1。Twodefinitionsofpsychologyhavebeenthemostprominentinthehistoryofthisscience。Accordingtoone，psychologyisthe“scienceofmind“，psychicalprocessesbeingregardedasphenomenafrom。whichitispossibletoinferthenatureofanunderlyingmetaphysicalmind；substance。
Accordingtotheother，psychologyisthe“scienceofinnerexperience“；
psychicalprocessesareherelookeduponasbelongingtoaspecificformofexperience，whichisreadilydistinguishedbythefactthatitscontentsareknownthrough“introspection“，orthroughthe“innersense“asitiscalledifoneusesthephrasephrasewhichhasbeenemployedtodistinguishintrospectionfromsense-perceptionthroughtheoutersenses。
Neitherofthesedefinitions，however，issatisfactorytothepsychologyoftoday。Thefirstormetaphysicaldefinitionbelongstoaperiodofdevelopmentthatlastedlongerinthissciencethaninothers。Butishere，too，foreverleftbehind，sincepsychologyhasdevelopedintoanempiricaldiscipline，operatingwithmethodsofitsown；andsincethe“mentalsciences“havegainedrecognitionasagreatdepartmentofscientificinvestigation，distinctfromthespherethenaturalsciences，andrequiringasageneralgroundworkanindependentpsychology，freefromallmetaphysicaltheories。
[p。2]Thesecondorempiricaldefinition，whichseesinpsychologya“scienceofinnerexperience“，isinadequatebecauseitmaygiverisetothemisunderstandingthatpsychologyhastodowithobjectstotallydifferentfromtheobjectsofsocalled“outerexperience“。Itis，indeed，truethattherearecertaincontentsofexperiencewhichbelonginthesphereofpsychologicalinvestigation，andarenottobefoundamongtheobjectsandprocessesstudiedbynaturalscience；suchareourfeelings，emotions，anddecisions。Ontheotherhand，thereisnotasinglenaturalphenomenonthatmaynot，fromadifferentpointofview，becomeanobjectofpsychology。Astone，aplant，atone，arayoflight，are，whentreatedasnaturalphenomena，objectsofmineralogy，botany，physics，etc。Insofar，however，astheyareatthesametimeideas，theyareobjectsofpsychology，forpsychologyseekstoaccountforthegenesisoftheseideas，andfortheirrelations，bothtootherideasandtothosepsychicalprocesses，suchasfeelings，volitions，etc。，whicharenotreferredtoexternalobjects。Thereisthen，nosuchthingasan“innersense“whichcanberegardedasanorganofintrospection，andasdistinctfromtheoutersenses，ororgansofobjectiveperception。Theideasofwhichpsychologyseekstoinvestigatetheattributes，areidenticalwiththoseuponwhichnaturalscienceisbased；whilethesubjectiveactivitiesoffeeling，emotion，andvolition，whichareneglectedinnaturalscience，arenotknownthroughspecialorgansbutaredirectlyandinseparablyconnectedwiththeidesreferredtoexternalobjects。
2。Itfollows，then，thattheexpressionsouterandinnerexperiencedonotindicatedifferentobjects，butdifferentpointsofviewfromwhichwetakeuptheconsiderationandscientifictreatmentofaunitaryexperience。Wearenaturallyledtothesepointsofview，becauseeveryconcreteex-[p。3]perienceimmediatelydividesintotwofactors:intoacontentpresentedtous，andourapprehensionofthiscontent。
Wecallthefirstofthesefactorsobjectsofexperience，thesecond，experiencingsubject。Thisdivisionindicatestwodirectionsforthetreatmentofexperience。Oneisthatofthenaturalsciences，whichconcernthemselveswiththeobjectsofexperience，thoughtofasindependentofthesubject。Theotheristhatofpsychology，whichinvestigatesthewholecontentofexperienceinitsrelationstothesubjectandalsoinregardtotheattributeswhichthiscontentderivesdirectlyfromthesubject。Thepointofviewofnaturalsciencemay，accordingly，bedesignatedasthatofmediateexperience，sinceitispossibleonlyafterabstractingfromthesubjectivefactorpresentinallactualexperience；
thepointofviewofpsychology，ontheotherhand，maybedesignatedasthatofimmediateexperience，sinceitpurposelydoesawaywiththisabstractionandallitsconsequences。
3。Theassignmentofthisproblemtopsychology，makingitageneral，empiricalsciencecoordinatewiththenaturalsciences，andsupplementarytothem，isjustifiedbythemethodofallthementalsciences，forwhichpsychologyfurnishesthebasis。Allofthesesciences，philology，historyandpoliticalandsocialscience，haveastheirsubject；matter，immediateexperienceasdeterminedbytheinteractionofobjectswithknowingandactingsubjects。Noneofthementalsciencesemploystheabstractionsandhypotheticalsupplementaryconceptsofnaturalscience；quiteotherwise，theyallacceptideasandtheaccompanyingsubjectiveactivitiesasimmediatereality。Theeffortisthenmadetoexplainthesinglecomponentsofthisrealitythroughtheirmutualinterconnections。Thismethodofpsychologicalinterpretationemployedineachofthespecialmentalsciences，mustalsobethemodeofprocedureinpsychologyitself，beingthemethodrequiredbythesubject-matterofpsychology，theimmediaterealityofexperience。
[p。4]Sincenaturalscienceinvestigatesthecontentofexperienceafterabstractingfromtheexperiencingsubject，itsproblemisusuallystatedasthatofacquiring“knowledgeoftheouterworld“。Bytheexpressionouterworldismeantthesumtotalofalltheobjectspresentedinexperience。
Theproblemofpsychologyhassometimesbeencorrespondinglydefinedas“selfknowledgeofthesubject“。Thisdefinitionis，however，inadequate，becausetheinteractionofthesubjectwiththeouterworldandwithothersimilarsubjectsisjustasmuchapartoftheproblemofpsychologyasaretheattributesofthesinglesubject。Furthermore，theexpressioncaneasilybeinterpretedtomeanthattheouterworldandthesubjectareseparatecomponentsofexperience，or，atleast，componentswhichcanbedistinguishedasindependentcontentsofexperience，whereas，intruth，outerexperienceisalwaysconnectedwiththeapprehendingandknowingfunctionsofthesubject，andinnerexperiencealwayscontainsideasfromtheouterworldasindispensablecomponents。Thisinterconnectionisthenecessaryresultofthefactthatinrealityexperienceisnotamerejuxtapositionofdifferentelements，butasingleorganizedwholewhichrequiresineachofitscomponentsthesubjectwhichapprehendsthecontent，andtheobjectswhicharepresentedascontent。Forthisreasonnaturalsciencecannotabstractfromtheknowingsubjectentirely，butonlyfromthoseattributesofthesubjectwhicheitherdisappearentirelywhenweremovethesubjectinthought，as，forexample，thefeelings，orfromthoseattributeswhichmustberegardedonthegroundofphysicalresearchesasbelongingtothesubject，as，forexample，thequalitiesofsensations。Psychology，onthecontrary，hasasitssubjectoftreatmentthetotal，contentof，experienceinitsimmediatecharacter。
Theonlyground，then，forthedivisionbetweennatural，scienceontheonehand，andpsychologyandthementalsciencesontheother，istobefoundinthefactthatallinthefactthatallexperiencecontainsasitsfactorsacontentobjectivelypresented，andanexperiencingsubject。
Still，itisbynomeansnecessarythatlogicaldefinitionsofthesetwofactorsshouldprecedetheseparationofthesciencesfromoneanother，foritisobviousthatsuchdefinitionsarepossibleonlyaftertheyhaveabasisintheinvestigationsofnaturalscienceandofpsychology。Allthatitis[p。5]necessarytopresupposefromthefirstistheconsciousnesswhichaccompaniesallexperience，thatinthisexperienceobjectsarebeingpresentedtoasubject。Therecanbenoassumptionknowledgeoftheconditionsuponwhichthedistinctionisbased，orofthedefinitecharacteristicsbywhichonefactoristobedistinguishedfromtheother。Eventheuseofthetermsobjectandsubjectinthisconnectionmustberegardedastheapplicationtothefirststageofexperience，ofdistinctionswhicharereachedonlythroughdevelopedlogicalreflection。
Theformsofinterpretationinnaturalscienceandpsychologyaresupplementary，notonlyinthesensethatthefirstconsidersobjectsafterabstracting，asfaraspossible，fromthesubject，whilethesecondhastodowiththepartwhichthesubjectplaysintheriseofexperience；buttheyarealsosupplementaryinthesensethateachtakesadifferentpointofviewinconsideringanysinglecontentofexperience。Naturalscienceseekstodiscoverthenatureofobjectswithoutreferencetothesubject。Theknowledgethatitproducesisthereforemediateorconceptual。Inplaceoftheimmediateobjectsofexperience，itsetsconceptsgainedfromtheseobjectsbyabstractingfromthesubjectivecomponentsofourideas。Thisabstractionmakesitnecessarycontinuallytosupplementrealitywithhypotheticalelements。Scientificanalysisshowsthatmanycomponentsofexperience——as，forexample，sensations；-aresubjectiveeffectsofobjectiveprocesses。Theseobjectiveprocessesintheirobjectivecharacter，independentofthesubject，canthereforeneverbeapartofexperience。Sciencemakesupforthislackofdirectcontactwiththeobjectiveprocesses，byformingsupplementaryhypotheticalconceptsoftheobjectivepropertiesofmatter。
