第1章

1 WHENtheobjectsofaninquiry，inanydepartment，haveprinciples，conditions，orelements，itisthroughacquaintancewiththesethatknowledge，thatistosayscientificknowledge，isattained。Forwedonotthinkthatweknowathinguntilweareacquaintedwithitsprimaryconditionsorfirstprinciples，andhavecarriedouranalysisasfarasitssimplestelements。PlainlythereforeinthescienceofNature，asinotherbranchesofstudy，ourfirsttaskwillbetotrytodeterminewhatrelatestoitsprinciples。 Thenaturalwayofdoingthisistostartfromthethingswhicharemoreknowableandobvioustousandproceedtowardsthosewhichareclearerandmoreknowablebynature；forthesamethingsarenot\'knowablerelativelytous\'and\'knowable\'withoutqualification。Sointhepresentinquirywemustfollowthismethodandadvancefromwhatismoreobscurebynature，butclearertous，towardswhatismoreclearandmoreknowablebynature。 Nowwhatistousplainandobviousatfirstisratherconfusedmasses，theelementsandprinciplesofwhichbecomeknowntouslaterbyanalysis。Thuswemustadvancefromgeneralitiestoparticulars；foritisawholethatisbestknowntosense-perception，andageneralityisakindofwhole，comprehendingmanythingswithinit，likeparts。Muchthesamethinghappensintherelationofthenametotheformula。Aname，e。g。\'round\'，meansvaguelyasortofwhole:itsdefinitionanalysesthisintoitsparticularsenses。 Similarlyachildbeginsbycallingallmen\'father\'，andallwomen\'mother\'，butlaterondistinguisheseachofthem。 2 Theprinciplesinquestionmustbeeither(a)oneor(b)morethanone。If(a)one，itmustbeeither(i)motionless，asParmenidesandMelissusassert，or(ii)inmotion，asthephysicistshold，somedeclaringairtobethefirstprinciple，otherswater。If(b)morethanone，theneither(i)afiniteor(ii)aninfiniteplurality。If(i)finite(butmorethanone)，theneithertwoorthreeorfourorsomeothernumber。If(ii)infinite，theneitherasDemocritusbelievedoneinkind，butdifferinginshapeorform；ordifferentinkindandevencontrary。 Asimilarinquiryismadebythosewhoinquireintothenumberofexistents:fortheyinquirewhethertheultimateconstituentsofexistingthingsareoneormany，andifmany，whetherafiniteoraninfiniteplurality。Sotheytooareinquiringwhethertheprincipleorelementisoneormany。 NowtoinvestigatewhetherBeingisoneandmotionlessisnotacontributiontothescienceofNature。Forjustasthegeometerhasnothingmoretosaytoonewhodeniestheprinciplesofhisscience-thisbeingaquestionforadifferentscienceorfororcommontoall-soamaninvestigatingprinciplescannotarguewithonewhodeniestheirexistence。ForifBeingisjustone，andoneinthewaymentioned，thereisaprinciplenolonger，sinceaprinciplemustbetheprincipleofsomethingorthings。 ToinquirethereforewhetherBeingisoneinthissensewouldbelikearguingagainstanyotherpositionmaintainedforthesakeofargument(suchastheHeracliteanthesis，orsuchathesisasthatBeingisoneman)orlikerefutingamerelycontentiousargument-adescriptionwhichappliestotheargumentsbothofMelissusandofParmenides:theirpremissesarefalseandtheirconclusionsdonotfollow。OrrathertheargumentofMelissusisgrossandpalpableandoffersnodifficultyatall:acceptoneridiculouspropositionandtherestfollows-asimpleenoughproceeding。 Wephysicists，ontheotherhand，musttakeforgrantedthatthethingsthatexistbynatureare，eitherallorsomeofthem，inmotionwhichisindeedmadeplainbyinduction。Moreover，nomanofscienceisboundtosolveeverykindofdifficultythatmayberaised，butonlyasmanyasaredrawnfalselyfromtheprinciplesofthescience:itisnotourbusinesstorefutethosethatdonotariseinthisway:justasitisthedutyofthegeometertorefutethesquaringofthecirclebymeansofsegments，butitisnothisdutytorefuteAntiphon\'sproof。Atthesametimetheholdersofthetheoryofwhichwearespeakingdoincidentallyraisephysicalquestions，thoughNatureisnottheirsubject:soitwillperhapsbeaswelltospendafewwordsonthem，especiallyastheinquiryisnotwithoutscientificinterest。 Themostpertinentquestionwithwhichtobeginwillbethis:Inwhatsenseisitassertedthatallthingsareone?For\'is\'isusedinmanysenses。Dotheymeanthatallthings\'are\'substanceorquantitiesorqualities?And，further，areallthingsonesubstance-oneman，onehorse，oronesoul-orqualityandthatoneandthesame-whiteorhotorsomethingofthekind?Theseareallverydifferentdoctrinesandallimpossibletomaintain。 Forifbothsubstanceandquantityandqualityare，then，whethertheseexistindependentlyofeachotherornot，Beingwillbemany。 Ifontheotherhanditisassertedthatallthingsarequalityorquantity，then，whethersubstanceexistsornot，anabsurdityresults，iftheimpossiblecanproperlybecalledabsurd。Fornoneoftheotherscanexistindependently:substancealoneisindependent:foreverythingispredicatedofsubstanceassubject。NowMelissussaysthatBeingisinfinite。Itisthenaquantity。Fortheinfiniteisinthecategoryofquantity，whereassubstanceorqualityoraffectioncannotbeinfiniteexceptthroughaconcomitantattribute，thatis，ifatthesametimetheyarealsoquantities。Fortodefinetheinfiniteyoumustusequantityinyourformula，butnotsubstanceorquality。IfthenBeingisbothsubstanceandquantity，itistwo，notone:ifonlysubstance，itisnotinfiniteandhasnomagnitude； fortohavethatitwillhavetobeaquantity。 Again，\'one\'itself，nolessthan\'being\'，isusedinmanysenses，sowemustconsiderinwhatsensethewordisusedwhenitissaidthattheAllisone。 Nowwesaythat(a)thecontinuousisoneorthat(b)theindivisibleisone，or(c)thingsaresaidtobe\'one\'，whentheiressenceisoneandthesame，as\'liquor\'and\'drink\'。 If(a)theirOneisoneinthesenseofcontinuous，itismany，forthecontinuousisdivisibleadinfinitum。 Thereis，indeed，adifficultyaboutpartandwhole，perhapsnotrelevanttothepresentargument，yetdeservingconsiderationonitsownaccount-namely，whetherthepartandthewholeareoneormorethanone，andhowtheycanbeoneormany，and，iftheyaremorethanone，inwhatsensetheyaremorethanone。(Similarlywiththepartsofwholeswhicharenotcontinuous。)Further，ifeachofthetwopartsisindivisiblyonewiththewhole，thedifficultyarisesthattheywillbeindivisiblyonewitheachotheralso。 Buttoproceed:If(b)theirOneisoneasindivisible，nothingwillhavequantityorquality，andsotheonewillnotbeinfinite，asMelissussays-nor，indeed，limited，asParmenidessays，forthoughthelimitisindivisible，thelimitedisnot。 Butif(c)allthingsareoneinthesenseofhavingthesamedefinition，like\'raiment\'and\'dress\'，thenitturnsoutthattheyaremaintainingtheHeracliteandoctrine，foritwillbethesamething\'tobegood\'and\'tobebad\'，and\'tobegood\'and\'tobenotgood\'，andsothesamethingwillbe\'good\'and\'notgood\'，andmanandhorse；infact，theirviewwillbe，notthatallthingsareone，butthattheyarenothing；andthat\'tobeofsuch-and-suchaquality\' isthesameas\'tobeofsuch-and-suchasize\'。 Eventhemorerecentoftheancientthinkerswereinapotherlestthesamethingshouldturnoutintheirhandsbothoneandmany。Sosome，likeLycophron，wereledtoomit\'is\'，otherstochangethemodeofexpressionandsay\'themanhasbeenwhitened\'insteadof\'iswhite\'，and\'walks\'insteadof\'iswalking\'，forfearthatiftheyaddedtheword\'is\'theyshouldbemakingtheonetobemany-asif\'one\'and\'being\'werealwaysusedinoneandthesamesense。What\'is\'maybemanyeitherindefinition(forexample\'tobewhite\'isonething，\'tobemusical\'another，yetthesamethingbeboth，sotheoneismany)orbydivision，asthewholeanditsparts。