Justasmuchasintheprocedureofratiocination，thestudyofphilosophyfindsobstruction，too，intheunreasoningconceitthatbuildsitselfonwell-establishedtruths，whichthepossessorconsidershehasnoneedtoreturnuponandreconsider，butrathertakestobefundamental，andthinkshecanbymeansthereofpropoundaswellasdecideandpasssentence。Inthisregard，itisespeciallyneedfultomakeonceagainaseriousbusinessofphilosophy。Inallspheresofscience，art，skill，andhandicraftitisneverdoubtedthat，inordertomasterthem，aconsiderableamountoftroublemustbespentinlearningandinbeingtrained。Asregardsphilosophy，onthecontrary，thereseemsstillanassumptionprevalentthat，thougheveryonewitheyesandfingersisnotonthataccountinapositiontomakeshoesifheonlyhasleatherandalast，yeteverybodyunderstandshowtophilosophizestraightaway，andpassjudgmentonphilosophy，simplybecausehepossessesthecriterionfordoingsoinhisnaturalreason—asifhedidnotinthesamewaypossessthestandardforshoemakingtooinhisownfoot。Itseemsasifthepossessionofphilosophylayjustinthewantofknowledgeandstudy，asifphilosophyleftoffwherethelatterbegan。It，iscommonlyheldtobeaformalkindofknowledgedevoidofallsubstantialcontent。Thereisageneralfailuretoperceivethat，inthecaseofanyknowledge，andanyscience，whatistakenfortruth，evenasregardscontent，canonlydeservethenameof“truth“whenphilosophyhashadahandinitsproduction。
Lettheothersciencestryasmuchastheyliketogetalongbyratiocinationorraisonnementwithoutphilosophy，theyareunabletokeepalivewithoutit，ortohaveanyspiritualsignificanceandtruthinthem。
18。NaturalphilosophizingashealthycommonsenseandasgeniusAsregardsphilosophyinitsproperandgenuinesense，wefindputforwardwithoutanyhesitation，asanentirelysufficientequivalentforthelongcourseofmentaldiscipline—forthatprofoundandfruitfulprocessthroughwhichthehumanspiritattainstoknowledge—thedirectrevelationofthedivineandthehealthycommonsenseofmankind，unconcernedwithandundisciplinedbyanyotherknowledgeorbyproperphilosophicalreflection。Theseareheldtobeagoodsubstituteforrealphilosophy，muchinthewaythatchicoryislaudedasasubstituteforcoffee。Itisnotaverypleasingspectacletoobserveuncultivatedignoranceandcrudityofmind，withneitherformnortaste，withoutthecapacitytoconcentrateitsthoughtsonanabstractproposition，stilllessonaconnectedstatementofsuchpropositions，confidentlyproclaimingitselftobeintellectualfreedomandtoleration，andeventheinspirationofgenius。Thislastusedonceuponatime，aseveryoneknows，tobeallthevogueinthecaseofpoetry，asitisnowinphilosophy。Insteadofpoetry，however，theeffortsofthisformofinspiration，whenithadanysenseatall，resultedintheproductionoftrivialprose，or，ifitwentbeyondthat，itproducedravingharangues。Inthesamewayhereinthecaseofphilosophy；philosophizingbythelightofnature，whichthinksitselftoogoodforconceptualthinking，and，becauseofthewantofit，takesitselftohavedirectintuitiveideasandpoeticalthoughts，—suchphilosophizingtradesinarbitrarycombinationsofanimaginationmerelydisorganizedthroughthinking—fictitiouscreationsthatareneitherfishnorflesh，neitherpoetrynorphilosophy。
Ontheotherhandagain，wheninstinctivephilosophyfollowsthemoresecurecourseprescribedbyhealthycommonsense，ittreatsustoarhetoricalmélangeofcommonplacetruths。Whenitischargedwiththetrivialityofwhatitoffers，itassuresus，inreply，thatthefullnessandrichnessofitsmeaningliedeepdowninitsownheart，andthatothersmustfeelthistoo，sincewithsuchphrasesasthe“heart\'snaturalinnocence“，“purityofconscience“，andsoon，itsupposesithasexpressedthingsthatareultimateandfinal，towhichnoonecantakeexception，andaboutwhichnothingfurthercanberequired。Buttheveryprobleminhandwasjustthatthebestmustnotbeleftbehindhiddenawayinsecret，butbebroughtoutofthedepthsandsetforthinthelightofday。Itcouldquitewellfromthestarthavespareditselfthetroubleofbringingforwardultimateandfinaltruthsofthatsort；theywerelongsincetobefound，say，intheCatechism，inpopularproverbs，etc。Itisaneasymattertograspsuchtruthsintheirindefiniteandcrookedinaccurateform，andinmanycasestopointoutthatthemindconvincedofthemisconsciousoftheveryoppositetruths。Whenitstrugglestogetitselfoutofthementalembarrassmenttherebyproduced，itwilltumbleintofurtherconfusion，andpossiblyburstoutwiththeassertionthatinshortandinfinethematterissettled，thetruthissoandso，andanythingelseismere“sophistry“—apasswordusedbyplaincommonsenseagainstcultivatedcriticalreason，likethephrase“visionarydreaming“，bywhichthoseignorantofphilosophysumupitscharacteronceforall。Sincethemanofcommonsenseappealstohisfeeling，toanoraclewithinhisbreast，heisdonewithanyonewhodoesnotagree。
Hehasjusttoexplainthathehasnomoretosaytoanyonewhodoesnotfindandfeelthesameashimself。Inotherwords，hetramplestherootsofhumanityunderfoot。Forthenatureofhumanityistoimpelmentoagreewithoneanother，anditsveryexistenceliessimplyintheexplicitrealizationofacommunityofconsciouslife。Whatisanti-human，theconditionofmereanimals，consistsinkeepingwithinthesphereoffeelingpureandsimple，andinbeingabletocommunicateonlybywayoffeeling-states。
Whenamanasksforaroyalroadtoscience，nomoreconvenientandcomfortablewaycanbementionedtohimthantoputhistrustin“healthycommonsense“。Andfortherest，tokeepabreastofthetimesandadvancewithphilosophy，lethimreadreviewsofphilosophicalworks，andevengothelengthofreadingtheprefacesandfirstparagraphsoftheworksthemselves；forthelattergivethegeneralprinciplesonwhicheverythingturns，whilethereviewsalongwiththehistoricalnoticeprovideoverandabovethecriticaljudgmentandappreciation，which，beingajudgmentpassedonthework，goesfartherthantheworkthatisjudged。Thiscommonwayamancantakeinhisdressing-gown。Butspiritualelationintheeternal，thesacred，theinfinite，movesalongthehighwayoftruthintherobesofthehighpriestsroadthat，fromthefirst，isitselfimmediatebeinginitsinnermost，theinspirationofprofoundandoriginalideasandflashesofelevatedthought。Allthesame，thosedepthsdonotyetrevealthewell-springofinnerreality；nor，again，arethesesky-rocketstheempyrean。Truethoughtsandscientificinsightcanonlybewonbythelabourofthenotion。Conceptionsalonecanproduceuniversalityintheknowingprocess。Thisuniversalityiscriticallydevelopedandcompletelyfinishedknowledge。Itisnotthecommonindefinitenessandinadequacyofordinaryintelligence。Nor，again，isitthatextraordinarykindofuniversalitywherethepowersandpotenciesofreasonarespoiledandruinedbygeniusthroughindolenceandself-conceit。Itistruthwhichhassuccessfullyreacheditsowninherentnativeform。Itisthisuniversalitywhichiscapableofbeingthepropertyofeveryself-consciousreason。
19。Conclusion:theauthor\'srelationtothepublicSinceIhavetakentheself-developmentofthenotiontobethemediumwhereinsciencereallyexists，andsinceinthoserespectstowhichIhavedrawnattention，aswellasinothers，currentideasaboutthenatureoftruthandtheshapeitassumesdeviatefrommyview，andindeedarequiteopposedtomyposition，theconsiderationofthisdivergenceofviewdoesnotseemtopromisewellforafavourablereceptionofanattempttoexpoundthesystemofscienceinthissense。Inthemeantime，Imaycalltomindthatwhilee。g。thesuprememeritofPlato\'sphilosophyhassometimesbeenheldtoconsistinhismythswhicharescientificallyvalueless，therehavealsobeentimes，spokenofevenastimesofmeresentimentalenthusiasm，whentheAristotelianphilosophyhasbeenrespectedonaccountofitsspeculativedepthofinsight，andwhentheParmenidesofPlato—perhapsthegreatestliteraryproductofancientdialectic—hasbeentakentobethepositiveexpressionofthedivinelife，theunveilinganddisclosingofitsinmosttruth。Imayreflect，too，thatnotwithstandingmuchcloudyobscuritywhichwastheproductofecstasy，thismisunderstoodecstasywasinpointoffactmeanttobenothingelsethantheactivityofthepurenotion；furthermore，thatwhatisbestinthephilosophyofourtimetakesitsvaluetolieinitsscientificcharacter；andthat，eventhoughotherstakeadifferentview，itisonlyinvirtueofitsscientificcharacterthatrecentphilosophyreallygainsvalidityandacceptance。Thus，then，Imayhopetoothatthisattempttojustifytheclaimofsciencetobeaconceptualprocess，andsystematicallytodevelopandpresentscienceinthisitsownpeculiarmedium，willmanagetomakeawayforitselfbytheinherenttruthoftheresultaccomplished。Wemayrestassuredthatitisthenatureoftruthtoforceitswaytorecognitionwhenthetimecomes，andthatitonlyappearswhenitstimehascome，andhenceneverappearstoosoon，andneverfindsapublicthatisnotripetoreceiveit。