§10。
Thecontentordeterminatephaseofwillisinthefirstinstancedirectorimmediate。Thenthewillisfreeonlyinitselforforus，i。e。，itisthewillinitsconception。Onlywhenithasitselfasanobjectisitalsoforitself，anditsimplicitfreedombecomesrealised。
Remark:Atthisstandpointthefiniteimpliesthatwhateverisinitself，oraccordingtoitsconception，hasanexistenceormanifestationdifferentfromwhatitisforitself。Forexampletheabstractseparatenessofnatureisinitselfspace，butforitselftime。Here，twothingsaretobeobserved，1。thatbecausethetruthistheidea，whenanyobjectorphaseisapprehendedonlyasitisinitselforinconception，itisnotasyetapprehendedinitstruth，andyet2。that，whateverexistsasconceptionorinitself，atthesametimeexists，andthisexistenceisapeculiarformoftheobject，ase。g。space。
Theseparationofexistencein-itselforimplicitexistencefromexistence-for-itselforexplicitexistenceisacharacteristicofthefinite，andconstitutesitsappearanceormerelyexternalreality。
Anexampleofthisistohandintheseparationofthenaturalwillfromformalright。Theunderstandingadherestomereimplicitexistence，andinaccordancewiththispositioncallsfreedomacapacity，sinceitisatthispointonlyapossibility。Buttheunderstanding，regardsthisphaseasabsoluteandperennial，andconsiderstherelationofthewilltowhatitwillsorrealityasanapplicationtoagivenmaterial，whichdoesnotbelongtotheessenceoffreedom。Inthiswaytheunderstandingoccupiesitselfwithmereabstractions，andnotwiththeideaandtruth。
Addition。Thewill，whichiswillonlyaccordingtotheconception，isfreeimplicitly，butisatthesametimenotfree。Tobetrulyfree。itmusthaveatrulyfixedcontent；thenitisexplicitlyfree，hasfreedomforitsobject，andisfreedom。Whatisatfirstmerelyinconception，i。e。，implicit，isonlydirectandnatural，Wearefamiliarwiththisinpictorialthoughtalso。Thechildisimplicitlyaman，atfirsthasreasonimplicitly，andisatfirstthepossibilityofreasonandfreedom。Heisthusfreemerelyaccordingtotheconception。Thatwhichisonlyimplicitdoesnotyetexistinactuality。A
man，whoisimplicitlyrational，mustcreatehimselfbyworkingthroughandoutofhimselfandbyreconstructinghimselfwithinhimself，beforehecanbecomealsoexplicitlyrational。
§11。
Thewill，whichisatfirstonlyimplicitlyfree，isthedirectornaturalwill。Thedistinctivephases，whichtheself-determiningconceptionsetsupinthewill，appearinthedirectwill，asadirectlypresentcontent。Theyareimpulses，appetites，inclinations，bywhichthewillfindsitselfdeterminedbynature。Nowthiscontent，withallitsattendantphases，proceedsfromtherationalityofthewill，andisthereforeimplicitlyrational；butletlooseinitsimmediatedirectnessithasnotasyettheformofrationality。Thecontentisindeedformeandmyown，buttheformandthecontentareyetdifferent。Thewillisthusinitselffinite。
Note。Empiricalpsychologyenumeratesanddescribestheseimpulsesandinclinations，andthewantswhicharebaseduponthem。Ittakes，orimaginesthatittakesthismaterialfromexperience，andthenseekstoclassifyitintheusualway。Itwillbestatedbelow，whattheobjectivesideofimpulseis，andwhatimpulseisinitstruth，apartfromtheformofirrationalitywhichithasasanimpulse，andalsowhatshapeitassumeswhenitreachesexistence。
Addition。Impulse，appetite，inclinationarepossessedbytheanimalalso，butithasnotwill；itmustobeyimpulse，ifthereisnoexternalobstacle。Man，however，isthecompletelyundetermined，andstandsaboveimpulse，andmayfixandsetitupashis。Impulseisinnature，butitdependsonmywillwhetherIestablishitintheI。Norcanthewillbeunconditionallycalledtothisactionbythefactthattheimpulseliesinnature。
§12。
Thesystemofthiscontent，asitoccursdirectlyinthewill，existsonlyasamultitudeormultiplicityofimpulses，everyoneofwhichismineinageneralwayalongwithothers，butisatthesametimeuniversalandundetermined，havingmanyobjectsandwaysofsatisfaction。Thewill，bygivingitselfinthistwo-foldindefinitenesstheformofindividuality(§7)，resolves，andonlyasresolvingisitactual。
Remark:Insteadofto“resolve，“i。e。tosupersedetheindefiniteconditioninwhichacontentismerelypossible，ourlanguagehastheexpression“decide“(“unfolditself“)。Theindeterminateconditionofthewill，asneutralbutinfinitelyfruitfulgermofallexistence，containswithinitselfitsdefinitecharacterandends，andbringsthemforthsolelyoutofitself。
§13。
Byresolution，willfixesitselfasthewillofadefiniteindividual，andastherebydistinguishingitselffromanother。Howeverapartfromthisfinitecharacterwhichithasasconsciousness(§8)，theimmediatewillisinvirtueofthedistinctionbetweenitsformanditscontentformal。Henceitsresolutionassuchisabstract，anditscontentisnotyetthecontentandworkofitsfreedom。
Remark:Totheintelligence，asthinking，theobjectorcontentremainsuniversal；theintelligenceretainstheformmerelyofauniversalactivity。Nowtheuniversalsignifiesinwillthatwhichismine，i。e。itisindividuality。Andyet，also，thedirectandformalwillisabstract；itsindividualityisnotyetfilledwithitsfreeuniversality。Henceatthebeginningthepeculiarfinitudeoftheintelligenceisinwill，andonlybyexaltingitselfagaintothoughtandgivingitselfintrinsicuniversalitydoesthewilltranscendthedistinctionofformandcontentandmakeitselfobjectiveinfinitewill。Itisthereforeamisunderstandingofthenatureofthoughtandwilltosupposethatinthewillmanisinfinite，whileinthoughtandeveninreasonheislimited。Insofarasthoughtandwillarestilldistinct，thereverseisratherthecase，andthinkingreason，whenitbecomeswill，assignsitselftofinitude。
Addition。Awillwhichresolvesnothing，isnotanactualwill；thatwhichisdevoidofdefinitecharacterneverreachesavolition。Thereasonforhesitationmaylieinasensitiveness，whichisawarethatindeterminingitselfitisengagedwithwhatisfinite，isassigningitselfalimit，andabandoningitsinfinity；itmaythusholdtoitsdecisionnottorenouncethetotalitywhichitintends。
Suchafeelingisdead，evenwhenitaimstobesomethingbeautiful。“Whowillbegreat，“saysGoethe，“mustbeabletolimithimself。”Byvolitionalonemanentersactuality，howeverdistastefulitmaybetohim；forindolencewillnotdesertitsownself-brooding，inwhichitclingstoauniversalpossibility。Butpossibilityisnotyetactuality。Hencethewill，whichissecuresimplyofitself，doesnotasyetloseitselfinanydefinitereality。
§14。
Thefinitewill，whichhasmerelyfromthestandpointofformdoubleditselfbackuponitself，andhasbecometheinfiniteandself-secludedI(§5)，standsaboveitscontentofdifferentimpulsesandalsoabovetheseveralwaysbywhichtheyarerealisedandsatisfied。Atthesametime，asitisonlyformallyinfinite，itisconfinedtothisverycontentasthedecisivefeatureofitsnatureandexternalactuality，althoughitisundeterminedandnotconfinedtoonecontentratherthananother(§§6，11)。AstothereturnoftheIintoitselfsuchawillisonlyapossiblewill，whichmayormaynotbemine，andtheIisonlythepossibilityofdeputingitselftothisorthatobject。Henceamongstthesedefinitephases，whichinthislightarefortheIexternal，thewillchooses。
§15。
Freedomofthewillis，inthisviewofit，caprice，inwhicharecontainedbothareflection，whichisfreeandabstractedfromeverythingandadependenceuponacontentormattereitherinternallyorexternallyprovided。Sincethecontentisinitselforimplicitlynecessaryasallend，andinoppositiontothisreflectionisadefinitepossibility，caprice，whenitiswill，isinitsnaturecontingent。
Remark:The，usualideaoffreedomisthatofcaprice。Itisamidwaystageofreflectionbetweenthewillasmerelynaturalimpulseandthewillasfreeabsolutely。Whenitissaidthatfreedomasa，generalthingconsistsindoingwhatonelikes，suchanideamustbetakentoimplyanutterlackofdevelopedthought，containingasyetnoteventhesuspicionofwhatismeantbytheabsolutelyfreewill，right，theethicalsystem，etc。Reflection，beingtheformaluniversalityandI
unityofself-consciousness，isthewill\'sabstractcertitudeofitsfreedom，butitisnotyetthetruthofit，becauseithasnotasyetitselfforcontentandend；thesubjectivesideisstilldifferentfromtheobjective。Thusthecontentinsuchacaseremainspurelyandcompletelyfinite。Caprice，insteadofbeingwillinitstruth，isratherwillinitscontradiction。