Onthispoint，indeed，theywerealreadygettingintodifficultiesandadmittedthattheonewasmany-asiftherewasanydifficultyaboutthesamethingbeingbothoneandmany，providedthatthesearenotopposites；for\'one\'maymeaneither\'potentiallyone\'or\'actuallyone\'。 3 If，then，weapproachthethesisinthiswayitseemsimpossibleforallthingstobeone。Further，theargumentstheyusetoprovetheirpositionarenotdifficulttoexpose。Forbothofthemreasoncontentiously-ImeanbothMelissusandParmenides。[Theirpremissesarefalseandtheirconclusionsdonotfollow。OrrathertheargumentofMelissusisgrossandpalpableandoffersnodifficultyatall:admitoneridiculouspropositionandtherestfollows-asimpleenoughproceeding。]ThefallacyofMelissusisobvious。Forhesupposesthattheassumption\'whathascomeintobeingalwayshasabeginning\'justifiestheassumption\'whathasnotcomeintobeinghasnobeginning\'。Thenthisalsoisabsurd，thatineverycasethereshouldbeabeginningofthething-notofthetimeandnotonlyinthecaseofcomingtobeinthefullsensebutalsointhecaseofcomingtohaveaquality-asifchangenevertookplacesuddenly。Again，doesitfollowthatBeing，ifone，ismotionless?Whyshoulditnotmove，thewholeofitwithinitself，aspartsofitdowhichareunities，e。g。thiswater?Again，whyisqualitativechangeimpossible?But，further，Beingcannotbeoneinform，thoughitmaybeinwhatitismadeof。(Evensomeofthephysicistsholdittobeoneinthelatterway，thoughnotintheformer。)Manobviouslydiffersfromhorseinform，andcontrariesfromeachother。 ThesamekindofargumentholdsgoodagainstParmenidesalso，besidesanythatmayapplyspeciallytohisview:theanswertohimbeingthat\'thisisnottrue\'and\'thatdoesnotfollow\'。Hisassumptionthatoneisusedinasinglesenseonlyisfalse，becauseitisusedinseveral。Hisconclusiondoesnotfollow，becauseifwetakeonlywhitethings，andif\'white\'hasasinglemeaning，nonethelesswhatiswhitewillbemanyandnotone。Forwhatiswhitewillnotbeoneeitherinthesensethatitiscontinuousorinthesensethatitmustbedefinedinonlyoneway。\'Whiteness\'willbedifferentfrom\'whathaswhiteness\'。Nordoesthismeanthatthereisanythingthatcanexistseparately，overandabovewhatiswhite。 For\'whiteness\'and\'thatwhichiswhite\'differindefinition，notinthesensethattheyarethingswhichcanexistapartfromeachother。ButParmenideshadnotcomeinsightofthisdistinction。 Itisnecessaryforhim，then，toassumenotonlythat\'being\'hasthesamemeaning，ofwhateveritispredicated，butfurtherthatitmeans(1)whatjustisand(2)whatisjustone。 Itmustbeso，for(1)anattributeispredicatedofsomesubject，sothatthesubjecttowhich\'being\'isattributedwillnotbe，asitissomethingdifferentfrom\'being\'。Something，therefore，whichisnotwillbe。Hence\'substance\'willnotbeapredicateofanythingelse。Forthesubjectcannotbeabeing，unless\'being\'meansseveralthings，insuchawaythateachissomething。Butexhypothesi\'being\'meansonlyonething。 If，then，\'substance\'isnotattributedtoanything，butotherthingsareattributedtoit，howdoes\'substance\'meanwhatisratherthanwhatisnot?Forsupposethat\'substance\'isalso\'white\'。 Sincethedefinitionofthelatterisdifferent(forbeingcannotevenbeattributedtowhite，asnothingiswhichisnot\'substance\')，itfollowsthat\'white\'isnot-being——andthatnotinthesenseofaparticularnot-being，butinthesensethatitisnotatall。Hence\'substance\'isnot；foritistruetosaythatitiswhite，whichwefoundtomeannot-being。Iftoavoidthiswesaythateven\'white\' meanssubstance，itfollowsthat\'being\'hasmorethanonemeaning。 Inparticular，then，Beingwillnothavemagnitude，ifitissubstance。Foreachofthetwopartsmustheinadifferentsense。 (2)Substanceisplainlydivisibleintoothersubstances，ifweconsiderthemerenatureofadefinition。Forinstance，if\'man\'isasubstance，\'animal\'and\'biped\'mustalsobesubstances。Forifnotsubstances，theymustbeattributes-andifattributes，attributeseitherof(a)manorof(b)someothersubject。Butneitherispossible。 (a)Anattributeiseitherthatwhichmayormaynotbelongtothesubjectorthatinwhosedefinitionthesubjectofwhichitisanattributeisinvolved。Thus\'sitting\'isanexampleofaseparableattribute，while\'snubness\'containsthedefinitionof\'nose\'，towhichweattributesnubness。Further，thedefinitionofthewholeisnotcontainedinthedefinitionsofthecontentsorelementsofthedefinitoryformula；thatof\'man\'forinstancein\'biped\'，orthatof\'whiteman\'in\'white\'。Ifthenthisisso，andif\'biped\'issupposedtobeanattributeof\'man\'，itmustbeeitherseparable，sothat\'man\'mightpossiblynotbe\'biped\'，orthedefinitionof\'man\'mustcomeintothedefinitionof\'biped\'-whichisimpossible，astheconverseisthecase。 (b)If，ontheotherhand，wesupposethat\'biped\'and\'animal\' areattributesnotofmanbutofsomethingelse，andarenoteachofthemasubstance，then\'man\'toowillbeanattributeofsomethingelse。Butwemustassumethatsubstanceisnottheattributeofanything，thatthesubjectofwhichboth\'biped\'and\'animal\'andeachseparatelyarepredicatedisthesubjectalsoofthecomplex\'bipedanimal\'。 ArewethentosaythattheAlliscomposedofindivisiblesubstances?Somethinkersdid，inpointoffact，givewaytobotharguments。Totheargumentthatallthingsareoneifbeingmeansonething，theyconcededthatnot-beingis；tothatfrombisection，theyyieldedbypositingatomicmagnitudes。Butobviouslyitisnottruethatifbeingmeansonething，andcannotatthesametimemeanthecontradictoryofthis，therewillbenothingwhichisnot，forevenifwhatisnotcannotbewithoutqualification，thereisnoreasonwhyitshouldnotbeaparticularnot-being。Tosaythatallthingswillbeone，ifthereisnothingbesidesBeingitself，isabsurd。Forwhounderstands\'beingitself\'tobeanythingbutaparticularsubstance?Butifthisisso，thereisnothingtopreventtherebeingmanybeings，ashasbeensaid。 Itis，then，clearlyimpossibleforBeingtobeoneinthissense。 4 Thephysicistsontheotherhandhavetwomodesofexplanation。 Thefirstsetmaketheunderlyingbodyoneeitheroneofthethreeorsomethingelsewhichisdenserthanfireandrarerthanairthengenerateeverythingelsefromthis，andobtainmultiplicitybycondensationandrarefaction。Nowthesearecontraries，whichmaybegeneralizedinto\'excessanddefect\'。(ComparePlato\'s\'GreatandSmall\'-exceptthathemakethesehismatter，theonehisform，whiletheotherstreattheonewhichunderliesasmatterandthecontrariesasdifferentiae，i。e。forms)。 Thesecondsetassertthatthecontrarietiesarecontainedintheoneandemergefromitbysegregation，forexampleAnaximanderandalsoallthosewhoassertthat\'whatis\'isoneandmany，likeEmpedoclesandAnaxagoras；fortheytooproduceotherthingsfromtheirmixturebysegregation。Thesediffer，however，fromeachotherinthattheformerimaginesacycleofsuchchanges，thelatterasingleseries。Anaxagorasagainmadebothhis\'homceomerous\' substancesandhiscontrariesinfiniteinmultitude，whereasEmpedoclespositsonlytheso-calledelements。 ThetheoryofAnaxagorasthattheprinciplesareinfiniteinmultitudewasprobablyduetohisacceptanceofthecommonopinionofthephysiciststhatnothingcomesintobeingfromnot-being。Forthisisthereasonwhytheyusethephrase\'allthingsweretogether\'andthecomingintobeingofsuchandsuchakindofthingisreducedtochangeofquality，whilesomespokeofcombinationandseparation。Moreover，thefactthatthecontrariesproceedfromeachotherledthemtotheconclusion。