And，further，wemaybesurethattheindividualthinkerrequiresthisresulttotakeplace，inordertogivehimconfidenceinregardtowhatisnomoreasyetthanamatterforhimselfsinglyandalone，andinordertofindhisassurance，whichinthefirstinstancemerelybelongstoaparticularindividual，realizedassomethinguniversal。Inthisconnection，however，itisveryoftennecessarytodistinguishthepublicfromthosewhotakeuponthemselvestobeitsrepresentativesandspokesmen。Thepublictakesupanattitudeinmanyrespectsquitedifferentfromthelatter，indeed，evenopposedtothem。Whereasthepublicgood-naturedlyandgenerouslywillrathertaketheblameuponitselfwhenaphilosophicalworkisnotquiteacceptableorintelligibletoit，these“representatives“，onthecontrary，convincedoftheirowncompetence，putalltheblameontheauthors。Theinfluenceoftheworkonthepublicismoresilentthantheactionofthose“representatives“，whoarelikethedeadburyingtheirdead。Whilethegenerallevelofinsightatthepresenttimeisinthemainmorehighlycultivated，itscuriositymorequickenedandalert，anditsjudgmentmoreswiftlymadeupandpronounced，sothatthefeetofthosewhowillcarryyououtarealreadyatthedoor:atthesametimewehaveoftentodistinguishfromallthistheslowerandmoregradualeffectwhichrectifiesthedirectionofattentioncaughtandcompelledbyimposingassurances，corrects，too，contemptuouscensure，andafteralittleprovidesacontemporaryaudienceforonepart，whileanotherafteratemporaryvoguefindsnoaudiencewithposterityanylonger。
Fortherest，atatimewhentheuniversalnatureofspirituallifehasbecomesoverymuchemphasizedandstrengthened，andthemereindividualaspecthasbecome，asitshouldbe，correspondinglyamatterofindifference，when，too，thatuniversalaspectholds，bytheentirerangeofitssubstance，thefullmeasureofthewealthithasbuiltup，andlaysclaimtoitall，theshareinthetotalworkofmindthatfallstotheactivityofanyparticularindividualcanonlybeverysmall。
Becausethisisso，theindividualmustallthemoreforgethimself，asinfacttheverynatureofscienceimpliesandrequiresthatheshould；andhemust，moreover，becomeanddowhathecan。
Butallthelessmustbedemandedofhim，justashecanexpectthelessfromhimself，andmayaskthelessforhimself。
INTRODUCTION
§1
Itisnaturaltosupposethat，beforephilosophyentersuponitssubjectproper-namely，theactualknowledgeofwhattrulvis-itisnecessarytocomefirsttoanunderstandingconcerningknowledge，whichislookeduponastheinstrumentbywhichtotakepossessionoftheAbsolute，orasthemeansthroughwhichtogetasightofit。Theapprehensionseemslegitimate，ontheonehandthattheremaybevariouskindsofknowledge，amongwhichonemightbebetteradaptedthananotherfortheattainmentofourpurpose-andthusawrongchoiceispossible:ontheotherhandagainthat，sinceknowingisafacultyofadefinitekindandwithadeterminaterange，withoutthemoreprecisedeterminationofitsnatureandlimitswemighttakeholdoncloudsoferrorinsteadoftheheavenoftruth。
§2
Thisapprehensivenessissuretopassevenintotheconvictionthatthewholeenterprisewhichsetsouttosecureforconsciousnessbymeansofknowledgewhatexistsperse，isinitsverynatureabsurd；andthatbetweenknowledgeandtheAbsolutethereliesaboundarywhichcompletelycutsofftheonefromtheother。ForifknowledgeistheinstrumentbywhichtogetpossessionofabsoluteReality，thesuggestionimmediatelyoccursthattheapplicationofaninstrumenttoanythingdoesnotleaveitasitisforitself，butratherentailsintheprocess，andhasinview，amouldingandalterationofit。Or，again，ifknowledgeisnotaninstrumentwhichweactivelyemploy，butakindofpassivemediumthroughwhichthelightofthetruthreachesus，thenhere，too，wedonotreceiveitasitisinitself。butasitisthroughandinthismedium。Ineithercaseweemployameanswhichimmediatelybringsabouttheveryoppositeofitsownend；or，rather，theabsurdityliesinmakinguseofanymeansatall。Itseemsindeedopentoustofindintheknowledgeofthewayinwhichtheinstrumentoperates，aremedyforthisparlousstate；fortherebyitbecomespossibletoremovefromtheresultthepartwhich，inourideaoftheAbsolutereceivedthroughthatinstrument，belongstotheinstrument，andthustogetthetruthinitspurity。
Butthisimprovementwould，asamatteroffact，onlybringusbacktothepointwherewewerebefore。Ifwetakeawayagainfromadefinitelyformedthingthatwhichtheinstrumenthasdoneintheshapingofit，thenthething(inthiscasetheAbsolute)standsbeforeusoncemorejustasitwasprevioustoallthistrouble，which，aswenowsee，wassuperfluous。IftheAbsolutewereonlytobebroughtonthewholenearertousbythisagency，withoutanychangebeingwroughtinit，likeabirdcaughtbyalimestick，itwouldcertainlyscornatrickofthatsort，ifitwerenotinitsverynature，anddiditnotwishtobe，besideusfromthestart。Foratrickiswhatknowledgeinsuchacasewouldbe，sincebyallitsbusytoilandtroubleitgivesitselftheairofdoingsomethingquitedifferentfrombringingaboutarelationthatismerelyimmediate，andsoawasteoftimetoestablish。Or，again，iftheexaminationofknowledge，whichwerepresentasamedium，makesusacquaintedwiththelawofitsrefraction，itislikewiseuselesstoeliminatethisrefractionfromtheresult。Forknowledgeisnotthedivergenceoftheray，buttherayitselfbywhichthetruthcomesincontactwithus；andifthisberemoved，thebaredirectionortheemptyplacewouldalonebeindicated。
§3
Meanwhile，ifthefearoffallingintoerrorintroducesanelementofdistrustintoscience，whichwithoutanyscruplesofthatsortgoestoworkandactuallydoesknow，itisnoteasytounderstandwhy，conversely，adistrustshouldnotbeplacedinthisverydistrust，andwhyweshouldnottakecarelestthefearoferrorisnotjusttheinitialerror。Asamatteroffact，thisfearpresupposessomething，indeedagreatdeal，astruth，andsupportsitsscruplesandconsequencesonwhatshoulditselfbeexaminedbeforehandtoseewhetheritistruth。Itstartswithideasofknowledgeasaninstrument，andasamedium；andpresupposesadistinctionofourselvesfromthisknowledge。
MoreespeciallyittakesforgrantedthattheAbsolutestandsononeside，andthatknowledgeontheotherside，byitselfandcutofffromtheAbsolute，isstillsomethingreal；inotherwords，thatknowledge，which，bybeingoutsidetheAbsolute，iscertainlyalsooutsidetruth，isneverthelesstrue-apositionwhich，whilecallingitselffearoferror，makesitselfknownratherasfearofthetruth。
§4
ThisconclusioncomesfromthefactthattheAbsolutealoneistrueorthattheTrueisaloneabsolute，ItmaybesetasidebymakingthedistinctionthataknowledgewhichdoesnotindeedknowtheAbsoluteassciencewantstodo，isnonethelesstruetoo；andthatknowledgeingeneral，thoughitmaypossiblybeincapableofgraspingtheAbsolute，canstillbecapableoftruthofanotherkind。Butweshallseeasweproceedthatrandomtalklikethisleadsinthelongruntoaconfuseddistinctionbetweentheabsolutetruthandatruthofsomeothersort，andthat“absolute“，“knowledge“，andsoon，arewordswhichpresupposeameaningthathasfirsttobegotat。
§5
Withsuchlikeuselessideasandexpressionsaboutknowledge，asaninstrumenttotakeholdoftheAbsolute，orasamediumthroughwhichwehaveaglimpseoftruth，andsoon(relationstowhichalltheseideasofaknowledgewhichisdividedfromtheAbsoluteandanAbsolutedividedfromknowledgeinthelastresortlead)，weneednotconcernourselves。Norneedwetroubleabouttheevasivepretextswhichcreatetheincapacityofscienceoutofthepresuppositionofsuchrelations，inorderatoncetoberidofthetoilofscience，andtoassumetheairofseriousandzealouseffortaboutit。Insteadofbeingtroubledwithgivinganswerstoallthese，theymaybestraightwayrejectedasadventitiousandarbitraryideas；andtheusewhichisheremadeofwordslike“absolute“，“knowledge“，asalso“objective“and“subjective“，andinnumerableothers，whosemeaningisassumedtobefamiliartoeveryone，mightwellberegardedassomuchdeception。Fortogiveoutthattheirsignificanceisuniversallyfamiliarandthateveryoneindeedpossessestheirnotion，ratherlookslikeanattempttodispensewiththeonlyimportantmatter，whichisjusttogivethisnotion。Withbetterright，onthecontrary，wemightspareourselvesthetroubleoftalkinganynoticeatallofsuchideasandwaysoftalkingwhichwouldhavetheeffectofwardingoffsciencealtogether；fortheymakeamereemptyshowofknowledgewhichatoncevanisheswhensciencecomesonthescene。
§6
