Andevenifshecouldcommandit,theprocesswouldbetooslowtoaffordeffectualrelief.ItisimpossibletoimaginethatanyfreeandsovereignStateeverdesignedtosurrenderherpowerofselfprotectioninacaselikethis,orevermeanttoauthorizeanyotherpowertoreducehertoasituationsohelplessandcontemptible.25
Yielding,therefore,totheSupremeCourtallthejurisdictionandauthoritywhichproperlybelongstoit,wecannotsafelyorwiselyreposeinitthevasttrustofascertaining,definingorlimitingthesovereignpowersoftheStates.
Letusnowfollowtheauthorintheenquiry,bywhatrulesshalltheConstitutionbeinterpreted?Manyofthosewhichhehasgivenaremerelysuchasweapplytoeveryinstrument,andtheydonot,therefore,requireanyparticularexamination.Theprincipalone,andthatfromwhichhededucesmanyothersasconsequences,isthis:\"Itistobeconstruedasaframeorfundamentallawofgovernment,establishedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStates,accordingtotheirownfreepleasureandsovereignwill.Inthisrespect,itisinnowisedistinguishablefromtheconstitutionsoftheStategovernments.\"ThatourConstitutionis\"aframeofgovernment\"willscarcelybedeniedbyanyone,andthis,whetheritbeinitsnaturefederalorconsolidated.Itis,also,asineveryotherconstitutionofgovernment,\"afundamentallaw.\"Itistheacknowledgedbasisofallfederalpowerandauthority,thesolechartbywhichfederalofficersaretodirecttheircourse.Butallthisleavestheenquirystillopen,whatisthisfundamentallaw,whatisthecourseindicatedbythechartoffederalpower,andhowisittobeascertained?JudgeStoryseemstosupposethatafullanswertothisquestionmaybefoundinthefact,thatthisframeorfundamentallawofgovernmentwasestablishedby\"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,accordingtotheirfreepleasureandsovereignwill.\"Ifthefactwerereallyso,itwouldundoubtedlyexertanimportantinfluence,andwouldgofartojustifyhisconstructionoftheConstitution.Weherediscerntheusefulnessandnecessityofthathistoricalenquiry,whichhasjustbeenfinished.Fromthatenquiry,welearn,distinctlyandwithoutdoubt,thattheConstitutionwasnotestablishedby\"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,\"and,consequently,thatitdoesnotresemble,inthatrespect,theconstitutionsoftheStates.Thereisnosuchanalogybetweenthem,aswillpresentlybeshown,astorequirethattheyshouldbeconstruedbythesamerules.TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesistobeconsideredasacompactorconfederationbetweenfree,independentandsovereignStates,andistobeconstruedassuch,inallcaseswhereitslanguageisdoubtful.
Thisistheleadingandfundamentalrule,fromwhichthefollowingmaybededucedasconsequences.
Itistobeconstruedstrictly.JudgeStorysupposesthattheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesoughttoreceiveasfavorableaconstructionasthoseoftheStates;thatitistobeliberallyconstrued;thatdoubtfulwordsaretobetakenmoststronglyinfavorofthepowersoftheFederalGovernment;
andthatthereis\"nosolidobjectiontoimpliedpowers.\"Allthesearebutinferencesfromthegreatrulewhichhefirstlaiddown,towit,thattheConstitutionistobeconsideredasaframeofgovernment,establishedbythepeopleoftheUnitedStates.Asthatrulecannotapply,becausethefactonwhichitwasfoundedisnottrue,itwouldseemtofollow,asanecessaryconsequence,thattheinferencesdeducedfromitcannotbeallowed.Nevertheless,theyshallreceiveamoreparticularconsiderationunderthepresentenquiry.
Accordingtotheprinciplesofallourinstitutions,sovereigntydoesnotresideinanygovernmentwhatever,neitherStatenorfederal.Governmentisregardedmerelyastheagentofthosewhocreateit,andsubjectinallrespectstotheirwill.IntheStatesthesovereignpowerisinthepeopleoftheStatesrespectively;andthesovereignpoweroftheUnitedStateswould,forthesamereason,bein\"thepeopleoftheUnitedStates,\"
iftherewereanysuchpeople,knownasasinglenation,andtheframersoftheFederalGovernment.Wehavealreadyseen,however,thattherearenosuchpeople,inastrictpoliticalsense,andthatnosuchpeoplehadanyagencyintheformationofourConstitution,butthatitwasformedbytheStates,emphaticallyassuch.Itwouldbeabsurd,accordingtoallprinciplesreceivedandacknowledgedamongus,tosaythatthesovereignpowerisinoneparty,andthepowerwhichisinthegovernmentisinanother.
ThetruesovereigntyoftheUnitedStates,therefore,isintheStates,andnotinthepeopleoftheUnitedStates,norintheFederalGovernment.