Inthecontroversycarriedon，especiallyatthetimeofthemetaphysicofWolf，astowhetherthewillisreallyfreeorourconsciousnessofitsfreedomisadelusion，itwasthiscaprice，whichwasinthemindsofbothparties。Againstthecertitudeofabstractself-direction，determinismrightlyopposedacontent，whichwasexternallypresented，andnotbeingcontainedinthiscertitudecamefromwithout。Itdidnotmatterwhetherthis“without“wereimpulse，imagination，oringeneralaconsciousnesssofilledthatthecontentwasnotthepeculiarpossessionoftheself-activityassuch。
Sinceonlytheformalelementoffreeself-directionisimmanentincaprice，whiletheotherelementissomethinggiventoitfromwithout，totakecapriceasfreedommayfairlybenamedadelusion。
Freedomineveryphilosophyofreflection，whetheritbetheKantianortheFriesian，whichistheKantiansuperficialised，isnothingmorethanthisformalself-activity。
Addition。SinceIhavethepossibilityofdetermininghimselfinthisorthatway，sinceIhavethepowerofchoice，possesscaprice，orwhatiscommonlycalledfreedom。Thischoiceisduetotheuniversalityofthewill，enablingmetomakemyownthisthingoranother。Thispossessionisaparticularcontent，whichisthereforenotadequatetome，butseparatedfromme，andismineonlyinpossibility；justasIamthepossibilityofbringingmyselfintocoincidencewithit。HencechoiceisduetotheindeterminatenessoftheI，andtothedeterminatenessofacontent。Butastothiscontentthewillisnotfree，althoughithasinitselfformallythesideofinfinitude。Nosuchcontentcorrespondstowill；innocontentcanittrulyfinditself。Incapriceitisinvolvedthatthecontentisnotformedbythenatureofmywill，butbycontingency。Iamdependentuponthiscontent。Thisisthecontradictioncontainedincaprice。Ordinarymanbelievesthatheisfree，whenlieisallowedtoactcapriciously，butpreciselyincapriceisitinherentthatheisnotfree。WhenIwilltherational，I
donotactasaparticularindividualbutaccordingtotheconceptionofethicallifeingeneral。InanethicalactIestablishnotmyselfbutthething。Aman，whoactsperversely，exhibitsparticularity。
Therationalisthehighwayonwhicheveryonetravels，andnooneisspeciallymarked。Whenagreatartistfinishesaworkwesay:“Itmustbeso。”Theparticularityofthe，artisthaswhollydisappearedandtheworkshowsnomannerism。Phidiashasnomannerism；thestatueitselflivesandmoves。Butthepooreristheartist，themoreeasilywediscernhimself，hisparticularityallcaprice。Ifweadheretotheconsiderationthatincapriceamancanwillwhathepleases，wehavecertainlyfreedomofakind；butagain，ifweholdtotheviewthatthecontentisgiven，thenmanmustbedeterminedbyit，andinthislightisnolongerfree。
§16。
Whatisresolveduponandchosen(§14)thewillmayagaingiveup(§5)。Yet，evenwiththepossibilityoftranscendinganyothercontentwhichitmaysubstitute，andofproceedinginthiswayadinfinitum，thewilldoesnotadvancebeyondfinitude，becauseeverycontentinturnisdifferentfromtheformandisfinite。Theoppositeaspect，namelyindeterminateness，irresolutionorabstraction，isalsoone-sided。
§17。
Sincethecontradictioninvolvedincaprice(§15)isthedialecticoftheimpulsesandinclinations，itismanifestedintheirmutualantagonism。Thesatisfactionofonedemandsthesubjectionandsacrificeofthesatisfactionofanother。Sinceanimpulseismerelythesimpletendencyofitsownessentialnature，andhasnomeasureinitself，tosubjectorsacrificethesatisfactionofanyimpulseisacontingentdecisionofcaprice。Insuchacasecapricemayactuponthecalculationastowhichimpulsewillbringthegreatersatisfaction，ormayhavesomeothersimilarpurpose。
Addition。Impulsesandinclinationsareinthefirstinstancethecontentofwill，andonlyreflectiontranscendsthem。Buttheseimpulsesareself-directing，crowdinguponandjostlingoneanother，andallseekingtobesatisfied。Tosetallbutoneinthebackground，andputmyselfintothisone，istolimitanddistortmyself，sinceI，insodoing，renouncemyuniversality，whichisasystemoftheimpulses。Justaslittlehelpisfoundinameresubordinationofthem，acourseusuallyfollowedbytheunderstanding。Thereisavailablenocriterionbywhichtomakesuchanarrangement，andhencethedemandforasubordinationisusuallysustainedbytediousandirrelevantallusionstogeneralsavings。
§18。
Withregardtothemoralestimateofimpulses，dialecticappearsinthisform。Thephasesofthedirectornaturalwillareimmanentandpositive，andthusgood。
Hencemanisbynaturegood。Butnaturalcharacteristics，sincetheyareopposedtofreedomandtheconceptionofthespirit，andare，hence，negative，mustbeeradicated。Thusmanisbynatureevil。Todecideforeitherviewisamatterofsubjectivecaprice。
Addition。TheChristiandoctrinethatmanisbynatureevilisloftierthantheoppositethatheisnaturallygood，andistobeinterpretedphilosophicallyinthisway。Manasspiritisafreebeing，whoneednotgivewaytoimpulse。Henceinhisdirectandunformedcondition，manisinasituationinwhichheoughtnottobe，andhemustfreehimself。Thisisthemeaningofthedoctrineoforiginalsin，withoutwhichChristianitywouldnotbethereligionoffreedom。
§19。
Inthedemandthatimpulsesmustbepurifiedisfoundthegeneralideathattheymustbefreedfromtheformofdirectsubjectiontonature，andfromacontentthatissubjectiveandcontingent，andmustberestoredtotheirsubstantiveessence。Thetruthcontainedinthisindefinitedemandisthatimpulsesshouldbephasesofwillinarationalsystem。Toapprehendtheminthiswayasproceedingfromtheconceptionisthecontentofthescienceofright。
Remark:Thecontentofthissciencemay，inallitsseveralelements，right，property，morality，family，state，berepresentedinthisway，thatmanhasbynaturetheimpulsetoright，theimpulsetoproperty，tomorality，tosexuallove，andtosociallife。Ifinsteadofthisform，whichbelongstoempiricalpsychology，aphilosophicformbepreferred，itmaybeobtainedcheapfromwhat，inmoderntimeswasreputedandstillisreputedtobephilosophy。Hewillthensaythatmanfindsinhimselfasafactofconsciousnessthathewillsright，property，thestate，etc。Laterwillbegivenstillanotherformofthecontentwhichappearshereintheshapeofimpulses，that，namely，ofduties。
§20。
Thereflectionwhichisbroughttobearuponimpulses，placingthembeforeitself，estimatingthem，comparingthemwithoneanother，andcontrastingthemwiththeirmeansandconsequences，andalsowithawholeofsatisfaction，namelyhappiness，bringstheformaluniversaltothismaterial，andinanexternalwaypurifiesitofitscrudityandbarbarism。Thispropulsionbytheuniversalityofthoughtistheabsoluteworthofcivilisation(§187)。
Addition。Inhappinessthoughthasalreadytheupperhandwiththeforceofnaturalimpulse，sinceitisnotsatisfiedwithwhatismomentary，butrequireshappinessasawhole。Thishappinessisdependentuponcivilisationtotheextenttowhichcivilisationconfirmstheuniversal。Butintheidealofhappinesstherearetwoelements。Thereis1。auniversalthatishigherthanallparticulars；vet，asthecontentofthisuniversalisinturnonlyuniversalpleasure，therearisesoncemoretheindividual，particularandfinite，andretreatmustbemadetoimpulse；
2。Sincethecontentofhappinessliesinthesubjectiveperceptionofeachindividual，thisuniversalendisagainparticular；noristherepresentinitanytrueunityofcontentandform。
§21。
Butthetruthofthisformaluniversality，whichtakenbyitselfisundeterminedandfindsdefinitecharacterinexternallygivenmaterial，istheself-directinguniversalitywhichiswillorfreedom。Sincethewillhasasitsobject，contentandend，universalityitself，andthusassumestheformoftheinfinite，itisfreenotonlyinitselforimplicitly，butforitselforexplicitly。Itisthetrueidea。