Theone，theyreasoned，musthavealreadyexistedintheother；forsinceeverythingthatcomesintobeingmustariseeitherfromwhatisorfromwhatisnot，anditisimpossibleforittoarisefromwhatisnot(onthispointallthephysicistsagree)，theythoughtthatthetruthofthealternativenecessarilyfollowed，namelythatthingscomeintobeingoutofexistentthings，i。e。outofthingsalreadypresent，butimperceptibletooursensesbecauseofthesmallnessoftheirbulk。Sotheyassertthateverythinghasbeenmixedinevery。thing，becausetheysaweverythingarisingoutofeverything。Butthings，astheysay，appeardifferentfromoneanotherandreceivedifferentnamesaccordingtothenatureoftheparticleswhicharenumericallypredominantamongtheinnumerableconstituentsofthemixture。Fornothing，theysay，ispurelyandentirelywhiteorblackorsweet，boneorflesh，butthenatureofathingisheldtobethatofwhichitcontainsthemost。 Now(1)theinfinitequainfiniteisunknowable，sothatwhatisinfiniteinmultitudeorsizeisunknowableinquantity，andwhatisinfiniteinvarietyofkindisunknowableinquality。Buttheprinciplesinquestionareinfinitebothinmultitudeandinkind。 Thereforeitisimpossibletoknowthingswhicharecomposedofthem；foritiswhenweknowthenatureandquantityofitscomponentsthatwesupposeweknowacomplex。 Further(2)ifthepartsofawholemaybeofanysizeinthedirectioneitherofgreatnessorofsmallness(by\'parts\'Imeancomponentsintowhichawholecanbedividedandwhichareactuallypresentinit)，itisnecessarythatthewholethingitselfmaybeofanysize。Clearly，therefore，sinceitisimpossibleforananimalorplanttobeindefinitelybigorsmall，neithercanitspartsbesuch，orthewholewillbethesame。Butflesh，bone，andthelikearethepartsofanimals，andthefruitsarethepartsofplants。 Henceitisobviousthatneitherflesh，bone，noranysuchthingcanbeofindefinitesizeinthedirectioneitherofthegreateroroftheless。 Again(3)accordingtothetheoryallsuchthingsarealreadypresentinoneanotheranddonotcomeintobeingbutareconstituentswhichareseparatedout，andathingreceivesitsdesignationfromitschiefconstituent。Further，anythingmaycomeoutofanything-waterbysegregationfromfleshandfleshfromwater。Hence，sinceeveryfinitebodyisexhaustedbytherepeatedabstractionofafinitebody，itseemsobviouslytofollowthateverythingcannotsubsistineverythingelse。Forletfleshbeextractedfromwaterandagainmorefleshbeproducedfromtheremainderbyrepeatingtheprocessofseparation: then，eventhoughthequantityseparatedoutwillcontinuallydecrease，stillitwillnotfallbelowacertainmagnitude。If，therefore，theprocesscomestoanend，everythingwillnotbeineverythingelse(fortherewillbenofleshintheremainingwater)； ifontheotherhanditdoesnot，andfurtherextractionisalwayspossible，therewillbeaninfinitemultitudeoffiniteequalparticlesinafinitequantity-whichisimpossible。Anotherproofmaybeadded:Sinceeverybodymustdiminishinsizewhensomethingistakenfromit，andfleshisquantitativelydefiniteinrespectbothofgreatnessandsmallness，itisclearthatfromtheminimumquantityoffleshnobodycanbeseparatedout；forthefleshleftwouldbelessthantheminimumofflesh。 Lastly(4)ineachofhisinfinitebodiestherewouldbealreadypresentinfinitefleshandbloodandbrain-havingadistinctexistence，however，fromoneanother，andnolessrealthantheinfinitebodies，andeachinfinite:whichiscontrarytoreason。 Thestatementthatcompleteseparationneverwilltakeplaceiscorrectenough，thoughAnaxagorasisnotfullyawareofwhatitmeans。 Foraffectionsareindeedinseparable。Ifthencoloursandstateshadenteredintothemixture，andifseparationtookplace，therewouldbea\'white\'ora\'healthy\'whichwasnothingbutwhiteorhealthy，i。e。wasnotthepredicateofasubject。Sohis\'Mind\'isanabsurdpersonaimingattheimpossible，ifheissupposedtowishtoseparatethem，anditisimpossibletodoso，bothinrespectofquantityandofquality-ofquantity，becausethereisnominimummagnitude，andofquality，becauseaffectionsareinseparable。 NorisAnaxagorasrightaboutthecomingtobeofhomogeneousbodies。Itistruethereisasenseinwhichclayisdividedintopiecesofclay，butthereisanotherinwhichitisnot。Waterandairare，andaregenerated\'from\'eachother，butnotinthewayinwhichbrickscome\'from\'ahouseandagainahouse\'from\'bricks； anditisbettertoassumeasmallerandfinitenumberofprinciples，asEmpedoclesdoes。 5 Allthinkersthenagreeinmakingthecontrariesprinciples，boththosewhodescribetheAllasoneandunmoved(forevenParmenidestreatshotandcoldasprinciplesunderthenamesoffireandearth) andthosetoowhousetherareandthedense。ThesameistrueofDemocritusalso，withhisplenumandvoid，bothofwhichexist，besays，theoneasbeing，theotherasnot-being。Againhespeaksofdifferencesinposition，shape，andorder，andthesearegeneraofwhichthespeciesarecontraries，namely，ofposition，aboveandbelow，beforeandbehind；ofshape，angularandangle-less，straightandround。 Itisplainthenthattheyallinonewayoranotheridentifythecontrarieswiththeprinciples。Andwithgoodreason。Forfirstprinciplesmustnotbederivedfromoneanothernorfromanythingelse，whileeverythinghastobederivedfromthem。Buttheseconditionsarefulfilledbytheprimarycontraries，whicharenotderivedfromanythingelsebecausetheyareprimary，norfromeachotherbecausetheyarecontraries。 Butwemustseehowthiscanbearrivedatasareasonedresult，aswellasinthewayjustindicated。 Ourfirstpresuppositionmustbethatinnaturenothingactson，orisactedonby，anyotherthingatrandom，normayanythingcomefromanythingelse，unlesswemeanthatitdoessoinvirtueofaconcomitantattribute。Forhowcould\'white\'comefrom\'musical\'，unless\'musical\'happenedtobeanattributeofthenot-whiteoroftheblack?No，\'white\'comesfrom\'not-white\'-andnotfromany\'not-white\'，butfromblackorsomeintermediatecolour。Similarly，\'musical\'comestobefrom\'not-musical\'，butnotfromanythingotherthanmusical，butfrom\'unmusical\'oranyintermediatestatetheremaybe。 Noragaindothingspassintothefirstchancething；\'white\'doesnotpassinto\'musical\'(except，itmaybe，invirtueofaconcomitantattribute)，butinto\'not-white\'-andnotintoanychancethingwhichisnotwhite，butintoblackoranintermediatecolour；\'musical\' passesinto\'not-musical\'-andnotintoanychancethingotherthanmusical，butinto\'unmusical\'oranyintermediatestatetheremaybe。 Thesameholdsofotherthingsalso:eventhingswhicharenotsimplebutcomplexfollowthesameprinciple，buttheoppositestatehasnotreceivedaname，sowefailtonoticethefact。Whatisintunemustcomefromwhatisnotintune，andviceversa；thetunedpassesintountunedness-andnotintoanyuntunedness，butintothecorrespondingopposite。Itdoesnotmatterwhetherwetakeattunement，order，orcompositionforourillustration；theprincipleisobviouslythesameinall，andinfactappliesequallytotheproductionofahouse，astatue，oranyothercomplex。Ahousecomesfromcertainthingsinacertainstateofseparationinsteadofconjunction，astatue(oranyotherthingthathasbeenshaped)fromshapelessness-eachoftheseobjectsbeingpartlyorderandpartlycomposition。 Ifthenthisistrue，everythingthatcomestobeorpassesawayfrom，orpassesinto，itscontraryoranintermediatestate。Buttheintermediatesarederivedfromthecontraries-colours，forinstance，fromblackandwhite。Everything，therefore，thatcomestobebyanaturalprocessiseitheracontraryoraproductofcontraries。 Uptothispointwehavepracticallyhadmostoftheotherwritersonthesubjectwithus，asIhavesaidalready:forallofthemidentifytheirelements，andwhattheycalltheirprinciples，withthecontraries，givingnoreasonindeedforthetheory，butcontrainedasitwerebythetruthitself。