Butscience，intheveryfactthatitcomesonthescene，isitselfaphenomenon；its“comingonthescene“isnotyetitselfcarriedoutinallthelengthandbreadthofitstruth。Inthisregard，itisamatterofindifferencewhetherweconsiderthatit(science)isthephenomenonbecauseitmakesitsappearancealongsideanotherkindofknowledge，orcallthatotheruntrueknowledgeitsprocessofappearing。Science，however，mustliberateitselffromthisphenomenality，anditcanonlydosobyturningagainstit。Forsciencecannotsimplyrejectaformofknowledgewhichisnottrue，andtreatthisasacommonviewofthings，andthenassureusthatitselfisanentirelydifferentkindofknowledge，andholdstheothertobeofnoaccountatall；norcanitappealtothefactthatinthisothertherearepresagesofabetter。Bygivingthatassuranceitwoulddeclareitsforceandvaluetolieinitsbareexistence；buttheuntrueknowledgeappealslikewisetothefactthatitis，andassuresusthattoitscienceisnothing。Onebarrenassurance，however，isofjustasmuchvalueasanother。Stilllesscanscienceappealtothepresagesofabetter，whicharetobefoundpresentinuntrueknowledgeandaretherepointingthewaytowardsscience；foritwould，ontheonehand，beappealingagaininthesamewaytoamerelyexistentfact；and，ontheother，itwouldbeappealingtoitself，tothewayinwhichitexistsinuntrueknowledge，i。e。toabadformofitsownexistence，toitsappearance，ratherthantoitsrealandtruenature(anundfürsich)。Forthisreasonweshallhereundertaketheexpositionofknowledgeasaphenomenon。
§7
Nowbecausethisexpositionhasforitsobjectonlyphenomenalknowledge，theexpositionitselfseemsnottobescience，free，self-movingintheshapepropertoitself，butmay，fromthispointofview，betakenasthepathwayofthenaturalconsciousnesswhichispressingforwardtotrueknowledge。Oritcanberegardedasthepathofthesoul，whichistraversingtheseriesofitsownformsofembodiment，likestagesappointedforitbyitsownnature，thatitmaypossesstheclearnessofspirituallifewhen，throughthecompleteexperienceofitsownself，itarrivesattheknowledgeofwhatitisinitself。
§8
Naturalconsciousnesswillproveitselftobeonlyknowledgeinprincipleornotrealknowledge。
Since，however，itimmediatelytakesitselftobetherealandgenuineknowledge，thispathwayhasanegativesignificanceforit；whatisarealizationofthenotionofknowledgemeansforitrathertheruinandoverthrowofitself；foronthisroaditlosesitsowntruth。Becauseofthat，theroadcanbelookedonasthepathofdoubt，ormoreproperlyahighwayofdespair。Forwhathappensthereisnotwhatisusuallyunderstoodbydoubting，ajostlingagainstthisorthatsupposedtruth，theoutcomeofwhichisagainadisappearanceinduecourseofthedoubtandareturntotheformertruth，sothatattheendthematteristakenasitwasbefore。Onthecontrary，thatpathwayistheconsciousinsightintotheuntruthofthephenomenalknowledge，forwhichthatisthemostrealwhichisafterallonlytheunrealizednotion。Onthataccount，too，thisthoroughgoingscepticismisnotwhatdoubtlessearnestzealfortruthandsciencefanciesithasequippeditselfwithinordertobereadytodealwiththem-viz。theresolve，inscience，nottodeliveritselfovertothethoughtsofothersontheirmereauthority，buttoexamineeverythingforitself，andonlyfollowitsownconviction，or，stillbetter，toproduceeverythingitselfandholdonlyitsownactfortrue。
§9
Theseriesofshapes，whichconsciousnesstraversesonthisroad，isratherthedetailedhistoryoftheprocessoftrainingandeducatingconsciousnessitselfuptothelevelofscience。Thatresolvepresentsthismentaldevelopment(Bildung)inthesimpleformofanintendedpurpose，asimmediatelyfinishedandcomplete，ashavingtakenplace；thispathway，ontheotherhand，is，asopposedtothisabstractintention，oruntruth，theactualcarryingoutofthatprocessofdevelopment。Tofollowone\'sownconvictioniscertainlymorethantohandoneselfovertoauthority；butbytheconversionofopinionheldonauthorityintoopinionheldoutofpersonalconviction，thecontentofwhatisheldisnotnecessarilyaltered，andtruthhasnottherebytakentheplaceoferror。Ifwesticktoasystemofopinionandprejudicerestingontheauthorityofothers，oruponpersonalconviction，theonediffersfromtheothermerelyintheconceitwhichanimatesthelatter。Scepticism，directedtothewholecompassofphenomenalconsciousness，onthecontrary，makesmindforthefirsttimequalifiedtotestwhattruthis；sinceitbringsaboutadespairregardingwhatarecallednaturalviews，thoughts，andopinions，whichitismatterofindifferencetocallpersonalorbelongingtoothers，andwithwhichtheconsciousness，thatproceedsstraightawaytocriticizeandtest，isstillfilledandhampered，thusbeing，asamatteroffact，incapableofwhatitwantstoundertake。
§10
Thecompletenessoftheformsofunrealconsciousnesswillbebroughtaboutpreciselythroughthenecessityoftheadvanceandthenecessityoftheirconnectionwithoneanother。Tomakethiscomprehensiblewemayremark，bywayofpreliminary，thattheexpositionofuntrueconsciousnessinitsuntruthisnotamerelynegativeprocess。Suchaone-sidedviewofitiswhatthenaturalconsciousnessgenerallyadopts；andaknowledge，whichmakesthisone-sidednessitsessence，isoneofthoseshapesassumedbyincompleteconsciousnesswhichfallsintothecourseoftheinquiryitselfandwillcomebeforeusthere。Forthisviewisscepticism，whichalwaysseesintheresultonlypurenothingness，andabstractsfromthefactthatthisnothingisdeterminate，isthenothingofthatoutofwhichitcomesasaresult。Nothing，however，isonly，infact，thetrueresult，whentakenasthenothingofwhatitcomesfrom；itisthusitselfadeterminatenothing，andhasacontent。Thescepticismwhichendswiththeabstraction“nothing“or“emptiness“canadvancefromthisnotastepfarther，butmustwaitandseewhetherthereispossiblyanythingnewoffered，andwhatthatis-inordertocastitintothesameabysmalvoid。Whenonce，ontheotherhand，theresultisapprehended，asittrulyis，asdeterminatenegation，anewformhastherebyimmediatelyarisen；andinthenegationthetransitionismadebywhichtheprogressthroughthecompletesuccessionofformscomesaboutofitself。
§11
Thegoal，however，isfixedforknowledgejustasnecessarilyasthesuccessionintheprocess。Theterminusisatthatpointwhereknowledgeisnolongercompelledtogobeyonditself，whereitfindsitsownself，andthenotioncorrespondstotheobjectandtheobjecttothenotion。Theprogresstowardsthisgoalconsequentlyiswithoutahalt，andatnoearlierstageissatisfactiontobefound。Thatwhichisconfinedtoalifeofnatureisunableofitselftogobeyonditsimmediateexistence；butbysomethingotherthanitselfitisforcedbeyondthat；andtobethuswrenchedoutofitssettingisitsdeath。Consciousness，however，istoitselfitsownnotion；therebyitimmediatelytranscendswhatislimited，and，sincethislatterbelongstoit，consciousnesstranscendsitsownself。Alongwiththeparticularthereisatthesametimesetupthe“beyond“，werethisonly，asinspatialintuition，besidewhatislimited。Consciousness，therefore，suffersthisviolenceatitsownhands；itdestroysitsownlimitedsatisfaction。Whenfeelingofviolence，anxietyforthetruthmaywellwithdraw，andstruggletopreserveforitselfthatwhichisindangerofbeinglost。Butitcanfindnorest。Shouldthatanxiousfearfulnesswishtoremainalwaysinunthinkingindolence，thoughtwillagitatethethoughtlessness，itsrestlessnesswilldisturbthatindolence。Orletittakeitsstandasaformofsentimentalitywhichassuresusitfindseverythinggoodinitskind，andthisassurancelikewisewillsufferviolenceatthehandsofreason，whichfindssomethingnotgoodjustbecauseandinsofarasitisakind。Or，again，fearofthetruthmayconcealitselffromitselfandothersbehindthepretextthatpreciselyburningzealfortheverytruthmakesitsodifficult，nayimpossible，tofindanyothertruthexceptthatofwhichalonevanityiscapable-thatofbeingeversomuchclevererthananyideas，whichonegetsfromoneselforothers，couldmakepossible。Thissortofconceitwhichunderstandshowtobelittleeverytruthandturnawayfromitbackintoitself，andgloatsoverthisitsownprivateunderstanding，whichalwaysknowshowtodissipateeverypossiblethought，andtofind，insteadofallthecontent，merelythebarrenEgo-thisisasatisfactionwhichmustbelefttoitself；foritfleestheuniversalandseeksonlyanisolatedexistenceonitsownaccount(Fürsichseyn)。
§12
Astheforegoinghasbeenstated，provisionallyandingeneral，concerningthemannerandthenecessityOftheprocessoftheinquiry，itmayalsobeoffurtherservicetomakesomeobservationsregardingthemethodofcarryingthisout。Thisexposition，viewedasaprocessofrelatingsciencetophenomenalknowledge，andasaninquiryandcriticalexaminationintotherealityofknowing，doesnotseemabletobeeffectedwithoutsomepresuppositionwhichislaiddownasanultimatecriterion。Foranexaminationconsistsinapplyinganacceptedstandard，and，onthefinalagreementordisagreementtherewithofwhatistested，decidingwhetherthelatterisrightorwrong；andthestandardingeneral，andsoscience，werethisthecriterion，istherebyacceptedastheessenceorinherentlyreal(Ausich)。But，here，。wheresciencefirstappearsonthescene，neithersciencenoranysortofstandardhasjustifieditselfastheessenceorultimatereality；
andwithoutthisnoexaminationseemsabletobeinstituted。
§13
Thiscontradictionandtheremovalofitwillbecomemoredefiniteif，tobeginwith，wecalltomindtheabstractdeterminationsofknowledgeandoftruthastheyarefoundinconsciousness。