Remark:Theself-consciousnessofthewillintheformofappetiteorimpulseissensible，thesensibleingeneralindicatingtheexternalityofself-consciousness，orthatconditioninwhichself-consciousnessisoutsideofitself。Nowthissensiblesideisoneofthetwoelementsofthereflectingwill，andtheotheristheabstractuniversalityofthought。Buttheabsolutewillhasasitsobjectthewillitselfassuchinitspureuniversality。Inthisuniversalitythedirectnessofthenaturalwillissuperseded，andsoalsoistheprivateindividualitywhichisproducedbyreflectionandinfectsthenaturalcondition。Buttosupersedetheseandliftthemintotheuniversal，constitutestheactivityofthought。Thustheself-consciousness，whichpurifiesitsobject，contentorend，andexaltsittouniversality，isthoughtcarryingitselfthroughintowill。Itisatthispointthatitbecomesclearthatthewillistrueandfreeonlyasthinkingintelligence。Theslaveknowsnothisessence，hisinfinitude，hisfreedom；hedoesnotknowhimselfinhisessence，andnottoknowhimselfisnottothinkhimself。Theself-consciousness，whichbythoughtapprehendsthatitselfisessence，andthusputsawayfromitselftheaccidentalanduntrue，constitutestheprincipleofright，morality，andallformsofethicallife。Theywho，inspeakingphilosophicallyofright，morality，andethicallife，wouldexcludethoughtandturntofeeling，theheart，thebreast，andinspiration，expressthedeepestcontemptforthoughtandscience。Andscienceitself，overwhelmedwithdespairandutterinsipidity，makesbarbarismandabsenceofthoughtaprinciple，andsofarasinitlayrobbedmenofalltruth，dignity，andworth。
Addition。Inphilosophytruthishadwhentheconceptioncorrespondstoreality。Abodyisthereality，andsoulistheconception。Soulandbodyshouldbeadequatetoeachother。Adeadmanisstillanexistence，butnolongeratrueexistence；itisarealityvoidofconception。Forthatreasonthedeadbodydecays。Sowiththetruewill；thatwhichitwills，namely，itscontent，isidenticalwithit，andsofreedomwillsfreedom。
§22。
Thewillwhichexistsabsolutelyistrulyinfinite，becauseitsobjectbeingthewillitself，isforitnotanotheroralimitation。Intheobjectthewillhassimplyrevertedintoitself。Moreover，itisnotmerepossibility，capacity，potentiality(potential，butinfinitelyactual(infinitumactu)，becausetherealityoftheconceptionoritsvisibleexternalityisinternaltoitself。
Remark:Hencewhenthefreewillisspokenofwithoutthequalificationofabsolutefreedom，onlythecapacityoffreedomismeant，orthenaturalandfinitewill(§11)，and，notwithstandingallwordsandopinionstothecontrary，notthefreewill。Sincetheunderstandingcomprehendstheinfiniteonlyinitsnegativeaspect，andhenceasabeyond，itthinkstodotheinfiniteallthemorehonourthefartheritremovesitintothevaguedistance，andthemoreittakesitasaforeignthing。
Infreewillthetrueinfiniteispresentandreal；itisitselftheactuallypresentself-containedidea。
Addition。Theinfinitehasrightlybeenrepresentedasacircle。Thestraightlinegoesoutfartherandfarther，andsymbolisesthemerelynegativeandbadinfinite，which，unlikethetrue，doesnotreturnintoitself。Thefreewillistrulyinfinite，foritisnotamerepossibilityordisposition。Itsexternalrealityisitsowninnernature，itself。
§23。
Onlyinthisfreedomisthewillwhollybyitself，becauseitreferstonothingbutitself，andalldependenceuponanyotherthingfallsaway。Thewillistrue，orrathertruthitself，becauseitscharacterconsistsinitsbeinginitsmanifestedreality，orcorrelativeopposite，whatitisinitsconception。Inotherwords，thepureconceptionhastheperceptionorintuitionofitselfasitsendandreality。
§24。
Thewillisuniversal，becauseinitalllimitationandparticularindividualityaresuperseded。Theseone-sidedphasesarefoundonlyinthedifferencebetweentheconceptionanditsobjectorcontent，or，fromanotherstandpoint，inthedifferencebetweentheconsciousindependentexistenceofthesubject，andthewill\'simplicit，orself-involvedexistence，orbetweenitsexcludingandconcludingindividuality，anditsuniversality。
Remark:ThedifferentphasesofuniversalityaretabulatedInthelogic(Encyclopaedia。ofthePhil。Sciences，§§118-126)。Imaginativethinkingalwaystakesuniversalityinanabstractandexternalway。Butabsoluteuniversalityisnottobethoughtofeitherastheuniversalityofreflection，whichisakindofconsensusorgenerality，or，astheabstractuniversalityandself-identity，whichisfashionedbytheunderstanding(§6，note)，andkeepsalooffromtheindividual。Itisrathertheconcrete，self-contained，andself-referringuniversality，whichisthesubstance，intrinsicgenus，orimmanentideaofself-consciousness。Itisaconceptionoffreewillastheuniversal，transcendingitsobject，passingthroughandbeyonditsownspecificcharacter，andthenbecomingidenticalwithitself。Thisabsoluteuniversaliswhatisingeneralcalledtherational，andistobeapprehendedonlyinthisspeculativeway。
§25。
Thesubjectivesideofthewillisthesideofitsself-consciousnessandindividuality(§7)，asdistinguishedfromitsimplicitconception。Thissubjectivityis[a]pureformorabsoluteunityofself-consciousnesswithitself。Thisunityistheequation“I=I，“consciousnessbeingcharacterisedbyathoroughlyinwardandabstractself-dependence。Itispurecertitudeofitselfincontrastwiththetruth；
[b]particularityofwill，ascapricewithitsaccidentalcontentofpleasurableends；
[c]ingeneralaone-sidedform(§8)，insofarasthatwhichiswilledisatfirstanunfulfilledend，oracontentwhichsimplybelongstoself-consciousness。
§26。
[a]Insofarasfreewillisdeterminedbyitself，andisinaccordwithitsconceptionandtrue，itiswhollyobjectivewill。[b]Butobjectiveself-consciousness，whichhasnottheformoftheinfinite，isawillsunkinitsobjectorcondition，whateverthecontentofthatmaybe。Itisthewillofthechild，orthewillpresentinslaveryorsuperstition。[c]Objectivityisfinallyaone-sidedforminoppositiontothesubjectivephaseofwill；itisdirectreality，orexternalexistence。Inthissensethewillbecomesobjectiveonlybytheexecutionofitsends。
Remark:Theselogicalphasesofsubjectivityandobjectivity，sincetheyareoftenmadeuseofinthesequel，arehereexposed，withtheexpresspurposeofnotingthatithappenswiththemaswithotherdistinctionsandopposedaspectsofreflection；theybyvirtueoftheirfiniteanddialecticcharacterpassoverintotheiropposites。Forimaginationandunderstandingthemeaningsofantitheticphasesarenotconvertible，becausetheiridentityisstillinternal。Butinwill，onthecontrary，thesephases，whichoughttobeatonceabstractandyetalsosidesofthatwhichcanbeknownonlyasconcrete，leadofthemselvestoidentity，andtoanexchangeofmeaning。Totheunderstandingthisisunintelligible。Thus，e。g。，thewill，asafreedomwhichexistsinitself，issubjectivityitself；thussubjectivityistheconceptionofthewill，andthereforeitsobjectivity。Butsubjectivityisfiniteinoppositiontoobjectivity，yetinthisoppositionthewillis]lotisolated，butinintricateunionwiththeobject；andthusitsfinitudeconsistsquiteasmuchinitsnotbeingsubjective，etc。Whatinthesequelistobemeantbythesubjectiveortheobjectivesideofthewill，haseachtimetobemadeclearfromthecontext，whichwillsupplytheirpositionsinrelationtothetotality。
Addition。Itisordinarilysupposedthatsubjectiveandobjectiveareblankopposites；butthisisnotthecase。Ratherdotheypassintooneanother，fortheyarenotabstractaspectslikepositiveandnegative，buthavealreadyaconcretesignificance。Toconsiderinthefirstinstancetheexpression“subjective；“thismaymeananendwhichismerelytheendofacertainsubject。Inthissenseapoorworkofart，thatisnotadequatetothethingismerelysubjective。But，further，thisexpressionmaypointtothecontentofthewill，andisthenofaboutthesamemeaningascapricious；thesubjectivecontentthenisthatwhichbelongsmerelytothesubject。Inthissensebadactsaremerelysubjective。Further，thepure，emptyImaybecalledsubjective，asithasonlyitselfasanobject，andpossessesthepowerofabstractionfromallfurthercontent。Subjectivityhas，moreover，awhollyparticularandcorrectmeaninginaccordancewithwhichanything，inordertowinrecognitionfromme，hastobecomemineandseekvalidityinme。Thisistheinfiniteavariceofsubjectivity，eagertocomprehendandconsumeeverythingwithinthesimpleandpureI。
Similarlywemaytaketheobjectiveindifferentways。Byitwemayunderstandanythingtowhichwegiveexistenceincontrasttoourselves，whetheritbeanactualthingoramerethought，whichweplaceoveragainstourselves。Byitalsoweunderstandthedirectreality，inwhichtheendistoberealised。Althoughtheenditselfisquiteparticularandsubjective，weyetnameitobjectiveafterithasmadeitsappearance。Further，theobjectivewillisalsothatinwhichtruthis；thus，God\'swill，theethicalwillalso，areobjective。Lastly，wemaycallthewillobjective，whenitiswhollysubmergedinitsobject，as，e。g。，thechild\'swill，whichisconfidingandwithoutsubjectivefreedom，andtheslave\'swill，whichdoesnotknowitselfasfree，andisthusawill-lesswill。Inthissenseanywillisobjective，ifitisguidedinitsactionbyaforeignauthority，andhasnotyetcompletedtheinfinitereturnintoitself。