Thatgovernmentisbuttheagentthroughwhomaportionofthissovereignpowerisexerted;possessingnosovereigntyitself,andexertingnopower,exceptsuchonlyasitsconstituentshaveconferredonit.Inascertainingwhatthesepowersare,itisobviouslyproperthatweshouldlookonlytothegrantfromwhichtheyarederived.Theagentcanclaimnothingforitself,andonitsownaccountTheConstitutionisacompact,andthepartiestoitareeachState,witheachandeveryotherState.TheFederalGovernmentisnotaparty,butisthemerecreatureoftheagreementbetweentheStatesasparties.EachStateisbothgrantorandgrantee,receivingfromeachandalltheotherStatespreciselywhat,initsturn,itconcedestoeachandallofthem.Therule,therefore,thatthewordsaretobetakenmoststronglyinfavorofthegrantee,cannotapply,because,aseachStateisbothgrantorandgrantee,itwouldgiveexactlyasmuchasitwouldtakeaway.Theonlymode,therefore,bywhichwemaybecertaintodonoinjusticetotheintentionsoftheparties,isbytakingtheirwordsasthetrueexponentsoftheirmeaning.
JudgeStorythinks,however,thatamoreliberalruleoughttobeadopted,inconstruingtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,because\"thegrantinuressolelyandexclusivelyforthebenefitofthegrantorhimself\";
andthereforehesupposesthat\"noonewoulddenytheproprietyofgivingtothewordsofthegrantabenignandliberalinterpretation.\"Admitthatitisso,anditwouldseemtofollowthat\"thebenefitofthegrantor\"
requiresthatweshouldtakefromhimaslittleaspossible,andthatan\"interpretationofthewordsofthegrant\"wouldnotbe\"benignandliberal\"
astohim,ifitdeprivedhimofanymoreofhisrightsandpowers,thanhisownwordsprovethatheintendedtorelinquish.Itisevidentthatthisremarkoftheauthorproceedsupontheleadingidea,thatthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesaretheonlypartytothecontract;anideawhich,wehavealreadyseen,canbynomeansbejustifiedorallowed.TheStatesareparties;eachagreeingwitheach,andalltherest,thatitwillexercise,throughacommonagent,preciselysomuchofitssovereignrightsandpowers,aswill,initsownopinion,bebeneficialtoitselfwhensoexercised.
Thegrant\"inurestothesoleandexclusivebenefitofthegrantor\";andwhobutthegrantorhimselfshalldeterminewhatbenefithehadinview,andhowfarthegrantshallextend,inordertosecureit?Thishehasdone,inthecasebeforeus,bytheverytermsofthegrant.Ifyouholdhimboundbyanythingbeyondthoseterms,youenableotherstodecidethismatterforhim,andmaythusvirtuallyabrogatehiscontract,andsubstituteanotherinitsplace.
Icertainlydonotmeantosay,thatinconstruingtheConstitution,weshouldatalltimesconfineourselvestoitsstrictletter.Thiswould,indeed,bestickinginthebark,totheworstpossiblepurpose.Manypowersaregrantedbythatinstrument,whicharenotincludedwithinitsexpressterms,literallytaken,butwhichare,nevertheless,withintheirobviousmeaning.ThestrictconstructionforwhichIcontend,appliestotheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitution;andthismayormaynotrequireastrictconstructionoftheirwords.ThereisnofairanalogyastothismatterbetweentheFederalConstitutionandthoseoftheStates,althoughtheauthorbroadlyassertsthattheyarenot\"distinguishableinthisrespect\";
andthiswillsufficientlyappearfromthefollowingconsiderations:
1.TheentiresovereigntyofeachStateisinthepeoplethereof.Whentheyformforthemselvesaconstitutionofgovernment,theypartwithnoportionoftheirsovereignty,butmerelydeterminewhatportionthereofshallliedormant,whatportiontheywillexercise,andinwhatmodesandbywhatagenciestheywillexerciseit.Thereisbutonepartytosuchagovernment,towit,thepeopleoftheState.Whateverpowertheirgovernmentmaypossess,itisstillthepowerofthepeople;andtheirsovereigntyremainsthesame.Sofar,therefore,thereis\"nosolidobjectiontoimpliedpowers\"inaStateconstitution;because,byemployingpowerinthegovernment,youtakenopowerfromthosewhomadethegovernment.
2.Asgovernmentistheagentandrepresentativeofthesovereignpowerofthepeople,thepresumptionis,thattheyintendtomakeittheagentandrepresentativeofalltheirpower.Ineveryframeoflimitedgovernment,thepeopledenytothemselvestheexerciseofsomeportionoftheirrightsandpowers,butthelargerportionneverliesthusdormant.Inthiscase,therefore,(viz.:ofagovernmentestablishedbyanaggregatepeople),thequestionnaturallyis,notwhatpowersaregranted,butwhataredenied;
andtheruleofstrictconstruction,ifappliedatall,shouldbeappliedonlytothepowersdenied.Thiswouldhavetheeffectofenlargingthepowersofgovernment,bylimitingtherestraintsimposedonit.