Psychology，ontheotherhand，investigatesthecontentsofexperienceintheircompleteandactualform，boththeideasthatarereferredtoobjects，andalsothesubjectiveprocesseswhichclusterabouttheseideas。
Theknowledgethusgainedinpsychologyis，therefore，immediateandperceptual，——perceptualinthebroadsenseoftheterminwhich，notonlysense；perceptions，butallconcreterealityisdistinguishedfromallthatisabstractandconceptualinthought。Psychologycanexhibittheinterconnectionofthecontentsofexperience，astheseinterconnectionsareactuallypresentedtothesubject，onlybyavoidingentirelytheabstractionsandsupplementaryconceptsofnaturalscience。
Thus，whilenaturalscienceandpsychologyare[p。6]bothempiricalsciencesinthesensethattheyaimtoexplainthecontentsofexperience，thoughfromdifferentpointsofview，itisobviousthat，inconsequenceofthespecialcharacterofitsproblem，psychologymustberecognizedasthemorestrictlyempirical。
ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——Wundt(1897)Section2OutlinesofPsychologyWilhelmMaxWundt(1897)TranslatedbyCharlesHubbardJudd(1897)
INTRODUCTION2。GENERALTHEORIESOFPSYCHOLOGY
1……Theviewthatpsychologyisanempiricalsciencewhichdeals，notwithalimitedgroupofspecificcontentsofexperience，butwiththeimmediatecontentsofallexperience，isofrecentorigin。Itencounterseveninthescienceoftodayhostileviews，whicharetobelookedupon，ingeneral，asthesurvivalsofearlierstagesofdevelopment，andwhichareinturnarrayedagainstoneanotheraccordingtotheirattitudesonthequestionoftherelationsofpsychologytophilosophyandtotheothersciences。
Onthebasisofthetwodefinitionsmentionedabove(sec。1，1)asbeingthemostwidelyaccepted，twochiefformsofpsychologymaybedistinguished:metaphysicalpsychologyandempiricalpsychology。Eachisfurtherdividedintoanumberofspecialtendencies。
Metaphysicalpsychologygenerallyvaluesverylittletheempiricalanalysisandcausalinterpretationofpsychicalprocesses。Regardingpsychologyasapartofphilosophicalmetaphysics，thechiefeffortofsuchpsychologyisdirectedtowardthediscoveryofadefinitionofthe“natureofmind“
whichshallbeinaccordwiththemetaphysicalsystemtowhichtheparticularformofpsychologybelongs。Afterametaphysicalconceptofmindhasthusbeenestablished，theattemptismadetodeducefromittheactualcontentofpsychicalexperience。Thecharacteristicwhichdistinguishesmetaphysicalpsychologyfromempiricalpsychology，then，isitsattempttodeducepsychicalprocesses，notfromotherpsychicalprocesses，butfromsome[p。7]substratumentirelyunliketheseprocessesthemselves:eitherfromthemanifestationsofaspecialmind；substance，orfromtheattributesandprocessesofmatter。Atthispointmetaphysicalpsychologybranchesoffintwodirections。Spiritualisticpsychologyconsiderspsychicalthemanifestationsofaspecificmind；substance，whichisregardedeitherasessentiallydifferentformmatter(dualism)，orasrelatedinnaturetomatter(monismormonadalogy)。Thefundamentalmetaphysicaldoctrineofspiritualisticpsychologyistheassumptionofthesupersensiblenatureofmind，andinconnectionwiththis，theassumptionofitsimmortality。Sometimesthefurthernotionofpreexistenceisalsoadded。Materialisticpsychology，ontheotherhandreferspsychicalprocessestothesamematerialsubstratumasthatwhichnaturalscienceemploysforthehypotheticalexplanationofnaturalphenomena。
Accordingtothisview，psychicalprocesses，likephysicalvitalprocesses，areconnectedwithcertainorganizationsofmaterialparticleswhichareformedduringthelifeoftheindividualandbrokenupattheendofthatlife。Themetaphysicalcharacterofthisformofpsychologyisdeterminedbyitsdenialthatthemindissupersensibleinitsnatureasisassertedbyspiritualisticpsychology。Boththeorieshavethisincommon，thattheyseeknottointerpretpsychicalexperiencefromexperienceitself，buttoderiveitfrompresuppositionsabouthypotheticalprocessesinametaphysicalsubstratum。
2。Fromthestrifethatfollowedtheseattemptsatmetaphysicalexplanation，empiricalpsychologyarose。Whereverempiricalpsychologyisconsistentlycarriedout，itstriveseithertoarrangepsychicalprocessesundergeneralconceptsderiveddirectlyfromtheinterconnectionoftheseprocessesthemselves，oritbeginswithcertain，asarulesimplerprocesses，andthenexplainsthemorecomplicatedastheresultoftheinteractionofthosewithwhichitstarted。Theremaybevariousfun-[p。8]damentalprinciplesforsuchanempiricalinterpretation，andthusitbecomespossibletodistinguishseveralvarietiesofempiricalpsychology。Ingeneral，thesemaybeclassifiedaccordingtotwoprinciplesofdivision。Thefirsthasreferencetotherelationofinnerandouterexperienceandtotheattitudewhichthetwoempiricalsciences，naturalscienceandpsychology，taketowardeachother。Thesecondhadreferencetothefactsorconceptsderivedfromthesefacts，whichareusedfortheinterpretationofpsychicalprocesses。
Everysystemofempiricalpsychologytakesitsplaceunderbothoftheseprinciplesofclassification。
3。Onthegeneralquestionastothenatureofpsychicalexperiencethetwoviewsalreadymentioned。(sec。1)onaccountoftheirdecisivesignificanceindeterminingtheproblemofpsychology:psychologyofhteinnersense，andpsychologyasthescienceofimmediateexperience。
Thefirsttreatspsychicalprocessesascontentsofasphereofexperiencecoordinatewiththesphereofexperienceswhich，derivedthroughtheoutersenses，isassignedastheprovinceofthenaturalsciences，butthoughcoordinateistotallydifferentfromit。Thesecondrecognizesnorealdifferencebetweeninnerandouterexperience，butfindsthedistinctiononlyinthedifferentpointsofviewfromwhichunitaryexperienceisconsideredinthetwocases。
Thefirstofthesetwovarietiesofempiricalpsychologyistheolder。
Itaroseprimarilythroughtheefforttoestablishtheindependenceofpsychicalobservationinoppositiontotheencroachmentsofnaturalphilosophy。
Inthuscoordinatingnaturalscienceandpsychology，itseesthejustificationfortheequalrecognitionofbothspheresofscienceinthefactthattheyhaveentirelydifferentobjectsandmodesofperceivingtheseobjects。
Thisviewhasinfluencedempiricalpsychologyintwoways。First，itfavoredtheopinionthatpsychologyshouldemployempirical[p。9]methods，butthatthesemethods，likepsychologicalexperience，shouldbefundamentallydifferentfromthoseofnaturalscience。Secondly，itgaverisetothenecessityofshowingsomeconnectionorotherbetweenthesetwokindsofexperience，whichweresupposedtobedifferent。Inregardtothefirstdemand，itwaschieflythepsychologyoftheinnersensethatdevelopedthemethodofpureintrospection(sec。3，2)。Inattemptingtosolvethesecondproblem，thispsychologywasnecessarilydrivenbacktoametaphysicalbasis，becauseofitsassumptionofadifferencebetweenthephysicalandthepsychicalcontentsofexperience。For，fromtheverynatureofthecase，itisimpossible，toaccountfortherelationsofinnertoouterexperience，ortheso；called“interactionbetweenbodyandmind“，fromthepositionheretaken，exceptthroughmetaphysicalpresuppositions。Thesepresuppositionsmustthen，inturn，affectthepsychologicalinvestigationitselfinsuchawayastoresultintheimportationofmetaphysicalhypothesesintoit。
4。Essentiallydistinctfromthepsychologyoftheinnersenseistheformofpsychologywhichdefinesitselfas“thescienceofimmediateexperience“。
Regarding，asitdoes，outerandinnerexperience，notasdifferentpartsofexperience，butasdifferentwaysoflookingatoneandthesameexperience，thisformofpsychologycannotadmitanyfundamentaldifferencebetweenthemethodsofpsychologyandthoseofnaturalscience。Ithas，therefore，soughtabovealltocultivateexperimentalmethodswhichshallleadtojustsuchanexactanalysisofpsychicalprocessesasthatwhichtheexplanatorynaturalsciencesundertakeinthecaseofnaturalphenomena，theonlydifferencesbeingthosewhicharisefromthediversepointsofview。Itholds，also，thatthespecialmentalscienceswhichhavetodowithconcretementalprocessesandcreations，standonthesamebasisofascientificconsiderationoftheimmediatecontentsof[p。10]experienceandoftheirrelationstoactingsubjects。Itfollows，then，thatpsychologicalanalysisofthemostgeneralmentalproducts，suchaslanguage，mythologicalideas，andlawsofcustom，istoberegardedasanaidtotheunderstandingofallthemorecomplicatedpsychicalprocesses。Initsmethods，accordingly，thisformofpsychologystandsincloserelationtoothersciences:asexperimentalpsychology，tothenaturalsciences；associalpsychology，tothespecialmentalsciences。
