§114。
Therightofthemoralwillinvolvesthreeaspects:
(a)Theabstractorformalrightofaction，therightthatthecontentoftheactionascarriedoutinimmediateexistence，shallbeinprinciplemine，thatthustheactionshallbethePurposeofthesubjectivewill。
(b)Theparticularaspectoftheactionisitsinnercontent[a]asIamawareofitinitsgeneralcharacter；myawarenessofthisgeneralcharacterconstitutestheworthoftheactionandthereasonIthinkgoodtodoit-inshortmyIntention。[b]Itscontentismyspecialaim，theaimofmyparticular，merelyindividual，existence，i。e。Welfare。
(c)Thiscontent(assomethingwhichisinwardandwhichyetatthesametimeisraisedtoitsuniversalityastoabsoluteobjectivity)istheabsoluteendofthewill，theGood—withtheoppositioninthesphereofreflection，ofsubjectiveuniversality，whichisnowwickednessandnowconscience。
Addition:Ifanactionistobemoral，itmustinthefirstplacecorrespondwithmypurpose，sincethemoralwillhastherighttorefusetorecogniseintheresultingstateofaffairswhatwasnotpresentinwardlyaspurpose。Purposeconcernsonlytheformalprinciplethattheexternalwillshallbewithinmeassomethinginward。Ontheotherhand，inthesecondmomentofthemoralsphere，questionsmaybeaskedabouttheintentionbehindtheaction，i。e。abouttherelativeworthoftheactioninrelationtome。Thethirdandlastmomentisnottherelativeworthoftheactionbutitsuniversalworth，thegood。
Inamoralaction，then，theremaybeabreachfirstbetweenwhatispurposedandwhatisreallyeffectedandachieved；secondly，betweenwhatisthereexternallyasauniversalwillandtheparticularinnerdeterminationwhichIgivetoit。Thethirdandlastpointisthattheintentionshouldbeinadditiontheuniversalcontentoftheaction。Thegoodistheintentionraisedtobetheconceptofthewill。
iPurpose&Responsibility§115。
Thefinitudeofthesubjectivewillintheimmediacyofactingconsistsdirectlyinthis，thatitsactionpresupposesanexternalobjectwithacomplexenvironment。
Thedeedsetsupanalterationinthisstateofaffairsconfrontingthewill，andmywillhasresponsibilityingeneralforitsdeedinsofarastheabstractpredicate\'mine\'belongstothestateofaffairssoaltered。
Remark:Anevent，asituationwhichhasbeenproduced，isaconcreteexternalactualitywhichbecauseofitsconcretenesshasinitanindeterminablemultiplicityoffactors。Anyandeverysingleelementwhichappearsasthecondition，ground，orcauseofonesuchfactor，andsohascontributeditssharetotheeventinquestion，maybelookeduponasresponsiblefortheevent，oratleastassharingtheresponsibilityforit。Hence，inthecaseofacomplexevent(e。g。theFrenchRevolution)itisopentotheabstractUnderstandingtochoosewhichofanendlessnumberoffactorsitwillmaintaintoberesponsibleforit。
Addition:Iamchargeablewithwhatlayinmypurposeandthisisthemostimportantpointinconnectionwithcrime。ButresponsibilitycontainsonlythequiteexternaljudgementwhetherIhaveorhavenotdonesomething。Itdoesnotfollowthat，becauseIamresponsible，thethingdonemaybeimputedtome。
§116。
Itis，ofcourse，notmyowndoingifdamageiscausedtoothersbythingswhoseownerIamandwhichasexternalobjectsstandandareeffectiveinmanifoldconnectionswithotherthings(asmayalsobethecasewithmyselfasabodilymechanismorasalivingthing)。Thisdamage，however，istosomeextentchargeabletomebecausethethingsthatcauseitareinprinciplemine，althoughitistruethattheyaresubjecttomycontrol，vigilance，&c。，onlytoanextentvaryingwiththeirspecialcharacter。
§117。
Thefreelyactingwill，indirectingitsaimonthestateofaffairsconfrontingit，hasanideaoftheattendantcircumstances。Butbecausethewillisfinite，sincethisstateofaffairsispresupposed，theobjectivephenomenoniscontingentsofarasthewillisconcerned，andmaycontainsomethingotherthanwhatthewill\'sideaofitcontains。Thewill\'sright，however，istorecogniseasitsaction，andtoacceptresponsibilityfor，onlythosepresuppositionsofthedeedofwhichitwasconsciousinitsaimandthoseaspectsofthedeedwhichwerecontainedinitspurpose。Thedeedcanbeimputedtomeonlyifmywillisresponsibleforit-thisistherighttoknow。
Addition:Thewillhasconfrontingitastateofaffairsuponwhichitacts。ButinordertoknowwhatthisstateofaffairsisImusthaveanideaofit，andtheresponsibilityistrulymineonlyinsofarasIhadknowledgeofthesituationconfrontingme。Suchasituationisapresuppositionofmyvolitionandmywillisthereforefinite，orrather，sincemywillisfinite，ithasapresuppositionofthiskind。Assoonasmythinkingandwillingisrational，Iamnolongeratthisleveloffinitude，sincetheobjectonwhichIactisnolongeran\'other\'tome。Finitude，however，impliesfixedlimitsandrestrictions。Ihaveconfrontingmean\'other\'whichisonlycontingent，somethingnecessaryinapurelyexternalway；itspathandminemaymeetordiverge。Nevertheless，Iamnothingexceptinrelationtomyfreedom，andmywillisresponsibleforthedeedonlyinsofarasIknowwhatIamdoing。Oedipus，whokilledhisfatherwithoutknowingit，cannotbeaccusedofparricide。Theancientpenalcodes，however，attachedlessweighttothesubjectivesideofaction，toimputability，thanwedonowadays。Thatiswhysanctuarieswereinstitutedinancienttimesforharbouringandprotectingthefugitivefromvengeance。
§118。
Further，actionistranslatedintoexternalfact，andexternalfacthasconnectionsinthefieldofexternalnecessitythroughwhichitdevelopsitselfinalldirections。
Henceactionhasamultitudeofconsequences。Theseconsequencesaretheoutwardformwhoseinnersoulistheaimoftheaction，andthustheyaretheconsequencesoftheaction，theybelongtotheaction。Atthesametime，however，theaction，astheaimpositedintheexternalworld，hasbecomethepreyofexternalforceswhichattachtoitsomethingtotallydifferentfromwhatitisexplicitlyanddriveitonintoalienanddistantconsequences。Thusthewillhastherighttorepudiatetheimputationofallconsequencesexceptthefirst，sinceitalonewaspurposed。
Remark:Todeterminewhichresultsareaccidentalandwhichnecessaryisimpossible，becausethenecessityimplicitinthefinitecomesintodeterminateexistenceasanexternalnecessity，asarelationofsinglethingstooneanother，thingswhichasself-subsistentareconjoinedinindifferencetooneanotherandexternally。Themaxim:\'Ignoretheconsequencesofactions\'andtheother:
\'Judgeactionsbytheirconsequencesandmakethesethecriterionofrightandgood\'arebothalikemaximsoftheabstractUnderstanding。Theconsequences，astheshapepropertotheactionandimmanentwithinit，exhibitnothingbutitsnatureandaresimplytheactionitself；thereforetheactioncanneitherdisavownorignorethem。Ontheotherhand，however，amongtheconsequencesthereisalsocomprisedsomethinginterposedfromwithoutandintroducedbychance，andthisisquiteunrelatedtothenatureoftheactionitself。
Thedevelopmentintheexternalworldofthecontradictioninvolvedinthenecessityofthefiniteisjusttheconversionofnecessityintocontingencyandviceversa。Fromthispointofview，therefore，actingmeanssurrenderingoneselftothislaw。Itisbecauseofthisthatitistotheadvantageofthecriminalifhisactionhascomparativelyfewbadconsequences(whileagoodactionmustbecontenttohavehadnoconsequencesorveryfew)，andthatthefulldevelopedconsequencesofacrimearecountedaspartofthecrime。
Theself-consciousnessofheroes(likethatofOedipusandothersinGreektragedy)hadnotadvancedoutofitsprimitivesimplicityeithertoreflectiononthedistinctionbetweenactandaction，betweentheexternaleventandthepurposeandknowledgeofthecircumstances，ortothesubdivisionofconsequences。Onthecontrary，theyacceptedresponsibilityforthewholecompassofthedeed。
Addition:ThetransitiontointentiondependsonthefactthatIacceptresponsibilityonlyforwhatmyideaofthesituationwas。Thatistosay，therecanbeimputedtomeonlywhatIknewofthecircumstances。Ontheotherhand，thereareinevitableconsequenceslinkedwitheveryaction，evenifIamonlybringingaboutsomesingle，immediate，stateofaffairs。Theconsequencesinsuchacaserepresenttheuniversalimplicitwithinthatstateofaffairs。OfcourseIcannotforeseetheconsequences-theymightbepreventable-butImustbeawareoftheuniversalcharacterofanyisolatedact。Theimportantpointhereisnottheisolatedthingbutthewhole，andthatdependsnotonthedifferentiaoftheparticularaction，butonitsuniversalnature。NowthetransitionfrompurposetointentionliesinthefactthatIoughttobeawarenotsimplyofmysingleactionbutalsooftheuniversalwhichisconjoinedwithit。TheuniversalwhichcomesonthescenehereinthiswayiswhatIhavewilled，myintention。