3.Asitisfairtopresumethatapeopleabsolutelysovereign,andhavinganunlimitedrighttogovernthemselvesastheyplease,wouldnotdenytothemselvestheexerciseofanypowernecessarytotheirprosperityandhappiness,weshouldadmitallfairandreasonableimplicationsinfavorofthegovernment,because,otherwise,somepowernecessarytothepublicweal,mightbedormantanduseless.
Intheserespects,thereisnojustanalogybetweentheStateconstitutionsandthatoftheUnitedStates.
Inthefirstplace,theConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisnotaframeofgovernmenttowhichthereisbutoneparty.TheStatesareparties,eachstipulatingandagreeingwitheachandalltherest.Theiragreementis,thatacertainportionofthatpowerwhicheachisauthorizedtoexercisewithinitsownlimitsshallbeexercisedbytheircommonagent,withinthelimitsofallofthem.Thisisnottheseparatepowerofeach,butthejointpowerofall.Inproportion,therefore,asyouincreasethepowersoftheFederalGovernment,younecessarilydetractfromtheseparatepowersoftheStates.Wearenottopresumethatasovereignpeoplemeantosurrenderanyoftheirpowers;stilllessshouldwepresumethattheymeantosurrenderthem,tobeexertedoverthemselvesbyadifferentsovereignty.Inthisrespect,then,everyreasonableimplicationisagainsttheFederalGovernment.
Inthesecondplace,theConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisnottheprimarysocialrelationofthosewhoformedit.TheStategovernmentswerealreadyorganized,andwereadequatetoallthepurposesoftheirmunicipalconcerns.TheFederalGovernmentwasestablishedonlyforsuchpurposesastheStategovernmentcouldnotanswer,towit:thecommonpurposesofalltheStates.Whether,therefore,thepowersofthatgovernmentbegreaterorless,thewholepoweroftheStates,(orsomuchthereofastheydesigntoexerciseatall),isrepresented,eitherintheFederalGovernmentorintheirown.Inthisrespect,therefore,thereisnonecessitytoimplypowerintheFederalGovernment.
Inthethirdplace,whateverpowertheStateshavenotdelegatedtotheFederalGovernment,theyhavereservedtothemselves.Everyusefulfacultyofgovernmentisfoundeitherintheoneortheother.WhatevertheFederalGovernmentcannotdoforalltheStates,eachStatecandoforitself,subjectonlytotherestraintsofitsownconstitution.Nopower,therefore,isdormantanduseless,exceptsofaronlyastheStatesvoluntarilydeclinetoexertit.Inthisrespect,also,thereisnonecessitytoimplypowerintheFederalGovernment.
Inalltheseparticulars,theFederalConstitutionisclearly\"distinguishablefromtheconstitutionsoftheStategovernments.\"Theviewsjustpresentedsupportthisobviousdistinction,thatintheStateconstitutionseverypowerisgrantedwhichisnotdenied;intheFederalConstitution,everypowerisdeniedwhichisnotgranted.Thereareyetotherviewsofthesubject,whichleadustothesameconclusion.
TheobjectsforwhichtheFederalGovernmentwas,established,arebynomeansequalinimportancetothoseoftheStateconstitutions.ItisdifficulttoimagineanynecessityforaFederalGovernmentatall,exceptwhatspringsfromtherelationoftheStatestoforeignnations.Aunionamongthemisundoubtedlyvaluableformanypurposes.Itrendersthemstrongerandmoreabletoresisttheirenemies;itattractstothemtherespectofothercountries,andgivesthemadvantagesintheformationofforeignconnections;itfacilitatesalltheoperationsofwar,ofcommerceandofforeigndiplomacy.Buttheseobjects,althoughhighlyimportant,arenotsoimportantasthosegreatrightswhicharesecuredtousbytheStateconstitutions.TheStatesmightsinglyprotectthemselves;singlyformtheirforeignconnections,andsinglyregulatetheircommerce,notsoeffectually,itistrue,buteffectuallyenoughtoaffordreasonablesecuritytotheirindependenceandgeneralprosperity.Inadditiontoallthis,werelyexclusivelyontheStategovernmentsforthesecurityofthegreatrightsoflife,libertyandproperty.Allthevaluableandinterestingrelationsofthesocialstatespringfromthem.Theygivevaliditytothemarriagetie;
theyprescribethelimitsofparentalauthority;theyenforcefilialdutyandobedience;theylimitthepowerofthemaster,andexacttheproperdutiesoftheservant.Theirpowerpervadesallranksofsociety,restrainingthestrong,protectingtheweak,succoringthepoor,andliftingupthefallenandhelpless.Theysecuretoallpersonsanimpartialadministrationofpublicjustice.Inallthedailybusinessoflife,wesetundertheprotectionandguidanceoftheStategovernments.Theyregulateandsecureourrightsofproperty;theyenforceourcontractsandpresideoverthepeaceandsafetyofourfiresides.Thereisnothingdeartoourfeelingsorvaluableinoursocialcondition,forwhichwearenotindebtedtotheirprotectingandbenignantaction.TakeawaytheFederalGovernmentaltogether,andstillwearefree,ourrightsarestillprotected,ourbusinessisstillregulated,andwestillenjoyalltheotheradvantagesandblessingsofestablishedandwell-organizedgovernment.ButifyoutakeawaytheStategovernments,whathaveyouleft?AFederalGovernment,whichcanneitherregulateyourindustry,secureyourproperty,norprotectyourperson!Surelytherecanbenojustreasonforstealing,byliberalconstructionsandimplications,fromthesebeneficentStategovernments,anyportionoftheirpower,inordertoconferitonanothergovernment,which,fromitsveryorganization,cannotpossiblyexertitforequallyusefulpurposes.