Consciousness，wefind，distinguishesfromitselfsomething，towhichatthesametimeitrelatesitself；or，tousethecurrentexpression，thereissomethingforconsciousness；andthedeterminateformofthisprocessofrelating，oroftherebeingsomethingforaconsciousness，isknowledge。Butfromthisbeingforanotherwedistinguishbeinginitselforperse；whatisrelatedtoknowledgeislikewisedistinguishedfromit，andpositedasalsoexistingoutsidethisrelation；theaspectofbeingperseorinitselfiscalledTruth。Whatreallyliesinthesedeterminationsdoesnotfurtherconcernushere；forsincetheobjectofourinquiryisphenomenalknowledge。，itsdeterminationsarealsotakenup，inthefirstinstance，astheyareimmediatelyofferedtous。Andtheyareofferedtousverymuchinthewaywehavejuststated。
§14
Ifnowourinquirydealswiththetruthofknowledge，itappearsthatweareinquiringwhatknowledgeisinitself。Butinthisinquiryknowledgeisourobject，itisforus；andtheessentialnature(Ansich)ofknowledge，werethistocometolight，wouldberatheritsbeingforus:whatweshouldasserttobeitsessencewouldratherbe，notthetruthofknowledge，butonlyourknowledgeofit。Theessenceorthecriterionwouldlieinus；andthatwhichwastobecomparedwiththisstandard，andonwhichadecisionwastobepassedasaresultofthiscomparison，wouldnotnecessarilyhavetorecognizethatcriterion。
§15
Butthenatureoftheobjectwhichweareexaminingsurmountsthisseparation，orsemblanceofseparation，andpresupposition。Consciousnessfurnishesitsowncriterioninitself，andtheinquirywilltherebybeacomparisonofitselfwithitsownself；forthedistinction，justmade，fallsinsideitself。Inconsciousnessthereisoneelementforanother，or，ingeneral，consciousnessimplicatesthespecificcharacterofthemomentofknowledge。Atthesametimethis“other“istoconsciousnessnotmerelyforit，butalsooutsidethisrelation，orhasabeinginitself，i。e。thereisthemomentoftruth。Thusinwhatconsciousnessinsideitselfdeclarestobetheessenceortruthwehavethestandardwhichitselfsetsup，andbywhichwearetomeasureitsknowledge。
§16
Supposewecallknowledgethenotion，andtheessenceortruth“being“ortheobject，thentheexaminationconsistsinseeingwhetherthenotioncorrespondswiththeobject。Butifwecalltheinnernatureoftheobject，orwhatitisinitself，thenotion，and，ontheotherside，understandbyobjectthenotionquaobject，i。e。thewaythenotionisforanother，thentheexaminationconsistsinourseeingwhethertheobjectcorrespondstoitsownnotion。Itisclear，ofcourse，thatbothoftheseprocessesarethesame。Theessentialfact，however，tobeborneinmindthroughoutthewholeinquiryisthatboththesemoments，notionandobject，“beingforanother“and“beinginitself“，themselvesfallwithinthatknowledgewhichweareexamining。Consequentlywedonotrequiretobringstandardswithus，nortoapplyourfanciesandthoughtsintheinquire；andjustbyourleavingtheseasideweareenabledtotreatanddiscussthesubjectasitactuallyisinitselfandforitself，asitisinitscompletereality。
§17
Butnotonlyinthisrespect，thatnotionandobject，thecriterionandwhatistobetested，arereadytohandinconsciousnessitself，isanyadditionofourssuperfluous，butwearealsosparedthetroubleofcomparingthesetwoandofmakinganexaminationinthestrictsenseoftheterm；sothatinthisrespect，too，sinceconsciousnesstestsandexaminesitself，allwearelefttodoissimplyandsolelytolookon。Forconsciousnessis，ontheonehand，consciousnessoftheobject，ontheother，consciousnessofitself；consciousnessofwhattoitistrue，andconsciousnessofitsknowledgeofthattruth。Sincebothareforthesameconsciousness，itisitselftheircomparison；itisthesameconsciousnessthatdecidesandknowswhetheritsknowledgeoftheobjectcorrespondswiththisobjectornot。Theobject，itistrue，appearsonlytobeinsuchwiseforconsciousnessasconsciousnessknowsit。Consciousnessdoesnotseemabletoget，sotosay，behinditasitis，notforconsciousness，butinitself，andconsequentlyseemsalsounabletotestknowledgebyit。Butjustbecauseconsciousnesshas，ingeneral，knowledgeofanobject，thereisalreadypresentthedistinctionthattheinherentnature，whattheobjectisinitself，isonethingtoconsciousness，whileknowledge，orthebeingoftheobjectforconsciousness，isanothermoment。
Uponthisdistinction，whichispresentasafact，theexaminationturns。Shouldboth，whenthuscompared，notcorrespond，consciousnessseemsboundtoalteritsknowledge，inordertomakeitfittheobject。Butinthealterationoftheknowledge，theobjectitselfalso，inpointoffact，isaltered；fortheknowledgewhichexistedwasessentiallyaknowledgeoftheobject；withchangeintheknowledge，theobjectalsobecomesdifferent，sinceitbelongedessentiallytothisknowledge。
Henceconsciousnesscomestofindthatwhatformerlytoitwastheessenceisnotwhatisperse，orwhatwaspersewasonlyperseforconsciousness。Since，then，inthecaseofitsobjectconsciousnessfindsitsknowledgenotcorrespondingwiththisobject，theobjectlikewisefailstoholdout；orthestandardforexaminingisalteredwhenthat，whosecriterionthisstandardwastobe，doesnotholditsgroundinthecourseoftheexamination；andtheexaminationisnotonlyanexaminationofknowledge，butalsoofthecriterionusedintheprocess。
§18
Thisdialecticprocesswhichconsciousnessexecutesonitself-onitsknowledgeaswellasonitsobject—inthesensethatoutofitthenewandtrueobjectarises，isprecisely，whatistermedExperience。Inthisconnection，thereisamomentintheprocessjustmentionedwhichshouldbebroughtintomoredecidedprominence，andbywhichanewlightiscastonthescientificaspectofthefollowingexposition。Consciousnessknowssomething；thissomethingistheessenceorisperse。Thisobject，however，isalsotheperse，theinherentreality，forconsciousness。Hencecomesambiguityofthistruth。Consciousness，aswesee，hasnowtwoobjects:oneisthefirstperse，thesecondistheexistenceforconsciousnessofthisperse。Thelastobjectappearsatfirstsighttobemerelythereflectionofconsciousnessintoitself，i。e。anideanotofanobject，butsolelyofitsknowledgeofthatfirstobject。But，aswasalreadyindicated，bythatveryprocessthefirstobjectisaltered；itceasestobewhatisperse，andbecomesconsciouslysomethingwhichisperseonlyforconsciousness。Consequently，then，whatthisrealperseisforconsciousnessistruth:which，however，meansthatthisistheessentialreality，ortheobjectwhichconsciousnesshas。Thisnewobjectcontainsthenothingnessofthefirst；thenewobjectistheexperienceconcerningthatfirstobject。
§19
Inthistreatmentofthecourseofexperience，thereisanelementinvirtueofwhichitdoesnotseemtobeinagreementwithwhatisordinarilyunderstoodbyexperience。Thetransitionfromthefirstobjectandtheknowledgeofittotheotherobject，inregardtowhichwesaywehavehadexperience，wassostatedthattheknowledgeofthefirstobject，theexistenceforconsciousnessofthefirstensperse，isitselftobethesecondobject。Butitusuallyseemsthatwelearnbyexperiencetheuntruthofourfirstnotionbyappealingtosomeotherobjectwhichwemayhappentofindcasuallyandexternally；sothat，ingeneral，whatwehaveismerelythebareandsimpleapprehensionofwhatisinandforitself。Ontheviewabovegiven，however，thenewobjectisseentohavecomeaboutbyatransformationorconversionofconsciousnessitself。Thiswayoflookingatthematterisourdoing，whatwecontribute；byitsmeanstheseriesofexperiencesthroughwhichconsciousnesspassesisliftedintoascientificallyconstitutedsequence，butthisdoesnotexistfortheconsciousnesswecontemplateandconsider。Wehavehere，however，thesamesortofcircumstance，again，ofwhichwespokeashorttimeagowhendealingwiththerelationofthisexpositiontoscepticism，viz。thattheresultwhichatanytimecomesaboutinthecaseofanuntruemodeofknowledgecannotpossiblycollapseintoanemptynothing，butmustnecessarilybetakenasthenegationofthatofwhichitisaresult-aresultwhichcontainswhattruththeprecedingmodeofknowledgehasinit。Inthepresentinstancethepositiontakesthisform:sincewhatatfirstappearedasobjectisreduced，whenitpassesintoconsciousness，towhatknowledgetakesittobe，andtheimplicitnature，therealinitself，becomeswhatthisentityperse，isforconsciousness；
thislatteristhenewobject，whereuponthereappearsalsoanewmodeorembodimentofconsciousness，ofwhichtheessenceissomethingotherthanthatoftheprecedingmode。Itisthiscircumstancewhichcarriesforwardthewholesuccessionofthemodesorattitudesofconsciousnessintheirownnecessity。Itisonlythisnecessity，thisoriginationofthenewobject-whichoffersitselftoconsciousnesswithoutconsciousnessknowinghowitcomesbyit-thattous，whowatchtheprocess，istobeseengoingon，sotosay，behinditsback。Therebythereentersintoitsprocessamomentofbeingperse，orofbeingforus，whichisnotexpresslypresentedtothatconsciousnesswhichisinthegripofexperienceitself。Thecontent，however，ofwhatweseearising，existsforit，andwelayholdofandcomprehendmerelyitsformalcharacter，i。e。itsbareorigination；forit，whathasthusarisenhasmerelythecharacterofobject，while，forus，itappearsatthesametimeasaprocessandcomingintobeing。
§20