iiIntention&Welfare§119。
Anactionasanexternalevent。isacomplexofconnectedpartswhichmayberegardedasdividedintounitsadinfinitum，andtheactionmaybetreatedashavingtouchedinthefirstinstanceonlyoneoftheseunits。Thetruthofthesingle，however，istheuniversal；andwhatexplicitlygivesactionitsspecificcharacterisnotanisolatedcontentlimitedtoanexternalunit，butauniversalcontent，comprisinginitselfthecomplexofconnectedparts。Purpose，asissuingfromathinker，comprisesmorethanthemereunit；essentiallyitcomprisesthatuniversalsideoftheaction，i。e。theintention。
Remark:Etymologically，Absicht(intention)impliesabstraction，eithertheformofuniversalityortheextractionofaparticularaspectoftheconcretething。Theendeavourtojustifyanactionbytheintentionbehinditinvolvestheisolationofoneorotherofitssingleaspectswhichisallegedtobetheessenceoftheactiononitssubjectiveside。
Tojudgeanactionasanexternaldeedwithoutyetdeterminingitsrightnessorwrongnessissimplytobestowonitauniversalpredicate，i。e。todescribeitasburning，killing，&c。
Thediscretecharacteroftheexternalworldshowswhatthenatureofthatworldis，namelyachainofexternalrelations。Actualityistouchedinthefirstinstanceonlyatasinglepoint(arson，forinstance，directlyconcernsonlyatinysectionofthefirewood，i。e。isdescribableinaproposition，notajudgment)，buttheuniversalnatureofthispointentailsitsexpansion。Inalivingthing，thesinglepartisthereinitsimmediacynotasamerepart，butasanorganinwhichtheuniversalisreallypresentastheuniversal；henceinmurder，itisnotapieceofflesh，assomethingisolated，whichisinjured，butlifeitselfwhichisinjuredinthatpieceofflesh。Itissubjectivereflection，ignorantofthelogicalnatureofthesingleandtheuniversal，whichindulgesadlibituminthesubdivisionofsinglepartsandconsequences；andyetitisthenatureofthefinitedeeditselftocontainsuchseparablecontingencies。Thedeviceofdolusindirectushasitsbasisintheseconsiderations。
Addition:Ithappensofcoursethatcircumstancesmaymakeanactionmiscarrytoagreaterorlesserdegree。Inacaseofarson，forinstance，thefiremaynotcatchoralternativelyitmaytakeholdfurtherthantheincendiaryintended。Inspiteofthis，however，wemustnotmakethisadistinctionbetweengoodandbadluck，sinceinactingamanmustlayhisaccountwithexternality。
TheoldProverbiscorrect:\'Aflungstoneisthedevil\'s。\'Toactistoexposeoneselftobadluck。
Thusbadluckhasarightovermeandisanembodimentofmyownwilling。
§120。
Therightofintentionisthattheuniversalqualityoftheactionshallnotmerelybeimplicitbutshallbeknownbytheagent，andsoshallhavelainfromthestartinhissubjectivewill。Viceversa，whatmaybecalledtherightoftheobjectivityofactionistherightoftheactiontoevinceitselfasknownandwilledbythesubjectasathinker。
Remark:Thisrighttoinsightofthiskindentailsthecomplete，oralmostcomplete，irresponsibilityofchildren，imbeciles，lunatics，&c。，fortheiractions。Butjustasactionsontheirexternalsideaseventsincludeaccidentalconsequences，sothereisinvolvedinthesubjectiveagentanindeterminacywhosedegreedependsonthestrengthandforceofhisself-consciousnessandcircumspection。Thisindeterminacy，however，maynotbetakenintoaccountexceptinconnectionwithchildhoodorimbecility，lunacy，&c。，sinceitisonlysuchwellmarkedstatesofmindthatnullifythetraitofthoughtandfreedomofwill，andpermitustotreattheagentasdevoidofthedignityofbeingathinkerandawill。
§121。
Theuniversalqualityoftheactionisthemanifoldcontentoftheactionassuch，reducedtothesimpleformofuniversality。Butthesubject，anentityreflectedintohimselfandsoparticularincorrelationwiththeparticularityofhisobject，hasinhisendhisownparticularcontent，andthiscontentisthesouloftheactionanddeterminesitscharacter。Thefactthatthismomentoftheparticularityoftheagentiscontainedandrealisedintheactionconstitutessubjectivefreedominitsmoreconcretesense，therightofthesubjecttofindhissatisfactionintheaction。
Addition:Inmyowneyes，reflectedintomyself，Iamaparticularincorrelationwiththeexternalityofmyaction。Myendconstitutesthecontentoftheaction，thecontentdeterminantoftheaction。Murderandarson，forexample，areuniversalsandsoarenotthepositivecontentofmyactionquatheactionofasubject。Ifoneofthesecrimeshasbeencommitted，itsperpetratormaybeaskedwhyhecommittedit。Themurderwasnotdoneforthesakeofmurdering；themurdererhadinViewsomeparticularpositiveend。Butifweweretosaythathemurderedforthemerepleasureofmurdering，thenthepurelypositivecontentofthesubjectwouldsurelybepleasure，andifthatisthecasethenthedeedisthesatisfactionofthesubject\'swill。Thusthemotiveofanactis，moreparticularly，whatiscalledthe\'moral\'factor，andthishasinthatcasethedoublemeaningoftheuniversalimplicitinthepurposeandtheparticularaspectoftheintention。
Itisastrikingmodeminnovationtoinquirecontinuallyaboutthemotivesofmen\'sactions。
Formerly，thequestionwassimply:\'Isheanhonestman?Doeshedohisduty?\'Nowadaysweinsistonlookingintomen\'sheartsandsowepresupposeagulfbetweentheobjectivityofactionsandtheirinnerside，thesubjectivemotives。Tobesure，thesubject\'svolitionmustbeconsidered；
hewillssomethingandthereasonforwhathewillslieswithinhimself；hewillsthesatisfactionofhisdesire，thegratificationofhispassion。Nonetheless，thegoodandtherightarealsoacontentofaction，acontentnotpurelynaturalbutputtherebymyrationality。TomakemyfreedomthecontentofwhatIwillisaplaingoalofmyfreedomitself。Thereforeitistotakehighermoralgroundtofindsatisfactionintheactionandtoadvancebeyondthegulfbetweentheself-consciousnessofamanandtheobjectivityofhisdeed，eventhoughtotreatactionasifitinvolvedsuchagulfisawayoflookingatthemattercharacteristicofcertainepochsinworldhistoryandinindividualbiography。
§122。
Itisonthestrengthofthisparticularaspectthattheactionhassubjectiveworthorinterestforme。Incontrastwiththisend-thecontentoftheintention-thedirectcharacteroftheactioninitsfurthercontentisreducedtoameans。Insofarassuchanendissomethingfinite，itmayinitsturnbereducedtoameanstosomefurtherintentionandsoonadinfinitum。
§123。
Forthecontentoftheseendsnothingisavailableatthispointexcept[a]pureactivityitself，i。e。theactivitypresentowingtothefactthatthesubjectputshimselfintowhateverheistolookuponandpromoteashisend。Menarewillingtobeactiveinpursuitofwhatintereststhem，orshouldinterestthem，assomethingwhichistheirown。[b]Amoredeterminatecontent，however，thestillabstractandformalfreedomofsubjectivitypossessesonlyinits。natural。
subjectiveembodiment，i。e。inneeds，inclinations，passions，opinions，fancies，&c。
Thesatisfactionoftheseiswelfareorhappiness，bothingeneralandinitsparticularspecies-theendsofthewholesphereoffinitude。
Remark:Here-thestandpointofrelation(see§108)，whenthesubjectischaracterisedbyhisself-differenceandsocountsasaparticular-istheplacewherethecontentofthenaturalwill(see§11)。comesonthescene。Butthewillhereisnotasitisinitsimmediacy；onthecontrary，thiscontentnowbelongstoawillreflectedintoitselfandsoiselevatedtobecomeauniversalend，theendofwelfareorhappiness；thishappensatthelevelofthethinkingwhichdoesnotyetapprehendthewillinitsfreedombutreflectsonitscontentasononenaturalandgiven-thelevel，forexample，ofthetimeofCroesusandSolon。
Addition:Sincethespecificationsofhappinessaregiven，theyarenottruespecificationsoffreedom，becausefreedomisnotgenuinelyfreeinitsowneyesexceptinthegood，i。e。exceptwhenitisitsownend。Consequentlywemayraisethequestionwhetheramanhastherighttosetbeforehimselfendsnotfreelychosenbutrestingsolelyonthefactthatthesubjectisalivingbeing。
Thefactthatmanisalivingbeing，however，isnotfortuitous，butinconformitywithreason，andtothatextenthehasarighttomakehisneedshisend。Thereisnothingdegradinginbeingalive，andthereisnomodeofintelligentbeinghigherthanlifeinwhichexistencewouldbepossible。Itisonlytheraisingofthegiventosomethingself-createdwhichyieldsthehigherorbitofthegood，althoughthisdistinctionimpliesnoincompatibilitybetweenthetwolevels。
§124。