Finally，fromthispointofview，thequestionoftherelationbetweenpsychicalandphysicalobjectsdisappearsentirely。Theyarenotdifferentobjectsatall，butoneandthesamecontentofexperience，lookedatinonecase——thatofthenaturalsciences——afterabstractingfromthesubject，intheother——thatofpsychology——intheirimmediatecharacterandcompleterelationtothesubject。Allmetaphysicalhypothesesastotherelationofpsychicalandphysicalobjectsare，whenviewedfromthisposition，attemptstosolveaproblemwhichneverwouldhaveexistedifthecasehadbeencorrectlystated。Thoughpsychologymustthendispensewithmetaphysicalsupplementaryhypothesesinregardtotheinterconnectionofpsychicalprocesses，becausetheseprocessesaretheimmediatecontentsofexperience，stillanothermethodofprocedure，however，isopensinceinnerandouterexperiencearesupplementarypointsofview。Whereverbreaksappearintheinterconnectionofpsychicalprocesses，itisallowabletocarryontheinvestigationaccordingtothephysicalmethodsofconsideringthesesameprocesses，inordertodiscoverwhethertheabsentlinkcanbethussupplied。Thesameholdsforthereversemethodoffillingupthebreaksinthecontinuityofourphysiologicalknowledge，bymeansofelementsderivedfrompsychologicalinvestigation。Onlyonthebasisofsuchaview，whichsetsthetwoformsofknowledgeintheirtruerelation，isit，possibleforpsycholo-[p。11]gytobecomeinthefullestsenseanempiricalscience。
Onlyinthisway，too，canphysiologybecomethetruesupplementaryscienceofpsychology，andpsychology，ontheotherhand，theauxiliaryofphysiology。
5。Underthesecondprincipleofclassificationmentionedabove(2)，thatis，accordingtothefactsorconceptswithwhichtheinvestigationofpsychicalprocessesstarts，therearetwovarietiesofempiricalpsychologytobedistinguished。Theyare，atthesametime，successivestagesinthedevelopmentofpsychologicalinterpretation。Thefirstcorrespondstoadescriptive，thesecondtoanexplanatorystage。Theattempttopresentadiscriminatingdescriptionofthedifferentpsychicalprocesses，gaverisetotheneedofanappropriateclassification。
Class；conceptswereformed，underwhichthevariousprocessesweregrouped；andtheattemptwasmadetosatisfytheneedofaninterpretationineachparticularcase，bysubsumingthecomponentsofagivencompoundprocessundertheirproperclass；concepts。Suchconceptsare，forexample，sensation，knowledge，attention，memory，imagination，understanding，andwill。Theycorrespondtothegeneralconceptsofphysicswhicharederivedfromtheimmediateperceptionofnaturalphenomena，suchasweight，heat，sound，andlight。Likethoseconceptsofphysics，thesederivedpsychicalconceptsmayserveforafirstgroupingofthefacts，buttheycontributenothingwhatevertotheexplanationofthesefacts。Empiricalpsychologyhas，however，oftenbeenguiltyofconfoundingthisdescriptionwithexplanation。
Thus，thefaculty-psychologyconsideredtheseclass；conceptsaspsychicalforcesorfaculties，andreferredpsychicalprocessestotheiralternatingorunitedactivity。
6。Opposedtothismethodoftreatmentfoundindescriptivefaculty；psychology，isthatofexplanatorypsychology。Whenconsistentlyempirical，thelattermustbaseitsinter-[p。12]pretationsoncertainfactswhichthemselvesbelongtopsychicalexperience。Thesefactsmay，however，betakenfromdifferentspheresofpsychicalactivity，andsoitcomesthatexplanatorytreatmentmaybefurtherdividedintotwovarietieswhichcorrespondrespectivelytothetwofactors，objectsandsubject，whichgotomakeupimmediateexperience。Whenthechiefemphasisislaidontheobjectsofimmediateexperience，intellectualisticpsychology。
Thistypeofpsychologyattemptstoderiveallpsychicalprocesses，especiallythesubjectivefeelings，impulses，andvolitions，fromideas，orintellectualprocessesastheymaybecalledonaccountoftheirimportanceforknowledgeoftheobjectiveworld。If，onthecontrary，thechiefemphasisislaidonthewayinwhichimmediateexperiencearisesinthesubject，avarietyofexplanatorypsychologyresultswhichattributestothosesubjectiveactivitiesreferredtoexternalobjects，apositionasindependentasthatassignedtoideas。Thisvarietyhasbeencalledvoluntaristicpsychology，becauseoftheimportancethatmustbeconcededtovolitionalprocessesincomparisonwithothersubjectiveprocesses。
Ofthetwovarietiesofpsychologywhichresultfromthegeneralattitudesonthequestionofthenatureofinnerexperience(3)，psychologyoftheinnersensecommonlytendstowardsintellectualism。Thisisduetothefactthat，whentheinnersenseiscoordinatedwiththeoutersenses，thecontentsofpsychicalexperiencewhichfirstattractconsiderationarethosewhicharepresentedasobjectstothisinnersenseinamanneranalogoustothepresentationofnaturalobjectstotheoutersenses。Itisassumedthatthecharacterofobjectscanbeattributedtoideasaloneofallthecontentsofpsychicalexperience，becausetheyareregardedasimagesoftheexternalobjectspresentedtotheoutersenses。Ideasare，accordingly，lookeduponastheonlyrealobjectsoftheinnersensewhileallprocessesnotreferredtoexternalobjects，as，[p。13]forexample，thefeelings，areinterpretedasobscureideas，orasideasrelatedtoone\'sownbody，or，finally，aseffectsarisingfromcombinationsofideas。
Thepsychologyofimmediateexperience(4)，ontheotherhand，tendstowardvoluntarism。Itisobviousthathere，wherethechiefproblemofpsychologyisheldtobetheinvestigationofthesubjectiveriseofallexperience，specialattentionwillbedevotedtothosefactorsfromwhichnaturalscienceabstracts。
7。Intellectualisticpsychologyhasinthecourseofitsdevelopmentseparatedintotwotrends。Inone，thelogicalprocessesofjudgmentandreasoningareregardedasthetypicalformsofallpsychoses；
intheother，certaincombinationsofsuccessivememory-imagesdistinguishedbytheirfrequency，theso；calledassociationsofideas，areacceptedassuch。Thelogicaltheoryismostclearlyrelatedtothepopularmethodofpsychologicalinterpretationandis，therefore，theolder。Itstillfindssomeacceptance，however，eveninmoderntimes。Theassociation-theoryarosefromthephilosophicalempiricismofthelastcentury。Thetwotheoriesstandtoacertainextent，inantithesis，sincethefirstattemptstoreducethetotalityofpsychicalprocessestohigher，whilethelatterseekstoreduceittothelowerand，asitisassumed，simplerformsofintellectualactivity。Bothareone；sided，andnotonlyfailtoexplainaffectiveprocessesandvolitionalprocessesonthebasisoftheassumptionwithwhichtheystart，butarenotabletogiveacompleteinterpretationevenoftheintellectualprocesses。
8。Theunionofpsychologyoftheinnersensewiththeintellectualisticviewhasledtoapeculiarassumptionthathasbeeninmanycasesfataltopsychologicaltheory。Wemaydefinethisassumptionbrieflyastheerroneousattributionofthenatureofthingstoideas，toideas。Notonlywasananalogy[p。14]assumedbetweentheobjectsofso；calledinnersenseandthoseoftheoutersenses，butformerwereregardedastheimagesofthelatter；itcamethattheattributeswhichnaturalscienceascribestoexternalobjects，werealsotransferredtotheimmediateobjectsofthe“innersense“，theideas。Theassumptionwasmadethatideasarethemselvesthings，justastheexternalobjectstowhichwereferthem；thattheydisappearfromconsciousnessandcomebackintoit；thattheymay，indeed，bemoreorlessintenselyandclearlyperceived，accordingastheinnersenseisstimulatedthroughtheoutersensesornot，andaccordingtothedegreeofattentionconcentrateduponthem，butthatonthetheyremainunchangedinqualitativecharacter。
9。Inalltheserespectsvoluntaristicpsychologyisopposedtointellectualism。Whilethelatterassumesaninnersenseandspecificobjectsofinnerexperience，volunteerismiscloselyrelatedtotheviewthatinnerexperienceisidenticalwithimmediateexperience。Accordingtothisdoctrine，thecontentpsychologicalexperiencedoesnotconsistofasumofobjects，butofallthatwhichmakesuptheprocessofexperienceingeneral，thatisofalltheexperiencesofthesubjectintheirimmediatecharacter，unmodifiedbyabstractionorreflection。Itfollowsofnecessitythatthecontentsofpsychologicalexperiencearehereregardedasaninterconnectionofprocesses。