Theydiffer，however，fromoneanotherinthatsomeassumecontrarieswhicharemoreprimary，otherscontrarieswhicharelessso:somethosemoreknowableintheorderofexplanation，othersthosemorefamiliartosense。Forsomemakehotandcold，oragainmoistanddry，theconditionsofbecoming；whileothersmakeoddandeven，oragainLoveandStrife；andthesedifferfromeachotherinthewaymentioned。 Hencetheirprinciplesareinonesensethesame，inanotherdifferent；differentcertainly，asindeedmostpeoplethink，butthesameinasmuchastheyareanalogous；forallaretakenfromthesametableofcolumns，someofthepairsbeingwider，othersnarrowerinextent。Inthiswaythentheirtheoriesareboththesameanddifferent，somebetter，someworse；some，asIhavesaid，takeastheircontrarieswhatismoreknowableintheorderofexplanation，otherswhatismorefamiliartosense。(Theuniversalismoreknowableintheorderofexplanation，theparticularintheorderofsense:forexplanationhastodowiththeuniversal，sensewiththeparticular。)\'Thegreatandthesmall\'，forexample，belongtotheformerclass，\'thedenseandtherare\'tothelatter。 Itisclearthenthatourprinciplesmustbecontraries。 6 Thenextquestioniswhethertheprinciplesaretwoorthreeormoreinnumber。 Onetheycannotbe，fortherecannotbeonecontrary。Norcantheybeinnumerable，because，ifso，Beingwillnotbeknowable:andinanyonegenusthereisonlyonecontrariety，andsubstanceisonegenus: alsoafinitenumberissufficient，andafinitenumber，suchastheprinciplesofEmpedocles，isbetterthananinfinitemultitude；forEmpedoclesprofessestoobtainfromhisprinciplesallthatAnaxagorasobtainsfromhisinnumerableprinciples。Lastly，somecontrariesaremoreprimarythanothers，andsomearisefromothers-forexamplesweetandbitter，whiteandblack-whereastheprinciplesmustalwaysremainprinciples。 Thiswillsufficetoshowthattheprinciplesareneitheronenorinnumerable。 Granted，then，thattheyarealimitednumber，itisplausibletosupposethemmorethantwo。Foritisdifficulttoseehoweitherdensityshouldbeofsuchanatureastoactinanywayonrarityorrarityondensity。Thesameistrueofanyotherpairofcontraries； forLovedoesnotgatherStrifetogetherandmakethingsoutofit，nordoesStrifemakeanythingoutofLove，butbothactonathirdthingdifferentfromboth。Someindeedassumemorethanonesuchthingfromwhichtheyconstructtheworldofnature。 Otherobjectionstotheviewthatitisnotnecessarytoassumeathirdprincipleasasubstratummaybeadded。(1)Wedonotfindthatthecontrariesconstitutethesubstanceofanything。Butwhatisafirstprincipleoughtnottobethepredicateofanysubject。Ifitwere，therewouldbeaprincipleofthesupposedprinciple:forthesubjectisaprinciple，andpriorpresumablytowhatispredicatedofit。Again(2)weholdthatasubstanceisnotcontrarytoanothersubstance。Howthencansubstancebederivedfromwhatarenotsubstances?Orhowcannon-substancesbepriortosubstance? Ifthenweacceptboththeformerargumentandthisone，wemust，topreserveboth，assumeathirdsomewhatasthesubstratumofthecontraries，suchasisspokenofbythosewhodescribetheAllasonenature-waterorfireorwhatisintermediatebetweenthem。Whatisintermediateseemspreferable；forfire，earth，air，andwaterarealreadyinvolvedwithpairsofcontraries。Thereis，therefore，muchtobesaidforthosewhomaketheunderlyingsubstancedifferentfromthesefour；oftherest，thenextbestchoiceisair，aspresentingsensibledifferencesinalessdegreethantheothers； andafterair，water。All，however，agreeinthis，thattheydifferentiatetheirOnebymeansofthecontraries，suchasdensityandrarityandmoreandless，whichmayofcoursebegeneralized，ashasalreadybeensaidintoexcessanddefect。Indeedthisdoctrinetoo(thattheOneandexcessanddefectaretheprinciplesofthings) wouldappeartobeofoldstanding，thoughindifferentforms；fortheearlythinkersmadethetwotheactiveandtheonethepassiveprinciple，whereassomeofthemorerecentmaintainthereverse。 Tosupposethenthattheelementsarethreeinnumberwouldseem，fromtheseandsimilarconsiderations，aplausibleview，asIsaidbefore。Ontheotherhand，theviewthattheyaremorethanthreeinnumberwouldseemtobeuntenable。 Fortheonesubstratumissufficienttobeactedon；butifwehavefourcontraries，therewillbetwocontrarieties，andweshallhavetosupposeanintermediatenatureforeachpairseparately。If，ontheotherhand，thecontrarieties，beingtwo，cangeneratefromeachother，thesecondcontrarietywillbesuperfluous。Moreover，itisimpossiblethatthereshouldbemorethanoneprimarycontrariety。Forsubstanceisasinglegenusofbeing，sothattheprinciplescandifferonlyaspriorandposterior，notingenus；inasinglegenusthereisalwaysasinglecontrariety，alltheothercontrarietiesinitbeingheldtobereducibletoone。 Itisclearthenthatthenumberofelementsisneitheronenormorethantwoorthree；butwhethertwoorthreeis，asIsaid，aquestionofconsiderabledifficulty。 7 Wewillnowgiveourownaccount，approachingthequestionfirstwithreferencetobecominginitswidestsense:forweshallbefollowingthenaturalorderofinquiryifwespeakfirstofcommoncharacteristics，andtheninvestigatethecharacteristicsofspecialcases。 Wesaythatonethingcomestobefromanotherthing，andonesortofthingfromanothersortofthing，bothinthecaseofsimpleandofcomplexthings。Imeanthefollowing。Wecansay(1)\'manbecomesmusical\'，(2)whatis\'not-musicalbecomesmusical\'，or(3)，the\'not-musicalmanbecomesamusicalman\'。Nowwhatbecomesin(1)and(2)-\'man\'and\'notmusical\'-Icallsimple，andwhateachbecomes-\'musical\'-simplealso。Butwhen(3)wesaythe\'not-musicalmanbecomesamusicalman\'，bothwhatbecomesandwhatitbecomesarecomplex。 Asregardsoneofthesesimple\'thingsthatbecome\'wesaynotonly\'thisbecomesso-and-so\'，butalso\'frombeingthis，comestobeso-and-so\'，as\'frombeingnot-musicalcomestobemusical\'；asregardstheotherwedonotsaythisinallcases，aswedonotsay(1)\'frombeingamanhecametobemusical\'butonly\'themanbecamemusical\'。 Whena\'simple\'thingissaidtobecomesomething，inonecase(1) itsurvivesthroughtheprocess，intheother(2)itdoesnot。Formanremainsamanandissuchevenwhenhebecomesmusical，whereaswhatisnotmusicalorisunmusicaldoesnotcontinuetoexist，eithersimplyorcombinedwiththesubject。 Thesedistinctionsdrawn，onecangatherfromsurveyingthevariouscasesofbecominginthewaywearedescribingthat，aswesay，theremustalwaysbeanunderlyingsomething，namelythatwhichbecomes，andthatthis，thoughalwaysonenumerically，informatleastisnotone。(BythatImeanthatitcanbedescribedindifferentways。)For\'tobeman\'isnotthesameas\'tobeunmusical\'。 Onepartsurvives，theotherdoesnot:whatisnotanoppositesurvives(for\'man\'survives)，but\'not-musical\'or\'unmusical\'doesnotsurvive，nordoesthecompoundofthetwo，namely\'unmusicalman\'。 Wespeakof\'becomingthatfromthis\'insteadof\'thisbecomingthat\'moreinthecaseofwhatdoesnotsurvivethechange-\'becomingmusicalfromunmusical\'，not\'fromman\'-butthereareexceptions，aswesometimesusethelatterformofexpressionevenofwhatsurvives；wespeakof\'astatuecomingtobefrombronze\'，notofthe\'bronzebecomingastatue\'。Thechange，however，fromanoppositewhichdoesnotsurviveisdescribedindifferentlyinbothways，\'becomingthatfromthis\'or\'thisbecomingthat\'。Wesayboththat\'theunmusicalbecomesmusical\'，andthat\'fromunmusicalhebecomesmusical\'。Andsobothformsareusedofthecomplex，\'becomingamusicalmanfromanunmusicalman\'，andunmusicalmanbecomingamusicalman\'。 Buttherearedifferentsensesof\'comingtobe\'。