Sincethesubjectivesatisfactionoftheindividualhimself(includingtherecognitionwhichhereceivesbywayofhonourandfame)isalsopartandparceloftheachievementofendsofabsoluteworth，itfollowsthatthedemandthatsuchanendaloneshallappearaswilledandattained，liketheviewthat，inwilling，objectiveandsubjectiveendsaremutuallyexclusive，isanemptydogmatismoftheabstractUnderstanding。Andthisdogmatismismorethanempty，itisperniciousifitpassesintotheassertionthatbecausesubjectivesatisfactionispresent，asitalwaysiswhenanytaskisbroughttocompletion，itiswhattheagentintendedinessencetosecureandthattheobjectiveendwasinhiseyesonlyameanstothat。—Whatthesubjectis，istheseriesofhisactions。If，theseareaseriesofworthlessproductions，thenthesubjectivityofhiswillingisjustasworthless。Butiftheseriesofhisdeedsisofasubstantivenature，thenthesameistruealsooftheindividual\'sinnerwill。
Remark:Therightofthesubject\'sparticularity，hisrighttobesatisfied，orinotherwordstherightofsubjectivefreedom，isthepivotandcentreofthedifferencebetweenantiquityandmoderntimes。ThisrightinitsinfinityisgivenexpressioninChristianityandithasbecometheuniversaleffectiveprincipleofanewformofcivilisation。Amongsttheprimaryshapeswhichthisrightassumesarelove，romanticism，thequestfortheeternalsalvationoftheindividual，&c。；nextcomemoralconvictionsandconscience；and，finally，theotherforms，someofwhichcomeintoprominenceinwhatfollowsastheprincipleofcivilsocietyandasmomentsintheconstitutionofthestate，whileothersappearinthecourseofhistory，particularlythehistoryofart，science，andphilosophy。
Nowthisprincipleofparticularityis，tobesure，onemomentoftheantithesis，andinthefirstplaceatleastitisjustasmuchidenticalwiththeuniversalasdistinctfromit。Abstractreflection，however，fixesthismomentinitsdistinctionfromandoppositiontotheuniversalandsoproducesaviewofmoralityasnothingbutabitter，unending，struggleagainstself-satisfaction，asthecommand:\'Dowithabhorrencewhatdutyenjoins。\'
Itisjustthistypeofratiocinationwhichadducesthatfamiliarpsychologicalviewofhistorywhichunderstandshowtobelittleanddisparageallgreatdeedsandgreatmenbytransformingintothemainintentionandoperativemotiveofactionstheinclinationsandpassionswhichlikewisefoundtheirsatisfactionfromtheachievementofsomethingsubstantive，thefameandhonour，&c。，consequentialonsuchactions，inawordtheirparticularaspect，theaspectwhichithasdecreedinadvancetobesomethinginitselfpernicious。Suchratiocinationassuresusthat，whilegreatactionsandtheefficiencywhichhassubsistedthroughaseriesofthemhaveproducedgreatnessintheworldandhavehadastheirconsequencesfortheindividualagentpower，honour，andfame，stillwhatbelongstotheindividualisnotthegreatnessitselfbutwhathasaccruedtohimfromit，thispurelyparticularandexternalresult；becausethisresultisaconsequence，itisthereforesupposedtohavebeentheagent\'sendandevenhissoleend。Reflectionofthissortstopsshortatthesubjectivesideofgreatmen，sinceititselfstandsonpurelysubjectiveground，andconsequentlyitoverlookswhatissubstantiveinthisemptinessofitsownmaking。Thisistheviewofthosevaletpsychologists\'forwhomtherearenoheroes，notbecausetherearenoheroes，butbecausethesepsychologistsareonlyvalets\'。
Addition:Inmagnis……voluissesatest[Ingreatthingstohavewilledisenough]isrightinthesensethatweoughttowillsomethinggreat。Butwemustalsobeabletoachieveit，otherwisethewillingisnugatory。Thelaurelsofmerewillingaredryleavesthatneverweregreen。
§125。
Thesubjectiveelementofthewill，withitsparticularcontent-welfare，isreflectedintoitselfandinfiniteandsostandsrelatedtotheuniversalelement，totheprincipleofthewill。Thismomentofuniversality，positedfirstofallwithinthisparticularcontentitself，isthewelfareofothersalso，or，specifiedcompletely，thoughquiteemptily，thewelfareofall。Thewelfareofmanyotherunspecifiedparticularsisthusalsoanessentialendandrightofsubjectivity。Butsincetheabsolutelyuniversal，indistinctionfromsuchaparticularcontent，hasnotsofarbeenfurtherdeterminedthanas\'theright\'，itfollowsthattheseendsofparticularity，differingastheydofromtheuniversal，maybeinconformitywithit，buttheyalsomaynot。
§126。
Myparticularity，however，likethatofothers，isonlyarightatallinsofarasI
amafreeentity。Thereforeitmaynotmakeclaimsforitselfincontradictiontothisitssubstantivebasis，andanintentiontosecuremywelfareorthatofothers(anditisparticularlyinthislattercasethatsuchanintentioniscalledmoral\')
cannotjustifyanactionwhichiswrong。
Remark:Itisoneofthemostprominentofthecorruptmaximsofourtimetoenterapleafortheso-called\'moral\'intentionbehindwrongactionsandtoimaginebadmenwithwell-meaninghearts，i。e。heartswillingtheirownwelfareandperhapsthatofothersalso。Thisdoctrineisrootedinthe\'benevolence\'(gutenHerzens)ofthepre-Kantianphilosophersandconstitutes，e。g。，thequintessenceofwell-knowntouchingdramaticproductions；buttodayithasbeenresuscitatedinamoreextravagantform，andinnerenthusiasmandtheheart，i。e。theformofparticularityassuch，havebeenmadethecriterionofright，rationality，andexcellence。Theresultisthatcrimeandthethoughtsthatleadtoit，betheyfancieshowevertriteandempty，oropinionshoweverwild，aretoberegardedasright，rational，andexcellent，simplybecausetheyissuefrommen\'sheartsandenthusiasms。(SeetheRemarkto§140，wheremoredetailsaregiven。)，Incidentally，however，attentionmustbepaidtothepointofviewfromwhichrightandwelfarearebeingtreatedhere。
Weareconsideringrightasabstractrightandwelfareastheparticularwelfareofthesingleagent。
Theso-called\'generalgood\'，thewelfareofthestate，i。e。therightofmindactualandconcrete，isquiteadifferentsphere，asphereinwhichabstractrightisasubordinatemomentlikeparticularwelfareandthehappinessoftheindividual。Aswasremarkedabove，itisoneofthecommonestblundersofabstractthinkingtomakeprivaterightsandprivatewelfarecountasabsoluteinoppositiontotheuniversalityofthestate。
Addition:Thefamousanswer:Jen\'envoispaslanécessité，given[byRichelieu]tothelampoonerwhoexcusedhimselfwiththewords:Ilfautdoncquejevive，isappositeatthispoint。
Lifeceasestobenecessaryinfaceofthehigherrealmoffreedom。WhenSt。Crispinstoleleathertomakeshoesforthepoor，hisactionwasmoralbutwrongandsoinadmissible。
§127。
Theparticularityoftheinterestsofthenaturalwill，takenintheirentiretyasasinglewhole，ispersonalexistenceorlife。Inextremedangerandinconflictwiththerightfulpropertyofsomeoneelse，thislifemayclaim(asaright，notamercy)
arightofdistress，becauseinsuchasituationthereisontheonehandaninfiniteinjurytoaman\'sexistenceandtheconsequentlossofrightsaltogether，andontheotherhandonlyaninjurytoasinglerestrictedembodimentoffreedom，andthisimpliesarecognitionbothofrightassuchandalsooftheinjuredman\'scapacityforrights，becausetheinjuryaffectsonlythispropertyofhis。
Remark:Therightofdistressisthebasisofbeneficiumcompetentiaewherebyadebtorisallowedtoretainofhistools，farmingimplements，clothes，or，inshort，ofhisresources，i。e。ofhiscreditor\'sproperty，somuchasisregardedasindispensableifheistocontinuetosupportlife-tosupportit，ofcourse，onhisownsociallevel。
Addition:Lifeasthesumofendshasarightagainstabstractright。Ifforexampleitisonlybystealingbreadthatthewolfcanbekeptfromthedoor，theactionisofcourseanencroachmentonsomeone\'sproperty，butitwouldbewrongtotreatthisactionasanordinarytheft。Torefusetoallowamaninjeopardyofhislifetotakesuchstepsforself-preservationwouldbetostigmatisehimaswithoutrights，andsincehewouldbedeprivedofhislife，hisfreedomwouldbeannulledaltogether。Manydiversedetailshaveabearingonthepreservationoflife，andwhenwehaveoureyesonthefuturewehavetoengageourselvesinthesedetails。Buttheonlythingthatisnecessaryistolivenow，thefutureisnotabsolutebuteverexposedtoaccident。Henceitisonlythenecessityoftheimmediatepresentwhichcanjustifyawrongaction，becausenottodotheactionwouldinturnbetocommitanoffence，indeedthemostwrongofalloffences，namelythecompletedestructionoftheembodimentoffreedom。Beneficiumcompetentiaeisrelevanthere，becausekinshipandothercloserelationshipsimplytherighttodemandthatnooneshallbesacrificedaltogetheronthealtarofright。
§128。