§27。
Theabsolutecharacteror，ifyoulike，theabsoluteimpulseofthefreespirit(§
21)is，ashasbeenobserved，thatitsfreedomshallbeforitanobject。Itistobeobjectiveinatwo-foldsense:itistherationalsystemofitself，andthissystemistobedirectlyreal(§26)。Thereisthusactualisedasideawhatthewillisimplicitly。Hence，theabstractconceptionoftheideaofthewillisingeneralthefreewillwhichwillsthefreewill。
§28。
Theactivityofthewill，directedtothetaskoftranscendingthecontradictionbetweensubjectivityandobjectivity，oftransferringitsendfromsubjectivityintoobjectivity，andyetwhileinobjectivityofremainingwithitself，isbeyondtheformalmethodofconsciousness(§8)，inwhichobjectivityisonlydirectactuality。Thisactivityistheessentialdevelopmentofthesubstantivecontentoftheidea(§21)。Inthisdevelopmenttheconceptionmouldstheidea，whichisinthefirstinstanceabstract，intothetotalityofasystem。Thistotalityassubstantiveisindependentoftheoppositionbetweenmeresubjectiveendanditsrealisation，andinbothoftheseformsisthesame。
§29。
Thatarealityistherealisationofthefreewill，thisiswhatismeantbyaright。
Right，therefore，is，ingeneral，freedomasidea。
Remark:IntheKantiandoctrine(IntroductiontoKant\'sTheoryofRight)，nowgenerallyaccepted，“the，highestfactorisalimitationofmyfreedomorcaprice，inorderthatitmaybeabletosubsistalongsideofeveryotherindividual\'scapriceinaccordancewithauniversallaw。”Thisdoctrinecontainsonlyanegativephase，thatoflimitation。Andbesides，thepositivephase，theuniversallaworso-calledlawofreason，consistingintheagreementofthecapriceofonewiththatofanother，goesbeyondthewell-knownformalidentityandthepropositionofcontradiction。Thedefinitionofright，justquoted，containstheviewwhichhasespeciallysinceRousseauspreadwidely。Accordingtothisviewneithertheabsoluteandrationalwill，northetruespirit，butthewillandspiritoftheparticularindividualintheirpeculiarcaprice，arethesubstantiveandprimarybasis。
Whenoncethisprincipleisaccepted，therationalcanannounceitselfonlyaslimitingthisfreedom。
Henceitisnotaninherentrationality，butonlyamereexternalandformaluniversal。Thisviewisaccordinglydevoidofspeculativethought，andisrejectedbythephilosophicconception。Inthemindsofmenandintheactualworldithasassumedashape，whosehorroriswithoutaparallel，exceptintheshallownessofthethoughtsuponwhichitwasfounded。
§30。
Rightingeneralissomethingholy，becauseitistheembodimentoftheabsoluteconceptionandself-consciousfreedom。Buttheformalismofright，andafterawhileofdutyalso，isduetodistinctionsarisingoutofthedevelopmentoftheconceptionoffreedom。Incontrastwiththemoreformal，abstractandlimitedright，thereisthatsphereorstageofthespirit，inwhichspirithasbroughttodefiniteactualitythefurtherelementscontainedintheidea。Thisstageisthericherandmoreconcrete；itistrulyuniversalandhasthereforeahigherright。
Remark:Everystepinthedevelopmentoftheideaoffreedomhasitspeculiarright，becauseitistheembodimentofaphaseoffreedom。Whenmoralityandethicallifearespokenofinoppositiontoright，onlythefirstorformalrightoftheabstractpersonalityismeant。Morality，ethicallife，astate-interest，areeveryoneaspecialright，becauseeachoftheseisadefiniterealisationoffreedom。Theycancomeintocollisiononlyinsofarastheyoccupythesameplane。
Ifthemoralstandpointofspiritwerenotalsoarightandoneoftheformsoffreedom，itcouldnotcollidewiththerightofpersonalityoranyotherright。Arightcontainstheconceptionoffreedomwhichisthehighestphaseofspirit，andinoppositiontoitanyotherkindofthingislackinginrealsubstance。Yetcollisionalsoimpliesalimitandasubordinationofonephasetoanother。Onlytherightoftheworld-spiritistheunlimitedabsolute。
§31。
Thescientificmethodbywhichtheconceptionisself-evolved，anditsphasesself-developedandself-produced，isnotfirstofallanassurancethatcertainrelationsaregivenfromsomewhereorother，andthentheapplicationtothisforeignmaterialoftheuniversal。Thetrueprocessisfoundinthelogic，andhereispresupposed。
Remark:Theefficientormotiveprinciple，whichisnotmerelytheanalysisbuttheproductionoftheseveralelementsoftheuniversal，Icalldialectic。Dialecticisnotthatprocessinwhichanobjectorproposition，presented，tofeelingorthedirectconsciousness，isanalysed，entangled，takenhitherandthither，untilatlastitscontraryisderived。SuchamerelynegativemethodappearsfrequentlyinPlato。Itmayfixtheoppositeofanynotion，orrevealthecontradictioncontainedinit，asdidtheancientscepticism，oritmayinafeeblewayconsideranapproximationtotruth，ormodernhalf-and-halfattainmentofit，asitsgoal。Butthehigherdialecticoftheconceptiondoesnotmerelyapprehendanyphaseasalimitandopposite，butproducesoutofthisnegativeapositivecontentandresult。Onlybysuchacourseistheredevelopmentandinherentprogress。
Hencethisdialecticisnottheexternalagencyofsubjectivethinking，buttheprivatesoulofthecontent，whichunfoldsitsbranchesandfruitorganically。Thoughtregardsthisdevelopmentoftheideaandofthepeculiaractivityofthereasonoftheideaasonlysubjective，butisonitssideunabletomakeanyaddition。Toconsideranythingrationallyisnottobringreasontoitfromtheoutside，andworkitupinthisway，buttocountitasitselfreasonable。Hereitisspiritinitsfreedom，thesummitofself-consciousreason，whichgivesitselfactuality，andproducesitselfastheexistingworld。Thebusinessofscienceissimplytobringthespecificworkofthereason，whichisinthething，toconsciousness。
§32。
Thephasesofthedevelopmentoftheconceptionarethemselvesconceptions。
Andyet，becausetheconceptionisessentiallytheidea，theyhavetheformofmanifestations。Hencethesequenceoftheconceptions，whichariseinthisway，isatthesametimeasequenceofrealisations，andaretobebysciencesoconsidered。
Remark:Inaspeculativesensetheway，inwhichaconceptionismanifestedinreality，isidenticalwithadefinitephaseoftheconception。Butitisnoteworthythat，inthescientificdevelopmentoftheidea，theelements，whichresultinafurtherdefiniteform，althoughprecedingthisresultasphasesoftheconception，donotinthetemporaldevelopmentgobeforeitasconcreterealisations。Thus，aswillbeseenlater，thatstageoftheideawhichisthefamilypresupposesphasesoftheconception，whoseresultitis。Butthattheseinternalpresuppositionsshouldbepresentinsuchvisiblerealisationsasrightofproperty，contract，morality，etc。，thisistheothersideoftheprocess，whichonlyinahighlydevelopedcivilisationhasattainedtoaspecificrealisationofitselements。
Addition。Theideamustalwaysgoondeterminingitselfwithinitself，sinceatthebeginningitisonlyabstractconception。However，thisinitialabstractconceptionisnevergivenup，butonlybecomesinwardlyricher，thelastphasebeingtherichest。Theearlierandmerelyimplicitphasesreachinthiswayfreeself-dependence，butinsuchamannerthattheconceptionremainsthesoulwhichholdseverythingtogether，andonlythroughaprocedureimmanentwithinitselfarrivesatitsowndistinctions。Hencethelastphasefallsagainintoaunitywiththefirst，anditcannotbesaidthattheconceptionevercomestosomethingnew。Althoughtheelementsoftheconceptionappeartohavefallenapartwhentheyenterreality，thisisonlyamereappearance。Itssuperficialcharacterisrevealedintheprocess，sincealltheparticularsfinallyturnbackagainintotheconceptionoftheuniversal。Theempiricalsciencesusuallyanalysewhattheyfindinpictorialideas，andiftheindividualissuccessfullybroughtbacktothegeneral，thegeneralpropertyisthencalledtheconception。Butthisisnotourprocedure。Wedesireonlytoobservehowtheconceptiondeterminesitself，andcompelsustokeepatadistanceeverythingofourownspinningandthinking。Butwhatwegetinthiswayisoneseriesofthoughtsandanotherseriesofrealisedforms。