AstrictconstructionoftheConstitutionwillgivetotheFederalGovernmentallthepowerwhichitcanbeneficiallyexert,allthatisnecessaryforhertopossess,andallthatitsframerseverdesignedtoconferonit.
Totheseviewsofthesubjectwemayadd,thatthereisanaturalandnecessarytendencyintheFederalGovernmenttoencroachontherightsandpowersoftheStates.AstherepresentativeofalltheStates,itaffords,initsorganization,anopportunityforthesecombinations,bywhichamajorityoftheStatesmayoppresstheminority,againstthespiritoreventheletteroftheConstitution.ThereisnodangerthattheFederalGovernmentwilleverbetooweak.Itsmeansofaggrandizingitselfaresonumerous,anditstemptationstodosoaresostrong,thatthereisnottheleastnecessitytoimplyanynewpowerinitsfavor.TheStates,onthecontrary,havenomotivetoencroachontheFederalGovernment,andnopowertodoso,eveniftheydesiredit.Inorder,therefore,topreservethejustbalancebetweenthem,weshouldincline,ineverydoubtfulcase,infavoroftheStates;confidentthattheFederalGovernmenthasalwaystheinclination,andalwaysthemeans,tomaintainitselfinallitsjustpowers.
TheConstitutionitselfsuggeststhatitshouldbestrictlyandnotliberallyconstrued.Thetenthamendmentprovides,that\"thepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStates,norprohibited,totheStates,bytheConstitution,arereservedtotheStatesandthepeople.\"TherewasacorrespondingprovisionintheArticlesofConfederation,whichdoubtlesssuggestedthisamendment.
Itwasconsiderednecessary,inordertopreventthatlatitudeofconstructionwhichwascontendedforbyoneofthegreatpoliticalpartiesofthecountry,andmuchdreadedandstrenuouslyopposedbytheother.IntheArticlesofConfederationall\"rights,jurisdictionandpowers\"arereserved,exceptonlysuchasareexpresslydelegated:butintheConstitutiontheword\"expressly\"isomitted.JudgeStorybelieves,fromthisfact,thatitwastheintentionoftheframersofthetenthamendmenttoleave\"thequestion,whethertheparticularpowerwhichisthesubjectofcontest,hasbeendelegatedtoonegovernmentorprohibitedtotheother,todependuponafairconstructionofthewholeinstrument\";doubtlessintendingbytheword\"fair,\"aconstructionasliberalaswouldbe,appliedtoanyotherframeofgovernment.Thisargumentismuchreliedon,andiscertainlynotwithoutplausibility,butitlosesallitsforce,iftheomissioncanbeotherwisesatisfactorilyaccountedfor.TheConstitutionprovidesthatCongressshallhavepowertopassalllawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoeffectthevariouspowerswhichitgrants.Ifthisclauseconfersnoadditionalfacultyofanysort,itiswhollyuselessandoutofplace;thefactthatitisfoundintheConstitutionissufficientproofthatsomeeffectwasintendedtobegiventoit.Itwascontemplatedthat,inexecutingthepowersexpresslygranted,itmightbenecessarytoexertsomepowernotenumerated,andastowhichsomedoubtmight,forthatreason,beentertained.Forexample,thepowertoprovideanavyisnot,initself,thepowertobuildadrydock;but,asdrydocksarenecessaryandpropermeansforprovidinganavy,Congressshallhavepowertoauthorizetheconstructionofthem.Butiftheword\"expressly\"hadbeenusedinthetenthamendment,itwouldhavecreatedaveryrationalandstrongdoubtofthis.Therewouldhavebeen,atleast,anapparentrepugnancebetweenthetwoprovisionsoftheConstitution;notarealone,Iadmit,butstillsufficientlyprobabletogiverisetoembarrassingdoubtsanddisputes.
Hencethenecessityofomittingtheword\"expressly,\"inthetenthamendment.
ItleftfreefromdoubtandunaffectedthepowerofCongresstoprovidethenecessaryandpropermeansofexecutingthegrantedpowers,whileitdeniedtotheFederalGovernmenteverypowerwhichwasnotgranted.ThesameresultwasdoubtlessexpectedfromthisamendmentoftheConstitution,whichwasexpectedfromthecorrespondingprovisionintheArticlesofConfederation;andthedifferenceinthetermsemployedisbutthenecessaryconsequenceofthedifferenceinotherprovisionsofthetwosystems.