Thisdistressrevealsthefinitudeandthereforethecontingencyofbothrightandwelfareofrightastheabstractembodimentoffreedomwithoutembodyingtheparticularperson，andofwelfareasthesphereoftheparticularwillwithouttheuniversalityofright。Inthiswaytheyareestablishedasone-sidedandideal，thecharacterwhichinconceptiontheyalreadypossessed。Righthasalready(see§
106)determineditsembodimentastheparticularwill；andsubjectivity，initsparticularityasacomprehensivewhole，isitselftheembodimentoffreedom(see§127)，whileastheinfiniterelationofthewilltoitself，itisimplicitlytheuniversalelementinfreedom。Thetwomomentspresentinrightandsubjectivity，thusintegratedandattainingtheirtruth，theiridentity，thoughinthefirstinstancestillremainingrelativetooneanother，are(a)thegood(astheconcrete，absolutelydeterminate，universal)，and(b)conscience(asinfinitesubjectivityinwardlyconsciousandinwardlydeterminingitscontent)。
iiiGood&Conscience§129。
ThegoodistheIdeaastheunityoftheconceptofthewillwiththeparticularwill。Inthisunity，abstractright，welfare，thesubjectivityofknowingandthecontingencyofexternalfact，havetheirindependentself-subsistencesuperseded，thoughatthesametimetheyarestillcontainedandretainedwithinitintheiressence。Thegoodisthusfreedomrealised，theabsoluteendandaimoftheworld。
Addition:EverystageisreallytheIdea，buttheearlierstagescontainitonlyinratheranabstractform。Thusforexample，eventheego，aspersonality，isalreadytheIdea，thoughinitsmostabstractshape。Thegood，therefore，istheIdeafurtherdetermined，theunityoftheconceptofthewillwiththeparticularwill。Itisnotsomethingabstractlyright，butsomethingconcretewhosecontentsaremadeupofbothrightandwelfarealike。
§130。
InthisIdea，welfarehasnoindependentvalidityastheembodimentofasingleparticularwillbutonlyasuniversalwelfareandessentiallyasuniversalinprinciple，i。e。asaccordingwithfreedom。Welfarewithoutrightisnotagood。
Similarly，rightwithoutwelfareisnotthegood；fiatjustitiashouldnotbefollowedbypereatmundus。Consequently，sincethegoodmustofnecessitybeactualisedthroughtheparticularwillandisatthesametimeitssubstance，ithasabsoluterightincontrastwiththeabstractrightofpropertyandtheparticularaimsofwelfare。Ifeitherofthesemomentsbecomesdistinguishedfromthegood，ithasvalidityonlyinsofarasitaccordswiththegoodandissubordinatedtoit。
§131。
Forthesubjectivewill，thegoodandthegoodaloneistheessential，andthesubjectivewillhasvalueanddignityonlyinsofarasitsinsightandintentionaccordwiththegood。InasmuchasthegoodisatthispointstillonlythisabstractIdeaofgood，thesubjectivewillhasnotyetbeencaughtupintoitandestablishedasaccordingwithit。Consequently，itstandsinarelationtothegood，andtherelationisthatthegoodoughttobesubstantiveforit，i。e。itoughttomakethegooditsaimandrealiseitcompletely，whilethegoodonitssidehasinthesubjectivewillitsonlymeansofsteppingintoactuality。
Addition:Thegoodisthetruthoftheparticularwill，butthewillisonlythatintowhichitputsitself；itisnotgoodbynaturebutcanbecomewhatitisonlybyitsownlabour。Ontheotherhand，thegooditself，apartfromthesubjectivewill，isonlyanabstractionwithoutthatrealexistencewhichitistoacquireforthefirsttimethroughtheeffortsofthatwill。Accordingly，thedevelopmentofthegoodhasthreestages:(i)ThegoodshouldpresentitselftomyvolitionasaparticularwillandIshouldknowit。(ii)Ishouldmyselfsaywhatisgoodandshoulddevelopitsparticularspecifications。(iii)Finally，thespecificationofthegoodonitsownaccount，theparticularisationofthegoodasinfinitesubjectivityawareofitself。Thisinwardspecifyingofwhatgoodis，isconscience。
§132。
Therightofthesubjectivewillisthatwhateveritistorecogniseasvalidshallbeseenbyitasgood，andthatanaction，asitsaimenteringuponexternalobjectivity，shallbeimputedtoitasrightorwrong，goodorevil，legalorillegal，inaccordancewithitsknowledgeoftheworthwhichtheactionhasinthisobjectivity。
Remark:Thegoodisinprincipletheessenceofthewillinitssubstantialityanduniversality，i。e。
ofthewillinitstruth，andthereforeitexistssimplyandsolelyinthinkingandbymeansofthinking。
Henceassertionssuchas\'mancannotknowthetruthbuthastodoonlywithphenomena\'，or\'thinkinginjuresthegoodwill\'aredogmasdeprivingmindnotonlyofintellectualbutalsoofallethicalworthanddignity。
Therightofgivingrecognitiononlytowhatmyinsightseesasrationalisthehighestrightofthesubject，althoughowingtoitssubjectivecharacteritremainsaformalright；againstittherightwhichreasonquatheobjectivepossessesoverthesubjectremainsfirmlyestablished。
Onaccountofitsformalcharacter，insightiscapableequallyofbeingtrueandofbeingmereopinionanderror。Theindividual\'sacquisitionofthisrightofinsightis，ontheprinciplesofthespherewhichisstillmoralonly，partandparcelofhisparticularsubjectiveeducation。Imaydemandfrommyself，andregarditasoneofmysubjectiverights，thatmyinsightintoanobligationshallbebasedongoodreasons，thatIshallbeconvincedoftheobligationandeventhatIshallapprehenditfromitsconceptandfundamentalnature。ButwhateverImayclaimforthesatisfactionofmyconvictionaboutthecharacterofanactionasgood，permitted，orforbidden，andsoaboutitsimputabilityinrespectofthischaracter，thisinnowaydetractsfromtherightofobjectivity。
Thisrightofinsightintothegoodisdistinctfromtherightofinsightinrespectofactionassuch(see§117)；theformoftherightofobjectivitywhichcorrespondstothelatteristhis，thatsinceactionisanalterationwhichistotakeplaceinanactualworldandsowillhaverecognitioninit，itmustingeneralaccordwithwhathasvaliditythere。Whoeverwillstoactinthisworldofactualityhaseoipsosubmittedhimselftoitslawsandrecognisedtherightofobjectivity。
Similarly，inthestateastheobjectivityoftheconceptofreason，legalresponsibilitycannotbetieddowntowhatanindividualmayholdtobeornottobeinaccordancewithhisreason，ortohissubjectiveinsightintowhatisrightorwrong，goodorevil，ortothedemandswhichhemakesforthesatisfactionofhisconviction。Inthisobjectivefield，therightofinsightisvalidasinsightintothelegalorillegal，quaintowhatisrecognisedasright，anditisrestrictedtoitselementarymeaning，i。e。toknowledgeinthesenseofacquaintancewithwhatislegalandtothatextentobligatory。Bymeansofthepublicityofthelawsandtheuniversalityofmanners，thestateremovesfromtherightofinsightitsformalaspectandthecontingencywhichitstillretainsforthesubjectatthelevelofmorality。Thesubject\'srighttoknowactioninitsspecificcharacterasgoodorevil，legalorillegal，hastheresultofdiminishingorcancellinginthisrespecttootheresponsibilityofchildren，imbeciles，andlunatics，althoughitisimpossibletodelimitpreciselyeitherchildhood，imbecility，&c。，ortheirdegreeofirresponsibility。Buttoturnmomentaryblindness，thegoadofpassion，intoxication，or，inaword，whatiscalledthestrengthofsensualimpulse(excludingimpulseswhicharethebasisoftherightofdistress-see§127)intoreasonswhentheimputation，specificcharacter，andculpabilityofacrimeareinquestion，andtolook。uponsuchcircumstancesasiftheytookawaythecriminal\'sguilt，againmeans(compare§100andtheRemarkto§120)failingtotreatthecriminal。inaccordancewiththerightandhonourduetohimasaman；forthenatureofmanconsistspreciselyinthefactthatheisessentiallysomethinguniversal，notabeingwhoseknowledgeisanabstractlymomentaryandpiecemealaffair。
Justaswhattheincendiaryreallysetsonfireisnottheisolatedsquareinchofwoodensurfacetowhichheapplieshistorch，buttheuniversalinthatsquareinch，e。g。thehouseasawhole，so，assubject，heisneitherthesingleexistentofthismomentoftimenorthisisolatedhotfeelingofrevenge。Ifhewere，hewouldbeananimalwhichwouldhavetobeknockedontheheadasdangerousandunsafebecauseofitsliabilitytofitsofmadness。
Theclaimismadethatthecriminalinthemomentofhisactionmusthavehada\'clearidea\'ofthewronganditsculpabilitybeforeitcanbeimputedtohimasacrime。Atfirstsight，thisclaimseemstopreservetherightofhissubjectivity，butthetruthisthatitdepriveshimofhisindwellingnatureasintelligent，anaturewhoseeffectivepresenceisnotconfinedtothe\'clearideas\'ofWolff\'spsychology，andonlyincasesoflunacyisitsoderangedastobedivorcedfromtheknowinganddoingofisolatedthings。
Thesphereinwhichtheseextenuatingcircumstancescomeintoconsiderationasgroundsforthemitigationofpunishmentisasphereotherthanthatofrights，thesphereofpardon。
§133。