Astothesetwoseries，itmayhappenthattheorderoftimeoftheactualmanifestationsispartlydifferentfromtheorderoftheconception。Thusitcannot，e。g。，besaidthatpropertyexistedbeforethefamily，andyet，inspiteofthatitisdiscussedbeforethefamilyisdiscussed。Thequestionmightalsoberaisedhere，Whydowenotbeginwiththehighest，i。e。，withconcretetruth?Theansweris，becausewedesiretoseetruthintheformofaresult，anditisanessentialpartoftheprocesstoconceivetheconceptionfirstofallasabstract。Theactualseriesofrealisationsoftheconceptionisthusforusinduecourseasfollows，evenalthoughinactualitytheordershouldbethesame。Ourprocessisthis，thattheabstractformsrevealthemselvesnotasself-subsistentbutasuntrue。
DivisionoftheWork。
§33。
Accordingtothestagesinthedevelopmentoftheideaoftheabsolutelyfreewill，A。Thewillisdirectorimmediate；itsconceptionistherefore，abstract，i。e。，personality，anditsembodiedrealityisadirectexternalthing。Thisisthesphereofabstractorformalright。
B。Thewill，passingoutofexternalreality，turnsbackintoitself。Itsphaseissubjectiveindividuality，anditiscontrastedwiththeuniversal。Thisuniversalisonitsinternalsidethegood，andonitsexternalsideapresentedworld，andthesetwosidesareoccasionedonlybymeansofeachother。Inthisspheretheideaisdivided，andexistsinseparateelements。Therightofthesubjectivewillisinarelationofcontrasttotherightoftheworld，ortherightoftheidea。Here，however，theideaexistsonlyimplicitly。Thisisthesphereofmorality。
C。Theunityandtruthofthesetwoabstractelements。Thethoughtideaofthegoodisrealisedbothinthewillturnedbackintoitself，andalsointheexternalworld。Thusfreedomexistsasrealsubstance，whichisquiteasmuchactualityandnecessityasitissubjectivewill。Theideahereisitsabsolutelyuniversalexistence，viz。，ethicallife。Thisethicalsubstanceisagain，a。Naturalspirit；thefamily，b。Thecivilsociety，orspiritinitsdualexistenceandmereappearance，c。Thestate，orfreedom，which，whileestablishedinthefreeself-dependenceoftheparticularwillisalsouniversalandobjective。Thisactualandorganicspirit[a]isthespiritofanation，[b]isfoundintherelationtooneanotherofnationalspirits，and[c]passingthroughandbeyondthisrelationisactualisedandrevealedinworldhistoryastheuniversalworld-spirit，whoserightisthehighest。
Note。Itistobefoundinthespeculativelogic，andhereispresupposed，thatathingorcontent，whichisestablishedfirstofallaccordingtoitsconception，orimplicitly，hastheformofdirectexistence。Theconception，however，whenithastheformoftheconceptionisexplicit，andnolongerisadirectexistence。So，too，theprinciple，uponwhichthedivisionofthisworkproceeds，ispresupposed。Thedivisionsmightberegardedasalreadysettledbyhistory，sincethedifferentstagesmustbeviewedaselementsinthedevelopmentoftheidea，andthereforeasspringingfromthenatureofthecontentitself。Aphilosophicdivisionisnotanexternalclassificationofanygivenmaterial，suchaclassificationaswouldbemadeaccordingtooneorseveralschemespickedupatrandom，buttheinherentdistinctionsoftheconceptionitself。Moralityandethicallife，whichareusuallysupposedtomeanthesamething，areheretakeninessentiallydifferentmeanings。
Meanwhileevenimaginativethoughtseemstomakeadistinctionbetweenthem。IntheusageofKantthepreferenceisgiventothetermmorality，andthepracticalprinciplesofhisphilosophylimitthemselveswhollytothisstandpoint，makingimpossiblethestandpointofethicallife，andindeedexpresslydestroyingandabolishingit。Althoughmoralityandethicshavethesamemeaningaccordingtotheiretymology，yetthesedifferentwordsmaybeusedfordifferentconceptions。
Addition。Whenwespeakofright，wemeannotonlycivilright，whichistheusualsignificanceoftheword，butalsomorality，ethicallifeandworld-history。Thesebelongtothisrealm，becausetheconceptiontakingthemintheirtruth，bringsthemalltogether。Freewill，inordernottoremainabstract，mustinthefirstinstancegiveitselfreality；thesensiblematerialsofthisrealityareobjects，i。e。，externalthings。Thisfirstphaseoffreedomweshallknowasproperty。Thisisthesphereofformalandabstractright，towhichbelongpropertyinthemoredevelopedformofcontractandalsotheinjuryofright，i。e。，crimeandpunishment。Thefreedom，wehavehere，wenameperson，or，inotherwords，thesubjectwhoisfree，andindeedfreeindependently，andgiveshimselfarealityinthings。Butthisdirectrealityisnotadequatetofreedom，andthenegationofthisphaseismorality。InmoralityIambeyondthefreedomfounddirectlyinthisthing，andhaveafreedominwhichthisdirectnessissuperseded。Iamfreeinmyself，i。e。，inthesubjective。Inthisspherewecomeuponmyinsight，intention，andend，andexternalityisestablishedasindifferent。Thegoodisnowtheuniversalend，whichisnottoremainmerelyinternaltome，buttorealiseitself。Thesubjectivewilldemandsthatitsinwardcharacter，orpurpose，shallreceiveexternalreality，andalsothatthegoodshallbebroughttocompletioninexternalexistence。Morality，likeformalright，isalsoanabstraction，whosetruthisreachedonlyinethicallife。Henceethicallifeistheunityofthewillinitsconceptionwiththewilloftheindividualorsubject。Theprimaryrealityofethicallifeisinitsturnnatural，takingtheformofloveandfeeling。Thisisthefamily。Inittheindividualhastranscendedhisprudishpersonality，andfindshimselfwithhisconsciousnessinatotality。Inthenextstageisseenthelossofthispeculiarethicalexistenceandsubstantiveunity。Herethefamilyfallsasunder，andthemembersbecomeindependentoneofanother，beingnowheldtogethermerelybythebondofmutualneed。Thisisthestageofthecivilsociety，whichhasfrequentlybeentakenforthestate。Butthestatedoesnotariseuntilwereachthethirdstage，thatstageofethicallifeorspirit，inwhichbothindividualindependenceanduniversalsubstantivityarefoundingiganticunion。Therightofthestateis，therefore，higherthanthatoftheotherstages。Itisfreedominitsmostconcreteembodiment，whichyieldstonothingbutthehighestabsolutetruthoftheworld-spirit。
FirstPart:AbstractRight§34。
Theabsolutelyfreewill，atthestagewhenitsconceptisabstract，hasthedeterminatecharacterofimmediacy。Accordinglythisstageisitsnegativeactuality，anactualitycontrastedwiththerealworld，onlyanabstractlyself-relatedactuality—theinherentlysinglewillofasubject。Pursuanttothemomentoftheparticularityofthewill，ithasinadditionacontentconsistingofdeterminateaimsand，asexclusiveindividuality，ithasthiscontentatthesametimeasanexternalworlddirectlyconfrontingit。
Addition:WhenIsaythat\'theabsolutelyfreewillatthestagewhenitsconceptisabstracthasthedeterminatecharacterofimmediacy\'，whatImeanisthis:whentheconcepthadfullyrealiseditselfandwhentheembodimentoftheconcepthadbecomenothingbuttheunfoldingofitsownself，thenthatstateofaffairswouldbethefullydevelopedIdeaofthewill。Butatthestarttheconceptisabstract，whichmeansthatallitsdeterminationsarecontainedwithinit，butstillonlycontainedwithinit；theyareonlyimplicitandnotyetdevelopedtobeatotalityinthemselves。IfI
say\'Iamfree\'，theegoisstillthisinwardness，notconfrontedbyanopposite。Inmorality，ontheotherhand，thereisoppositionfromthestart，sinceIstandinthemoralsphereasasinglewillwhilethegoodistheuniversaleventhoughitiswithinmyself。Thusatthatlevel，thewillhasinitselfthedifferentfactorsofsingularityanduniversality，andthisgivesititsspecificcharacter。But，tobeginwith，nosuchdifferenceispresent，sinceatthefirststage，thatofabstractunity，thereisnoadvanceandnomediationandsothewillhastheformofimmediacy，ofmerebeing。Theessentialpointofviewtobetakenherethenisthatthisoriginalindeterminacyisitselfadeterminacy。Theindeterminacyliesinthefactthatthereisasyetnodifferencebetweenthewillanditscontent；butindeterminacy，opposedtothedeterminate，acquiresthecharacterofbeingsomethingdeterminate。Itisabstractidentitywhichhereconstitutesdeterminacy；thewillthereforebecomesasinglewill，aperson。
§35。