Invirtueofthatnecessitythispathwaytoscienceisitselfeoipsoscience，andis，moreover，asregardsitscontent，ScienceoftheExperienceofConsciousness。
§21
Theexperiencewhichconsciousnesshasconcerningitselfcan，byitsessentialprinciple，embracenothinglessthantheentiresystemofconsciousness，thewholerealmofthetruthofmind，andinsuchwisethatthemomentsoftrutharesetforthinthespecificandpeculiarcharactertheyherepossess-i。e。notasabstractpuremoments，butastheyareforconsciousness，orasconsciousnessitselfappearsinitsrelationtothem，andinvirtueofwhichtheyaremomentsofthewhole，areembodimentsormodesofconsciousness。Inpressingforwardtoitstrueformofexistence，consciousnesswillcometoapointatwhichitlaysasideitssemblanceofbeinghamperedwithwhatisforeigntoit，withwhatisonlyforitandexistsasanother；itwillreachapositionwhereappearancebecomesidentifiedwithessence，where，inconsequence，itsexpositioncoincideswithjustthisverypoint，thisverystageofthescienceproperofmind。And，finally，whenitgraspsthisitsownessence，itwillconnotethenatureofabsoluteknowledgeitself。
A—
CONSCIOUSNESS(1)
I
CertaintyattheLevelofSenseExperience-the“This“，and“Meaning“
1。TheObjectofSenseCertaintyTHEknowledge，whichisatthestartorimmediatelyourobject，canbenothingelsethanjustthatwhichisimmediateknowledge，knowledgeoftheimmediate，ofwhatis。Wehave，indealingwithit，toproceed，too，inanimmediateway，toacceptwhatisgiven，notalteringanythinginitasitispresentedbeforeus，andkeepingmereapprehension(Auffassen)freefromconceptualcomprehension(Begreifen)。
Theconcretecontent，whichsensuouscertaintyfurnishes，makesthisprimafacieappeartobetherichestkindofknowledge，tobeevenaknowledgeofendlesswealth—awealthtowhichwecanaslittlefindanylimitwhenwetraverseitsextentinspaceandtime，wherethatcontentispresentedbeforeus，aswhenwetakeafragmentoutoftheabundanceitoffersusandbydividinganddividingseektopenetrateitsintent。Besidesthat。itseemstobethetruest，themostauthenticknowledge:forithasnotasyetdroppedanythingfromtheobject；ithastheobjectbeforeitselfinitsentiretyandcompleteness。Thisbarefactofcertainty，however，isreallyandadmittedlytheabstractestandthepoorestkindoftruth。Itmerelysaysregardingwhatitknows:itis；anditstruthcontainssolelythebeingofthefactitknows。Consciousness，onitspart，inthecaseofthisformofcertainty，takestheshapemerelyofpureEgo。Inotherwords，IinsuchacaseammerelyquapureThis，andtheobjectlikewiseismerelyquapureThis。I，thisparticularconsciousI，amcertainofthisfactbeforeme，notbecauseIquaconsciousnesshavedevelopedmyselfinconnectionwithitandinmanifoldwayssetthoughttoworkaboutit:andnot，again，becausethefact，thething，ofwhichIamcertain，invirtueofitshavingamultitudeofdistinctqualities，wasrepletewithpossiblemodesofrelationandavarietyofconnectionswithotherthings。Neitherhasanythingtodowiththetruthsensuouscertaintycontains:neithertheInorthethinghasherethemeaningofamanifoldrelationwithavarietyofotherthings，ofmediationinavarietyofways。TheIdoesnotcontainorimplyamanifoldofideas，theIheredoesnotthink:nordoesthethingmeanwhathasamultiplicityofqualities。Rather，thething，thefact，is；anditismerelybecauseitis。Itis—thatistheessentialpointforsense-knowledge，andthatbarefactofbeing，thatsimpleimmediacy，constitutesitstruth。Inthesamewaythecertaintyquarelation，thecertainty“of“
something，isanimmediatepurerelation；consciousnessisI—nothingmore，apurethis；theindividualconsciousnessknowsapurethis，orknowswhatisindividual。
But，whenwelookclosely，thereisagooddealmoreimpliedinthatbarepurebeing，whichconstitutesthekernelofthisformofcertainty，andisgivenoutbyitasitstruth。Aconcreteactualcertaintyofsenseisnotmerelythispureimmediacy，butanexample，aninstance，ofthatimmediacy。Amongsttheinnumerabledistinctionsthatherecometolight，wefindinallcasesthefundamentaldifference—viz。thatinsense-experiencepurebeingatoncebreaksupintothetwo“thises“，aswehavecalledthem，onethisasI，andoneasobject。Whenwereflect(2)onthisdistinction，itisseenthatneithertheonenortheotherismerelyimmediate，merelyisinsense-certainty，butisatthesametimemediated:Ihavethecertaintythroughtheother，viz。
throughtheactualfact；andthis，again，existsinthatcertaintythroughanother，viz。throughtheI。
Itisnotonlywewhomakethisdistinctionofessentialtruthandparticularexample，ofessenceandinstance，immediacyandmediation；wefinditinsense-certaintyitself，andithastobetakenupintheforminwhichitexiststhere，notaswehavejustdeterminedit。Oneofthemisputforwardinitasexistinginsimpleimmediacy，astheessentialreality，theobject。Theother，however，isputforwardasthenon-essential，asmediated，somethingwhichisnotperseinthecertainty，buttherethroughsomethingelse，ego，astateofknowledgewhichonlyknowstheobjectbecausetheobjectis，andwhichcanaswellbeasnotbe。Theobject，however，istherealtruth，istheessentialreality；itis，quiteindifferenttowhetheritisknownornot；itremainsandstandseventhoughitisnotknown，whiletheknowledgedoesnotexistiftheobjectisnotthere。
Wehavethustoconsiderastotheobject，whetherinpointoffactitdoesexistinsense-certaintyitselfassuchanessentialrealityasthatcertaintygivesitouttobe；whetheritsmeaningandnotion，whichistobeessentialreality，correspondstothewayitispresentinthatcertainty。Wehaveforthatpurposenottoreflectaboutitandponderwhatitmightbeintruth，buttodealwithitmerelyassense-certaintycontainsit。
Sense-certaintyitselfhasthustobeasked:WhatistheThis?Ifwetakeitinthetwo-foldformofitsexistence，astheNowandastheHere，thedialecticithasinitwilltakeaformasintelligibleastheThisitself。Tothequestion，WhatistheNow?wereply，forexample，theNowisnight-time。
Totestthetruthofthiscertaintyofsense，asimpleexperimentisallweneed:writethattruthdown。Atruthcannotloseanythingbybeingwrittendown，andjustaslittlebyourpreservingandkeepingit。Ifwelookagainatthetruthwehavewrittendown，lookatitnow，atthisnoon-time，weshallhavetosayithasturnedstaleandbecomeoutofdate。
TheNowthatisnightiskeptfixed，i。e。itistreatedaswhatitisgivenouttobe，assomethingwhichis；butitprovestoberatherasomethingwhichisnot。TheNowitselfnodoubtmaintainsitself，butaswhatisnotnight；similarlyinitsrelationtothedaywhichtheNowisatpresent，itmaintainsitselfassomethingthatisalsonotday，orasaltogethersomethingnegative。Thisself-maintainingNowisthereforenotsomethingimmediatebutsomethingmediated；for，quasomethingthatremainsandpreservesitself，itisdeterminedthroughandbymeansofthefactthatsomethingelse，namelydayandnight，isnot。Therebyitisjustasmuchaseveritwasbefore，Now，andinbeingthissimplefact，itisindifferenttowhatisstillassociatedwithit；justaslittleasnightordayisitsbeing，itisjustastrulyalsodayandnight；itisnotintheleastaffectedbythisothernessthroughwhichitiswhatitis。Asimpleentityofthissort，whichisbyandthroughnegation，whichisneitherthisnorthat，whichisanot-this，andwithequalindifferencethisaswellasthat—athingofthiskindwecallaUniversal。TheUniversalisthereforeinpointoffactthetruthofsense-certaintv，thetruecontentofsense-experience。
Itisasauniversal，too，thatwe(3)giveutterancetosensuousfact。Whatwesayis:“This“，i。e。theuniversalthis；orwesay:“itis“，i。e。beingingeneral。Ofcoursewedonotpresentbeforeourmindinsaying，sotheuniversalthis，orbeingingeneral，butweutterwhatisuniversal；inotherwords，wedonotactuallyandabsolutelysaywhatinthissense-certaintywereallymean。Language，however，aswesee，isthemoretruthful；initweourselvesrefutedirectlyandatonceourown“meaning“；andsinceuniversalityistherealtruthofsense-certainty，andlanguagemerelyexpressesthistruth，itisnotpossibleatallforuseventoexpressinwordsanysensuousexistencewhichwe“mean“。
ThesamewillbethecasewhenwetaketheHere，theotherformoftheThis。TheHereise。g。thetree。
Iturnaboutandthistruthhasdisappearedandhaschangedroundintoitsopposite:theHere，isnotatree，butahouse。TheHereitselfdoesnotdisappear；itisandremainsinthedisappearanceofthehouse，tree，andsoon，andisindifferentlyhouse，tree。TheThisisshownthusagaintobemediatedsimplicity，inotherwords，tobeuniversality。
Purebeing，then，remainsastheessentialelementforthissense-certainty，sincesense-certaintyinitsverynatureprovestheuniversaltobethetruthofitsobject。Butthatpurebeingisnotintheformofsomethingimmediate，butofsomethinginwhichtheprocessofnegationandmediationisessential。Consequentlyitisnotwhatweintendor“mean“bybeing，butbeingwiththecharacteristicthatitisanabstraction，thepurelyuniversal；andourintended“meaning“，whichtakesthetruthofsense-certaintytobenotsomethinguniversal，isaloneleftstandingincontrasttothisempty。indifferentNowandHere。