Theparticularsubjectisrelatedtothegoodastotheessenceofhiswill，andhencehiswill\'sobligationarisesdirectlyinthisrelation。Sinceparticularityisdistinctfromthegoodandfallswithinthesubjectivewill，thegoodischaracterisedtobeginwithonlyastheuniversalabstractessentialityofthewill，i。e。asduty。Sincedutyisthusabstractanduniversalincharacter，itshouldbedoneforduty\'ssake。
Addition:Frommypointofviewtheessenceofthewillisduty。Nowifmyknowledgestopsatthefactthatthegoodismyduty，Iamstillgoingnofurtherthantheabstractcharacterofduty。I
shoulddomydutyforduty\'ssake，andwhenIdomydutyitisinatruesensemyownobjectivitywhichIambringingtorealisation。Indoingmyduty，Iambymyselfandfree。TohaveemphasisedthismeaningofdutyhasconstitutedthemeritofKant\'smoralphilosophyanditsloftinessofoutlook。
§134。
Becauseeveryactionexplicitlycallsforaparticularcontentandaspecificend，whiledutyasanabstractionentailsnothingofthekind，thequestionarises:whatismyduty?Asananswernothingissofaravailableexcept:(a)todotheright，and(b)tostriveafterwelfare，one\'sownwelfare，andwelfareinuniversalterms，thewelfareofothers(see§119)。
Addition:ThisisthesamequestionaswasputtoJesuswhensomeonewishedtolearnfromhimwhatheshoulddotoinheriteternallife。Goodasauniversalisabstractandcannotbeaccomplishedsolongasitremainsabstract。Tobeaccomplisheditmustacquireinadditionthecharacterofparticularity。
§135。
Thesespecificduties，however，arenotcontainedinthedefinitionofdutyitself；
butsincebothofthemareconditionedandrestricted，theyeoipsobringaboutthetransitiontothehighersphereoftheunconditioned，thesphereofduty。Dutyitselfinthemoralself-consciousnessistheessenceortheuniversalityofthatconsciousness，thewayinwhichitisinwardlyrelatedtoitselfalone；allthatislefttoit，therefore，isabstractuniversality，andforitsdeterminatecharacterithasidentitywithoutcontent，ortheabstractlypositive，theindeterminate。
Remark:Howeveressentialitistogiveprominencetothepureunconditionedself-determinationofthewillastherootofduty，andtothewayinwhichknowledgeofthewill，thankstoKant\'sphilosophy，haswonitsfirmfoundationandstarting-pointforthefirsttimeowingtothethoughtofitsinfiniteautonomy，stilltoadheretotheexclusivelymoralposition，withoutmakingthetransitiontotheconceptionofethics，istoreducethisgaintoanemptyformalism，andthescienceofmoralstothepreachingofdutyforduty\'ssake。Fromthispointofview，noimmanentdoctrineofdutiesispossible；ofcourse，materialmaybebroughtinfromoutsideandparticulardutiesmaybearrivedataccordingly，butffthedefinitionofdutyistakentobetheabsenceofcontradiction，formalcorrespondencewithitself-whichisnothingbutabstractindeterminacystabilised-thennotransitionispossibletothespecificationofparticulardutiesnor，ifsomesuchparticularcontentforactingcomesunderconsideration，isthereanycriterioninthatprinciplefordecidingwhetheritisorisnotaduty。Onthecontrary，bythismeansanywrongorimmorallineofconductmaybejustified。
Kant\'sfurtherformulationsthepossibilityofvisualisinganactionasauniversalmaxim，doesleadtothemoreconcretevisualisationofasituation，butinitselfitcontainsnoprinciplebeyondabstractidentityandthe\'absenceofcontradiction\'alreadymentioned。
Theabsenceofpropertycontainsinitselfjustaslittlecontradictionasthenon-existenceofthisorthatnation，family，&c。，orthedeathofthewholehumanrace。Butifitisalreadyestablishedonothergroundsandpresupposedthatpropertyandhumanlifearetoexistandberespected，thenindeeditisacontradictiontocommittheftormurder；acontradictionmustbeacontradictionofsomething，i。e。ofsomecontentpresupposedfromthestartasafixedprinciple。Itistoaprincipleofthatkindalone，therefore，thatanactioncanberelatedeitherbycorrespondenceorcontradiction。Butifdutyistobewilledsimplyforduty\'ssakeandnotforthesakeofsomecontent，itisonlyaformalidentitywhosenatureitistoexcludeallcontentandspecification。
Thefurtherantinomiesandconfigurationsofthisnever-endingought-to-be，inwhichtheexclusivelymoralwayofthinking-thinkingintermsofrelation-justwanderstoandfrowithoutbeingabletoresolvethemandgetbeyondtheought-to-be，IhavedevelopedinmyPhenomenologyofMind。
Addition:WhilewelaidemphasisaboveonthefactthattheoutlookofKant\'sphilosophyisahighoneinthatitpropoundsacorrespondencebetweendutyandrationality，stillwemustnoticeherethatthispointofviewisdefectiveinlackingallarticulation。Theproposition:\'Actasifthemaximofthineactioncouldbelaiddownasauniversalprinciple\'，wouldbeadmirableifwealreadyhaddeterminateprinciplesofconduct。Thatistosay，todemandofaprinciplethatitshallbeabletoserveinadditionasadeterminantofuniversallegislationistopresupposethatitalreadypossessesacontent。Giventhecontent，thenofcoursetheapplicationoftheprinciplewouldbeasimplematter。InKant\'scase，however，theprincipleitselfisstillnotavailableandhiscriterionofnon-contradictionisproductiveofnothing，sincewherethereisnothing，therecanbenocontradictioneither。
§136。
Becauseoftheabstractcharacterisationofthegood，theothermomentoftheIdea-particularityingeneral-fallswithinsubjectivity。Subjectivityinitsuniversalityreflectedintoitselfisthesubject\'sabsoluteinwardcertainty(Gewissheit)ofhimself，thatwhichestablishestheparticularandisthedetermininganddecisiveelementinhim，hisconscience(Gewissen)。
Addition:Wemayspeakinaveryloftystrainaboutduty，andtalkofthekindisupliftingandbroadenshumansympathies，butifitnevercomestoanythingspecificitendsinbeingwearisome。
Minddemandsparticularityandisentitledtoit。Butconscienceisthisdeepestinwardsolitudewithoneselfwhereeverythingexternalandeveryrestrictionhasdisappeared-thiscompletewithdrawalintooneself。Asconscience，manisnolongershackledbytheaimsofparticularity，andconsequentlyinattainingthatpositionhehasrisentohigherground，thegroundofthemodernworld，whichforthefirsttimehasreachedthisconsciousness，reachedthissinkingintooneself。
Themoresensuousconsciousness[Forthedistinctionbetweensense-consciousnessand\'morehighlydevelopedtypesofconsciousness\'，seeRemarksto§§21and35。]ofearlierepochshadsomethingexternalandgivenconfrontingit，eitherreligionorlaw。ButconscienceknowsitselfasthinkingandknowsthatwhatalonehasobligatoryforceformeisthisthatIthink。
§137。
Trueconscienceisthedispositiontowillwhatisabsolutelygood。Itthereforehasfixedprinciplesanditisawareoftheseasitsexplicitlyobjectivedeterminantsandduties。Indistinctionfromthisitscontent(i。e。truth)，conscienceisonlytheformalsideoftheactivityofthewill，whichasthiswillhasnospecialcontentofitsown。Buttheobjectivesystemoftheseprinciplesandduties，andtheunionofsubjectiveknowingwiththissystem，isnotpresentuntilwecometothestandpointofethicallife。Hereattheabstractstandpointofmorality，consciencelacksthisobjectivecontentandsoitsexplicitcharacteristhatofinfiniteabstractself-certainty，whichatthesametimeisforthisveryreasontheself-certaintyofthissubject。
Remark:Conscienceistheexpressionoftheabsolutetitleofsubjectiveself-consciousnesstoknowinitselfandfromwithinitselfwhatisrightandobligatory，togiverecognitiononlytowhatitthusknowsasgood，andatthesametimetomaintainthatwhateverinthiswayitknowsandwillsisintruthrightandobligatory。Conscienceasthisunityofsubjectiveknowingwithwhatisabsoluteisasanctuarywhichitwouldbesacrilegetoviolate。ButwhethertheconscienceofaspecificindividualcorrespondswiththisIdeaofconscience，orwhetherwhatittakesordeclarestobegoodisactuallyso，isascertainableonlyfromthecontentofthegooditseekstorealise。Whatisrightandobligatoryistheabsolutelyrationalelementinthewill\'svolitionsandthereforeitisnotinessencetheparticularpropertyofanindividual，anditsformisnotthatoffeelingoranyotherprivate(i。e。sensuous)typeofknowing，butessentiallythatofuniversalsdeterminedbythought，i。e。theformoflawsandprinciples。Conscienceisthereforesubjecttothejudgementofitstruthorfalsity，andwhenitappealsonlytoitselfforadecision，itisdirectlyatvariancewithwhatitwishestobe，namelytheruleforamodeofconductwhichisrational，absolutelyvalid，anduniversal。Forthisreason，thestatecannotgiverecognitiontoconscienceinitsprivateformassubjectiveknowing，anymorethansciencecangrantvaliditytosubjectiveopinion，dogmatism，andtheappealtoasubjectiveopinion。Intrueconscience，itselementsarenotdifferent，buttheymaybecomeso，anditisthedeterminingelement，thesubjectivityofwillingandknowing，whichcanseveritselffromthetruecontentofconscience，establishitsownindependence，andreducethatcontenttoaformandashow。Theambiguityinconnectionwithconscienceliesthereforeinthis:itispresupposedtomeantheidentityofsubjectiveknowingandwillingwiththetruegood，andsoisclaimedandrecognisedtobesomethingsacrosanct；andyetatthesametime，asthemeresubjectivereflectionofself-consciousnessintoitself，itstillclaimsforitselfthetitledue，solelyonthestrengthofitsabsolutelyvalidrationalcontent，tothatidentityalone。