Theuniversalityofthisconsciouslyfreewillisabstractuniversality，theself-consciousbutotherwisecontentlessandsimplerelationofitselftoitselfinitsindividuality，andfromthispointofviewthesubjectisaperson。Personalityimpliesthatasthisperson:(i)Iamcompletelydeterminedoneveryside(inmyinnercaprice，impulse，anddesire，aswellasbyimmediateexternalfacts)andsofinite，yet(ii)nonethelessIamsimplyandsolelyself-relation，andthereforeinfinitudeIknowmyselfassomethinginfinite，—universal，andfree。
Remark:Personalitybeginsnotwiththesubject\'smeregeneralconsciousnessofhimselfasanegoconcretelydeterminedinsomewayorother，butratherwithhisconsciousnessofhimselfasacompletelyabstractegoinwhicheveryconcreterestrictionandvalueisnegatedandwithoutvalidity。Inpersonality，therefore，knowledgeisknowledgeofoneselfasanobject，butanobjectraisedbythinkingtothelevelofsimpleinfinityandsoanobjectpurelyself-identical。Individualsandnationshavenopersonalityuntiltheyhaveachievedthispurethoughtandknowledgeofthemselves。Mindfullyexplicitdiffersfromthephenomenalmindinthis，thatatthesamelevelatwhichthelatterisonlyself-consciousness—aconsciousnessofselfbutonlyonepursuanttothenaturalwillanditsstillexternaloppositions—theformerhasitself，astheabstractandfreeego，foritsobjectandaim，andsoispersonality。
Addition:Theabstractwill，consciouslyself-contained，ispersonality。Man\'schiefgloryistobeaperson，andyetinspiteofthatthebareabstraction，\'person\'，issomewhatcontemptuousinitsveryexpression。\'Person\'isessentiallydifferentfrom\'subject\'，since\'subject\'isonlythepossibilityofpersonality；everylivingthingofanysortisasubject。Aperson，then，isasubjectawareofthissubjectivity，sinceinpersonalityitisofmyselfalonethatIamaware。Apersonisaunitoffreedomawareofitssheerindependence。Asthisperson，IknowmyselftobefreeinmyselfIcanabstractfromeverything，sincenothingconfrontsmesavepurepersonality，andyetasthispersonIamsomethingwhollydeterminate，e。g。Iamofacertainage，acertainstature，Ioccupythisspace，andsoonthroughwhateverotherdetailsyoulike。Thuspersonalityisatoncethesublimeandthetrivial。，Itimpliesthisunityoftheinfinitewiththepurelyfinite，ofthewhollylimitlesswithdeterminatelimitation。Itisthesublimityofpersonalitythatisabletosustainthiscontradiction，acontradictionwhichnothingmerelynaturalcontainsorcouldendure。
§36。
(1)Personalityessentiallyinvolvesthecapacityforrightsandconstitutestheconceptandthebasis(itselfabstract)ofthesystemofabstractandthereforeformalright。Hencetheimperativeofrightis:\'Beapersonandrespectothersaspersons。\'
§37。
(2)Theparticularityofthewillisamomentintheconsciousnessofthewillasawhole(see§34)，butitisnotyetcontainedinabstractpersonalityassuch。
Therefore，itispresentatthispoint，butasstillsunderedfrompersonality，fromthecharacteroffreedom，presentasdesire，need，impulse，casualwhim，andsoforth。Informalright，therefore，thereisnoquestionofparticularinterests，ofmyadvantageormywelfare，anymorethanthereisoftheparticularmotivebehindmyvolition，ofinsightandintention。
Addition:Since，inpersonality，particularityisnotpresentasfreedom，everythingwhichdependsonparticularityishereamatterofindifference。Tohavenointerestexceptinone\'sformalrightmaybepureobstinacy，oftenafittingaccompanimentofacoldheartandrestrictedsympathies。Itisunculturedpeoplewhoinsistmostontheirrights，whilenoblemindslookonotheraspectsofthething。Thusabstractrightisnothingbutabarepossibilityand，atleastincontrastwiththewholerangeofthesituation，somethingformal。Onthataccount，tohavearightgivesoneawarrant，butitisnotabsolutelynecessarythatoneshouldinsistonone\'srights，becausethatisonlyoneaspectofthewholesituation。Thatistosay，possibilityisbeingwhichhasthesignificanceofalsonotbeing。
§38。
Inrelationtoactionintheconcreteandtomoralandethicalties，abstractrightis，incontrastwiththefurthercontentwhichtheseinvolve，onlyapossibility，andtohavearightisthereforetohaveonlyapermissionorawarrant。Theunconditionalcommandsofabstractrightarerestricted，onceagainbecauseofitsabstractness，tothenegative:\'Donotinfringepersonalityandwhatpersonalityentails。\'Theresultisthatthereareonlyprohibitionsinthesphereofright，andthepositiveformofanycommandinthissphereisbasedinthelastresort，ifweexamineitsultimatecontent，onprohibition。
§39。
(3)Asimmediateindividuality，apersoninmakingdecisionsisrelatedtoaworldofnaturedirectlyconfrontinghim，andthusthepersonalityofthewillstandsoveragainstthisworldassomethingsubjective。Forpersonality，however，asinherentlyinfiniteanduniversal，therestrictionofbeingonlysubjectiveisacontradictionandanullity。Personalityisthatwhichstrugglestoliftitselfabovethisrestrictionandtogiveitselfreality，orinotherwordstoclaimthatexternalworldasitsown。
§40。
Rightisinthefirstplacetheimmediateembodimentwhichfreedomgivesitselfinanimmediateway，i。e。(a)possession，whichisproperty—ownership。Freedomisherethefreedomoftheabstractwillingeneralor，eoipso，thefreedomofasinglepersonrelatedonlytohimself。(b)Apersonbydistinguishinghimselffromhimselfrelateshimselftoanotherperson，anditisonlyasownersthatthesetwopersonsreallyexistforeachother。Theirimplicitidentityisrealisedthroughthetransferenceofpropertyfromonetotheotherinconformitywithacommonwillandwithoutdetrimenttotherightsofeither。Thisiscontract。(c)Thewillwhichisdifferentiatednotinthesenseof(b)asbeingcontrastedwithanotherperson，butinthesenseof(a)asrelatedtoitself，isasaparticularwillatvariancewithandopposedtoitselfasanabsolutewill。Thisoppositioniswrongdoingandcrime。
Remark:Theclassificationofthesystemofrightsintojusadpersonamandjusadremontheonehand，andjusadactionesontheother，likethemanyothersimilarclassifications，hasasitsprimaryaimtheimpositionofanexternalorderonthemassofunorganisedmaterialconfrontingtheclassifier。Thestrikingthingaboutthisclassificationistheconfusioninitduetothedisorderlyintermixtureofrightswhichpresupposesubstantialties，e。g。thoseoffamilyandpoliticallife，andrightswhichonlyanabstractpersonalityassuch。Thisconfusionisexemplifiedintheclassificationofrights(adoptedbyKantandsincefavouredbyothers)intojusreale，juspersonals，andjusrealiterpersonals。
Todeveloptheperversityandlackofspeculativethoughtintheclassificationofrightsintojusadpersonantandjusadrem，whichliesat\'therootofRomanlaw(jusadactionesconcernstheadministrationofandisofadifferentorderaltogether)，wouldtakeustoofarafield，arethismuchatleastisclear:itispersonalityalonewhichcanconferarighttothingsandthereforejusadpersonaminitsessenceisjusadrem，rembeingtakenhereinitsgeneralsenseasanythingexternaltomyfreedom，includingevenmybodyandmylife。Inthissense，jusadremistherightofpersonalityassuch。ButfromthepointofviewofwhatiscalledjusadpersonaminRomanlaw，amanisreckonedapersononlywhenheistreatedaspossessingacertainstatus。HenceinRomanlaw，evenpersonalityitselfisonlyacertainstandingorstatuscontrasted，withslavery。Theso-calledRomanlawof\'personal\'rights，then，isconcernedwithfamilyrelationships，thoughitexcludestherightoverslaves(and\'slaves\'almostincludeschildrentoo)aswellasthestatus(calledcapitisdiminutio)ofhavinglostone\'srights。(InKant，bytheway，familyrelationshipsarethejurarealiterpersonalia。)TheRomanjusadpersonamisthereforenottherightofthepersonaspersonbutatmosttherightofapersoninhisparticularcapacity。(Lateroninthisbook，itwillbeshownthatthesubstantialbasisoffamilyrelationshipsisratherthesacrificeofpersonality。)Nowitmustbeobviousthatitisperversetreattherightofaspecificpersoninhisparticularcapacitybeforetheuniversalrightofpersonalityassuch。
Kant\'sjurapersonaliaaretherightsissuingfromacontractwherebyIundertaketogivesomethingortoperformsomething—thejusadremconferredbyanobligatioinRomanlaw。Tobesure，itisonlyapersonwhoisrequiredtoexecutethecovenantsofacontract，justasitisalsoonlyapersonwhoacquirestherighttotheirexecution。Butarightofthissortcannotforthisreasonbecalleda\'personal\'right；rightsofwhateversortbelongtoapersonalone。Objectivelyconsidered，arightarisingfromacontractisneverarightoveraperson，butonlyarightoversomethingexternaltoapersonorsomethingwhichhecanalienate，alwaysarightoverathing。