Insomecaseswedonotusetheexpression\'cometobe\'，but\'cometobeso-and-so\'。 Onlysubstancesaresaidto\'cometobe\'intheunqualifiedsense。 Nowinallcasesotherthansubstanceitisplainthattheremustbesomesubject，namely，thatwhichbecomes。Forweknowthatwhenathingcomestobeofsuchaquantityorqualityorinsucharelation，time，orplace，asubjectisalwayspresupposed，sincesubstancealoneisnotpredicatedofanothersubject，buteverythingelseofsubstance。 Butthatsubstancestoo，andanythingelsethatcanbesaid\'tobe\'withoutqualification，cometobefromsomesubstratum，willappearonexamination。Forwefindineverycasesomethingthatunderliesfromwhichproceedsthatwhichcomestobe；forinstance，animalsandplantsfromseed。 Generallythingswhichcometobe，cometobeindifferentways:(1) bychangeofshape，asastatue；(2)byaddition，asthingswhichgrow；(3)bytakingaway，astheHermesfromthestone；(4)byputtingtogether，asahouse；(5)byalteration，asthingswhich\'turn\'inrespectoftheirmaterialsubstance。 Itisplainthattheseareallcasesofcomingtobefromasubstratum。 Thus，clearly，fromwhathasbeensaid，whatevercomestobeisalwayscomplex。Thereis，ontheonehand，(a)somethingwhichcomesintoexistence，andagain(b)somethingwhichbecomesthat-thelatter(b)intwosenses，eitherthesubjectortheopposite。Bythe\'opposite\'Imeanthe\'unmusical\'，bythe\'subject\'\'man\'，andsimilarlyIcalltheabsenceofshapeorformororderthe\'opposite\'，andthebronzeorstoneorgoldthe\'subject\'。 Plainlythen，ifthereareconditionsandprincipleswhichconstitutenaturalobjectsandfromwhichtheyprimarilyareorhavecometobe-havecometobe，Imean，whateachissaidtobeinitsessentialnature，notwhateachisinrespectofaconcomitantattribute-plainly，Isay，everythingcomestobefrombothsubjectandform。For\'musicalman\'iscomposed(inaway)of\'man\'and\'musical\': youcananalyseitintothedefinitionsofitselements。Itisclearthenthatwhatcomestobewillcometobefromtheseelements。 Nowthesubjectisonenumerically，thoughitistwoinform。(Foritistheman，thegold-the\'matter\'generally-thatiscounted，foritismoreofthenatureofa\'this\'，andwhatcomestobedoesnotcomefromitinvirtueofaconcomitantattribute；theprivation，ontheotherhand，andthecontraryareincidentalintheprocess。)Andthepositiveformisone-theorder，theacquiredartofmusic，oranysimilarpredicate。 Thereisasense，therefore，inwhichwemustdeclaretheprinciplestobetwo，andasenseinwhichtheyarethree；asenseinwhichthecontrariesaretheprinciples-sayforexamplethemusicalandtheunmusical，thehotandthecold，thetunedandtheuntuned-andasenseinwhichtheyarenot，sinceitisimpossibleforthecontrariestobeactedonbyeachother。Butthisdifficultyalsoissolvedbythefactthatthesubstratumisdifferentfromthecontraries，foritisitselfnotacontrary。Theprinciplesthereforeare，inaway，notmoreinnumberthanthecontraries，butasitweretwo，noryetpreciselytwo，sincethereisadifferenceofessentialnature，butthree。For\'tobeman\'isdifferentfrom\'tobeunmusical\'，and\'tobeunformed\'from\'tobebronze\'。 Wehavenowstatedthenumberoftheprinciplesofnaturalobjectswhicharesubjecttogeneration，andhowthenumberisreached:anditisclearthattheremustbeasubstratumforthecontraries，andthatthecontrariesmustbetwo。(Yetinanotherwayofputtingitthisisnotnecessary，asoneofthecontrarieswillservetoeffectthechangebyitssuccessiveabsenceandpresence。) Theunderlyingnatureisanobjectofscientificknowledge，byananalogy。Forasthebronzeistothestatue，thewoodtothebed，orthematterandtheformlessbeforereceivingformtoanythingwhichhasform，soistheunderlyingnaturetosubstance，i。e。the\'this\'orexistent。 Thisthenisoneprinciple(thoughnotoneorexistentinthesamesenseasthe\'this\')，andthedefinitionwasoneasweagreed；thenfurtherthereisitscontrary，theprivation。Inwhatsensethesearetwo，andinwhatsensemore，hasbeenstatedabove。Briefly，weexplainedfirstthatonlythecontrarieswereprinciples，andlaterthatasubstratumwasindispensable，andthattheprincipleswerethree；ourlaststatementhaselucidatedthedifferencebetweenthecontraries，themutualrelationoftheprinciples，andthenatureofthesubstratum。Whethertheformorthesubstratumistheessentialnatureofaphysicalobjectisnotyetclear。Butthattheprinciplesarethree，andinwhatsense，andthewayinwhicheachisaprinciple，isclear。 Somuchthenforthequestionofthenumberandthenatureoftheprinciples。 8 Wewillnowproceedtoshowthatthedifficultyoftheearlythinkers，aswellasourown，issolvedinthiswayalone。 Thefirstofthosewhostudiedscienceweremisledintheirsearchfortruthandthenatureofthingsbytheirinexperience，whichasitwerethrustthemintoanotherpath。Sotheysaythatnoneofthethingsthatareeithercomestobeorpassesoutofexistence，becausewhatcomestobemustdosoeitherfromwhatisorfromwhatisnot，bothofwhichareimpossible。Forwhatiscannotcometobe(becauseitisalready)，andfromwhatisnotnothingcouldhavecometobe(becausesomethingmustbepresentasasubstratum)。Sotootheyexaggeratedtheconsequenceofthis，andwentsofarastodenyeventheexistenceofapluralityofthings，maintainingthatonlyBeingitselfis。Suchthenwastheiropinion，andsuchthereasonforitsadoption。 Ourexplanationontheotherhandisthatthephrases\'somethingcomestobefromwhatisorfromwhatisnot\'，\'whatisnotorwhatisdoessomethingorhassomethingdonetoitorbecomessomeparticularthing\'，aretobetaken(inthefirstwayofputtingourexplanation)inthesamesenseas\'adoctordoessomethingorhassomethingdonetohim\'，\'isorbecomessomethingfrombeingadoctor。\' Theseexpressionsmaybetakenintwosenses，andsotoo，clearly，may\'frombeing\'，and\'beingactsorisactedon\'。Adoctorbuildsahouse，notquadoctor，butquahousebuilder，andturnsgray，notquadoctor，butquadark-haired。Ontheotherhandhedoctorsorfailstodoctorquadoctor。Butweareusingwordsmostappropriatelywhenwesaythatadoctordoessomethingorundergoessomething，orbecomessomethingfrombeingadoctor，ifhedoes，undergoes，orbecomesquadoctor。Clearlythenalso\'tocometobeso-and-sofromnot-being\' means\'quanot-being\'。 Itwasthroughfailuretomakethisdistinctionthatthosethinkersgavethematterup，andthroughthiserrorthattheywentsomuchfartherastrayastosupposethatnothingelsecomestobeorexistsapartfromBeingitself，thusdoingawaywithallbecoming。 Weourselvesareinagreementwiththeminholdingthatnothingcanbesaidwithoutqualificationtocomefromwhatisnot。Butneverthelesswemaintainthatathingmay\'cometobefromwhatisnot\'-thatis，inaqualifiedsense。Forathingcomestobefromtheprivation，whichinitsownnatureisnot-being，-thisnotsurvivingasaconstituentoftheresult。Yetthiscausessurprise，anditisthoughtimpossiblethatsomethingshouldcometobeinthewaydescribedfromwhatisnot。 Inthesamewaywemaintainthatnothingcomestobefrombeing，andthatbeingdoesnotcometobeexceptinaqualifiedsense。Inthatway，however，itdoes，justasanimalmightcometobefromanimal，andananimalofacertainkindfromananimalofacertainkind。 Thus，supposeadogtocometobefromahorse。Thedogwouldthen，itistrue，cometobefromanimal(aswellasfromananimalofacertainkind)butnotasanimal，forthatisalreadythere。Butifanythingistobecomeananimal，notinaqualifiedsense，itwillnotbefromanimal:andifbeing，notfrombeing-norfromnot-beingeither，forithasbeenexplainedthatby\'fromnotbeing\'wemeanfromnot-beingquanot-being。 Notefurtherthatwedonotsubverttheprinciplethateverythingeitherisorisnot。 Thisthenisonewayofsolvingthedifficulty。