,suchasarethoseoftheStates,apropercorrectiveisalwaysfoundinthepeoplethemselves.
Ifthejudicialinterpretationconfertoomuchortoolittlepoweronthegovernment,areadyremedyisfoundinanamendmentoftheConstitution.
Butinourfederalsystemtheeviliswithoutremedy,ifthefederalcourtsbeallowedtofixthelimitsoffederalpowerwithreferencetothoseoftheStates.ItwouldplaceeverythingintheStategovernments,excepttheirmereexistence,atthemercyofasingledepartmentoftheFederalGovernment.Themaxim,staredecisis,isnotalwaysadheredtobyourcourts;
theirowndecisionsarenotheldtobeabsolutelybindinguponthemselves.
Theymayestablisharighttodayandunsettleittomorrow.AdecisionoftheSupremeCourtmightarrestaStateinthefullexerciseofanimportantandnecessarypower,whichapreviousdecisionofthesamecourthadascertainedthatshepossessed.ThusthepowersoftheStategovernments,astomanyimportantobjects,mightbekeptindeterminateandconstantlyliabletochange,sothattheywouldlosetheirefficiency,andforfeitalltitletoconfidenceandrespect.Itistrue,thatinthiscase,too,thereisapossiblecorrectiveinthepowertoamendtheConstitution.ButthatpowerisnotwiththeaggrievedStatealone;itcouldbeexertedonlyinconnectionwithotherStates,whoseaidshemightnotbeabletocommand.