A:Property-B:Contract-C:WrongTransitionfromRighttoMorality§104。
Thatistosay，crime，andjusticeintheformofrevenge，display(i)theshapewhichthewill\'sdevelopmenttakeswhenithaspassedoverintothedistinctionbetweentheuniversalimplicitwillandthesinglewillexplicitlyinoppositiontotheuniversal；and(ii)thefactthattheuniversalwill，returningintoitselfthroughsupersedingthisopposition，hasnowitselfbecomeactualandexplicit。Inthisway，theright，upheldinfaceoftheexplicitlyindependentsinglewill，isandisrecognisedasactualonthescoreofitsnecessity。Atthesametime，however，thisexternalformationwhichthewillhashereiseoipsoastepforwardintheinnerdeterminationofthewillbytheconcept。Thewill\'simmanentactualisationinaccordancewithitsconceptistheprocesswherebyitsupersedesitsimplicitstateandtheformofimmediacyinwhichitbeginsandwhichistheshapeitassumesinabstractright(seeRemarkto§21)；thismeansthatitfirstputsitselfintheoppositionbetweentheimplicituniversalwillandthesingleexplicitlyindependentwill；andthen，throughthesupersessionofthisopposition(throughthenegationofthenegation)，itdeterminesitselfinitsexistenceasawill，sothatitisafreewillnotonlyinitselfbutforitselfalso，i。e。itdeterminesitselfasself-relatednegativity。Itspersonality—andinabstractrightthewillispersonalityandnomore—itnowhasforitsobject；theinfinitesubjectivityoffreedom，asubjectivitybecomeexplicitinthisway，istheprincipleofthemoralstandpoint。
Remark:Letuslookbackmorecloselyoverthemomentsthroughwhichtheconceptoffreedomdevelopsitselffromthewill\'sdeterminatecharacterasoriginallyabstracttoitscharacterasself-related，andsoatthispointtoitsself-determinationassubjectivity。Inpropertythisdeterminatecharacteristheabstractone，\'mine\'，andisthereforefoundinanexternalthing。Incontract，\'mine\'ismediatedbythewillsofthepartiesandmeansonlysomethingcommon。Inwrongthewillofthesphereofrighthasitsabstractcharacterofimplicitbeingorimmediacypositedascontingencythroughtheactofasinglewill，itselfacontingentwill。Atthemoralstandpoint，theabstractdeterminacyofthewillinthesphereofrighthasbeensofarovercomethatthiscontingencyitselfis，asreflectedinuponitselfandself-identical，theinwardinfinitecontingencyofthewill，i。e。itssubjectivity。
Addition:Truthentailsthattheconceptshallbe，andthatthisexistenceshallcorrespondwiththeconcept。Inthesphereofright，thewillisexistentinsomethingexternal，butthenextrequirementisthatthewillshouldbeexistentinsomethinginward，initself。Itmustinitsowneyesbesubjectivity，andhaveitselfasitsownobject。Thisrelationtoitselfisthemomentofaffirmation，butitcanattainitonlybysupersedingitsimmediacy。Theimmediacysupersededincrimeleads，then，throughpunishment，i。e。throughthenullityofthisnullity，toaffirmation，i。e。tomorality。
SecondPart:Morality§105。
Thestandpointofmoralityisthestandpointofthewillwhichisinfinitenotmerelyinitselfbutforitself(see§104)。Incontrastwiththewill\'simplicitbeing，withitsimmediacyandthedeterminatecharacteristicsdevelopedwithinitatthatlevel，thisreflectionofthewillintoitselfanditsexplicitawarenessofitsidentitymakesthepersonintothesubject。
§106。
Itisassubjectivitythattheconcepthasnowbeendetermined，andsincesubjectivityisdistinctfromtheconceptassuch，i。e。fromtheimplicitprincipleofthewill，andsincefurthermoreitisatthesametimethewillofthesubjectasasingleindividualawareofhimself(i。e。stillhasimmediacyinhim)，itconstitutesthedeterminateexistenceoftheconcept。Inthiswayahighergroundhasbeenassignedtofreedom；theIdea\'sexistentialaspect，oritsmomentofreality，isnowthesubjectivityofthewill。OnlyintheWillassubjectivecanfreedomortheimplicitprincipleofthewillbeactual。
Remark:Thesecondsphere，—Morality，thereforethroughoutportraystherealaspectoftheconceptoffreedom，andthemovementofthissphereisasfollows:thewill，whichatthestartisawareonlyofitsindependenceandwhichbeforeitismediatedisonlyimplicitlyidenticalwiththeuniversalwillortheprincipleofthewill，israisedbeyondits[explicit]differencefromtheuniversalwill，beyondthissituationinwhichitsinksdeeperanddeeperintoitself，andisestablishedasexplicitlyidenticalwiththeprincipleofthewill。，—Thisprocessisaccordinglythecultivationofthegroundinwhichfreedomisnowset，i。e。subjectivity。Whathappensisthatsubjectivity，whichisabstractatthestart，i。e。distinctfromtheconcept，becomeslikenedtoit，andtherebytheIdeaacquiresitsgenuinerealisation，Theresultisthatthesubjective-willdeterminesitselfasobjectivetooandsoastrulyconcrete。
Addition:Sofarasrightinthestrictsensewasconcerned，itwasofnoimportancewhatmyintentionormyprinciplewas。Thisquestionabouttheself-determinationandmotiveofthewill，likethequestionaboutitspurpose，nowentersatthispointinconnectionwithmorality。Sincemanwishestobejudgedinaccordancewithhisownself-determinedchoices，heisfreeinthisrelationtohimselfwhatevertheexternalsituationmayimposeuponhim。Noonecanbreakinuponthisinnerconvictionofmankind，noviolencecanbedonetoit，andthemoralwill，therefore，isinaccessible。Man\'sworthisestimatedbyreferencetohisinwardactionandhencethestandpointofmoralityisthatoffreedomawareofitself。
§107。
Theself-determinationofthewillisatthesametimeamomentintheconceptofthewill，andsubjectivityisnotmerelyitsexistentialaspectbutitsowndeterminatecharacter(see§104)。Thewillawareofitsfreedomanddeterminedassubjectiveisatthestartconceptalone，butitselfhasdeterminateexistenceinordertoexistasIdea。ThemoralstandpointthereforetakesshapeastherightofthesubjectiveWill。Inaccordancewiththisright，thewillrecognisessomethingandissomething，onlyinsofarasthethingisitsownandasthewillispresenttoitselfthereassomethingsubjective。
Thesameprocessthroughwhichthemoralattitudedevelops(seetheRemarktotheprecedingParagraph)hasfromthispointofviewtheformofbeingthedevelopmentoftherightofthesubjectivewill，orofthemodeofitsexistence。Inthisprocessthesubjectivewillfurtherdetermineswhatitrecognisesasitsowninitsobject(Gegenstand)，sothatthisobjectbecomesthewill\'sowntrueconcept，becomesobjective(objektiv)astheexpressionofthewill\'sownuniversality。
Addition:Thisentirecategoryofthesubjectivityofthewillisonceagainawholewhich，assubjectivity，mustalsohaveobjectivity。Itisinasubjectthatfreedomcanfirstberealised，sincethesubjectiveisthetruematerialforthisrealisation。Butthisembodimentofthewillwhichwehavecalledsubjectivityisdifferentfromthewillwhichhasdevelopedallitspotentialitiestoactuality。
Thatistosay，thewillmustfreeitselffromthissecondone-sidednessofpuresubjectivityinordertobecomethefullyactualisedwill。Inmorality，itisman\'sprivateinterestthatcomesintoquestion，andthehighworthofthisinterestconsistspreciselyinthefactthatmanknowshimselfasabsoluteandisself-determined。Theuneducatedmanallowshimselftobeconstrainedineverythingbybruteforceandnaturalfactors；childrenhavenomoralwillbutleavetheirparentstodecidethingsforthem。Theeducatedman，however，developsaninnerlifeandwillsthathehimselfshallbeineverythinghedoes。
§108。
Thesubjectivewill，directlyawareofitself，anddistinguishedfromtheprincipleofthewill(seeRemarkto§106)，isthereforeabstract，restricted，andformal。
Butnotmerelyissubjectivityitselfformal；inaddition，astheinfiniteself-determinationofthewill，itconstitutestheformofallwilling。Inthis，itsfirstappearanceinthesinglewill，thisformhasnotyetbeenestablishedasidenticalwiththeconceptofthewill，andthereforethemoralpointofviewisthatofrelation，ofought-to-be，ordemand。Andsincetheself-differenceofsubjectivityinvolvesatthesametimethecharacterofbeingopposedtoobjectivityasexternalfact，itfollowsthatthepointofviewofconsciousnesscomesonthesceneheretoo(see§8)。Thegeneralpointofviewhereisthatofthewill\'sself-difference，finitude，andappearance。