Atthelevelofmorality，distinguishedasitisinthisbookfromthelevelofethics，itisonlyformalconsciencethatistobefound。Trueconsciencehasbeenmentionedonlytoindicateitsdistinctionfromtheotherandtoobviatethepossiblemisunderstandingthathere，whereitisonlyformalconsciencethatisunderconsideration，theargumentisabouttrueconscience。Thelatterispartoftheethicaldispositionwhichcomesbeforeusforthefirsttimeinthefollowingsection。Thereligiousconscience，however，doesnotbelongtothissphereatall。
Addition:Whenwespeakofconscience，itmayeasilybethoughtthat，invirtueofitsform，whichisabstractinwardness，conscienceisattiespointwithoutmoreadotrueconscience。Buttrueconsciencedeterminesitselftowillwhatisabsolutelygoodandobligatoryandisthisself-determination。Sofar，however，itisonlywithgoodintheabstractthatwehavetodoandconscienceisstillwithoutthisobjectivecontentandisbuttheinfinitecertaintyofoneself。
§138。
Thissubjectivity，quaabstractself-determinationandpurecertaintyofoneselfalone，asreadilyevaporatesintoitselfthewholedeterminatecharacterofright，duty，andexistence，asitremainsboththepowertojudge，todeterminefromwithinitselfalone，whatisgoodinrespectofanycontent，andalsothepowertowhichthegood，atfirstonlyanidealandanought-to-be，owesitsactuality。
Remark:Theself-consciousnesswhichhasattainedthisabsolutereflectionintoitselfknowsitselfinthisreflectiontobethekindofconsciousnesswhichisandshouldbebeyondthereachofeveryexistentandgivenspecificdetermination。Asoneofthecommonerfeaturesofhistory(e。g。inSocrates，40theStoics，andothers)，thetendencytolookdeeperintooneselfandtoknowanddeterminefromwithinoneselfwhatisrightandgoodappearsinageswhenwhatisrecognisedasrightandgoodincontemporarymannerscannotsatisfythewillofbettermen。Whentheexistingworldoffreedomhasbecomefaithlesstothewillofbettermen，thatwillfailstofinditselfinthedutiesthererecognisedandmusttrytofindintheidealworldoftheinnerlifealonetheharmonywhichactualityhaslost。Onceself-consciousnesshasgraspedandsecureditsformalrightinthisway，everythingdependsonthecharacterofthecontentwhichitgivestoitself。
Addition:Ifwelookmorecloselyatthisprocessofevaporationandseehowallspecificdeterminationsdisappearintothissimpleconceptandthenhavetobecondensedoutofitagain，whatwefindisthatitisprimarilyduetothefactthateverythingrecognisedasrightanddutymaybeprovedbydiscursivethinkingtobenugatory，restricted，andinallrespectsnotabsolute。Ontheotherhand，justassubjectivityevaporateseverycontentintoitself，soitmaydevelopitoutofitselfoncemore。Everythingwhicharisesintheethicalsphereisproducedbythisactivityofmind。Themoralpointofview，however，isdefectivebecauseitispurelyabstract。WhenIamawareofmyfreedomasthesubstanceofmybeing，Iaminactiveanddonothing。ButifIproceedtoactandlookforprinciplesonwhichtoact，Igropeforsomethingdeterminateandthendemanditsdeductionfromtheconceptofthefreewill。While，therefore，itisrightenoughtoevaporaterightanddutyintosubjectivity，itiswrongifthisabstractgroundworkisnotthencondensedoutagain。
Itisonlyintimeswhentheworldofactualityishollow，spiritless，andunstable，thatanindividualmaybeallowedtotakerefugefromactualityinhisinnerlife。SocrateslivedatthetimeoftheruinoftheAtheniandemocracy。Histhoughtvaporisedtheworldaroundhimandhewithdrewintohimselftosearchtherefortherightandthegood。Eveninourdaytherearecaseswhenreverencefortheestablishedorderismoreorlesslacking；maninsistsonhavingtheauthoritativeashiswill，asthattowhichhehasgrantedrecognition。
§139。
Onceself-consciousnesshasreducedallotherwisevaliddutiestoemptinessanditselftothesheerinwardnessofthewill，ithasbecomethepotentialityofeithermakingtheabsolutelyuniversalitsprinciple，orequallywellofelevatingabovetheuniversaltheself-willofprivateparticularity，takingthatasitsprincipleandrealisingitthroughitsactions，i。e。ithasbecomepotentiallyevil。
Remark:Tohaveaconscience，ifconscienceisonlyformalsubjectivity，issimplytobeonthevergeofslippingintoevil；inindependentself-certainty，withitsindependenceofknowledgeanddecision，bothmoralityandevilhavetheircommonroot。
Theoriginofevilingeneralistobefoundinthemysteryoffreedom(i。e。inthespeculativeaspectoffreedom)，themysterywherebyfreedomofnecessityarisesoutofthenaturallevelofthewillandissomethinginwardincomparisonwiththatlevel。Itisthisnaturallevelofthewillwhichcomesintoexistenceasaself-contradiction，asincompatiblewithitselfinthisopposition，andsoitisjustthisparticularityofthewillwhichlatermakesitselfevil。Thatistosay，particularityisalwaysduality；hereitistheoppositionofthenaturallevelandtheinwardnessofthewill。Inthisopposition，thelatterisonlyarelativeandabstractsubjectivitywhichcandrawitscontentonlyfromthedeterminatecontentofthenaturalwill，fromdesire，impulse，inclination，&c。Nowitissaidofthesedesires，impulses，&c。，thattheymaybeeithergoodorevil。Butsincethewillheremakesintoadeterminantofitscontentboththeseimpulsesinthiscontingentcharacterwhichtheypossessasnatural，andalso，therefore，theformwhichithasatthispoint，theformofparticularityitself，itfollowsthatitissetinoppositiontotheuniversalasinnerobjectivity，tothegood，whichcomesonthesceneastheoppositeextremetoimmediateobjectivity，thenaturalpureandsimple，assoonasthewillisreflectedintoitselfandconsciousnessisaknowingconsciousness。Itisinthisoppositionthatthisinwardnessofthewillisevil。Manisthereforeevilbyaconjunctionbetweenhisnaturalorundevelopedcharacterandhisreflectionintohimself；andthereforeevilbelongsneithertonatureassuchbyitself-unlessnatureweresupposedtobethenaturalcharacterofthewillwhichrestsinitsparticularcontent-nortointrovertedreflectionbyitself，i。e。cognitioningeneral，unlessthisweretomaintainitselfinthatoppositiontotheuniversal。
Withthisfacetofevil，itsnecessity，thereisinevitablycombinedthefactthatthissameeviliscondemnedtobethatwhichofnecessityoughtnottobe，i。e。thefactthateviloughttobeannulled。Itisnotthatthereoughtnevertobeadiremptionofanysortinthewill-onthecontrary，itisjustthislevelofdiremptionwhichdistinguishesmanfromtheunreasoninganimal；thepointisthatthewillshouldnotrestatthatlevelandclingtotheparticularasifthatandnottheuniversalweretheessentialthing；itshouldovercomethediremptionasanullity。Further，astothisnecessityofevil，itissubjectivity，asinfiniteself-reflection，whichispresentinandconfrontedbythisoppositionofuniversalandparticular；ifitrestsinthisopposition，i。e。ifitisevil，thenitiseoipsoindependent，regardingitselfasisolated，andisitselfthisSelf-Will。Thereforeiftheindividualsubjectassuchdoesevil，theevilispurelyandsimplyhisownresponsibility。
Addition:Theabstractself-certaintywhichknowsitselfasthebasisofeverythinghasinitthepotentialityeitherofwillingtheuniversalityoftheconceptoralternativelyoftakingaparticularcontentasaprincipleandrealisingthat。Thesecondalternativeisevil，whichthereforealwaysincludestheabstractionofself-certainty。Itisonlymanwhoisgood，andheisgoodonlybecausehecanalsobeevil。Goodandevilareinseparable，andtheirinseparabilityisrootedinthefactthattheconceptbecomesanobjecttoitself，andasobjectiteoipsoacquiresthecharacterofdifference。Theevilwillwillssomethingopposedtotheuniversalityofthewill，whilethegoodwillactsinaccordancewithitstrueconcept。