Strictlyspeaking,then,theConstitutionallowsnoimplicationinfavoroftheFederalGovernment,inanycasewhatever.Everypowerwhichitcanproperlyexertisagrantedpower.AlltheseareenumeratedintheConstitution,andnothingcanbeconstitutionallydone,beyondthatenumeration,unlessitbedoneasameansofexecutingsomeoneoftheenumeratedpowers.Thesemeansaregranted,notimplied;theyaregivenasthenecessaryincidentsofthepoweritself,or,moreproperlyspeaking,ascomponentpartsofit,becausethepowerwouldbeimperfect,nugatoryanduseless,withoutthem.Itistrue,thatinregardtotheseincidentalpowers,somediscretionmust,ofnecessity,beleftwiththegovernment.Butthereisatthesametime,apeculiarnecessitythatastrictconstructionshouldbeappliedtothem;becausethatistheprecisepointatwhichthegovernmentismostapttoencroach.Withoutsomestrict,definiteandfixedrulesuponthesubject,itwouldbeleftundernorestraint,exceptwhatisimposedbyitsownwisdom,integrityandgoodfaith.Inproportionasapowerisliabletobeabused,shouldweincreaseandstrengthenthechecksuponit.Andthisbringsustotheenquiry,whataretheseincidentalpowers,andbywhatrulesaretheytobeascertainedanddefined?
Theonlysourcefromwhichtheseincidentalpowers,arederivedisthatclauseoftheConstitutionwhichconfersonCongressthepower\"tomakealllawswhicharenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoexecutiontheforegoingpowers,andallotherpowersvestedbythisConstitutioninthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates,orinanydepartmentorofficerthereof.\"
ThetruecharacterofthisclausecannotbebettergiventhaninthewordsofJudgeStoryhimself:\"Itneitherenlargesanypowerspeciallygranted,norisitagrantofanynewpowertoCongress.Butitismerelyadeclaration,fortheremovalofalluncertainty,thatthemeansofcarryingintoexecution,thoseotherwisegranted,areincludedinthegrant.\"Hisgeneralreasoninguponthesubjectisverylucid,and,toacertainextent,correctandconvincing.
Hecontendsthattheword\"necessary\"\'isnottobetakeninitsrestrictedsense,asimportingabsoluteandindispensablenecessity,butistobeunderstoodinthesenseof\"convenience,\"\"useful,\"\"requisite\";asbeingsuchthat,withoutthem,\"thegrantwouldbenugatory.\"Thedangerouslatitudeimpliedbythisconstruction,hethinkssufficientlyrestrainedbytheadditionalword\"proper,\"whichimplies,thatthemeansshallbe\"constitutionalandbonafideappropriate,totheend.\"Inallthisheisundoubtedlycorrect;
buttheconclusionwhichhedrawsfromitcannotbesoreadilyadmitted.
\"If,\"sayshe,\"therebeanygeneralprinciplewhichisinherentintheverydefinitionofgovernment,andessentialtoeverystepoftheprogresstobemadebythatoftheUnitedStates,itisthateverypowervestedinthegovernmentis,initsnature,sovereign,andincludes,byforceoftheterm,arighttoemployallthemeansrequisite,andfairlyapplicabletotheattainmentoftheendofsuchpower,unlesstheyareexceptedintheConstitution,orareimmoral,orarecontrarytotheessentialobjectsofpoliticalsociety.\"Thisisbynomeansalegitimateconclusionfromhisownfairandforciblereasoning.Thedoctrinehereis,ineffect,thattheFederalGovernmentisabsolutelyunrestrictedintheselectionanduseofthemeansofexecutingitsownpowers,exceptonlysofarasthosemeansareexceptedintheConstitution.Whetherornottheyare\"requisite,\"
\"fairlyapplicabletotheattainmentoftheendofsuchpower,\"\"immoralorcontrarytotheessentialobjectsofpoliticalsociety,\"allthesearequestionswhichthegovernmentalonecandecide,and,ofcourse,astheirownjudgmentanddiscretionaretheironlyrule,theyareundernosortoflimitationorcontrolintheserespects.Thestandardsofpoliticalmorality,ofpublicconvenienceandnecessity,andofconformitytotheessentialobjectsofsociety,arequitetoofluctuatingandindeterminatetobereliedon,byafreepeople,aschecksuponthepowersoftheirrulers.
Theonlyrealrestriction,then,whichtheauthorproposesintheabovepassage,isthatwhichmaybefoundinthefact,thattheproposedmeansare\"excepted\"intheConstitution;andthisisdirectlycontrarytotheletterandspiritofthatinstrument.TheFederalGovernmentpossessesnopowerwhichisnot\"delegated\";\"thepowersnotdelegatedtotheUnitedStatesbytheConstitution,norprohibitedbyittotheStates,arereservedbytheStatesrespectively,ortothepeople.\"JudgeStory\'sideais,thateverythingisgrantedwhichisnotexcepted;whereas,thelanguageofthetenthamendmentisexpress,thateverythingisexceptedwhichisnotgranted.Iftheword\"excepted\"istobeunderstoodinthissense,theauthor\'sideaiscorrect;butthisdoesnotaccordwiththegeneralscopeofhisopinions,andreasoning.Heapproachesmuchnearertothetrueruleinthefollowingpassage.Lettheendbelegitimate;letitbewithinscopeoftheConstitution;andallmeanswhichareappropriate,whichareplainlyadaptedtotheend,andwhicharenotprohibited,butareconsistentwiththeletterandspiritoftheinstrument,areconstitutional.\"
Thewordsinitalicsareallimportant,inthematter,andgivetothepassageameaningwhollydifferentfromthatofthepassagefirstquoted.