Anotherconsistsinpointingoutthatthesamethingscanbeexplainedintermsofpotentialityandactuality。Butthishasbeendonewithgreaterprecisionelsewhere。So，aswesaid，thedifficultieswhichconstrainpeopletodenytheexistenceofsomeofthethingswementionedarenowsolved。Foritwasthisreasonwhichalsocausedsomeoftheearlierthinkerstoturnsofarasidefromtheroadwhichleadstocomingtobeandpassingawayandchangegenerally。 Iftheyhadcomeinsightofthisnature，alltheirignorancewouldhavebeendispelled。 9 Others，indeed，haveapprehendedthenatureinquestion，butnotadequately。 Inthefirstplacetheyallowthatathingmaycometobewithoutqualificationfromnotbeing，acceptingonthispointthestatementofParmenides。Secondly，theythinkthatifthesubstratumisonenumerically，itmusthavealsoonlyasinglepotentiality-whichisaverydifferentthing。 Nowwedistinguishmatterandprivation，andholdthatoneofthese，namelythematter，isnot-beingonlyinvirtueofanattributewhichithas，whiletheprivationinitsownnatureisnot-being；andthatthematterisnearly，inasenseis，substance，whiletheprivationinnosenseis。They，ontheotherhand，identifytheirGreatandSmallalikewithnotbeing，andthatwhethertheyaretakentogetherasoneorseparately。Theirtriadisthereforeofquiteadifferentkindfromours。Fortheygotsofarastoseethattheremustbesomeunderlyingnature，buttheymakeitone-forevenifonephilosophermakesadyadofit，whichhecallsGreatandSmall，theeffectisthesame，forheoverlookedtheothernature。Fortheonewhichpersistsisajointcause，withtheform，ofwhatcomestobe-amother，asitwere。Butthenegativepartofthecontrarietymayoftenseem，ifyouconcentrateyourattentiononitasanevilagent，nottoexistatall。 Foradmittingwiththemthatthereissomethingdivine，good，anddesirable，weholdthattherearetwootherprinciples，theonecontrarytoit，theothersuchasofitsownnaturetodesireandyearnforit。Buttheconsequenceoftheirviewisthatthecontrarydesiresitswtextinction。Yettheformcannotdesireitself，foritisnotdefective；norcanthecontrarydesireit，forcontrariesaremutuallydestructive。Thetruthisthatwhatdesirestheformismatter，asthefemaledesiresthemaleandtheuglythebeautiful-onlytheuglyorthefemalenotpersebutperaccidens。 Themattercomestobeandceasestobeinonesense，whileinanotheritdoesnot。Asthatwhichcontainstheprivation，itceasestobeinitsownnature，forwhatceasestobe-theprivation-iscontainedwithinit。Butaspotentialityitdoesnotceasetobeinitsownnature，butisnecessarilyoutsidethesphereofbecomingandceasingtobe。Forifitcametobe，somethingmusthaveexistedasaprimarysubstratumfromwhichitshouldcomeandwhichshouldpersistinit；butthisisitsownspecialnature，sothatitwillbebeforecomingtobe。(Formydefinitionofmatterisjustthis-theprimarysubstratumofeachthing，fromwhichitcomestobewithoutqualification，andwhichpersistsintheresult。)Andifitceasestobeitwillpassintothatatthelast，soitwillhaveceasedtobebeforeceasingtobe。 Theaccuratedeterminationofthefirstprincipleinrespectofform，whetheritisoneormanyandwhatitisorwhattheyare，istheprovinceoftheprimarytypeofscience；sothesequestionsmaystandovertillthen。Butofthenatural，i。e。perishable，formsweshallspeakintheexpositionswhichfollow。 Theabove，then，maybetakenassufficienttoestablishthatthereareprinciplesandwhattheyareandhowmanythereare。Nowletusmakeafreshstartandproceed。 BookII 1 Ofthingsthatexist，someexistbynature，somefromothercauses。 \'Bynature\'theanimalsandtheirpartsexist，andtheplantsandthesimplebodies(earth，fire，air，water)-forwesaythattheseandthelikeexist\'bynature\'。 Allthethingsmentionedpresentafeatureinwhichtheydifferfromthingswhicharenotconstitutedbynature。Eachofthemhaswithinitselfaprincipleofmotionandofstationariness(inrespectofplace，orofgrowthanddecrease，orbywayofalteration)。Ontheotherhand，abedandacoatandanythingelseofthatsort，quareceivingthesedesignationsi。e。insofarastheyareproductsofart-havenoinnateimpulsetochange。Butinsofarastheyhappentobecomposedofstoneorofearthorofamixtureofthetwo，theydohavesuchanimpulse，andjusttothatextentwhichseemstoindicatethatnatureisasourceorcauseofbeingmovedandofbeingatrestinthattowhichitbelongsprimarily，invirtueofitselfandnotinvirtueofaconcomitantattribute。 Isay\'notinvirtueofaconcomitantattribute\'，because(forinstance)amanwhoisadoctormightcurehimself。Neverthelessitisnotinsofarasheisapatientthathepossessestheartofmedicine:itmerelyhashappenedthatthesamemanisdoctorandpatient-andthatiswhytheseattributesarenotalwaysfoundtogether。Soitiswithallotherartificialproducts。Noneofthemhasinitselfthesourceofitsownproduction。Butwhileinsomecases(forinstancehousesandtheotherproductsofmanuallabour) thatprincipleisinsomethingelseexternaltothething，inothersthosewhichmaycauseachangeinthemselvesinvirtueofaconcomitantattribute-itliesinthethingsthemselves(butnotinvirtueofwhattheyare)。 \'Nature\'theniswhathasbeenstated。Things\'haveanature\'whichhaveaprincipleofthiskind。Eachofthemisasubstance；foritisasubject，andnaturealwaysimpliesasubjectinwhichitinheres。 Theterm\'accordingtonature\'isappliedtoallthesethingsandalsototheattributeswhichbelongtotheminvirtueofwhattheyare，forinstancethepropertyoffiretobecarriedupwards-whichisnota\'nature\'nor\'hasanature\'butis\'bynature\'or\'accordingtonature\'。 Whatnatureis，then，andthemeaningoftheterms\'bynature\'and\'accordingtonature\'，hasbeenstated。Thatnatureexists，itwouldbeabsurdtotrytoprove；foritisobviousthattherearemanythingsofthiskind，andtoprovewhatisobviousbywhatisnotisthemarkofamanwhoisunabletodistinguishwhatisself-evidentfromwhatisnot。(Thisstateofmindisclearlypossible。Amanblindfrombirthmightreasonaboutcolours。Presumablythereforesuchpersonsmustbetalkingaboutwordswithoutanythoughttocorrespond。) Someidentifythenatureorsubstanceofanaturalobjectwiththatimmediateconstituentofitwhichtakenbyitselfiswithoutarrangement，e。g。thewoodisthe\'nature\'ofthebed，andthebronzethe\'nature\'ofthestatue。 AsanindicationofthisAntiphonpointsoutthatifyouplantedabedandtherottingwoodacquiredthepowerofsendingupashoot，itwouldnotbeabedthatwouldcomeup，butwood-whichshowsthatthearrangementinaccordancewiththerulesoftheartismerelyanincidentalattribute，whereastherealnatureistheother，which，further，persistscontinuouslythroughtheprocessofmaking。 Butifthematerialofeachoftheseobjectshasitselfthesamerelationtosomethingelse，saybronze(orgold)towater，bones(orwood)toearthandsoon，that(theysay)wouldbetheirnatureandessence。Consequentlysomeassertearth，othersfireorairorwaterorsomeorallofthese，tobethenatureofthethingsthatare。 Forwhateveranyoneofthemsupposedtohavethischaracter-whetheronethingormorethanonething-thisorthesehedeclaredtobethewholeofsubstance，allelsebeingitsaffections，states，ordispositions。Everysuchthingtheyheldtobeeternal(foritcouldnotpassintoanythingelse)，butotherthingstocomeintobeingandceasetobetimeswithoutnumber。 Thisthenisoneaccountof\'nature\'，namelythatitistheimmediatematerialsubstratumofthingswhichhaveinthemselvesaprincipleofmotionorchange。 Anotheraccountisthat\'nature\'istheshapeorformwhichisspecifiedinthedefinitionofthething。 Fortheword\'nature\'isappliedtowhatisaccordingtonatureandthenaturalinthesamewayas\'art\'isappliedtowhatisartisticoraworkofart。