Ifwecomparetherelationinwhichknowledgeandtheobjectfirststoodwiththerelationtheyhavecometoassumeinthisresult，itisfoundtobejustthereverseofwhatfirstappeared。Theobject，whichprofessedtobetheessentialreality，isnowthenon-essentialelementofsense-certainty；fortheuniversal，whichtheobjecthascometobe，isnolongersuchastheobjectessentiallywastobeforsense-certainty。Thecertaintyisnowfoundtolieintheoppositeelement，namelyinknowledge，whichformerlywasthenon-essentialfactor。Itstruthliesintheobjectasmy(meinem)object，orliesinthe“meaning“(Meinen)，inwhatI“mean“；itis，becauseIknowit。
Sense-certaintyisthusindeedbanishedfromtheobject，butitisnotyettherebydoneawaywith；itismerelyforcedbackintotheI。Wehavestilltoseewhatexperiencerevealsregardingitsrealityinthissense。
TheforceofitstruththusliesnowintheI，intheimmediatefactofmyseeing，hearing，andsoon；
thedisappearanceoftheparticularNowandHerethatwe“mean“ispreventedbythefactthatI
keepholdonthem。TheNowisdaytime，becauseIseeit；theHereisatreeforasimilarreason。
Sense-certainty，however，goesthrough，inthisconnection，thesamedialecticprocessasintheformercase。I，thisI，seethetree，andassertthetreetobetheHere；anotherI，however，seesthehouseandmaintainstheHereisnotatreebutahouse。Bothtruthshavethesameauthenticity—theimmediacyofseeingandthecertaintyandassurancebothhaveastotheirspecificwayofknowing；buttheonecertaintydisappearsintheother。
Inallthis，whatdoesnotdisappearistheIquauniversal，whoseseeingisneithertheseeingofthistreenorofthishouse，butjustseeingsimpliciter，whichismediatedthroughthenegationofthishouse，etc。，and，inbeingso，isallthesamesimpleandindifferenttowhatisassociatedwithit，thehouse，thetree，andsoon。Iismerelyuniversal，likeNow，Here，orThisingeneral。NodoubtI
“mean“anindividualI，butjustsomethingaslittleasIamabletosaywhatI“mean“byNow，Here，soitisimpossibleinthecaseoftheItoo。Bysaying“thisHere“，“thisNow“，“anindividualthing“，IsayallThises，Heres，Nows，orIndividuals。InthesamewaywhenIsay“I“，“thisindividualI“，Isayquitegenerally“allI\'s“，everyoneis“I“，thisindividualI。Whenphilosophyis。requested，bywayofputtingittoacrucialtest—atestwhichitcouldnotpossiblysustain—to“deduce“，to“construe“，“tofindapriori“，orhoweveritisput，aso-calledthisthing，orthisparticularman，(4)itisreasonablethatthepersonmakingthisdemandshouldsaywhat“thisthing“，orwhat“thisI“，hemeans:buttosaythisisquiteimpossible。
Sense-certaintydiscoversbyexperience，therefore，thatitsessentialnatureliesneitherintheobjectnorintheI；andthattheimmediacypeculiartoitisneitheranimmediacyoftheonenoroftheother。For，inthecaseofboth，whatI“mean“israthersomethingnon-essential；andtheobjectandtheIareuniversals，inwhichthatNowandHereandI，whichI“mean“，donotholdout，donotexist。Wearriveinthiswayattheresult，thatwehavetoputthewhole，ofsense-certaintyasitsessentialreality，andnolongermerelyoneofitsmoments，ashappenedinbothcases，wherefirsttheobjectasagainsttheI，andthentheI，wastobeitstruereality。Thusitisonlythewholesensecertaintyitselfwhichpersiststhereinasimmediacy，andinconsequenceexcludesfromitselfalltheoppositionwhichintheforegoinghadaplacethere。
Thispureimmediacy，then，hasnothingmoretodowiththefactofotherness，withHereintheformofatreepassingintoaHerethatisnotatree，withNowinthesenseofday-timechangingintoaNowthatisnight-time，orwiththerebeinganotherItowhichsomethingelseisobject。Itstruthstandsfastasaself-identicalrelationmakingnodistinctionofessentialandnon-essential，betweenIandobject，andintowhich，therefore，ingeneral，nodistinctioncanfinditsway。I，thisI，assert，then，theHereastree，anddonotturnroundsothatformeHeremightbecomenotatree，andItakenonoticeofthefactthatanotherIfindstheHereasnot-tree，orthatImyselfatsomeothertimetaketheHereasnot-tree，theNowasnot-day。Iamdirectlyconscious，Iintuitandnothingmore，Iampureintuition；Iam-seeing，looking。FormyselfIstandbythefact，theNowisday-time，or，again，bythefacttheHereistree，and，again，donotcompareHereandNowthemselveswithoneanother；Itakemystandononeimmediaterelation:theNowisday。
2。TheSubjectofSenseCertaintySince，then，thiscertaintywhollyrefusestocomeoutifwedirectitsattentiontoaNowthatisnightoranItowhomitisnight，wewillgotoitandletourselvespointouttheNowthatisasserted。WemustletourselvespointitoutforthetruthofthisimmediaterelationisthetruthofthisegowhichrestrictsitselftoaNoworaHere。Werewetoexaminethistruthafterwards，orstandatadistancefromit，。itwouldhavenomeaningatall；forthatwoulddoawaywiththeimmediacy，whichisofitsessence。Wehavethereforetoenterthesamepointoftimeorofspace，indicatethem，pointthemouttoourselves，i。e。wemustletourselvestaketheplaceoftheverysameI，theverysameThis，whichisthesubjectknowingwithcertainty。Letus，then，seehowthatimmediateisconstituted，whichisshowntous。
TheNowispointedout；thisNow。“Now“；ithasalreadyceasedtobewhenitispointedout。TheNowthatis，isotherthantheoneindicated，andweseethattheNowisjustthis—tobenolongertheverytimewhenitis。TheNowasitisshowntousisonethathasbeen，andthatisitstruth；itdoesnothavethetruthofbeing，ofsomethingthatis。Nodoubtthisistrue，thatithasbeen；butwhathasbeenisinpointoffactnotgenuinelyreal，itisnot，andthepointinquestionconcernedwhatis，concernedbeing。
InthuspointingouttheNowweseethenmerelyaprocesswhichtakesthefollowingcourse:FirstIpointouttheNow，anditisassertedtobethetruth。Ipointitout，however，assomethingthathasbeen，orassomethingcancelledanddoneawaywith。IthusannulandpassbeyondthatfirsttruthandinthesecondplaceInowassertasthesecondtruththatithasbeen，thatitissuperseded。But，thirdly，whathasbeenisnot；Ithensupersede，cancel，itshavingbeen，thefactofitsbeingannulled，thesecondtruth，negatetherebythenegationoftheNowandreturninsodoingtothefirstposition:thatNowis。TheNowandpointingouttheNowarethussoconstitutedthatneithertheonenortheotherisanimmediatesimplefact，butaprocesswithdiversemomentsinit。AThisissetup；itis，however，ratheranotherthatissetup；theThisissuperseded:andthisotherness，thiscancellingoftheformer，isitselfagainannulled，andsoturnedbacktothefirst。Butthisfirst，reflectedthusintoitself，isnotexactlythesameasitwastobeginwith，namelysomethingimmediate:ratheritisasomethingreflectedinto-self，asimpleentitywhichremainsinitsotherness，whatitis:aNowwhichisanynumberofNows。AndthatistheGenuinelytrueNow；theNowissimpleday-timewhichhasmanyNowswithinit—hours。ANowofthatsort，again—anhour—
issimilarlymanyminutes；andthisNow—aminute—inthesamewaymanyNowsandsoon。
Showing，indicating，pointingout[theNow]isthusitselftheveryprocesswhichexpresseswhattheNowintruthreallyis:namelyaresult，orapluralityofNowsalltakentogether。Andthepointing，outisthewayofgettingtoknow，ofexperiencing，thatNowisauniversal。
TheHerepointedout，whichIkeepholdof，islikewiseathisHerewhich，infact，isnotthisHere，butaBeforeandBehind，anAboveandBelow，aRightandLeft。TheAboveisitselflikewisethismanifoldotherness—above，below，etc。TheHere，whichwastobepointedout，disappearsinotherHeres，andthesedisappearsimilarly。Whatispointedout，heldfast，andispermanentsanegativeThis，whichonlyissowhentheHeresaretakenastheyshouldbe，butthereincanceloneanother；itisasimplecomplexofmanyHeres。TheHerethatis“meant“wouldbethepoint。Butitisnot:rather，whenitispointedoutasbeing，ashavingexistence，thatveryactofpointingoutprovestobenotimmediateknowledge，butaprocess，amovementfromtheHere“meant“throughapluralityofHerestotheuniversalHere，whichisasimplepluralityofHeres，justasdayisasimplepluralityofNows。
3。TheConcreteExperienceofSenseCertaintyItisclearfromallthisthatthedialecticprocessinvolvedinsense-certaintyisnothingelsethanthemerehistoryofitsprocess-ofitsexperience；andsense-certaintyitselfisnothingelsethansimplythishistory。Thena?veconsciousness，too，forthatreason，isofitselfalwayscomingtothisresult，whichistherealtruthinthiscase，andisalwayshavingexperienceofit:butisalwaysforgettingitagainandbeginningtheprocessallover。Itisthereforeastonishingwhen，indefianceofthisexperience，itisannouncedas“universalexperience“—nay，evenasaphilosophicaldoctrine，theoutcome，infact，ofscepticism—thattherealityorbeingofexternalthingsinthesenseof“Thises“，particularsenseobjects，hasabsolutevalidityandtruthforconsciousness。Onewhomakessuchanassertionreallydoesnotknowwhatheissaying，doesnotknowthatheisstatingtheoppositeofwhathewantstosay。Thetruthforconsciousnessofa“This“ofsenseissaidtobeuniversalexperience；buttheveryoppositeisuniversalexperience。Everyconsciousnessofitselfcancelsagain，assoonasmade，suchatruthase。g。theHereisatree，ortheNowisnoon，andexpressestheveryopposite:theHereisnotatreebutahouse。Andsimilarlyitstraightwaycancelsagaintheassertionwhichhereannulsthefirst，andwhichisalsojustsuchanassertionofasensuousThis。