Thisconceptofprocessexcludestheattributionofanobjectiveandmoreorlesspermanentcharactertothecontentsofpsychicalexperience。
Psychicalfactsareoccurrences，notobjects；theytakeplace，likealloccurrences，intimeandareneverthesameatagivenpointintimeastheywereduringtheprecedingmoment。Inthissensevolitionsaretypicalforallpsychicalporcesses。Voluntaristicpsychologydoesnotbyanymeansassertthatvolitionistheonlyrealformofpsychosis，butmerelythat，withitscloselyrelated[p。15]feelingsandemotions，itisjustasessentialacomponentofpsychologicalexperienceassensationsandideas。Itholds，further，thatallotherpsychicalprocessesaretobethoughtofaftertheanalogyofvolitions，theytoobeingaseriesofcontinuouschangesintime，notasumofpermanentobjects，asintellectualismgenerallyassumesinconsequenceofitserroneousattributiontoideasofthosepropertieswhichweattributetoexternalobjects。Therecognitionoftheimmediaterealityofpsychologicalexperienceexcludesthepossibilityoftheattempttoderivetheparticularcomponentsofpsychicalphenomenafromanyothersspecificallydifferent。Theanalogousattemptsofmetaphysicalpsychologytoreduceallpsychologicalexperiencetotheheterogeneous，imaginaryprocessesofahypotheticalsubstratumare，forthesamereason，inconsistentwiththerealproblemofpsychology。Whileitconcernsitself，however，withimmediateexperience，psychologyassumesfromthefirstthatallpsychicalcontentscontainobjectiveaswellasubjectivefactors。Thesearetobedistinguishedonlythroughdeliberateabstraction，andcanneverappearasreallyseparateprocesses。Infact，immediateexperienceshowsthattherearenoideaswhichdonotarouseinusfeelingsandimpulsesofdifferentintensities，and，ontheotherhand，thatafeelingorvolitionisimpossiblewhichdoesnotrefertosomeideatedobject。
10。Thegoverningprinciplesofthepsychologicalpositionmaintainedinthefollowingchaptersmaybesummedupinthreegeneralstatements。
1)Inner，orpsychologicalexperienceisnotaspecialsphereofexperienceapartfromothers，butisimmediateexperienceinitstotality。
2)Thisimmediateexperienceisnotmadeupofunchangingcontentsbutofaninterconnectionofprocesses；notofobjects，butofoccurrences，ofuniversalhumanexperiencesandtheirrelationsinaccordancewithcertainlaws。
[p。16]3)Eachoftheseprocessescontainsanobjectivecontentandasubjectiveprocess，thusincludingthegeneralconditionsbothofallknowledgeandofallpracticalhumanactivity。
Correspondingtothesethreegeneralprinciples，wehaveathreefoldrelationofpsychologytotheothersciences。
1)Asthescienceofimmediateexperience，itissupplementarytothenaturalsciences，which，inconsequenceoftheirabstractionfromthesubject，havetodoonlywiththeobjective，mediatecontentsofexperience。Anyparticularfactcan，strictlyspeaking，beunderstoodinitsfullsignificanceonlyafterithasbeensubjectedtotheanalysesofbothnaturalscienceandpsychology。Inthissense，then，physicsandphysiologyareauxiliarytopsychology，andthelatteris，inturn，supplementarytothenaturalsciences。
2)Asthescienceoftheuniversalformsofimmediatehumanexperienceandtheircombinationinaccordancewithcertainlaws，itisthefoundationofthementalsciences。Thesubject-matterofthesesciencesisinallcasesoftheactivitiesproceedingfromimmediatehumanexperiences，andtheireffects。Sincepsychologyhasforitsproblemtheinvestigationoftheformsandlawsoftheseactivities，itisatoncethemost，generalmentalscience，andthefoundationforalltheothers，suchasphilology，history，politicaleconomy，jurisprudence，etc。
3)Sincepsychologypaysequalattentiontoboththesubjectiveandobjectiveconditionswhichunderlienotonlytheoreticalknowledge，butpracticalactivityaswell，andsinceitseekstodeterminetheirinterrelation，itistheempiricaldisciplinewhoseresultsaremostimmediatelyusefulintheinventionofthegeneralproblemsofthetheoryofknowledge，andethics，thetwofoundationsofphilosophy。Thus，psychologyis，inrelationtothenaturalsciences，thesupplementary，inrelationtothementalsciencesthefundamental，and[p。17]inrelationtophilosophyitisthepropaedeuticempiricalscience。
10a。Theviewthatitisnotadifferenceintheobjectsofexperience，butinthewayoftreatingexperience，thatdistinguishespsychologyfromnaturalsciencehascometoberecognizedmoreandmoreinmodernpsychology。
Stillaclearcomprehensionoftheessentialcharactorofthispositioninregardtothescientificproblemsofpsychology，ispreventedbythepersistenceofoldertendenciesderivedfrommetaphysicsandnaturalphilosophy。
Insteadofstartingfromthefactthatthenaturalsciencesarepossibleonlyafterabstractingfromthesubjectivefactorsofexperience，themoregeneralproblemoftreatingthecontentsofallexperienceinthemostgeneralway，issometimesassignedtonaturalscience。Insuchacasepsychologyis，ofcourse，nolongercoordinatewiththenaturalsciences，butsubordinatetothem。Itsproblemisnolongertoremovetheabstractionemployedbythenaturalsciences，andinthiswaytogainwiththemacompleteviewofexperience，butithastousetheconcept“subject“furnishedbythenaturalsciences，andtogiveanaccountoftheinfluenceofthissubjectonthecontentsofexperience。Insteadofrecognizingthatanadequatedefinitionof“subject“ispossibleonlyasaresultofpsychologicalinvestigations(sec。1，3a)，afinishedconceptformedexclusivelybythenaturalsciencesisherefoisteduponpsychology。Now。forthenaturalsciencesthesubjectidenticalwiththebody。Psychologyisaccordinglydefinedasthesciencewhichhastodeterminethedependenceofimmediateexperienceonthebody。Thisposition，whichmaybedesignated“psycho-physicalmaterialism“，isepistemologicallyuntenableandpsychologicallyunproductive。Naturalscience，whichpurposelyabstractsfromthesubjectivecomponentofallexperience，isatleastinapositiontogiveafinaldefinitionofthesubject。Apsychologythatstartswithsuchapurelyphysiologicaldefinitiondepends，therefore，notonexperiencebut，justliketheoldermaterialisticpsychology，onametaphysicalpresupposition。Thepositionispsychologicallyunproductivebecause，fromtheveryfirst，itturnsoverthecausalinterpretationofpsychicalprocessestophysiology。Butphysiologyhasnotyetfurnishedsuchaninterpretationandnever[p。18]willbeabletodoso，becauseofthedifferencebetweenthemannerofregardingphenomenainnaturalscienceandinpsychology。Itisobvious，too，thatsuchaformofpsychology，whichbeenturnedintohypotheticalbrain-mechanics，conneverbeofanyserviceasabasisforthementalsciences。
Thestrictlyempiricaltrendofpsychology，definedintheprinciplesformulatedabove，isopposedtotheseattemptstorenewmetaphysicaldoctrines。
Incallingit“voluntaristic“，wearenottooverlookthefactthat，initself，thispsychologicalvoluntarismhasabsolutelynoconnectionwithanymetaphysicaldoctrineofwill。IndeeditstandsinoppositiontoSchopenhauer\'sone-sidedmetaphysicalvoluntarism，whichderivedallfrombeingfromatranscendentaloriginalwill，andtothemetaphysicalsystemsofaSpinozaoraHerbart，whicharosefromintellectualism。Initsrelationtometaphysics，thecharacteristicofpsychologicalvoluntarisminthesenseabovedefined，isitsexclusionofallmetaphysicsfrompsychology。Initsrelationstootherformsofpsychology，itrefusestoacceptanyoftheattemptstoreducevolitionstomereideas，andatthesametimeemphasizesthetypicalcharacterofvolitionforallpsychologicalexperience。
Volitionalactsareuniversallyrecognizedasoccurrences，madeupofaseriesofcontinualchangesinqualityandintensity。Theyaretypicalinthesensethatthischaracteristicofbeingoccurrencesisheldtohetrueforallthecontentsofpsychicalexperience。
[1]ClassicsEditor\'snote:Inthe3rdEnlgisheditionofOutlines(Judd，Trans，1907)，WundtincludedthefollowingshortessaysaboutsourcesforthevariousformsofpsychologyreviewedinthisIntroduction。
Intheirhistoricaldevelopmentmanyoftheseformsofpsychologyhavegrownuptogether。Onemay，however，markoffcertaingeneralsequences。
Thus，metaphysicalformshavegenerallyprecededempiricalforms；descriptiveformshaveprecededexplanatory；andfinally，intellectualismhasprecededvoluntarism。TheoldestworkwhichtreatedofpsychologyasanindependentsciencewasARISTOTLE\'Sworkentitled“OntheSoul“。Thisworkistobeclassifiedasbelongingtothedualisticgroupinitsmetaphysics，andtothegroupoffaculty；psychologiesonthesideofitsempiricalexplanations。