Weshouldnotsayinthelattercasethatthereisanythingartisticaboutathing，ifitisabedonlypotentially，notyethavingtheformofabed；norshouldwecallitaworkofart。Thesameistrueofnaturalcompounds。Whatispotentiallyfleshorbonehasnotyetitsown\'nature\'，anddoesnotexistuntilitreceivestheformspecifiedinthedefinition，whichwenameindefiningwhatfleshorboneis。Thusinthesecondsenseof\'nature\'itwouldbetheshapeorform(notseparableexceptinstatement)ofthingswhichhaveinthemselvesasourceofmotion。(Thecombinationofthetwo，e。g。man，isnot\'nature\'but\'bynature\'or\'natural\'。) Theformindeedis\'nature\'ratherthanthematter；forathingismoreproperlysaidtobewhatitiswhenithasattainedtofulfilmentthanwhenitexistspotentially。Againmanisbornfromman，butnotbedfrombed。Thatiswhypeoplesaythatthefigureisnotthenatureofabed，butthewoodis-ifthebedsproutednotabedbutwoodwouldcomeup。Butevenifthefigureisart，thenonthesameprincipletheshapeofmanishisnature。Formanisbornfromman。 Wealsospeakofathing\'snatureasbeingexhibitedintheprocessofgrowthbywhichitsnatureisattained。The\'nature\'inthissenseisnotlike\'doctoring\'，whichleadsnottotheartofdoctoringbuttohealth。Doctoringmuststartfromtheart，notleadtoit。Butitisnotinthiswaythatnature(intheonesense)isrelatedtonature(intheother)。Whatgrowsquagrowinggrowsfromsomethingintosomething。Intowhatthendoesitgrow?Notintothatfromwhichitarosebutintothattowhichittends。Theshapethenisnature。 \'Shape\'and\'nature\'，itshouldbeadded，areintwosenses。Fortheprivationtooisinawayform。Butwhetherinunqualifiedcomingtobethereisprivation，i。e。acontrarytowhatcomestobe，wemustconsiderlater。 2 Wehavedistinguished，then，thedifferentwaysinwhichtheterm\'nature\'isused。 Thenextpointtoconsiderishowthemathematiciandiffersfromthephysicist。Obviouslyphysicalbodiescontainsurfacesandvolumes，linesandpoints，andthesearethesubject-matterofmathematics。 Further，isastronomydifferentfromphysicsoradepartmentofit?Itseemsabsurdthatthephysicistshouldbesupposedtoknowthenatureofsunormoon，butnottoknowanyoftheiressentialattributes，particularlyasthewritersonphysicsobviouslydodiscusstheirshapealsoandwhethertheearthandtheworldaresphericalornot。 Nowthemathematician，thoughhetootreatsofthesethings，neverthelessdoesnottreatofthemasthelimitsofaphysicalbody；nordoesheconsidertheattributesindicatedastheattributesofsuchbodies。Thatiswhyheseparatesthem；forinthoughttheyareseparablefrommotion，anditmakesnodifference，nordoesanyfalsityresult，iftheyareseparated。TheholdersofthetheoryofFormsdothesame，thoughtheyarenotawareofit；fortheyseparatetheobjectsofphysics，whicharelessseparablethanthoseofmathematics。Thisbecomesplainifonetriestostateineachofthetwocasesthedefinitionsofthethingsandoftheirattributes。 \'Odd\'and\'even\'，\'straight\'and\'curved\'，andlikewise\'number\'，\'line\'，and\'figure\'，donotinvolvemotion；notso\'flesh\'and\'bone\' and\'man\'-thesearedefinedlike\'snubnose\'，notlike\'curved\'。 Similarevidenceissuppliedbythemorephysicalofthebranchesofmathematics，suchasoptics，harmonics，andastronomy。Theseareinawaytheconverseofgeometry。Whilegeometryinvestigatesphysicallinesbutnotquaphysical，opticsinvestigatesmathematicallines，butquaphysical，notquamathematical。 Since\'nature\'hastwosenses，theformandthematter，wemustinvestigateitsobjectsaswewouldtheessenceofsnubness。Thatis，suchthingsareneitherindependentofmatternorcanbedefinedintermsofmatteronly。Heretooindeedonemightraiseadifficulty。 Sincetherearetwonatures，withwhichisthephysicistconcerned?Orshouldheinvestigatethecombinationofthetwo?Butifthecombinationofthetwo，thenalsoeachseverally。Doesitbelongthentothesameortodifferentsciencestoknoweachseverally? Ifwelookattheancients，physicswouldtobeconcernedwiththematter。(ItwasonlyveryslightlythatEmpedoclesandDemocritustouchedontheformsandtheessence。) Butifontheotherhandartimitatesnature，anditisthepartofthesamedisciplinetoknowtheformandthematteruptoapoint(e。g。thedoctorhasaknowledgeofhealthandalsoofbileandphlegm，inwhichhealthisrealized，andthebuilderbothoftheformofthehouseandofthematter，namelythatitisbricksandbeams，andsoforth):ifthisisso，itwouldbethepartofphysicsalsotoknownatureinbothitssenses。 Again，\'thatforthesakeofwhich\'，ortheend，belongstothesamedepartmentofknowledgeasthemeans。Butthenatureistheendor\'thatforthesakeofwhich\'。Forifathingundergoesacontinuouschangeandthereisastagewhichislast，thisstageistheendor\'thatforthesakeofwhich\'。(Thatiswhythepoetwascarriedawayintomakinganabsurdstatementwhenhesaid\'hehastheendforthesakeofwhichhewasborn\'。Fornoteverystagethatislastclaimstobeanend，butonlythatwhichisbest。) Fortheartsmaketheirmaterial(somesimply\'make\'it，othersmakeitserviceable)，andweuseeverythingasifitwasthereforoursake。(Wealsoareinasenseanend。\'Thatforthesakeofwhich\'hastwosenses:thedistinctionismadeinourworkOnPhilosophy。)Thearts，therefore，whichgovernthematterandhaveknowledgearetwo，namelytheartwhichusestheproductandtheartwhichdirectstheproductionofit。Thatiswhytheusingartalsoisinasensedirective；butitdiffersinthatitknowstheform，whereastheartwhichisdirectiveasbeingconcernedwithproductionknowsthematter。Forthehelmsmanknowsandprescribeswhatsortofformahelmshouldhave，theotherfromwhatwooditshouldbemadeandbymeansofwhatoperations。Intheproductsofart，however，wemakethematerialwithaviewtothefunction，whereasintheproductsofnaturethematteristhereallalong。 Again，matterisarelativeterm:toeachformtherecorrespondsaspecialmatter。Howfarthenmustthephysicistknowtheformoressence?Uptoapoint，perhaps，asthedoctormustknowsineworthesmithbronze(i。e。untilheunderstandsthepurposeofeach): andthephysicistisconcernedonlywiththingswhoseformsareseparableindeed，butdonotexistapartfrommatter。Manisbegottenbymanandbythesunaswell。Themodeofexistenceandessenceoftheseparableitisthebusinessoftheprimarytypeofphilosophytodefine。 3 Nowthatwehaveestablishedthesedistinctions，wemustproceedtoconsidercauses，theircharacterandnumber。Knowledgeistheobjectofourinquiry，andmendonotthinktheyknowathingtilltheyhavegraspedthe\'why\'of(whichistograspitsprimarycause)。Soclearlywetoomustdothisasregardsbothcomingtobeandpassingawayandeverykindofphysicalchange，inorderthat，knowingtheirprinciples，wemaytrytorefertotheseprincipleseachofourproblems。 Inonesense，then，(1)thatoutofwhichathingcomestobeandwhichpersists，iscalled\'cause\'，e。g。thebronzeofthestatue，thesilverofthebowl，andthegeneraofwhichthebronzeandthesilverarespecies。 Inanothersense(2)theformorthearchetype，i。e。thestatementoftheessence，anditsgenera，arecalled\'causes\'(e。g。oftheoctavetherelationof2:1，andgenerallynumber)，andthepartsinthedefinition。 Again(3)theprimarysourceofthechangeorcomingtorest；e。g。 themanwhogaveadviceisacause，thefatheriscauseofthechild，andgenerallywhatmakesofwhatismadeandwhatcauseschangeofwhatischanged。 Again(4)inthesenseofendor\'thatforthesakeofwhich\'athingisdone，e。g。healthisthecauseofwalkingabout。(\'Whyishewalkingabout?\'wesay。\'Tobehealthy\'，and，havingsaidthat，wethinkwehaveassignedthecause。)Thesameistruealsoofalltheintermediatestepswhicharebroughtaboutthroughtheactionofsomethingelseasmeanstowardstheend，e。g。