Thedifficultyofthequestionastohowthewillcanbeevilaswellasgoodusuallyarisesbecausewethinkofthewillasrelatedtoitselfpurelypositivelyandbecausewerepresentitsvolitionassomethingdeterminateconfrontingit，asthegood。Buttheproblemoftheoriginofevilmaybemorepreciselyputintheform:\'Howdoesthenegativecomeintothepositive?\'IfwebeginbypresupposingthatinthecreationoftheworldGodistheabsolutelypositive，then，turnwherewewill，weshallneverdiscoverthenegativewithinthatpositive，sincetotalkofGod\'s\'Permitting\'evilistoascribetohimapassiverelationtoevilwhichisunsatisfactoryandmeaningless。Intherepresentativethinkingofreligiousmythologythereisnocomprehensionoftheoriginofevil；i。e。
thepositiveandthenegativearenotdiscoveredinoneanother，thereisonlyarepresentationoftheirsuccessionandjuxtaposition，sothatitisfromoutsidethatthenegativecomestothepositive。
Butthiscannotsatisfythought，whichdemandsareasonandanecessityandinsistsonapprehendingthenegativeasitselfrootedinthepositive。Nowthesolutionoftheproblem，thewaytheconcepttreatsthematter，isalreadycontainedintheconcept，sincetheconcept，ortospeakmoreconcretely，theIdea，hasitinitsessencetodifferentiateitselfandtoposititselfnegatively。Ifweadheretothepurelypositive，i。e。ifwerestintheunmixedgoodwhichissupposedtobegoodatitssource，thenweareacceptinganemptycategoryoftheUnderstandingwhichclingstoabstractionsandone-sidedcategoriesofthiskindandbytheveryaskingofthisquestionmakesitadifficultone。Ifwebeginwiththestandpointoftheconcept，however，weapprehendthepositiveasactivityandasself-distinction。Evilandgoodalikehavetheirorigininthewillandthewillinitsconceptisbothgoodandevil。
Thenaturalwillisimplicitlythecontradictionofself-distinction，ofbeingbothinwardnessandalsoself-awareness。Tomaintainthenthatevilimpliesthefurtherpointthatmanisevilinsofarashiswillisnaturalwouldbetocontradicttheusualideathatitisjustthenaturalwillwhichisguiltlessandgood。Butthenaturalwillstandsinoppositiontothecontentoffreedom，andthechildandtheuneducatedman，whosewillsareonlynatural，areforthatveryreasonliabletobecalledtoaccountfortheiractionsonlyinalessdegree。Nowwhenwespeakofman，wemeannotthechildbuttheself-consciousadult，andwhenwespeakofgood，wemeantheknowledgeofit。Itisdoubtlesstruethatthenaturalisinherentlyinnocent，neithergoodnorbad，butwhenitisdrawnintotheorbitofthewillwhichisfreeandknowsthatitisfree，itacquiresthecharacterofnotbeingfreeandisthereforeevil。Whenmanwillsthenatural，itisnolongermerelynatural，butthenegativeopposedtothegood，i。e。totheconceptofthewill。
Ontheotherhand，ifitisnowobjectedthatsinceevilisrootedintheconceptandinevitable，manwouldbeguiltlessifhecommittedit，ourreplymustbethataman\'sdecisionishisownact，andhisownactisfreelychosenandhisownresponsibility。InthereligiouslegenditissaidthatmanisasGodwhenheknowsgoodandevil；anditistruethatthislikenesstoGodispresentinsuchknowledgeinthattheinevitabilityhereisnonaturalinevitabilitysinceonthecontrarythedecisionisreallythetranscendenceofthisdualityofgoodandevil。Whenbothgoodandevilareplacedbeforeme，Ihaveachoicebetweenthetwo；Icandecidebetweenthemandendowmysubjectivecharacterwitheither。Thusthenatureofevilisthatmanmaywillitbutneednot。
§140。
Ineveryendofaself-conscioussubject，thereisapositiveaspect(see§135)
necessarilypresentbecausetheendiswhatispurposedinanactualconcreteaction。Thisaspectheknowshowtoelicitandemphasise，andhemaythenproceedtoregarditasadutyorafineintention。Bysointerpretingit，heisenabledtopassoffhisactionasgoodintheeyesbothofhimselfandothers，despitethefactthat，owingtohisreflectivecharacterandhisknowledgeoftheuniversalaspectofthewill，heisawareofthecontrastbetweenthisaspectandtheessentiallynegativecontentofhisaction。Toimposeinthiswayonothersishypocrisy；whiletoimposeononeselfisastagebeyondhypocrisy，astageatwhichsubjectivityclaimstobeabsolute。
Remark:Thisfinal，mostabstruse，formofevil，wherebyevilispervertedintogoodandgoodintoevil，andconsciousness，inbeingawareofitspowertoeffectthisperversion，isalsomadeawareofitselfasabsolute，isthehigh-watermarkofsubjectivityatthelevelofmorality；itistheformintowhichevilhasblossomedinourpresentepoch，aresultduetophilosophy，i。e。toashallownessofthoughtwhichhastwistedaprofoundconceptintothisshapeandusurpedthenameofphilosophy，justasithasarrogatedtoevilthenameofgood。
InthisRemark，Iwillindicatebrieflythechiefformsofthissubjectivitywhichhavebecomecurrent。
(a)Inhypocrisythefollowingmomentsarecontained:
[a]knowledgeofthetrueuniversal，whetherknowledgeintheformmerelyofafeelingforrightandduty，orofadeepercognitionandapprehensionofthem；
[b]volitionoftheparticularwhichconflictswiththisuniversal；
[c]consciouscomparisonofbothmoments[a]and[b]，sothattheconscioussubjectisawareinwillingthathisparticularvolitionisevilincharacter。
Thesepointsaredescriptiveofactingwithabadconscience；hypocrisyproperinvolvessomethingmore。
Atonetimegreatimportancewasattachedtothequestionwhetheranactionwasevilonlyinsofarasitwasdonewithabadconscience，i。e。withexplicitknowledgeofthethreemomentsjustspecified。TheinferencefromanaffirmativeanswerisadmirablydrawnbyPascal:Ilsseronttousdamnéscesdemi-pécheurs，quiontquelqueamourpourlavertu。Maispourcesfranc-pécheurs，pécheursendurcis，pécheurssansmélange，pleinsetachevés，1\'enfernelestientpas；ilsonttrompélediableàforcedes\'yabandonner。
Footnote:Lettresprovinciales，iv。Inthesamecontext，PascalalsoquotesChrist\'sintercessionontheCrossforhisenemies:\'Father，forgivethem，fortheyknownotwhattheydo\'-asuperfluousprayerifthefactthattheydidnotknowwhattheydidmadetheiractioninnocentandsotookawaytheneedofforgiveness。
PascalquotestheretooAristotle\'sdistinctionbetweenthemanwhoactsoukeidosandtheonewhoactsagnoon；intheformertypeofignorance，hisactionisnotfreelywilled(heretheignorancedependsonexternalcircumstances，seeabove，§117)andhisactionisnotimputabletohim。ButofthelatterAristotlesays:\'Everywickedmanisignorantofwhatheoughttodoandwhatheoughttorefrainfromdoing；anditisthiskindoffailurewhichmakesmenunjustandingeneralbad……Anignorantchoice\'betweengoodandevil\'isthecausenotoftheaction\'sbeinginvoluntary\'(ofbeingnon-imputable)\'butonlyofitsbeingwicked\'。Aristotleevidentlyhadadeeperinsightintotheconnectionbetweenknowingandwillingthanhasbecomecommoninasuperficialphilosophywhichteachesthattheoppositeofknowledge，theheartandenthusiasm，arethetrueprinciplesofethicalaction。
Thesubjectiverightofself-consciousnesstoknowwhetheranactionistrulygoodorevilincharactermustnotbethoughtofassocollidingwiththeabsoluterightoftheobjectivityofthischaracterthatthetworightsarerepresentedasseparable，indifferenttooneanother，andrelatedonlyaccidentally。Itwassuchaconceptionoftheirrelationthatlayinparticularattherootoftheoldquestionsaboutefficaciousgrace。Onitsformalside，evilismostpeculiarlytheindividual\'sown，since(a)itispreciselyhissubjectivityestablishingitselfpurelyandsimplyforitself，andforthatreasonitispurelyandsimplytheindividual\'sownresponsibility(see§139andtheRemarkthereto)；(b)onhisobjectivesidemanaccordswithhisconceptinasmuchasheismind，inawordarationalentity，andhasinhisownnatureassuchthecharacterofself-knowinguniversality。
Thereforeitmeansfailingtotreathimwiththerespectduetohisconceptifhisgoodsideisdivorcedfromhim，sothatthecharacterofhisevilactionasevilisdivorcedfromhimtooandisnotimputedtohimasevil。Howdeterminateistheconsciousnessofthesemomentsindistinctionfromoneanother，ortowhatextentithasdevelopedorfailedtodevelopinclaritysoastobecomearecognitionofthem，andtowhatdegreeanevilactionhasbeendonewithaconsciencemoreorlessdownrightevil-allthesequestionsarethemoretrivialaspectofthematter，theaspectmainlyconcernedwiththeempirical。
(b)Evilanddoingevilwithabadconscience，however，isnotquitehypocrisy。Intohypocrisythereentersinadditiontheformalcharacteroffalsity，firstthefalsityofholdingupevilasgoodintheeyesofothers，ofsettingoneselfuptoallappearanceasgood，conscientious，pious，andsoon-conductwhichinthesecircumstancesisonlyatricktodeceiveothers。Secondly，however，thehadmanmayfindinhisgoodconductonotheroccasions，orinhispiety，or，inaword，ingoodreasons，ajustificationinhisowneyesfortheevilhedoes，becausehecanusethesereasonstopervertitsapparentcharacterfromevilintogood。Hisabilitytodothisdependsonthesubjectivitywhich，asabstractnegativity，knowsthatalldeterminationsaresubordinatetoitselfandissuefromitsownwill。