(Thesoulwastreatedasthelivingprincipleinthebody。Therewerethreefundamentalfaculties，namely，alimentation，sensation，andthought，)ModernspiritualisticpsychologybeginswithDESCARTES\'dualismwhichrecognizestwodistinctformsofreality:first，thesoulasathinkingandunextendedentity，andsecond，matterasanextendedandnonthinkingreality。TheCartesiansystemfoundthepointofcontactbetweenthesetwoformsofrealityinaparticularregionofthehumanbrain，namely，the，pinealgland。ThefounderofmodernmaterialismisTHOMASHOBBES(1588；1679)。
(TheancientmaterialisticdualismofDEMOCRATEShadnotyetdifferentiateditselffromspiritualisticdualism)。HOBBES，togetherwithLAMETTRIEandHOLBACHdevelopedinthe18thcenturyamechanicalmaterialism，whileDIDEROT
andHELVETIUSdevelopedapsycho；physicalmaterialismwhichhasrepresentativeseveninpresenttimes。SpiritualisticmonismfirstaroseinthemonadologyofLEIBNIZ。InmoderntimesthishasbeentakenupbyHERBARTandhisschool，byLOTZE，andothers。TheestablishmentofthepsychologyoftheinnersensemaybeproperlyattributedtoJOHNLOCKE(1632；1704)。Thisformofpsychologyhasbeendefendedinmoderntimes，tosomeextentbyKANT，andwithspecialemphasisbyEDUARDBENEKE，(1798；1854)，K。FORTLAGE，andothers。Modernfaculty；psychologyarosewiththeworkofCHRISTIAN
WOLFF(1679；1754)，whodistinguishedasthechieffaculties，knowledgeanddesire。SincethetimeofTETENS(1736；1805)threefacultieshavebeenmorecommonlyacceptedthanWOLFF\'Stwo。PLATOnamedthesethree，asdidalsoKANT。Theyareknowledge，feelinganddesire。Logicalintellectualismistheoldestoftheexplanatoryformsofpsychology。Thiscorrespondsdirectlytothepopularinterpretationofpsychicalprocesses。Theearlierempiricists，asforexampleLOCKE，andevenBERKELEY(1648；1753)whoinhis“EssaytowardsaNewTheoryofVision“anticipatesmodernexperimentalpsychology，aretobeclassedasrepresentativesoflogicalintellectualism。
Thisviewisatthepresenttimetobefoundinthepsychologicaldiscussionsindulgedinbyphysiologicalwriters，whentheytreatofsuchtopicsassenseperception。Amongthephilosophicalrepresentativesofthislogicalintellectualisminourday，onemustmentionespeciallyFRANZBRENTANO
andhisschool。Associationpsychologyisfirstfoundintheworksoftwowriterswhoappearataboutthesametime，namely，DAVIDHARTLEY(1704；1757)
andDAVIDHUME(1711；1776)。Thesetwowritersrepresent，however，twodifferenttendencieswhichcontinueeveninpresent；daypsychology。
HARTLEY\'sassociationpsychologyreferstheassociationprocessestocertainphysiologicalconditions，whileHUME\'sregardstheassociationprocessasapsychologicalprocess。Thefirstformalliesitself，accordingly，topsycho；physicalmaterialism；thisisfoundintheworksofsuchamodernwriterasHERBERTSPENCER。CloselyrelatedtoHUME\'spsychologicalassociationismisthepsychologyofHERBART。HERBART\'sdoctrineofthestaticsandmechanicsofideasisapurelyintellectualisticdoctrine。
(Feelingandvolitionarehererecognizedonlyascertainphasesofideas)。
Itisinagreementwithassociationisminitsfundamentalmechanicalviewofmentallife。ThissimilarityisnottobeoverlookedmerelybecauseHerbartsoughtthroughcertainhypotheticalassumptionstogivehispsychologicaldiscussionsanexactmathematicalform。Therearemanyanticipationsofvoluntaristicpsychologyintheworksofpsychologistsofthe“pureintrospection“
school，andoftheassociationschools。Thefirstthorough-goingexpositionofthisformofpsychologywastheworkoftheauthorofthisOutlinesofPsychologyinhispsychologicaltreatises。Itistobenotedthatthispsychologicalvoluntarism，as，indeed，onecanseefromthedescriptionwhichhasalreadybeengiven，istobeclearlydistinguishedfrommetaphysicalvoluntarismasdevelopedbysuchawriterasSCHOPENHAUER。Metaphysicalvoluntarismseekstoreduceeverythingtoanoriginaltranscendentalwill，whichliesbackofthephenomenalworldandservesasasubstratumforthisworld。Psychologicalvoluntarismontheotherhand，looksuponempiricalvolitionalprocesseswiththeirconstituentfeelings，sensations，andideas，asthetypesofallconsciousprocesses。Forsuchavoluntarismevenvolitionisacomplexphenomenonwhichowesitstypicalsignificancetothisveryfactthatitincludesinitselfthedifferentkindsofpsychicalelements。
References。Psychologyoftheinnersense:LOCKE，AnEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding，169o。EDUARDBENEKE，PsychologischeSkizzen，2vols。，1825；1827，andLehrbuchderPsychologiealsNaturwissenschaft，1833，4thed。1877。K。FORTLAGE，SystemderPsychologie，2Vols。，1855。Faculty；psychology:
CHRISTIANWOLFF，Psychologiaempirica，1732，Psychologiarationalis，1734；
andVernunftigeGedankenvonGott，derWelt，derSeeledesMenschenetc。，1719。TETENS，PhilosophischeVersucheuberdiemenschlicheNatur，1776；1777。
KANT，Anthropologie，1798(apracticalpsychology，wellworthreadingevenatthislatedatebecauseofitsmanyniceobservations)。
Associationpsychology:HARTLEYObservationsonMan，hisFrame，hisDuties，hisExpectations，1749。PRIESTLY，Hartley\'sTheoryoftheHumanMindonthePrinciplesoftheAssociationofIdeas，1775。HUME，TreatiseonHumanNature，1734；1737；andEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding，1748。JAMESMILL，AnalysisofthePhenomenaoftheHumanMind，1829，latereditedwithnotesbyAlexanderBain，JohnStuartMillandothers，2nded。
1878。ALEXANDERBAIN，TheSensesandtheIntellect，1855，4thed。1894；
andTheEmotionsandtheWill，1859，3rded。1875。HERBERTSPENCER，PrinciplesofPsychology，1855，5thed。1890。HERBART，PsychologiealsWissenschaft，2vols。，1824；1825；and(Englishtrans。byM。K。Smith1891)Text；bookofPsychology，1816。
Workswhichpreparedthewayforexperimentalpsychology:LOTZE，MedizinischePsychologie，1852。G。T。FECHNER，ElementederPsychophysik，2vols。，1860。
Moreextendedmoderntreatises。OftheHerbartianSchool:W。F。VOLKMANN，LehrbuchderPsychologie，2vols。，4thed。，1894。M。LAZARUS，LebenderSeeleinMonographien，3vols。，3rded。1883。OftheAssociationSchool(generallywithatendencytowardpsycho；physicalmaterialism):KUELPE，(Englishtrans。byE。B。Titchener，1901)OutlinesofPsychology，1893。
EBBINGHAUS，GrundzugederPsychologie，1stvol。onlyasyet1897-1902。
ZIEHEN，(English~trans。byVANLIEWandBEYER1899)IntroductiontotheStudyofPhysiologicalPsychology，6thGer。ed。1902。MUNSTERBERG，GrundzugederPsychologie，1stvol。onlyasyet，1900。Worksstandingbetweenassociationpsychologyandvoluntaristicpsychology:HOEFFDING，(Englishtrans。byLowndes，1891，fromtheGermantrans。1887)OutlinesofPsychology，2ndDanished。1893。W。JERUSALEM，LehrbuchderempirischenPsychologie，2nded。1890。Worksrepresentingaformofintellectualismrelatedinmethodtoscholasticism:BRENTANO，PsychologievomempirischenStandpunkte，1stvol。only，1874。MEINONG，Psychologisch；ethischeUntersuchungenzurWerttheorie，1894；andUntersuchungenzurGegenstandstheorieundPsychologie，1904。Worksemphasizingtheindependenceofpsychologyandbasedonanempiricalanalysisofconsciousprocesses:Lipps，GrundtatsachendesSeelenlebens，1883；andLeitfadenderPsychologie，1903。JODL，LehrbuchderPsychologie，2nded。，1902。Thesameempiricalanalysis，andonthebasisofthisanalysisvoluntaristicpsychologyinthesenseabovedescribed，arepresentedbytheauthorofthisOutlinesofPsychologyinhisotherworksalso，namely，GrundzugederphysiologischenPsychologie，3vols。，5thed。1902；1903
(Englishtrans。inpreparationbyE。B。Titchener)；and(Englishtrans。
byE。B。CreightonandE。B。Titchener，1894)LecturesonHumanandAnimalPsychology，3rdGer。cd。1897。Workstreatingchieflyofthephilosophicalcharacteroffundamentalpsychologicalconcepts:UPHUES，PsychologiedesErkennens，1893。J。REHMKE，LehrbuchderallgemeinenPsychologie，1894。
NATORP，EinleitungindiePsychologie，1888。American，EnglishandFrenchworksallfollowinthepathofassociationalisrn。Furthermore，theytendforthemostparttowardpsycho；physicalmaterialismortowarddualisticspiritualism，lessfrequentlytowardvoluntarism。FromamongthenumerousAmericanworks，thefollowingaretobementioned:JAMES，PrinciplesofPsychology，2vols。，1890。LADD，PsychologyDescriptiveandExplanatory，1894。BALDWIN，HandbookofPsychology，1889。SCRIPTURE，TheNewPsychology，1897。TITCHENER，AnOutlineofPsychology，1896。Frenchworksareasfollows:
RIBOT\'Smonographsonvariouspsychologicalsubjectsaretobementioned。
(AlltranslatedintoEnglish:Attention，TheDiseasesofMemory，TheDiseasesoftheWill，TheDiseasesofPersonality，GeneralIdeas，TheCreativeImagination)。