Remark:Themoralisnotcharacterisedprimarilybyitshavingalreadybeenopposedtotheimmoral，norisrightdirectlycharacterisedbyitsoppositiontowrong。Thepointisratherthatthegeneralcharacteristicsofmoralityandimmoralityalikerestonthesubjectivityofthewill。
Addition:Inmorality，self-determinationistobethoughtofasthepurerestlessnessandactivitywhichcanneverarriveatanythingthatis。Itisinthesphereofethicallifethatthewillisforthefirsttimeidenticalwiththeconceptofthewillandhasthisconceptaloneasitscontent。Inthemoralspherethewillstillrelatesitselftoitsimplicitprincipleandconsequentlyitspositionisthatofdifference。Theprocessthroughwhichthispositiondevelopsisthatwherebythesubjectivewillbecomesidentifiedwithitsconcept。Thereforethe\'ought-to-be\'whichisneverabsentfromthemoralspherebecomesan\'is\'onlyinethicallife。Further，this\'other\'inrelationtowhichthesubjectivewillstandsistwo-sided:first，itiswhatissubstantive，theconcept；secondly，itisexternalfact。Evenifthegoodwerepositedinthesubjectivewill，thatstillwouldnotgiveitcompleterealisation。
§109。
Thisformofallwillingprimarilyinvolvesinaccordancewithitsgeneralcharacter(a)theoppositionofsubjectivityandobjectivity，and(b)theactivity(see§8)
relatedtothisopposition。Nowexistenceandspecificdeterminacyareidenticalintheconceptofthewill(see§104)，andthewillassubjectiveisitselfthisconcept。Hencethemomentsofthisactivityconsistmorepreciselyin(a)distinguishingbetweenobjectivityandsubjectivityandevenascribingindependenceto。themboth，and(b)establishingthemasidentical。Inthewillwhichisself-determining，[a]itsspecificdeterminacyisinthefirstplaceestablishedinthewillitselfbyitselfasitsinnerparticularisation，asacontentwhichitgivestoitself。Thisisthefirstnegation，andtheformallimitation(Grenze)ofthisnegationisthatofbeingonlysomethingposited，somethingsubjective。
[b]Asinfinitelyreflectedintoitself，thislimitationexistsforthewill，andthewillisthestruggletotranscendthisbarrier(Schranke)，i。e。itistheactivityoftranslatingthiscontentinsomewayorotherfromsubjectivityintoobjectivity，intoanimmediateexistence。
[c]Thesimpleidentityofthewillwithitselfinthisoppositionisthecontentwhichremainsself-identicalinboththeseoppositesandindifferenttothisformaldistinctionofopposition。Inshort，itismyaim[thepurposewilled]。
§110。
But，atthestandpointofmorality，wherethewillisawareofitsfreedom，ofthisidentityofthewillwithitself(see§105)，thisidentityofcontentacquiresthemoreparticularisedcharacterappropriatetoitself。
(a)Thecontentas\'mine\'hasformethischaracter:byvirtueofitsidentityinsubjectandobjectitenshrinesformemysubjectivity，notmerelyasmyinnerpurpose，butalsoinasmuchasithasacquiredoutwardexistence。
Addition:Thecontentofthesubjectiveormoralwillhasaspecificcharacterofitsown，i。e。
evenifithasacquiredtheformofobjectivity，itmuststillcontinuetoenshrinemysubjectivity，andmyactistocountasmineonlyifonitsinwardsideithasbeendeterminedbyme，ifitwasmypurpose，myintention。BeyondwhatlayinmysubjectivewillIrecognisenothinginitsexpressionasmine。WhatIwishtoseeinmydeedismysubjectiveconsciousnessoveragain。
§111。
(b)Thoughthecontentdoeshaveinitsomethingparticular，whencesoeveritmaybederived，stillitisthecontentofthewillreflectedintoitselfinitsdeterminacyandthusoftheself-identicalanduniversalwill；andtherefore:
[a]thecontentisinwardlycharacterisedasadequatetotheprincipleofthewilloraspossessingtheobjectivityoftheconcept；
[b]sincethesubjectivewill，asawareofitself，isatthesametimestillformal(see§108)，thecontent\'sadequacytotheconceptisstillonlysomethingdemanded，andhencethisentailsthepossibilitythatthecontentmaynotbeadequatetotheconcept。
§112。
(c)SinceincarryingoutmyaimsIretainmysubjectivity(see§110)，duringthisprocessofobjectifyingthemIsimultaneouslysupersedetheimmediacyofthissubjectivityaswellasitscharacterasthismyindividualsubjectivity。Buttheexternalsubjectivitywhichisthusidenticalwithmeisthewillofothers(see§
73)。Thewill\'sgroundofexistenceisnowsubjectivity(see§106)andthewillofothersisthatexistencewhichIgivetomyaimandwhichisatthesametimetomeanother。Theachievementofmyaim，therefore，impliesthisidentityofmywillwiththewillofothers，ithasapositivebearingonthewillofothers。
Remark:Theobjectivityoftheaimachievedthusinvolvesthreemeanings，orratherithasthreemomentspresentwithinitatonce；itis:
[a]somethingexistingexternallyandimmediately(see§106)；
[b]adequatetotheconcept(see§111)；
[c]universalsubjectivity。
Thesubjectivitywhichmaintainsitselfinthisobjectivityconsists:
[a]inthefactthattheobjectiveaimismine，sothatinitImaintainmyselfasthisindividual(see§110)；
[b]and[c]，inmomentswhichcoincidewiththemoments[b]and[c]above。
Atthestandpointofmorality，subjectivityandobjectivityaredistinctfromoneanother，orunitedonlybytheirmutualcontradiction；itisthisfactmoreparticularlywhichconstitutesthefinitudeofthissphereoritscharacterasmereappearance(see§108)，andthedevelopmentofthisstandpointisthedevelopmentofthesecontradictionsandtheirresolutions，resolutions，however，whichwithinthisfieldcanbenomorethanrelative。
Addition:Indealingwithformalright，Isaid[see§38]thatitcontainedprohibitionsonly，thathencearightaction，strictlysocalled，waspurelynegativeincharacterinrespectofthewillofothers。Inmorality，ontheotherhand，mywillhasapositivecharacterinrelationtotheWillofothers，i。e。theuniversalwillisimplicitlypresentwithinwhatthesubjectivewilleffects。Toeffectsomethingistoproducesomethingortoalterwhatalreadyexists，andsuchchangeshaveabearingonthewillofothers。Theconceptofmoralityistheinnerrelationofthewilltoitself。Buthereitisnotonlyonewill；onthecontraryitsobjectificationimpliesatthesametimethecancellationofthesinglewill，andtherefore，inaddition，justbecausethecharacterofone-sidednessvanishes，thepositingoftwowillsandapositivebearingofeachontheother。Sofarasrightsareconcerned，itmakesnodifferencewhethersomeoneelse\'swillmaydosomethinginrelationtomine，whenIgivemywillanembodimentinproperty。Inmorality，however，thewelfareofotherstooisinquestion，andthispositivebearingcannotcomeonthescenebeforethispoint。
§113。
Theexternalisationofthesubjectiveormoralwillisaction。Actionimpliesthedeterminatecharacteristicshereindicated:[a]initsexternalityitmustbeknowntomeasmyaction；[b]itmustbearessentiallyontheconceptasan\'ought\'[see§
131]；[c]itmusthaveanessentialbearingonthewillofothers。
Remark:Itisnotuntilwecometotheexternalisationofthemoralwillthatwecometoaction。
Theexistencewhichthewillgivestoitselfinthesphereofformalrightsisexistenceinanimmediatethingandisitselfimmediate；tostartwith，itneitherhasinitselfanyexpressbearingontheconcept，whichisatthatpointnotyetcontrastedwiththesubjectivewillandsoisnotdistinguishedfromit，norhasitapositivebearingonthewillofothers；inthesphereofright，commandinitsfundamentalcharacterisonlyprohibition(see§38)。Incontractandwrong，thereisthebeginningofabearingonthewillofothers；butthecorrespondenceestablishedincontractbetweenonewillandanotherisgroundedinarbitrariness，andtheessentialbearingwhichthewillhasthereonthewilloftheotheris，asamatterofrights，somethingnegative，i。e。onepartyretainshisproperty(thevalueofit)andallowstheothertoretainhis。Ontheotherhand，crimeinitsaspectasissuingfromthesubjectivewill，andthequestionofthemodeofitsexistenceinthatwill，comebeforeusnowforconsiderationforthefirsttime。
Thecontentofanactionatlaw(actio)，assomethingdeterminedbylegalenactment，isnotimputabletome。Consequently，suchanactioncontainsonlysomeofthemomentsofamoralactionproper，andcontainsthemonlyIncidentally。Theaspectofanactioninvirtueofwhichitisproperlymoralisthereforedistinctfromitsaspectaslegal。