JudgeStory\'serrorisequallygreat,andfarmoredangerous,insupposingthatthemeansofexecutingitspowersareconferredonthegovernment.
Thegeneralpropositionistrue,ashehasstatedit;butitisnottrueintheapplicationwhichhehasmadeofittoourgovernment.Heregardsthetenthamendmentasaltogetherunnecessary,andtellsus,inexpressterms,thatthepowersofthegovernmentwouldbeexactlythesamewithorwithoutit.Thisisagreatandobviousmistake.ThetenthamendmentwaswiselyincorporatedintotheConstitutionfortheexpresspurposeofdenyingtothegovernmentthatunboundeddiscretionintheselectionanduseofitsmeans,forwhichitcontends.ThepowertomakealllawsnecessaryandproperforcarryingintoeffectthegrantedpowersisconferredonCongressalone;itisexclusivelyalegislativepower.Sofar,therefore,asthegovernmentisconcerned,itderivesnopowerfromthisclause;andthesameistrueofitsseveraldepartments.Theyhavenodiscretionintheselectionofanyincidentalmeansofexecutingtheirseveraltrusts.
Iftheyneedtheuseofsuchmeans,theymustapplytoCongresstofurnishthem;anditisdiscretionarywiththatbodywhethertofurnishthemornot.AllthisisperfectlyclearfromtheverylanguageoftheConstitution,andtheproprietyofsuchaprovisionmustbeapparenttoeveryone.Ifpowercouldbeimpliedinfavorofsuchagovernmentasours,itwould,ifnothingwereaddtothecontrary,beimpliedinfavorofeverydepartmentandofficerthereof,totheexecutionofwhosedutiesitmightseemtobenecessary.Thiswouldbeawideextentofdiscretion,indeed;sowide,thatitwouldrenderallthelimitationsoftheConstitutionnugatoryanduseless.Itispreciselythisresultwhichwasintendedtobepreventedbytheclauseinquestion.TheStateswereunwillingtoentrustsuchadiscretioneithertothegovernment,ortotheseveraldepartmentsorofficersthereof.TheywerewillingtoconferitonCongressalone;onthelegislativedepartment,themoreimmediaterepresentativesoftheStatesandtheirpeople,whowouldbemostapttodischargethetrustproperly,becausetheyhadtheleasttemptationtoabuseit.Itisnottrue,then,asourauthorsupposes,or,atleast,itisnottrueofoursystem,that\"everypowerinthegovernmentis,initsnature,sovereign,andincludes,byforceoftheterm,arighttoemployallthemeansrequisite,andfairlyapplicabletotheattainmentoftheendsofsuchpower,unlesstheyareexceptedintheConstitution,orforbiddenbysomeconsiderationofpublicmorals,orbytheirunsuitablenesstotheproperobjectsofgovernment.\"
Inourgovernment,themeansareatthedisposalofonedepartmentonly,whichmayeithergrantorwithholdthematitspleasure.
What,than,aretheproperlimitationsofthepowerofCongressinthisrespect?Thishasalwaysbeenasubjectofgreatdifficulty,andofmarkeddifferenceofopinion,amongpoliticians.IcannothopethatIshallbeableperfectlytodisembarrassit;butIthink,nevertheless,thatthereareafewplainrules,theproprietyofwhichallwilladmit,andwhichmaymateriallyaidusintheformationofasoundopinionuponthesubject.
Inthefirstplace,then,itistobeobservedthatCongresshasnopowerunderthisclauseoftheConstitution,excepttoprovidethemeansofexecutingthegrantedpowers.Itisnotenoughthatthemeansadoptedaresufficienttothatandtheymustbeadoptedbonafide,withaviewtoaccomplishit.Congresshasnorighttousefortheaccomplishmentofonepurpose,meansostensiblyprovidedforanothertodosowouldbeapositivefraud,andamanifestusurpation;for,ifthepurposebelawful,itmaybeaccomplishedbyitsownappropriatemeans,andifitbeunlawful,itshouldnotbeaccomplishedatall.Itisquiteobviousthat,withoutthischeck,Congressmay,byindirection,accomplishalmostanyforbiddenobject;foramongthegreatvarietyofmeansadaptedtocarryoutthegrantedpowers,somemaybefoundequallycalculatedtoeffect,eitherbytheirdirectorindirectaction,purposesofawhollydifferentcharacterandtendency.Itis,therefore,oftheutmostimportancetothepreservationofthetrueprinciplesoftheConstitution,thatstrictfaithshouldbekeptuponthispoint.