Also，theworksofFOUILLEE，whicharerelatedtoGermanvoluntarism，butcontainatthesametimeagreatdealofmetaphysicsandaresomewhatinfluencedbythePlatonicdoctrineofideas(L\'evolutionismedesidees；forces，1890，andPsychologiedesidees；forces，1893)。Worksonthehistoryofpsychologyespeciallyworthyofmention:SIEBECK，GeschichtederPsychologie，Pt。1st，1880；1884，andalsoarticlesinthefirstthreevols。ofArch。
f。Gesch。d。Phil。(thesecovertheancientandmedievalperiods)。LANGE，HistoryofMaterialism。DESSOIR，GeschichtederneuerendeutschenPsychologie，2nded。1902(includingasyetonly1stvol。)。SOMMER，GrundzugeeinerGeschichtederdeutschenPsychologieundAesthetikvonWolf；BaumgartenbisKant；Schiller，1892。RIBOT，(Englishtrans。byBaldwin)GermanPsychologyofToday，Fr。ed。1885，Eng。ed。1886。W。WUNDT，“Psychologie“
intheFestschriftforKunoFischer，1904。
ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——Wundt(1897)Section3OutlinesofPsychologyWilhelmMaxWundt(1897)TranslatedbyCharlesHubbardJudd(1897)
INTRODUCTION3。METHODSOFPSYCHOLOGY
1。Sincepsychologyhasforitsobject，notspecificcontentsofexperience，butgeneralexperienceinitsimmediatecharacter，itcanmakeuseofnomethodsexceptsuchastheempiricalsciencesingeneralemployforthedetermination，analysis，andcausalsynthesisoffacts。Thecircumstance，thatnaturalscienceabstractsfromthesubject，whilepsychologydoesnot，canbenogroundformodificationsintheessentialcharacterofthemethodsemployedinthetwofields，thoughitdoesmodifythewayinwhichthesemethodsareapplied。[p。19]
Thenaturalsciences，whichmayserveasanexampleforpsychologyinthisrespect，sincetheyweredevelopedearlier，makeuseoftwochiefmethods:experimentandobservation。Experimentisobservationconnectedwithanintentionalinterferenceonthepartoftheobserver，intheriseandcourseofthephenomenaobserved。Observation，initspropersense，istheinvestigationofphenomenawithoutsuchinterference，justastheyarenaturallypresentedtotheobserverinthecontinuityofexperience。Whereverexperimentispossible，itisalwaysusedinthenaturalsciences；forunderallcircumstances，evenwhenthephenomenainthemselvespresenttheconditionsforsufficientlyexactobservation，itisanadvantagetobeabletocontrolatwilltheirriseandprogress，ortoisolatethevariouscomponentsofacompositephenomenon。Still，eveninthenaturalsciencesthetwomethodshavebeendistinguishedaccordingtotheirspheresofapplication。Itisheldthattheexperimentalmethodsareindispensableforcertainproblems，whileinothersthedesiredendmaynotinfrequentlybereachedthroughmereobservation。Ifweneglectafewexceptionalcasesduetospecialrelations，thesetwoclassesofproblemscorrespondtothegeneraldivisionofnaturalphenomenaintoprocessesandobjects。
Experimentalinterferenceisrequiredintheexactdeterminationofthecourse，andintheanalysisofthecomponents，ofanynaturalprocesssuchas，forexample，light-wavesorsound-waves，anelectricdischarge，theformationordisintegrationofachemicalcompound，andstimulationandmetabolisminplantsandanimals。Asarule，suchinterferenceisdesirablebecauseexactobservationispossibleonlywhentheobservercandeterminethemomentatwhichtheprocessshallcommence。Itisalsoindispensableinseparatingthevariouscomponentsofacomplexphenomenonfromoneanother。
Asarule，this[p。20]ispossibleonlythroughtheadditionorsubtractionofcertainconditions，oraquantitativevariationofthem。
Thecaseisdifferentwithobjectsofnature。Theyarerelativelyconstant；theydonothavetobeproducedataparticularmoment，butarealwaysattheobserver\'sdisposalandreadyforexamination。Here，then，experimentalinvestigationisgenerallynecessaryonlywhentheproductionandmodificationoftheobjectsaretobeinquiredinto。Insuchacase，theyareregardedeitherasproductsorcomponentsofnaturalprocessesandcomeundertheheadofprocessesratherthanobjects。When，onthecontrary，theonlyquestionistheactualnatureoftheseobjects，withoutreferencetotheiroriginormodification，mereobservationisgenerallyenough。Thus，mineralogy，botany，zoology，anatomy，andgeography，arepuresciencesofobservationsolongastheyarekeptfreefromthephysical，chemical，andphysiologicalproblemsthatare，indeed，frequentlybroughtintothem，buthavetodowithprocessesofnature，notwiththeobjectsinthemselves。
2。Ifweapplytheseconsiderationstopsychology，itisobviousatonce，fromtheverynatureofitssubject-matter，thatexactobservationisherepossibleonlyintheformofexperimentalobservation；andthatpsychologycanneverbeapurescienceofobservation。Thecontentsofthisscienceareexclusivelyprocesses，notpermanentobjects。Inordertoinvestigatewithexactnesstheriseandprogressoftheseprocesses，theircompositionoutofvariouscomponents，andtheinterrelationsofthesecomponents，wemustbeablefirstofalltobringabouttheirbeginningatwill，andpurposelytovarytheconditionsofthesame。Thisispossiblehere，asinallcases，onlythroughexperiment，notthroughpureintrospection。Besidesthisgeneralreasonthereisanother，peculiartopsychology，thatdoesnotapplyatalltonatural[p。21]phenomena。
Inthelattercasewepurposelyabstractfromtheperceivingsubject，andundercircumstances，especiallywhenfavoredbytheregularityofthephenomena，asinastronomy，mereobservationmaysucceedindeterminingwithadequatecertaintytheobjectivecomponentsoftheprocesses。Psychology，onthecontrary，isdebarredfromthisabstractionbyitsfundamentalprinciples，andtheconditionsforchanceobservationcanbesuitableonlywhenthesameobjectivecomponentsofimmediateexperiencearefrequentlyrepeatedinconnectionwiththesamesubjectivestates。Itishardlytobeexpected，inviewofthegreatcomplexityofpsychicalprocesses，thatthiswilleverbethecase。Thecoincidenceisespeciallyimprobablesincetheveryintentiontoobserve，whichisanecessaryconditionofallobservation，modifiesessentiallytheriseandprogressofpsychicalprocesses。Observationofnatureisnotdisturbedbythisintentiononthepartoftheobserver，becauseherewepurposelyabstractfromthestateofthesubject。Thechiefproblemofpsychology，however，istheexactobservationoftheriseandprogressofsubjectiveprocesses，anditcanbereadilyseenthatundersuchcircumstancestheintentiontoobserveeitheressentiallymodifiesthefactstobeobserved，orcompletelysuppressesthem。Ontheotherhand，psychology，bytheverywayinwhichpsychicalprocessesoriginate，isled，justasphysicsandphysiologyare，toemploytheexperimentalmodeofprocedure。Asensationarisesinusunderthemostfavorableconditionsforobservationwhenitiscausedbyanexternalsense-stimulus，as，forexample，atone-sensationfromanexternaltone-vibration，oralight-sensationfromanexternallight-impression。Theideaofanobjectisalwayscausedoriginallybythemoreorlesscomplicatedcooperationofexternalsense-stimuli。
Ifwewishtostudythewayinwhichanideaisformed，wecanchoose[p。
22]noothermethodthanthatofimitatingthisnaturalprocess。Indoingthis，wehaveatthesametimethegreatadvantageofbeingabletomodifytheideaitselfbychangingatwillthecombinationoftheimpressionsthatcooperatetoformit，andofthuslearningwhatinfluenceeachsingleconditionexercisesontheproduct。Memory-images，itistrue，cannotbedirectlyarousedthroughexternalsenseimpressions，butfollowthemafteralongerorshorterinterval。Still，itisobviousthattheirattributes，andespeciallytheirrelationtotheprimaryideasthroughdirectimpressions，canbemostaccuratelybelearned，notbywaitingfortheirchancearrival，butbyusingsuchmemory-ideasasmaybearousedinasystematic，experimentalway，throughimmediatelyprecedingimpressions。Thesameistrueoffeelingsandvolitions；theywillbepresentedintheformbestadaptedtoexactinvestigationwhenthoseimpressionsarepurposelyproducedwhichexperiencehasshowntoberegularlyconnectedwithaffectiveandvolitionalreactions。Thereis，then，nofundamentalpsychicalprocesstowhichexperimentalmethodscannotbeapplied，andthereforenoneinwhoseinvestigationtheyarenotlogicallyrequired。