Andinallsense-certaintywhatwefindbyexperienceisintruthmerely，aswehaveseen，that“This“isauniversal，theveryoppositeofwhatthatassertionmaintainedtobeuniversalexperience。
Wemaybepermittedhere，inthisappealtouniversalexperience，toanticipate(5)withareferencetothepracticalsphere。Inthisconnectionwemayanswerthosewhothusinsistonthetruthandcertaintyoftherealityofobjectsofsense，bysayingthattheyhadbetterbesentbacktothemostelementaryschoolofwisdom，theancientEleusinianmysteriesofCeresandBacchus；theyhavenotyetlearnttheinnersecretoftheeatingofbreadandthedrinkingofwine。Foronewhoisinitiatedintothesemysteriesnotonlycomestodoubtthebeingofthingsofsense，butgetsintoastateofdespairaboutitaltogether；andindealingwiththemhepartlyhimselfbringsaboutthenothingnessofthosethings，partlyheseesthesebringabouttheirownnothingness。Evenanimalsarenotshutofffromthiswisdom，butshowtheyaredeeplyinitiatedintoit。Fortheydonotstandstockstillbeforethingsofsenseasifthesewerethingsperse，withbeinginthemselves:theydespairofthisrealityaltogether，andincompleteassuranceofthenothingnessofthingstheyfall-towithoutmoreadoandeatthemup。Andallnatureproclaims，asanimalsdo，theseopensecrets，thesemysteriesrevealedtoall，whichteachwhatthetruthofthingsofsenseis。
Thosewhoputforwardsuchassertionsreallythemselvessay，ifwebearinmindwhatweremarkedbefore，thedirectoppositeofwhattheymean:afactwhichisperhapsbestabletobringthemtoreflectonthenatureofthecertaintyofsense-experience。Theyspeakofthe“existence“ofexternalobjects，whichcanbemorepreciselycharacterizedasactual，absolutelyparticular，whollypersonal，individualthings，eachofthemnotlikeanythingoranyoneelse；thisistheexistencewhichtheysayhasabsolutecertaintyandtruty。They“mean“thisbitofpaperIamwritingon，orratherhavewrittenon:buttheydonotsaywhatthey“mean“。Iftheyreallywantedtosaythisbitofpaperwhichthey“mean“，andtheywantedtosayso，thatisimpossible，becausetheThisofsense，whichis“meant“，cannotbereachedbylanguage，whichbelongstoconsciousness，i。e。towhatisinherentlyuniversal。Intheveryattempttosayit，itwould，therefore，crumbleintheirhands；thosewhohavebeguntodescribeitwouldnotbeabletofinishdoingso:theywouldhavetohanditovertoothers，whowouldthemselvesinthelastresorthavetoconfesstospeakingaboutathingthathasnobeing。Theymean，then，doubtlessthisbitofpaperhere，whichisquitedifferentfromthatbitoverthere；buttheyspeakofactualthings，externalorsensibleobjects，absolutelyindividual，real，andsoon；thatis，theysayaboutthemwhatissimplyuniversal。
Consequentlywhatiscalledunspeakableisnothingelsethanwhatisuntrue，irrational，somethingbarelyandsimplymeant。
Ifnothingissaidofathingexceptthatitisanactualthing，anexternalobject，thisonlymakesitthemostuniversalofallpossiblethings，andtherebyweexpressitslikeness，itsidentity，witheverything，ratherthanitsdifferencefromeverythingelse。WhenIsay“anindividualthing“，Iatoncestateittobereallyquiteauniversal，foreverythingisanindividualthing:andinthesameway“thisthing“iseverythingandanythingwelike。Moreprecisely，asthisbitofpaper，eachandeverypaperisa“thisbitofpaper“，andIhavethussaidallthewhilewhatisuniversal。IfIwant，however，tohelpoutspeech-whichhasthedivinenatureofdirectlyturningthemere“meaning“
rightroundabout，makingitintosomethingelse，andsonotlettingitevercomethelengthofwordsatall-bypointingoutthisbitofpaper，thenIgettheexperienceofwhatis，inpointoffact，therealtruthofsense-certainty。IpointitoutasaHere，whichisaHereofotherHeres，orisinitselfsimplymanyHerestogether，i。e。isauniversal。Itakeitupthen，asintruthitis；andinsteadofknowingsomethingimmediate，I“take“something“truly“，Iper-ceive(wahrnehme，per-cipio)。
1。Inadditiontotheworksmentionedonp。40(note)，thereadermaybereferredtotheanalysisofSensationandPerceptioninPlato\'sTheaetetus，andtoBradley\'sAppearanceandReality，Chaps。II，V，VIIIandXIX。
2。Ie。Forthepurposesofphilosophicalanalysis。
3。I。e。thena?veconsciousnesshereanalyzed。
4。Cf。Encyclo。§250。
5。Cf。AnalysisofDesire，p。220ff。
II。PerceptionOrThingsandtheirDeceptiveness(1)
Immediatecertaintydoesnotmakethetruthitsown，foritstruthissomethinguniversal，whereascertaintywantstodealwiththeThis。Perception，ontheotherhand，takeswhatexistsforittobeauniversal。Universalitybeingitsprincipleingeneral，itsmomentsimmediatelydistinguishedwithinitarealsouniversal；Iisauniversal，andtheobjectisauniversal。Thatprinciplehasarisenandcomeintobeingforuswhoaretracingthecourseofexperience；andourprocessofapprehendingwhatperceptionis，therefore，isnolongeracontingentseriesofactsofapprehension，asisthecasewiththeapprehensionofsense-certainty；itisalogicallynecessitatedprocess。Withtheoriginationoftheprinciple，boththemoments，whichastheyappearmerelyfallapartashappenings，haveatoncetogethercomeintobeing:theone，theprocessofpointingoutandindicating，theotherthesameprocess，butasasimplefact-theformertheprocessofperceiving，thelattertheobjectperceived。Theobjectisinitsessentialnaturethesameastheprocess；thelatteristheunfoldinganddistinguishingoftheelementsinvolved；theobjectisthesesameelementstakenandheldtogetherasasingletotality。Forus(tracingtheprocess)orinitself，(2)theuniversal，quaprinciple，istheessenceofperception；andasagainstthisabstraction，boththemomentsdistinguished-thatwhichperceivesandthatwhichisperceived-arewhatisnon-essential。
Butinpointoffact，becausebotharethemselvestheuniversal，ortheessence，theyarebothessential:butsincetheyarerelatedasopposites，onlyonecanintherelation(constitutingperception)betheessentialmoment；andthedistinctionofessentialandnon-essentialhastobesharedbetweenthem。Theonecharacterizedasthesimplefact，theobject，istheessence，quiteindifferentastowhetheritisperceivedornot:perceiving，ontheotherhand，beingtheprocess，istheinsubstantial，theinconstantfactor，whichcanbeaswellasnotbe，isthenon-essentialmoment。
Thisobjectwehavenowtodeterminemoreprecisely，andtodevelopthisdeterminatecharacterfromtheresultarrivedat:themoredetaileddevelopmentdoesnotfallinplacehere。Sinceitsprinciple，theuniversal，isinitssimplicityamediatedprinciple，theobjectmustexpressthisexplicitlyasitsowninherentnature。Theobjectshowsitselfbysodoingtobethethingwithmanyproperties。Thewealthofsense-knowledgebelongstoperception，nottoimmediatecertainty，whereallthatwealthwasmerelysomethingalongsideandbytheway；foritisonlyperceptionthathasnegation，distinction，multiplicityinitsverynature。
1。TheNotionofa“Thing”
TheThis，then，isestablishedasnotThis，orassuperseded，andyetnotnothing(simpliciter)，butadeterminatenothing，anothingwithacertaincontent，viz。theThis。Thesense-elementisinthiswayitselfstillpresent，butnotintheformofsomeparticularthatis“meant“-ashadtobethecaseinmeediatecertainty-butasauniversal，asthatwhichwillhavethecharacteroftheproperty。
Cancelling，superseding，bringsoutandlaysbareitstruetwofoldmeaningwhichwefoundcontainedinthenegative:tosupersede(aufheben)isatoncetonegateandtopreserve。ThenothingbeinganegationoftheThis，preservesimmediacyandisitselfsensuous，butauniversalimmediacy。Being，however，isauniversalbyitshavinginitmediationornegation。Whenitbringsthisexplicitlyoutasafactorinitsimmediacy，itisaspecificallydistinctdeterminateproperty。Asaresult，therearemanysuchpropertiessetupatonce，onethenegationoftheother。Sincetheyareexpressedinthesimpleformoftheuniversal，thesedeterminatecharacters-which，strictlyspeaking，becomepropertiesonlybyafurtheradditionalcharacteristic-areself-related，areindifferenttoeachother，eachisbyitself，freefromtherest。Thesimpleself-identicaluniversality，however，isitselfagaindistinctanddetachedfromthesedeterminatecharacteristicsithas。Itispureself-relation，the“medium“wherinallthesecharacteristicsexist:init，asinabare，simpleunity，theyinterpenetratewithoutaffectingoneanother；forjustbyparticipatinginthisuniversalitytheyareindifferenttoeachother，eachbyitself。
Thisabstractuniversalmedium，whichwecancall“Thinghood“ingeneralorpureessentialreality，isnothingelsethantheHereandNowasthisonanalysisturnedouttobe，viz。asimpletogethernessofmanyHeresandNows。Butthemany(inthepresentcase)areintheirdeterminatenessthemselvessimplyuniversals。ThissaltisasimpleHereandatthesametimemanifold:itiswhite，andalsopungent，alsocubicalinshape，alsoofaspecificweight，andsoon。