Inthesecondplace,themeansprovidedmustnotonlybe\"necessary,\"
buttheymustalsobe\"proper.\"Iftheword\"necessary\"stoodalone,itwouldbesusceptibleofaveryextendedmeaning,andwouldprobablybeconsideredasembracingpowerswhichitneverwasinthecontemplationoftheframersoftheConstitutiontogrant.Itwasnecessary,then,tolimitandrestrainitbysomeotherword,andtheword\"proper\"wasveryhappilyselected.Thiswordrequiresthatthemeansselectedshallbestrictlyconstitutional.Inascertainingthis,wemusthaveregardnotonlytotheexpressprovisionsoftheConstitution,butalsotothegeneralnatureandcharacterofourinstitutions.Oursisafreegovernment,whichimpliesthatitisalsoanequalgovernment;itthereforeauthorizestheemploymentofnomeansfortheexecutionofitspowers,exceptsuchasareconsistentwiththespiritoflibertyandequality.Oursisaconfederatedgovernment;
itthereforeauthorizesnomeanswhichareinconsistentwiththedistinctsovereigntyoftheStates,theconfederatingpowers.Oursisagovernmentof\"delegated\"powers,limitedandspecificallyenumerated;itthereforeauthorizesnomeanswhichinvolve,intheuseofthem,anydistinctsubstantivepower,notgranted.Thissinglerule,iffairlyandhonestlyobserved,willgofartoremovemanyseriousdifficultiesuponthispoint,andwilldeprivetheFederalGovernmentofmanyimportantpowerswhichithashithertoexercised,andwhicharestillclaimedforit,byJudgeStory,andthewholepoliticalworldtowhichhebelongs.Theproprietyand,indeed,theabsolutenecessityoftherule,appeartometobeobvious.Ifpowersnotgrantedmightbeusedasmeansofexecutingthegrantedpowers,itismanifestthatnopowerwhatevercouldbeconsideredasdenied.Itisnotenoughthatthereisnoapparentunconstitutionalityintheuseofsuchmeans,intheparticularcase.Iftheyinvolveaprinciplewhichwillauthorizetheuseofungrantedpowersinanyothercase,theyareforbiddenbytheConstitution.Toillustratethisideabyanexample:CongresshaspowertoregulatecommerceamongtheseveralStates.Thisissupposedbysometogivethempowertoopenchannelsofcommerce,bymakingroads,cuttingcanalsetc.,throughtheterritoriesoftheStates.Butthisisasubstantivepowerinitself,notgrantedtotheUnitedStates,butreservedtotheStatesrespectively,andthereforeisnotallowedasameansofregulatingcommerceamongtheStates.Letussuppose,however,thattheopeningofroadsandcuttingofcanalsaretheverybestmeansoffacilitatingandregulatingcommerceamongtheStates,andthatthereisnothinginthelanguageoftheConstitutiontoforbidit;wearestilltoinquirewhatfartherpowerswouldbenecessarilyimplied,asincidentsofthis.WefindthatthepowertoopenaroadthroughaState,impliesthepowertokeepitinrepair:toimposefinesandpenaltiesonthosewhoinjureit,and,consequently,toenforcethosefinesandpenaltiesbytheexerciseofajurisdictionoverit.Wefind,also,thatthepowertomakesucharoad,impliesthepowertolocateit;and,asthereisnothingtocontrolthediscretionofCongressinthisrespect,thereisnothingtoforbidthemtolocatetheirroad,uponthebedofaStatecanal,oralongthewholecourseofaStateturnpike.TheeffectofthiswouldbetotransfertotheUnitedStates,againsttheconsentoftheState,andwithoutcompensation,improvementsmadebytheStatewithinherownterritoryandatherownexpense.Nay,thesupremacyclaimedforthepowersofCongressinthisrespectwould,uponthesameprinciple,authorizethemtorunaroadthroughthecentreofaStatecapital,ortocoverhalfherterritorywithroadsandcanals,overwhichtheStatecouldexertneitherjurisdictionnorcontrol.
Theimprovementsofindividuals,too,andofcorporatebodiesmadeundertheauthorityofStatelaws,wouldthusbeheldatthemercyoftheUnitedStates.Whenwesee,then,thatthemeansofregulatingcommerceamongtheStateswouldnecessarilyimplythesevastandforbiddenpowers,weshouldunhesitatinglyrejectthemasunconstitutional.Thissingleinstance,givenbywayofexampleandillustration,presentsarulewhich,ifstrictlyadheredtoinallanalogouscases,wouldgofartoremovethedifficulties,andtopreventthecontests,whichsooftenariseonthispartoftheConstitution.