3。Pureobservation，suchasispossibleinmanydepartmentsofnaturalscience，is，fromtheverycharacterofpsychicphenomena，impossibleinindividualpsychology。Suchapossibilitywouldbeconceivableonlyundertheconditionthatthereexistedpermanentpsychicalobjects，independentofourattention，similartotherelativelypermanentobjectsofnature，whichremainunchangedbyourobservationofthem。Thereare，indeed，certainfactsatthedisposalofpsychology，which，althoughtheyarenotrealobjects，stillhavethecharacterofpsychicalobjectsinasmuchastheypossesstheseattributesofrelativepermanence，andindependenceoftheobserver。Connectedwiththesecharacteristics[p。23]isthefurtherfactthattheyareunapproachablebymeansofexperimentinthecommonacceptanceoftheterm。Thesefactsarethementalproductsthathavebeendevelopedinthecourseofhistory，suchaslanguage，mythologicalideas，andcustoms。Theoriginanddevelopmentoftheseproductsdependineverycaseongeneralpsychicalconditionswhichmaybeinferredfromtheirobjectiveattributes。Psychologicalanalysiscan，consequently，explainthepsychicalprocessesoperativeintheirformationanddevelopment。Allsuchmentalproductsofageneralcharacterpresupposeasaconditiontheexistenceofamentalcommunitycomposedofmanyindividuals，though，ofcourse，theirdeepestsourcesarethepsychicalattributesoftheindividual。
Becauseofthisdependenceonthecommunity，inparticularthesocialcommunity，thiswholedepartmentofpsychologicalinvestigationisdesignatedassocialpsychology，anddistinguishedfromindividual，orasitmaybecalledbecauseofitspredominatingmethod，experimentalpsychology。Inthepresentstageofthesciencethesetwobranchesofpsychologyaregenerallytakenupindifferenttreatises；still，theyarenotsomuchdifferentdepartmentsasdifferentmethods。So-calledsocialpsychologycorrespondstothemethodofpureobservation，theobjectsofobservationinthiscasebeingthementalproducts。Thenecessaryconnectionoftheseproductswithsocialcommunities，whichhasgiventosocialpsychologyitsname，isduetothefactthatthementalproductsoftheindividualareoftoovariableacharactertobethesubjectsofobjectiveobservation。Thephenomenagainthenecessarydegreeofconstancyonlywhentheybecomecollective。
Thuspsychologyhas，likenaturalscience，twoexactmethods:
theexperimentalmethod，servingfortheanalysisofsimplerpsychicalprocesses，andtheobservationofgeneral[p。24]mentalproducts，servingfortheinvestigationofthehigherpsychicalprocessesanddevelopments。
3a。Theintroductionoftheexperimentalmethodintopsychologywasoriginallyduetothemodesofprocedureinphysiology，especiallyinthephysiologyofthesense-organsandthenervoussystem。Forthisreasonexperimentalpsychologyisalsocommonlycalled“physiologicalpsychology“；
andworkstreatingitunderthistitleregularlycontainthosesupplementaryfactsfromthephysiologyofthenervoussystemandthesense-organs，whichrequirespecialdiscussionwithaviewtotheinterestsofpsychology，thoughinthemselvestheybelongtophysiologyalone。“Physiologicalpsychology“
is，accordingly，anintermediatedisciplinewhichis，however，asthenameindicates，primarilypsychology，andis，apartfromthesupplementaryphysiologicalfactsthatitpresents，justthesameas“experimentalpsychology“
inthesenseabovedefined。Theattemptsometimesmade，todistinguishpsychologyproperfromphysiologicalpsychology，byassigningtothefirstthepsychologicalinterpretationofinnerexperience，andtothesecondthederivationofthisexperiencefromphysiologicalprocesses，istoberejectedasinadmissible。Thereisonlyonekindofcausalexplanationinpsychology，andthatisthederivationofmorecomplexpsychicalprocessesfromsimplerones。Inthismethodofinterpretationphysiologicalelementscanbeusedonlyassupplementaryaids，becauseoftherelationbetweennaturalscienceandpsychologyasabovedefined(§；2，4)。
Materialisticpsychologydeniestheexistenceofpsychicalcausality，andsubstitutesforthisproblemtheother，ofexplainingpsychicalprocessesbybrain-physiology。Thistendency，whichhasbeenshown(§；2，10a)
tobeepistemologicallyandpsychologicallyuntenable，appearsamongtherepresentativesofboth“pure“and“physiological“psychology。
ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——Wundt(1897)Section4OutlinesofPsychologyWilhelmMaxWundt(1897)TranslatedbyCharlesHubbardJudd(1897)
INTRODUCTION4。GENERALSURVEYOFTHESUBJECT
1。Theimmediatecontentsofexperiencewhichconstitutethesubject-matterofpsychology，areunderallcircumstancesprocessesofacompositecharacter。
Sense-perceptionsofex-[p。25]ternalobjects，memoriesofsuchsense-perceptions，feelings，emotions，andvolitionalacts，arenotonlycontinuallyunitedinthemostvariousways，buteachoftheseprocessesisitselfamoreorlesscompositewhole。Theideaofanexternalbody，forexample，ismadeupofpartialideasofitsparts。Atonemaybeeversosimple，butwelocalizeitinsomedirection，thusbringingitintoconnectionwiththeideaofexternalspace，whichishighlycomposite。Afeelingorvolitionisreferredtosomesensationthatarousedthefeelingortoanobjectwilled。Indealingwithacomplexfactofthiskind，scientificinvestigationhasthreeproblemstobesolvedinsuccession。Thefirstistheanalysisofcompositeprocesses；thesecondisthedemonstrationofthecombinationsintowhichtheelementsdiscoveredbyanalysisenter；thethirdistheinvestigationofthelawsthatareoperativeintheformationofsuchcombinations。
2。Thesecond，orsynthetic，problemismadeupofseveralpartialproblems。Inthefirstplace，thepsychicalelementsunitetoformcompositepsychicalcompoundswhichareseparateandrelativelyindependentofoneanotherinthecontinualflowofpsychicalprocesses。Suchcompoundsare，forexample，ideas，whetherreferreddirectlytoexternalimpressionsorobjects，orinterpretedbyusasmemoriesofimpressionsandobjectsperceivedbefore。Otherexamplesarecompositefeelings，emotions，orvolitions。
Thenagain，thesepsychicalcompoundsstandinthemostvariousinterconnectionswithoneanother。Thus，ideasunitetofromlargersimultaneousideationalcomplexesorregularsuccessions，whileaffectiveandvolitionalprocessesformavarietyofcombinationswithoneanotherandwithideationalprocesses。
Inthiswaywehavetheinterconnectionofpsychicalcompoundsasaclassofsyntheticalprocessesoftheseconddegree，consistingofaunionbetweenthesimplercombinations，orthoseofelementsinto[p。26]psychicalcompounds。Theseparatepsychicalinterconnections，inturn，unitetoformstillmorecomprehensivecombinations，whichalsoshowacertainregularityinthearrangementoftheircomponents。Inthisway，combinationsofathirddegreearisewhichwedesignatebythegeneralnamepsychicaldevelopments。Theymaybedividedintodevelopmentsofadifferentscope。Developmentsofamorelimitedsortaresuchasrelatetoasinglementaltrend，forexample，thedevelopmentoftheintellectualfunctions，ofthewill，orofthefeelings，orofmerelyonespecialbranchofthesefunctions，suchastheaestheticormoralfeelings。Fromanumberofsuchpartialseriesarisesthetotaldevelopmentapsychicalpersonality。Finally，sinceanimalsandinastillhigherdegreehumanindividualsareincontinualinterrelation，withlikebeings，thereariseabovetheseindividualformsthegeneralpsychicaldevelopments。
Thesevariousbranchesofthestudyofpsychicaldevelopmentareinpartthepsychologicalfoundationsofothersciences，suchasthetheoryofknowledge，aesthetics，andethics，andare，accordingly，treatedmoreappropriatelyinconnectionwiththese。Inparttheyhavebecomespecialpsychologicalsciences，suchaschild-psychology，animalandsocialPsychology。Weshall，therefore，inthistreatisediscussonlythoseresultsfromthethreelastmentioneddepartmentswhichareofthemostimportanceforgeneralpsychology。
3。Thesolutionofthelastandmostgeneralpsychologicalproblem，theascertationofthelawsofpsychicalphenomena，dependsupontheinvestigationofallthecombinationofdifferentdegrees，thecombinationofelementsintocompounds，ofcompoundsintointerconnections，andofinterconnectionsintodevelopments。Andasthisinvestigationistheonlythingthatcanteachustheactualpositionofpsychicalprocesses，sowecandiscoverthe[p。27]attributesofpsychicalcausality，whichfindsitsexpressionintheseprocesses，onlyfromthelawsfollowedbythecontentsofexperienceandtheircomponentsintheirvariouscombinations。
Wehave，accordingly，toconsiderinthefollowingchapters:
1)PsychicalElements，2)PsychicalCompounds，3)InterconnectionofPsychicalCompounds，4)PsychicalDevelopments，5)PsychicalCausalityanditsLaws。
ClassicsintheHistoryofPsychology——Wundt(1897)Section5OutlinesofPsychologyWilhelmMaxWundt(1897)TranslatedbyCharlesHubbardJudd(1897)
I。PSYCHICALELEMENTS§；5。CHIEFFORMSANDGENERALATTRIBUTESOFPSYCHICAL
ELEMENTS。
1。Allthecontentsofpsychicalexperienceareofacompositecharacter。