AllthesemanypropertiesexistinasimpleHere，wheretheyinterpenetrateeachother。NoneofthesehasadifferentHerefromtheothers；eachiseverywhereinthesameHerewheretheothersare。Andatthesametime，withoutbeingdividedbydifferentHeres，theydonotaffecteachotherintheirinterpenetration；itsbeingwhitedoesnotaffectoralterthecubicalshapeithas，andneitheraffectsitstarttaste，andsoon:onthecontrary，sinceeachissimplerelationtoself，itleavestheothersaloneandisrelatedtothesemerelybybeingalsoalongwiththem，arelationofmereindifference。This“Also“isthusthepureuniversalitself，the“medium“，the“Thinghood“
keepingthemtogether。
Inthisrelation，whichhasemerged，itismerelythecharacterofpositiveuniversalitythatisfirstnoticedanddeveloped。Butthereisstillasidepresentedtoviewwhichmustalsobetakenintoaccount。Itisthis。Ifthemanydeterminatepropertieswereutterlyindifferenttoeachother，andwereentirelyrelatedtothemselvesalone，theywouldnotbedeterminate；fortheyareso，merelyinsofarastheyaredistinguishedandrelatedtoothersastheiropposites。Inviewofthisopposition，however，theycannotexisttogetherinthebareandsimpleunityoftheir“medium“，whichunityisjustasessentialtothemasnegation。Theprocessofdistinguishingthem，sofarasitdoesnotleavethemindifferent，buteffectuallyexcludes，negatesonefromanother，thusfallsoutsidethissimple“medium“。Andthis，consequently，isnotmerelyan“also“，anunityindifferenttowhatisinit，buta“one“aswell，anexcludingrepellingunity。
The“One“isthemomentofnegation，as，inadirectandsimplemanner，relatingitselftoitself，andexcludinganother:andisthatbywhich“Thinghood“isdeterminedquaThing。Inthepropertyofathingthenegationtakestheformofaspecificdeterminateness，whichisdirectlyonewiththeimmediacyofitsbeing，animmediacywhich，bythisunitywithnegation，isuniversality。Qua“one“，however，negation，thespecificquality，takesaforminwhichitisfreedfromthisunitywiththeobject，andexistsperseonitsownaccount。
ThesemomentstakentogetherexhaustthenatureoftheThing，thetruthofperception，sofarasitisnecessarytodevelopithere。Itis(1)auniversality，passiveandindifferent，the“also“whichformsthesolebondofconnectionbetweenthequalities，orratherconstituentelements，“matters“，existingtogether；(2)negation，likewiseinasimpleform，orthe“one“，whichconsistsinexcludingpropertiesofanoppositecharacter；and(3)themanypropertiesthemselves，therelationofthetwofirstmoments-thenegation，asitisrelatedtothatindifferentelement，andinbeingsoexpandsintoamanifoldofdifferences，thefocalpointofparticularityradiatingforthintopluralitywithinthe“medium“ofsubsistence。Takingtheaspectthatthesedifferencesbelongtoa“medium“indifferenttowhatiswithinit，theyarethemselvesuniversal，theyarerelatedmerelytothemselvesanddonotaffecteachother。Taking，however，theotheraspect，thattheybelongtothenegativeunity，theyatthesametimemutuallyexcludeoneanother；butdononecessarilyintheshapeofpropertiesthathaveaseparateexistenceapartfromthe“also“connectingthem。Thesensuousuniversality，theimmediateunityofpositivebeingandnegativeexclusion，isonlythenaproperty，whenonenessandpureuniversalityareevolvedfromitanddistinguishedfromoneanother，andwhenthatsensuousuniversalitycombinesthesewithoneanother。Onlyafterthisrelationoftheunitytothosepureessentialmomentsiseffected，isthe“Thing“complete。
This，then，isthewaythe“Thing“inperceptionisconstituted，andconsciousnessisperceptualincharactersofarasthis“Thing“isitsobject:ithasmerelyto“take“theobject(capio-per-ception)
andassumetheattitudeofpureapprehension，andwhatcomesitswayinsodoingistruth(dasWahre)。Ifitdidsomethingwhentakingthegiven，itwouldbysuchsupplementationoreliminationalterthetruth。Sincetheobjectisthetrueanduniversal，theself-same，whileconsciousnessisthevariableandnon-essential，itmayhappenthatconsciousnessapprehendstheobjectwronglyanddeceivesitself。Thepercipientisawareofthepossibilityofdeception；for，intheuniversalityformingtheprinciplehere，thepercipientisdirectlyawareofotherness，butawareofitasnullandnaught，aswhatissuperseded。Hiscriterionoftruthisthereforeself-sameness，andhisprocedureisthatofapprehendingwhatcomesbeforehimasself-same。Since，atthesametime，diversityisafactforhim，hisprocedureisawayofrelatingthediversemomentsofhisapprehensiontooneanother。If，however，inthiscomparisonawantofsamenesscomesout，thisisnotanuntruthonthepartoftheobject(fortheobjectistheself-same)，butonthepartofperception。
Letusnowseewhatsortofexperienceconsciousnessformsinthecourseofitsactualperception。
We，whoareanalysingtheprocess，findthisexperiencealreadycontainedinthedevelopment(justgiven)oftheobjectandoftheattitudeofconsciousnesstowardsit。Theexperiencewillbemerelythedevelopmentofthecontradictionsthatappearthere。
TheobjectwhichIapprehendpresentsitselfaspurely“one“andsingle:also，Iamawareofthe“property“(Eigenschaft)init，apropertywhichisuniversal，therebytranscendingtheparticularityoftheobject。Thefirstformofbeing，inwhichtheobjectiverealityhasthesenseofa“one“，wasthusnotitstruebeing；andsincetheobjectisthetruefacthere，theuntruthfallsonmyside，andtheapprehensionwasnotcorrect。Onaccountoftheuniversalityoftheproperty(Eigenschaft)
Imustrathertaketheobjectiveentityasacommunity(Gemeinschaft)ingeneral。Ifurtherperceivenowthepropertytobedeterminate，opposedtoanotherandexcludingthisother。Thus，inpointoffact，IdidnotapprehendtheobjectrightlywhenIdefineditasa“commonness“orcommunitywithothers，orascontinuity；andmustrather，takingaccountofthedeterminatenessoftheproperty，isolatepartswithinthecontinuityandsetdowntheobjectasa“one“thatexcludes。Inthedisintegrated“one“Ifindmanysuchproperties，whichdonotaffectoneanother，butareindifferenttooneanother。ThusIdidnotapprehendtheobjectcorrectlywhenItookitforsomethingthatexcludes。Theobject，instead，justasformerlyitwasmerelycontinuityingeneral，isnotauniversalcommonmediumwheremanypropertiesintheformofsenseuniversalssubsist，eachforitselfandonitsownaccount，and，quadeterminate，excludingtheothers。Thesimpleandtruefact，whichIperceive，is，however，invirtueofthisresult，notauniversalmediumeither，buttheparticularpropertybyitself，which，again，inthisform，isneitherapropertynoradeterminatebeing，foritisnowneitherattachedtoadistince“one“norinrelationtoothers。Buttheparticularqualityisapropertyonlywhenattachedtoa“one“，anddeterminateonlyinrelationtoothers。Bybeingthisbarerelationofselftoself，itremainsmerelysensuousexistenceingeneral，sinceitnolongercontainsthecharacterofnegativity；andthemodeofconsciousness，whichisnowawareofabeingofsense，ismerelyawayof“meaning“(Meinen)or“intending“，i。e。ithaslefttheattitudeofperceptionentirelyandgonebackintoitself。Butsenseexistenceand“meaning“themselvespassoverintoperception:Iamthrownbackonthebeginning，andoncemoredraggedintothesamecircuit，thatsupersedesitselfineverymomentandasawhole。
Consciousness，then，hastogooverthiscycleagain，butnotinthesamewayasonthefirstoccasion。Forithasfoundout，regardingperception，thatthetruthandoutcomeofperceptionisitsdissolution，isreflectionoutofandawayfromthetruthintoitself。Inthiswayconsciousnessbecomesdefinitelyawareofhowitsperceptualprocessisessentiallyconstituted，viz。thatthisisnotasimplebareapprehension，butinitsapprehensionisatthesametimereflectedoutofthetruecontentbackintoitself。Thisreturnofconsciousnessintoitself，whichisimmediatelyinvolvedandimplicatedinthatpureapprehension—forthisreturntoselfhasprovedtobeessentialtoperception—altersthetruecontent。Consciousnessisawarethatthisaspectisatthesametimeitsown，andtakesituponitselfandbysodoingconsciousnesswillthusgetthetrueobjectbareandnaked。
Inthiswaywehave，now，inthecaseofperception，ashappenedinthecaseofsensuouscertainty，theaspectofconsciousnessbeingforcedbackuponitself；but，inthefirstinstance，notinthesenseinwhichthistookplaceintheformercase—i。e。notasifthetruthofperceptionfellwithinit。Ratherconsciousnessisawarethattheuntruth，thatcomesoutthere，fallswithinit。Byknowingthis，however，consciousnessisabletocancelandsupersedethisuntruth。Itdistinguishesitsapprehensionofthetruthfromtheuntruthofitsperception，correctsthisuntruth，and，sofarasitselftakesinhandtomakethiscorrection，thetruth，quatruthofperception，certainlyfallswithinitsownconsciousness。Theprocedureofconsciousness，whichwehavenowtoconsider，isthussoconstitutedthatitnolongermerelyperceives，butisalsoconsciousofitsreflectionintoself，andkeepsthisapartfromthesimpleapprehensionproper。