reductionofflesh，purging，drugs，orsurgicalinstrumentsaremeanstowardshealth。 Allthesethingsare\'forthesakeof\'theend，thoughtheydifferfromoneanotherinthatsomeareactivities，othersinstruments。 Thisthenperhapsexhauststhenumberofwaysinwhichtheterm\'cause\'isused。 Asthewordhasseveralsenses，itfollowsthatthereareseveralcausesofthesamethingnotmerelyinvirtueofaconcomitantattribute)，e。g。boththeartofthesculptorandthebronzearecausesofthestatue。Thesearecausesofthestatuequastatue，notinvirtueofanythingelsethatitmaybe-onlynotinthesameway，theonebeingthematerialcause，theotherthecausewhencethemotioncomes。Somethingscauseeachotherreciprocally，e。g。hardworkcausesfitnessandviceversa，butagainnotinthesameway，buttheoneasend，theotherastheoriginofchange。Furtherthesamethingisthecauseofcontraryresults。Forthatwhichbyitspresencebringsaboutoneresultissometimesblamedforbringingaboutthecontrarybyitsabsence。Thusweascribethewreckofashiptotheabsenceofthepilotwhosepresencewasthecauseofitssafety。 Allthecausesnowmentionedfallintofourfamiliardivisions。 Thelettersarethecausesofsyllables，thematerialofartificialproducts，fire，&c。，ofbodies，thepartsofthewhole，andthepremissesoftheconclusion，inthesenseof\'thatfromwhich\'。Ofthesepairstheonesetarecausesinthesenseofsubstratum，e。g。 theparts，theothersetinthesenseofessence-thewholeandthecombinationandtheform。Buttheseedandthedoctorandtheadviser，andgenerallythemaker，areallsourceswhencethechangeorstationarinessoriginates，whiletheothersarecausesinthesenseoftheendorthegoodoftherest；for\'thatforthesakeofwhich\' meanswhatisbestandtheendofthethingsthatleaduptoit。 (Whetherwesaythe\'gooditselforthe\'apparentgood\'makesnodifference。) Suchthenisthenumberandnatureofthekindsofcause。 Nowthemodesofcausationaremany，thoughwhenbroughtunderheadstheytoocanbereducedinnumber。For\'cause\'isusedinmanysensesandevenwithinthesamekindonemaybepriortoanother(e。g。 thedoctorandtheexpertarecausesofhealth，therelation2:1andnumberoftheoctave)，andalwayswhatisinclusivetowhatisparticular。Anothermodeofcausationistheincidentalanditsgenera，e。g。inoneway\'Polyclitus\'，inanother\'sculptor\'isthecauseofastatue，because\'beingPolyclitus\'and\'sculptor\'areincidentallyconjoined。Alsotheclassesinwhichtheincidentalattributeisincluded；thus\'aman\'couldbesaidtobethecauseofastatueor，generally，\'alivingcreature\'。Anincidentalattributetoomaybemoreorlessremote，e。g。supposethat\'apaleman\'or\'amusicalman\'weresaidtobethecauseofthestatue。 Allcauses，bothproperandincidental，maybespokenofeitheraspotentialorasactual；e。g。thecauseofahousebeingbuiltiseither\'house-builder\'or\'house-builderbuilding\'。 Similardistinctionscanbemadeinthethingsofwhichthecausesarecauses，e。g。of\'thisstatue\'orof\'statue\'orof\'image\' generally，of\'thisbronze\'orof\'bronze\'orof\'material\'generally。 Sotoowiththeincidentalattributes。Againwemayuseacomplexexpressionforeitherandsay，e。g。neither\'Polyclitus\'nor\'sculptor\'but\'Polyclitus，sculptor\'。 Allthesevarioususes，however，cometosixinnumber，undereachofwhichagaintheusageistwofold。Causemeanseitherwhatisparticularoragenus，oranincidentalattributeoragenusofthat，andtheseeitherasacomplexoreachbyitself；andallsixeitherasactualoraspotential。Thedifferenceisthismuch，thatcauseswhichareactuallyatworkandparticularexistandceasetoexistsimultaneouslywiththeireffect，e。g。thishealingpersonwiththisbeing-healedpersonandthathouse-buildingmanwiththatbeing-builthouse；butthisisnotalwaystrueofpotentialcauses——thehouseandthehousebuilderdonotpassawaysimultaneously。 Ininvestigatingthecauseofeachthingitisalwaysnecessarytoseekwhatismostprecise(asalsoinotherthings):thusmanbuildsbecauseheisabuilder，andabuilderbuildsinvirtueofhisartofbuilding。Thislastcausethenisprior:andsogenerally。 Further，genericeffectsshouldbeassignedtogenericcauses，particulareffectstoparticularcauses，e。g。statuetosculptor，thisstatuetothissculptor；andpowersarerelativetopossibleeffects，actuallyoperatingcausestothingswhichareactuallybeingeffected。 Thismustsufficeforouraccountofthenumberofcausesandthemodesofcausation。 4 Butchancealsoandspontaneityarereckonedamongcauses:manythingsaresaidbothtobeandtocometobeasaresultofchanceandspontaneity。Wemustinquirethereforeinwhatmannerchanceandspontaneityarepresentamongthecausesenumerated，andwhethertheyarethesameordifferent，andgenerallywhatchanceandspontaneityare。 Somepeopleevenquestionwhethertheyarerealornot。Theysaythatnothinghappensbychance，butthateverythingwhichweascribetochanceorspontaneityhassomedefinitecause，e。g。coming\'bychance\'intothemarketandfindingthereamanwhomonewantedbutdidnotexpecttomeetisduetoone\'swishtogoandbuyinthemarket。Similarlyinothercasesofchanceitisalwayspossible，theymaintain，tofindsomethingwhichisthecause；butnotchance，forifchancewerereal，itwouldseemstrangeindeed，andthequestionmightberaised，whyonearthnoneofthewisemenofoldinspeakingofthecausesofgenerationanddecaytookaccountofchance；whenceitwouldseemthattheytoodidnotbelievethatanythingisbychance。Butthereisafurthercircumstancethatissurprising。Manythingsbothcometobeandarebychanceandspontaneity，andalthoughknowthateachofthemcanbeascribedtosomecause(astheoldargumentsaidwhichdeniedchance)，neverthelesstheyspeakofsomeofthesethingsashappeningbychanceandothersnot。Forthisreasonalsotheyoughttohaveatleastreferredtothematterinsomewayorother。 Certainlytheearlyphysicistsfoundnoplaceforchanceamongthecauseswhichtheyrecognized-love，strife，mind，fire，orthelike。 Thisisstrange，whethertheysupposedthatthereisnosuchthingaschanceorwhethertheythoughtthereisbutomittedtomentionit-andthattoowhentheysometimesusedit，asEmpedoclesdoeswhenhesaysthattheairisnotalwaysseparatedintothehighestregion，but\'asitmaychance\'。Atanyratehesaysinhiscosmogonythat\'ithappenedtorunthatwayatthattime，butitoftenranotherwise。\'Hetellsusalsothatmostofthepartsofanimalscametobebychance。 Therearesometoowhoascribethisheavenlysphereandalltheworldstospontaneity。Theysaythatthevortexarosespontaneously，i。e。themotionthatseparatedandarrangedinitspresentorderallthatexists。Thisstatementmightwellcausesurprise。Fortheyareassertingthatchanceisnotresponsiblefortheexistenceorgenerationofanimalsandplants，natureormindorsomethingofthekindbeingthecauseofthem(foritisnotanychancethingthatcomesfromagivenseedbutanolivefromonekindandamanfromanother)；andyetatthesametimetheyassertthattheheavenlysphereandthedivinestofvisiblethingsarosespontaneously，havingnosuchcauseasisassignedtoanimalsandplants。Yetifthisisso，itisafactwhichdeservestobedweltupon，andsomethingmightwellhavebeensaidaboutit。Forbesidestheotherabsurditiesofthestatement，itisthemoreabsurdthatpeopleshouldmakeitwhentheyseenothingcomingtobespontaneouslyintheheavens，butmuchhappeningbychanceamongthethingswhichastheysayarenotduetochance；whereasweshouldhaveexpectedexactlytheopposite。 Otherstherearewho，indeed，believethatchanceisacause，butthatitisinscrutabletohumanintelligence，asbeingadivinethingandfullofmystery。 Thuswemustinquirewhatchanceandspontaneityare，whethertheyarethesameordifferent，andhowtheyfitintoourdivisionofcauses。