Itfollows，therefore，thatpsychicalelements，ortheabsolutelysimpleandirreduciblecomponentsofpsychicalphenomena，cannotbefoundbyanalysisalone，butonlywiththeaidofabstraction。Thisabstractionisrenderedpossiblebythefactthattheelementsareinrealityunitedindifferentways。Iftheelementaisconnectedinonecasewiththeelementsb，c，d……，inanotherwithb\'，c\'，d\'……，itispossibletoabstractitfromalltheotherelements。because[sic]
noneofthemisalwaysunitedwithit。If，forexample，wehearasimpletoneofacertainpitchandintensity，itmaybelocatednowinthisdirection，nowinthat，andmaybeheard，alternatelywithvariousothertones。Butsincethedirectionisnotconstant，ortheaccompanyingtonethesame，itispossibletoabstractfromthesevariableelements，andwehavethesingletoneasapsychicalelement。
2。Asproductsofpsychicalanalysis，wehavepsychicalelementsoftwokinds，correspondingtothetwofactorscontainedinimmediateexperience(1，2)，theobjectivecontentsandtheexperiencingsubject。Theelementsoftheobjectivecontentswecallsensationalelements，orsimplysensations:suchareatone，oraparticularsensationofhot，cold，orlight，whenweneglectforthemomentalltheconnections[p。29]ofthesesensationswithothers，andalltheirspacialandtemporalrelations。Thesubjectiveelements，ontheotherhand，aredesignatedasaffectiveelements，orsimplefeelings。Wemaymentionasexamplesthefeelingsaccompanyingsensationsoflightt，sound，taste，smell，hot，cold，orpain，thefeelingsarousedbythesightofanagreeableordisagreeableobject，andthefeelingsarisinginastateofattentionoratthemomentofavolitionalact。Suchsimplefeelingsareinadoublesenseproductsofabstraction:eachisconnectedwithanideationalelement，andisfurthermoreacomponentofapsychicalprocesswhichoccursintime，andduringwhichthefeelingitselfiscontinuallychanging。
3。Theactualcontentsofpsychicalexperiencealwaysconsistofvariouscombinationsofsensationalandaffectiveelements，sothatthespecificcharacterofthesimplepsychicalprocessesdependsforthemostpartnotonthenatureoftheseelementssomuchasontheirunionintocompositepsychicalcompounds。Thus，theideaofanextendedbodyorofatemporalseriesofsensations，anemotion，andavolition，areallspecificformsofpsychicalexperience。Buttheircharacterassuchisaslittlepresentintheirsensationalandaffectiveelementsasthechemicalpropertiesofacompoundbodycanbedefinedbyrecountingthepropertiesofitschemicalelements。Specificcharacterandelementarynatureofpsychicalprocessesare，accordingly，twoentirelydifferentconcepts。Everypsychicalelementisaspecificcontentofexperience，butnoteveryspecificcontentofimmediateexperienceisatthesametimeapsychicalelement。Thus，especiallyspacialandtemporalideas，emotions，andvolitionalacts，arespecificbutnotelementaryprocesses。Manyelementsarepresentonlyinpsychicalcompoundsofaparticularkind，butsincethesecompoundsregularlycontainotherelementsaswell，theirspecialcharacteristicsare[p。30]
tobeattributedtothemodeofunion，ratherthantotheabstractattributes，oftheirelements。Thus，wealwaysreferamomentarysound-sensationtoadefinitepointintime。Thislocalizationintime，however，ispossibleonlybyrelatingthegivensensationtoothersprecedingandfollowingit，sothatthespecialcharacterofthetime-ideacannotarisefromthesinglesound-sensationthoughtofasisolated，butonlyfromitsunionwithothers。Again，anemotionofangeroravolitioncontainscertainsimplefeelingsthatareneverpresentinotherpsychicalcompounds，stilleachoftheseprocessesiscomposite，forithasduration，inthecourseofwhichparticularfeelingsfollowoneanotherwithacertainregularity，andtheprocessitselfisnotcompletewithoutthewholetrainofthesefeelings。
4。Sensationsandsimplefeelingsexhibitcertaincommonattributesandalsocertaincharacteristicdifferences。Theyhaveincommontwodeterminants，whichwecallqualityandintensity。Everysimplesensationandeverysimplefeelinghasadefinitequalitativecharacterthatmarksitofffromallothersensationsandfeelings；andthisqualitymustalwayshavesomedegreeofintensity。Accordingly，wedistinguishthedifferentpsychicalelementsfromoneanotherbytheirqualities，butregardtheintensityasthequantitativevaluewhichinanyconcretecasebelongstothegivenelement。Ourdesignationsofpsychicalelementsarebasedentirelyupontheirqualities；thus，wedistinguishsuchsensationsasblue，grey，yellow，hot，andcold，orsuchfeelingsasgrave，cheerful，sad，gloomy，andsorrowful。Ontheotherhand，wealwaysexpressthedifferencesintheintensityofpsychicalelementsbythesamequantitativedesignations，asweak，strong，mediumstrong，andverystrong。Theseexpressionsareinbothcasesclass-conceptswhichserveforafirstsuperficialarrangementoftheelements，andeachembraces[p。31]anunlimitedlylargenumberofconcreteelements。Languagehasdevelopedarelativelycompletestockofnamesforthequalitiesofsimplesensations，especiallyforcolorsandtones。Namesforthequalitiesoffeelingsandfordegreesofintensityarefarbehind。Clearnessandobscurity，asalsodistinctnessandindistinctness，aresometimesclassedwithqualityandintensity。Butsincetheseattributes，aswillappearlater(§；15，4)，alwaysarisefromtheinterconnectionofpsychicalcompounds，theycannotberegardedasdeterminantsofpsychicalelements。
5。Madeup，atitis，oftwodeterminants，qualityandintensity，everypsychicalelementmusthaveacertaindegreeofintensityfromwhichitispossibletopass，bycontinualgradations，toeveryotherdegreeofintensityinthesamequality。Suchgradationscanbemadeinonlytwodirections:onewecallincreaseinintensity，theotherdecrease。Thedegreesofintensityofeveryqualitativeelement，forminthiswayasingledimension，inwhich，fromagivenpoint，wemaymoveintwooppositedirections，justasfromanypointinastraightline。
Thismaybeexpressedinthegeneralstatement:Thevariousintensitiesofeverypsychicalelementformacontinuityofonedimension。
Theextremitiesofthiscontinuitywecalltheminimalandmaximalsensationorfeeling，asthecasemaybe。
Incontrastwiththisuniformityinintensifies，thequalitieshavemorevariableattributes。Everyqualitymay，indeed，besoarrangedinadefinitecontinuitythatitispossibletopassuninterruptedlyfromagivenpointtoanyotherpointsinthesamequality。Butthevariouscontinuitiesofdifferentqualities，whichwemaycallsystemsofquality，exhibitdifferencesbothinthevarietyofpossiblegradations，andinthenumberofdirectionsofgradation。Inthesetworespects，wemaydistinguish，ontheonehand，homogeneousandcomplex，on[p。32]
theotherone-dimensional，two-dimensional，andmany-dimensionalsystemsofquality。Withinahomogeneoussystem，onlysuchsmalldifferencesarepossiblethatgenerallytherehasneverarisenanypracticalneedofdistinguishingthembydifferentnames。Thus，wedistinguishonlylowqualityofpressure，hot，cold，orpain，onlyonefeelingofattentionorofactivity，although，inintensity，eachofthesequalitiesmayhavemanydifferentgrades。Itisnottobeinferredfromthisfactthatineachofthesesystemsthereisreallyonlyonequality。Thetruthisthatinthesecasesthenumberofdifferentqualitiesismerelyverylimited；ifweweretorepresentitgeometrically，itwouldprobablyneverreduceentirelytoasinglepoint。Thus，forexample，sensationsofpressurefromdifferentregionsoftheskinshow，beyondquestion，smallqualitativedifferenceswhicharegreatenoughtoletusdistinguishclearlyanypointoftheskinfromanotheratsomedistancefromit。Suchdifferences，however，asarisefromcontactwithasharpordull，aroughorsmoothbody，arenottobereckonedasdifferentqualities。Theyalwaysdependonalargenumberofsimultaneoussensations，andwithoutthevariouscombinationsofthesesensationsintocompositepsychicalcompounds，theimpressionsmentionedwouldbeimpossible。
Complexsystemsofqualitydifferfromthosewehavebeendiscussing，inthattheyembracealargenumberofclearlydistinguishableelementsbetweenwhichallpossibleintermediateformsexist。Inthisclasswemustincludethetonalsystemandcolor-system，thesystemsofsmellsandtastes，andamongtheaffectivesystemsthosewhichformthesubjectivecomplementsofthesesensationalsystems，suchasthesystemsoftonalfeelings，color-feelings，etc。Itisprobablealsothatmanysystemsoffeelingsbelonghere，whichareobjectivelyconnectedwithcompositeimpressions，butas[p。33]feelingsaresimpleincharacter，sucharethevariousfeelingsofharmonyordiscordthatcorrespondtothedifferentcombinationsoftones。