(c)InthisperversionofevilintogoodwemayprimafacieincludetheformofsubjectivismknownasProbabilism。Itsguidingprincipleisthatanactionispermissible，andmaybedonewithaneasyconscience，providedthattheagentcanhuntoutanysinglegoodreasonforit，beitonlytheauthorityofasingletheologian，andevenifothertheologiansareknownbytheagenttodissenteversowidelyfromthatauthority。Eveninthisideathereisstillpresentthecorrectapprehensionthatauthorityandareasonbasedonauthoritygivesprobabilityonly，althoughthisissupposedtobeenoughtoproduceaneasyconscience；itisgrantedinProbabilismthatagoodreasonisinevitablyofsuchacharacterthattheremayexistalongwithitdifferentreasonsatleastasgood。
Evenherewemustrecogniseavestigeofobjectivityintheadmissionthatitisareasonwhichshouldbethedeterminingfactor。Butsincethediscriminationbetweengoodandevilismadetodependonallthosegoodreasons，includingtheologicalauthoritiestoo，despitethefactthattheyaresonumerousandcontradictory，theimplicationisthatitisnotthisobjectivityofthething，butsubjectivity，whichhasthelastword。Thismeansthatcapriceandself-willaremadethearbitersofgoodandevil，andtheresultisthatethicsaswellasreligiousfeelingisundermined。ButthefactthatitisprivatesubjectivitytowhichthedecisionfallsisonewhichProbabilismdoesnotopenlyavowasitsprinciple；onthecontrary，ashasalreadybeenstated，itgivesoutthatitissomereasonorotherwhichisdecisive，andProbabilismistothatextentstillaformofhypocrisy。
(d)Inthestagesofsubjectivism，thenextinascendingorderistheviewthatthegoodnessofthewillconsistsinitswillingthegood；thiswillingoftheabstractgoodissupposedtosuffice，infacttobethesolerequisite，tomakeitsactiongood。Asthewillingofsomethingdeterminate，actionhasacontent，butgoodintheabstractdeterminesnothing，andhenceitdevolvesonparticularsubjectivitytogivethiscontentitscharacterandconstituents。justasinProbabilismanyonewhoisnothimselfalearnedRévérendPèremayhavethesubsumptionofadeterminatecontentundertheuniversalpredicate\'good\'effectedforhimbythesoleauthorityofonesuchtheologian，sohereeverysubject，withoutanyfurtherqualification，isinvestedwiththishonourofgivingacontenttogoodintheabstract，orinotherwordssubsumingacontentunderauniversal。Thiscontentisonlyoneofthemanyelementsinanactionasaconcretewhole，andtheothersmayperhapsentailitsdescriptionas\'criminal\'and\'bad\'。Thatdeterminatecontentwhich1，assubject，givetothegood，however，isthegoodknowntomeintheaction，i。e。itismygoodintention(see§114)。Thustherearisesacontradictionbetweendescriptions:accordingtoonetheactionisgood，accordingtotheotheritiscriminal。Hencealsothereseemstoarise，inconnectionwithaconcreteaction，thequestionwhetherinsuchcircumstancestheintentionbehinditisactuallygood。Itmaygenerallybethecasethatthegoodiswhatisactuallyintended；butthisinfactmustalwaysbethecaseifitisheldthatgoodintheabstractisthesubject\'sdeterminingmotive。Wherewrongisdonethroughanactionwhichiswellintentionedbutinotherrespectscriminalandbad，thewrongsodonemust，ofcourse，alsobegood，andtheimportantquestionwouldseemtobe:whichofthesesidesoftheactionisreallytheessentialone?Thisobjectivequestion，however，ishereoutofplace，orratheritisthesubjectiveconsciousnessalonewhosedecisionconstitutesobjectivityatthispoint。Besides，\'essential\'and\'good\'meanthesamething；oneisjustasmuchanabstractionastheother。Goodisthatwhichisessentialinrespectofthewill；andtheessentialinthisrespectshouldbepreciselythis，thatmyactionbecharacterisedasgoodinmyeyes。Butthesubsumptionunderthegoodofanycontentonepleasesisthedirectandexplicitresultofthefactthatthisabstractgoodistotallydevoidofcontentandsoissimplyreducedtomeaninganythingpositive，i。e。tosomethingwhichisvalidfromsomesinglepointofviewandwhichinitsimmediatecharactermayevenbevalidasanessentialend，asforexampletodogoodtothepoor，totakethoughtformyself，mylife，myfamily，andsoforth。Further，justasthegoodistheabstract，sothebadtoomustbewithoutcontentandderiveitsspecificationfrommysubjectivity；anditisinthiswayalsothattherearisesthemoralendofhatinganduprootingthebad，thenatureofthebadbeingleftunspecified。
Theft，cowardice，murder，andsoforth，asactions，i。e。asachievementsofasubjectivewill，havetheimmediatecharacterofbeingsatisfactionsofsuchawillandthereforeofbeingsomethingpositive。Inordertomaketheactionagoodone，itisonlyaquestionofrecognisingthispositiveaspectoftheactionasmyintention，andthisthenbecomestheessentialaspectinvirtueofwhichtheactionismadegood，simplybecauseIrecogniseitasthegoodinmyintention。Theftinordertodogoodtothepoor，theftorflightfrombattleforthesakeoffulfillingone\'sdutytocareforone\'slifeorone\'sfamily(apoorfamilyperhapsintothebargain)，murderoutofhateorrevenge(i。e。inordertosatisfyone\'ssenseofone\'sownrightsorofrightingeneral，orone\'ssenseofanother\'swickedness，ofwrongdonebyhimtooneselfortoothersortotheworldorthenationatlarge，byextirpatingthiswickedindividualwhoiswickednessincarnate，andtherebycontributingatleastone\'squotatotheprojectofuprootingthebad)-alltheseactionsaremadewellintentionedandthereforegoodbythismethodoftakingaccountofthepositiveaspectoftheircontent。Onlythebareminimumofintelligenceisrequiredtodiscoverinanyaction，asthoselearnedtheologianscan，apositivesideandsoagoodreasonforitandagoodintentionbehindit。
Henceithasbeensaidthatinthestrictsensetherearenowickedmen，sincenoonewillsevilforthesakeofevil，i。e。noonewillsapurenegativeassuch。Onthecontrary，everyonealwayswillssomethingpositive，andtherefore，ontheviewweareconsidering，somethinggood。Inthisabstractgoodthedistinctionbetweengoodandevilhasvanishedtogetherwithallconcreteduties；
forthisreason，simplytowillthegoodandtohaveagoodintentioninactingismorelikeevilthangood，becausethegoodwilledisonlythisabstractformofgoodandthereforetomakeitconcretedevolvesonthearbitraryWillofthesubject。
Tothiscontexttherealsobelongsthenotoriousmaxim:\'Theendjustifiesthemeans。\'Initselfandprimafaciethisexpressionistrivialandpointless。Quiteso，onemayretortintermsequallygeneral，ajustendofcoursejustifiesthemeans，whileanunjustenddoesnot。Thephrase:so\'Iftheendisright，soisthemeans\'isatautology，sincethemeansispreciselythatwhichisnothinginitselfbutisforthesakeofsomethingelse，andtherein，i。e。intheend，hasitspurposeandworth-
providedofcourseitbetrulyameans。
Butwhensomeonesaysthattheendjustifiesthemeans，hispurportisnotconfinedtothisbaretautology；heunderstandsbythewordssomethingmorespecific，namelythattouseasmeanstoagoodendsomethingwhichinitselfissimplynotameansatall，toviolatesomethinginitselfsacrosanct，inshorttocommitacrimeasameanstoagoodend，ispermissibleandevenone\'sboundenduty。(i)Therefloatsbeforethemindsofthosewhosaythattheendjustifiesthemeansavagueconsciousnessofthedialecticoftheaforesaid\'positive\'elementinisolatedlegalorethicalprinciples，orofsuchequallyvaguegeneralmaximsas:\'Thoushaltnotkill\'，or\'Thoushalttakethoughtforthywelfareandthewelfareofthyfamily\'。Executionersandsoldiershavenotmerelytherightbutthedutytokillmen，thoughthereithasbeenpreciselylaiddownwhatkindofmenandwhatcircumstancesmakethekillingpermissibleandobligatory。Soalsomywelfareandthewelfareofmyfamilymustbesubordinatedtohigherendsandsoreducedtomeanstotheirattainment。(ii)Andyetwhatbearsthemarkofcrimeisnotageneralmaximofthatkind，leftvagueandstillsubjecttoadialectic；onthecontrary，itsspecificcharacterisalreadyobjectivelyfixed。Nowwhatissetupagainstsuchadeterminatecrime，whatissupposedtohavedeprivedthecrimeofitscriminalnature，isthejustifyingend，andthisissimplysubjectiveopinionaboutwhatisgoodandbetter。Whathappenshereisthesameaswhathappenswhenthewillstopsatwillinggoodintheabstract，i。e。theabsoluteandvaliddeterminatecharacterassignedtogoodandevil，rightandwrong，isentirelysweptawayandthedeterminationofthemisascribedinsteadtotheindividual\'sfeeling，imagination，andcaprice。