Thesefewsimplerulesare,intheirnature,technical,andmayatalltimesbeeasilyapplied,ifCongresswillobservegoodfaithintheexerciseofitspowers.Thereisanotherofamoreenlargedandliberalcharacter,whichtheword\"proper\"suggests,andwhich,ifappliedwithsoundjudgment,perfectintegrityandimpartialjustice,willrenderallotherscomparativelyunnecessary.ItexactsofCongressanextendedandfairviewoftherelationsofalltheStates,andastrictlyimpartialregardtotheirrespectiverightsandinterests.Althoughthedirectactionofagrantedpower,bythemeansalsograntedintheConstitution,maybebothunequalandunjust,thosemeanswould,nevertheless,beperfectlyconstitutional.Suchinjusticeandinequalitywouldbebutthenecessaryconsequenceofthatimperfection,whichcharacterizeseveryhumaninstitution,andtowhichthosewhoundertaketoproscribespecificrulestothemselvesareboundtosubmit,Butwhen,Congressarecalledontoprescribenewmeansofexecutingagrantedpower,noneare\"proper,\"andthereforenoneareconstitutionalwhichoperateunequallyandunjustlyamongtheStatesorthepeople.Itintruethatperfectandexactequalityinthisrespectisnottobeexpected;butanearapproachtoitwillalwaysbemadebyawiseandfairlegislation.
Greatandobviousinjusticeandinequalitymayatalltimesbeavoided.
No\"means\"whichinvolvetheseconsequencescanpossiblybeconsidered\"proper\";eitherinamoralorinaconstitutionalsense.Itrequiresnohighintellectualfacultytoapplythisrule;simpleintegrityisallthatisrequired.
IhavenotthoughtitnecessarytofollowtheauthorthroughhisextendedexaminationofwhathetermstheincidentalpowersofCongress,arisingundertheclauseoftheConstitutionweareexamining.Itwouldbeindeedanendlesstasktodoso;forIamunabletoperceivethatheproposesanylimittothematall.Indeed,hetellsusinsomanywords,that\"uponthewhole,theresultofthemostcarefulexaminationofthisclauseis,thatifitdoesnotenlarge,itcannotbeconstruedtorestrainthepowersofCongress,orimpairtherightofthelegislaturetouseitsbestjudgmentintheselectionofmeasurestocarryintoexecutiontheconstitutionalpowersofthenationalgovernment.\"Thisis,indeed,asweepofauthority,boundlessandunrestricted.The\"bestjudgment\"ofCongressistheonlylimitproposedtoitspowers,whilstthereisnothingtocontrolthatjudgment,nortocorrectitserrors.Governmentisabandonedemphaticallytoitsowndiscretion;forevenifacorrectivebesupposedtoexistwiththepeople,thatcorrectivecanneverbeappliedinbehalfofanoppressedminority.AretheruleswhichIhaveproposedindeednothing?Isnoeffectwhatevertobegiventothisword\"proper,\"inthisclauseoftheConstitution?
CanJudgeStorypossiblyberightinsupposingthattheConstitutionwouldbethesamewithoutitaswithit;andthattheonlyobjectofinsertingitwas\"thedesiretoremoveallpossibledoubtrespectingtherighttolegislateonthevastmassofincidentalpowerswhichmustbeinvolvedintheConstitution,ifthatinstrumentbenotasplendidpageant,oradelusivephantomofsovereignty?\"Itwas,indeed,theobjectoftheframersoftheConstitution\"toremoveallpossibledoubt\"fromthissubject.Theydesiredneitherasplendidpageantnorasplendidgovernment.Theyknewthatwithoutthisrestrictionourswouldbeboth;andaspowerfulassplendid.
Theydidnotdesignthatanypowerwithwhichtheythoughtpropertoclotheitshouldbeinoperativeforwantofmeanstocarryitintoexecution;
buttheyneverdesignedtogiveittheboundlessfieldofitsownmerewill,fortheselectionofthosemeans.Havingspecificallyenumerateditspowers,asfaraswaspracticable,theyneverdesignedtoinvolvethemselvesintheabsurdityofremoving,byasingleclause,everyrestrictionwhichtheyhadpreviouslyimposed.Theymeanttoassuretheiragentthat,whilenoneofthepowerswithwhichtheyhadthoughtpropertoclotheitshouldbenugatory,noneofthemshouldbeexecutedbyanymeanswhichwerenotboth\"necessary\"and\"proper.\"
Theloversofastrongconsolidatedgovernmenthavelaboredstrenuously,andIfearwithtoomuchsuccess,toremoveeveryavailablerestrictionuponthepowersofCongress.ThetendencyoftheirprinciplesistoestablishthatlegislativeomnipotencewhichisthefundamentalprincipleoftheBritishConstitution,andwhichrenderseveryformofwrittenconstitutionidleanduseless.Theysufferthemselvestobetoomuchattractedbythesplendorsofagreatcentralpower.Dazzledbythesesplendors,theylosesightofthemoreuseful,yetlessostentatiouspurposesoftheStategovernments,andseemtobeunconsciousthat,inbuildingupthishugetempleoffederalpower,theynecessarilydestroythoselesspretendingstructuresfromwhichalonetheyderiveshelter,protectionandsafety.Thisistheignisfatuuswhichhassooftendeceivednations,andbetrayedthemintothesloughofdespotism.Onallsuch,theimpressivewarningofPatrickHenry,drawnfromthelessonsofallexperience,wouldbeutterlylost:
