UNDERSTANDING。
ADVERTISEMENT。
Mydesigninthepresentworkissufficientlyexplain’dintheIntroduction。Thereadermustonlyobserve，thatallthesubjectsIhavethereplann’douttomyself，arenottreatedofinthesetwovolumes。ThesubjectsoftheUnderstandingandPassionsmakeacompleatchainofreasoningbythemselves；andIwaswillingtotakeadvantageofthisnaturaldivision，inordertotrythetasteofthepublic。IfIhavethegoodfortunetomeetwithsuccess，IshallproceedtotheexaminationofMorals，Politics，andCriticism；whichwillcompleatthisTreatiseofHumanNature。TheapprobationofthepublicIconsiderasthegreatestrewardofmylabours；butamdetermin’dtoregarditsjudgment，whateveritbe，asmybestinstruction。
INTRODUCTION。
Nothingismoreusualandmorenaturalforthose，whopretendtodiscoveranythingnewtotheworldinphilosophyandthesciences，thantoinsinuatethepraisesoftheirownsystems，bydecryingallthose，whichhavebeenadvancedbeforethem。Andindeedweretheycontentwithlamentingthatignorance，whichwestilllieunderinthemostimportantquestions，thatcancomebeforethetribunalofhumanreason，therearefew，whohaveanacquaintancewiththesciences，thatwouldnotreadilyagreewiththem。’Tiseasyforoneofjudgmentandlearning，toperceivetheweakfoundationevenofthosesystems，whichhaveobtainedthegreatestcredit，andhavecarriedtheirpretensionshighesttoaccurateandprofoundreasoning。Principlestakenupontrust，consequenceslamelydeducedfromthem，wantofcoherenceintheparts，andofevidenceinthewhole，theseareeverywheretobemetwithinthesystemsofthemosteminentphilosophers，andseemtohavedrawndisgraceuponphilosophyitself。
Noristhererequir’dsuchprofoundknowledgetodiscoverthepresentimperfectconditionofthesciences，buteventherabblewithoutdoorsmay，judgefromthenoiseandclamour，whichtheyhear，thatallgoesnotwellwithin。Thereisnothingwhichisnotthesubjectofdebate，andinwhichmenoflearningarenotofcontraryopinions。Themosttrivialquestionescapesnotourcontroversy，andinthemostmomentouswearenotabletogiveanycertaindecision。Disputesaremultiplied，asifeverythingwasuncertain；andthesedisputesaremanagedwiththegreatestwarmth，asifeverythingwascertain。Amidstallthisbustle’tisnot。reason，whichcarriestheprize，buteloquence；andnomanneedseverdespairofgainingproselytestothemostextravaganthypothesis，whohasartenoughtorepresentitinanyfavourablecolours。Thevictoryisnotgainedbythemenatarms，whomanagethepikeandthesword；butbythetrumpeters，drummers，andmusiciansofthearmy。
Fromhenceinmyopinionarisesthatcommonprejudiceagainstmetaphysicalreasoningsofallkinds，evenamongstthose，whoprofessthemselvesscholars，andhaveajustvalueforeveryotherpartofliterature。Bymetaphysicalreasonings，theydonotunderstandthoseonanyparticularbranchofscience，buteverykindofargument，whichisanywayabstruse，andrequiressomeattentiontobecomprehended。Wehavesooftenlostourlabourinsuchresearches，thatwecommonlyrejectthemwithouthesitation，andresolve，ifwemustforeverbeapreytoerrorsanddelusions，thattheyshallatleastbenaturalandentertaining。Andindeednothingbutthemostdeterminedscepticism，alongwithagreatdegreeofindolence，canjustifythisaversiontometaphysics。Foriftruthbeatallwithinthereachofhumancapacity，’tiscertainitmustlieverydeepandabstruse:andtohopeweshallarriveatitwithoutpains，whilethegreatestgeniuseshavefailedwiththeutmostpains，mustcertainlybeesteemedsufficientlyvainandpresumptuous。IpretendtonosuchadvantageinthephilosophyIamgoingtounfold，andwouldesteemitastrongpresumptionagainstit，wereitsoveryeasyandobvious。
’Tisevident，thatallthescienceshavearelation，greaterorless，tohumannature:andthathoweverwideanyofthemmayseemtorunfromit，theystillreturnbackbyonepassageoranother。Even。Mathematics，NaturalPhilosophy，andNaturalReligion，areinsomemeasuredependentonthescienceofMAN；sincethelieunderthecognizanceofmen，andarejudgedofbytheirpowersandfaculties。’Tisimpossibletotellwhatchangesandimprovementswemightmakeinthesescienceswerewethoroughlyacquaintedwiththeextentandforceofhumanunderstanding，andcou’dexplainthenatureoftheideasweemploy，andoftheoperationsweperforminourreasonings。Andtheseimprovementsarethemoretobehopedforinnaturalreligion，asitisnotcontentwithinstructingusinthenatureofsuperiorpowers，butcarriesitsviewsfarther，totheirdispositiontowardsus，andourdutiestowardsthem；andconsequentlyweourselvesarenotonlythebeings，thatreason，butalsooneoftheobjects，concerningwhichwereason。
IfthereforethesciencesofMathematics，NaturalPhilosophy，andNaturalReligion，havesuchadependenceontheknowledgeofman，whatmaybeexpectedintheothersciences，whoseconnexionwithhumannatureismorecloseandintimate？Thesoleendoflogicistoexplaintheprinciplesandoperationsofourreasoningfaculty，andthenatureofourideas:moralsandcriticismregardourtastesandsentiments:andpoliticsconsidermenasunitedinsociety，anddependentoneachother。InthesefoursciencesofLogic，Morals，Criticism，andPolitics，iscomprehendedalmosteverything，whichitcananywayimportustobeacquaintedwith，orwhichcantendeithertotheimprovementorornamentofthehumanmind。
Herethenistheonlyexpedient，fromwhichwecanhopeforsuccessinourphilosophicalresearches，toleavethetediouslingeringmethod，whichwehavehithertofollowed，andinsteadoftakingnowandthenacastleorvillageonthefrontier，tomarchupdirectlytothecapitalorcenterofthesesciences，tohumannatureitself；whichbeingoncemastersof，wemayeverywhereelsehopeforaneasyvictory。Fromthisstationwemayextendourconquestsoverallthosesciences，whichmoreintimatelyconcernhumanlife，andmayafterwardsproceedatleisuretodiscovermorefullythose，whicharetheobjectsofporecuriosity。Thereisnoquestionofimportance，whosedecisionisnotcompriz’dinthescienceofman；andthereisnone，whichcanbedecidedwithanycertainty，beforewebecomeacquaintedwiththatscience。Inpretending，therefore，toexplaintheprinciplesofhumannature，weineffectproposeacompleatsystemofthesciences，builtonafoundationalmostentirelynew，andtheonlyoneuponwhichtheycanstandwithanysecurity。
Andasthescienceofmanisthe-onlysolidfoundationfortheothersciences，sotheonlysolidfoundationwecan(livetothisscienceitselfmustbelaidonexperienceandobservation。’Tisnoastonishingreflectiontoconsider，thattheapplicationofexperimentalphilosophytomoralsubjectsshouldcomeafterthattonaturalatthedistanceofaboveawholecentury；sincewefindinfact，thattherewasaboutthesameintervalbetwixttheoriginsofthesesciences；andthatreckoningfromTHALEStoSOCRATES，thespaceoftimeisnearlyequaltothatbetwixt，myLordBaconandsomelatephilosophersinEngland，whohavebeguntoputthescienceofmanonanewfooting，andhaveengagedtheattention，andexcitedthecuriosityofthepublic。Sotrueitis，thathoweverothernationsmayrivalusinpoetry，andexcelusinsomeotheragreeablearts，theimprovementsinreasonandphilosophycanonlybeowingtoalandoftolerationandofliberty。
Noroughtwetothink，thatthislatterimprovementinthescienceofmanwilldolesshonourtoournativecountrythantheformerinnaturalphilosophy，butoughtrathertoesteemitagreaterglory，uponaccountofthegreaterimportanceofthatscience，aswellasthenecessityitlayunderofsuchareformation。Fortomeitseemsevident，thattheessenceofthemindbeingequallyunknowntouswiththatofexternalbodies，itmustbeequallyimpossibletoformanynotionofitspowersandqualitiesotherwisethanfromcarefulandexactexperiments，andtheobservationofthoseparticulareffects，whichresultfromitsdifferentcircumstancesandsituations。Andtho’wemustendeavourtorenderallourprinciplesasuniversalaspossible，bytracingupourexperimentstotheutmost，andexplainingalleffectsfromthesimplestandfewestcauses，’tisstillcertainwecannotgobeyondexperience；andanyhypothesis，thatpretendstodiscovertheultimateoriginalqualitiesofhumannature，oughtatfirsttoberejectedaspresumptuousandchimerical。
Idonotthinkaphilosopher，whowouldapplyhimselfsoearnestlytotheexplainingtheultimateprinciplesofthesoul，wouldshowhimselfagreatmasterinthatveryscienceofhumannature，whichhepretendstoexplain，orveryknowing’mwhatisnaturallysatisfactorytothemindofman。Fornothingismorecertain，thanthatdespairhasalmostthesameeffectuponuswithenjoyment，andthatwearenosooneracquaintedwiththeimpossibilityofsatisfyinganydesire，thanthedesireitselfvanishes。Whenwesee，thatwehavearrivedattheutmostextentofhumanreason，wesitdowncontented，tho’webeperfectlysatisfiedinthemainofourignorance，andperceivethatwecangivenoreasonforourmostgeneralandmostrefinedprinciples，besideourexperienceoftheirreality；whichisthereasonofthemerevulgar，andwhatitrequirednostudyatfirsttohavediscoveredforthemostparticularandmostextraordinaryphaenomenon。Andasthisimpossibilityofmakinganyfartherprogressisenoughtosatisfythereader，sothewritermayderiveamoredelicatesatisfactionfromthefreeconfessionofhisignorance，andfromhisprudenceinavoidingthaterror，intowhichsomanyhavefallen，ofimposingtheirconjecturesandhypothesesontheworldforthemostcertainprinciples。Whenthismutualcontentmentandsatisfactioncanbeobtainedbetwixtthemasterandscholar，Iknownotwhatmorewecanrequireofourphilosophy。
Butifthisimpossibilityofexplainingultimateprinciplesshouldbeesteemedadefectinthescienceofman，Iwillventuretoaffirm，that’tieadefectcommontoitwithallthesciences，andallthearts，inwhichwecanemployourselves，whethertheybesuchasarecultivatedintheschoolsofthephilosophers，orpractisedintheshopsofthemeanestartizans。Noneofthemcangobeyondexperience，orestablishanyprincipleswhicharenotfoundedonthatauthority。Moralphilosophyhas，indeed，thispeculiardisadvantage，whichisnotfoundinnatural，thatincollectingitsexperiments，itcannotmakethempurposely，withpremeditation，andaftersuchamannerastosatisfyitselfconcerningeveryparticulardifficultywhichmaybe。WhenIamatalosstoknowtheeffectsofonebodyuponanotherinanysituation，Ineedonlyputtheminthatsituation，andobservewhatresultsfromit。ButshouldIendeavourtoclearupafterthesamemanneranydoubtinmoralphilosophy，byplacingmyselfinthesamecasewiththatwhichIconsider，’tisevidentthisreflectionandpremeditationwouldsodisturbtheoperationofmynaturalprinciples，asmustrenderitimpossibletoformanyjustconclusionfromthephenomenon。Wemustthereforegleanupourexperimentsinthissciencefromacautiousobservationofhumanlife，andtakethemastheyappearinthecommoncourseoftheworld，bymen’sbehaviourincompany，inaffairs，andintheirpleasures。Whereexperimentsofthiskindarejudiciouslycollectedandcompared，wemayhopetoestablishonthemasciencewhichwillnotbeinferiorincertainty，andwillbemuchsuperiorinutilitytoanyotherofhumancomprehension。
BOOKI。OftheUnderstandingPARTI。
OFIDEAS，THEIRORIGIN，COMPOSITION，CONNEXION，ABSTRACTION，ETC。
OftheOriginofourIdeas。
Alltheperceptionsofthehumanmindresolvethemselvesintotwodistinctkinds，whichIshallcallIMPRESSIONSandIDEAS。Thedifferencebetwixttheseconsistsinthedegreesofforceandliveliness，withwhichtheystrikeuponthemind，andmaketheirwayintoourthoughtorconsciousness。Thoseperceptions，whichenterwithmostforceandviolence，wemaynameimpressions:andunderthisnameIcomprehendalloursensations，passionsandemotions，astheymaketheirfirstappearanceinthesoul。ByideasImeanthefaintimagesoftheseinthinkingandreasoning；suchas，forinstance，arealltheperceptionsexcitedbythepresentdiscourse，exceptingonlythosewhicharisefromthesightandtouch，andexceptingtheimmediatepleasureoruneasinessitmayoccasion。Ibelieveitwillnotbeverynecessarytoemploymanywordsinexplainingthisdistinction。Everyoneofhimselfwillreadilyperceivethedifferencebetwixtfeelingandthinking。Thecommondegreesoftheseareeasilydistinguished；tho’itisnotimpossiblebutinparticularinstancestheymayverynearlyapproachtoeachother。Thusinsleep，inafever，inmadness，orinanyveryviolentemotionsofsoul，ourideasmayapproachtoourimpressions，Asontheotherhanditsometimeshappens，thatourimpressionsaresofaintandlow，thatwecannotdistinguishthemfromourideas。Butnotwithstandingthisnearresemblanceinafewinstances，theyareingeneralsoverydifferent，thatno-onecanmakeascrupletorankthemunderdistinctheads，andassigntoeachapeculiarnametomarkthedifference。(1)
Thereisanotherdivisionofourperceptions，whichitwillbeconvenienttoobserve，andwhichextendsitselfbothtoourimpressionsandideas。ThisdivisionisintoSIMPLEandCOMPLEX。Simpleperceptionsorimpressionsandideasaresuchasadmitofnodistinctionnorseparation。Thecomplexarethecontrarytothese，andmaybedistinguishedintoparts。Tho’aparticularcolour，taste，andsmell，arequalitiesallunitedtogetherinthisapple，’tiseasytoperceivetheyarenotthesame，butareatleastdistinguishablefromeachother。
Havingbythesedivisionsgivenanorderandarrangementtoourobjects，wemaynowapplyourselvestoconsiderwiththemoreaccuracytheirqualitiesandrelations。Thefirstcircumstance，thatstrikesmyeye，isthegreatresemblancebetwixtourimpressionsandideasineveryotherparticular，excepttheirdegreeofforceandvivacity。Theoneseemtobeinamannerthereflexionoftheother；sothatalltheperceptionsofthemindaredouble。，andappearbothasimpressionsandideas。WhenIshutmyeyesandthinkofmychamber，theideasIformareexactrepresentationsoftheimpressionsIfelt；noristhereanycircumstanceoftheone，whichisnottobefoundintheother。Inrunningovermyotherperceptions，Ifindstillthesameresemblanceandrepresentation。Ideasandimpressionsappearalwaystocorrespondtoeachother。Thiscircumstanceseemstomeremarkable，andengagesmyattentionforamoment。
UponamoreaccuratesurveyIfindIhavebeencarriedawaytoofarbythefirstappearance，andthatImustmakeuseofthedistinctionofperceptionsintosimpleandcomplex，tolimitthisgeneraldecision，thatallourideasandimpressionsareresembling。Iobserve，thatmanyofourcomplexideasneverhadimpressions，thatcorrespondedtothem，andthatmanyofourcompleximpressionsneverareexactlycopiedinideas。IcanimaginetomyselfsuchacityastheNewJerusalem，whosepavementisgoldandwallsarerubies，tho’Ineversawanysuch。IhaveseenParis；butshallIaffirmIcanformsuchanideaofthatcity，aswillperfectlyrepresentallitsstreetsandhousesintheirrealandjustproportions？
Iperceive，therefore，thattho’thereisingeneralagreat，resemblancebetwixtourcompleximpressionsandideas，yettheruleisnotuniversallytrue，thattheyareexactcopiesofeachother。Wemaynextconsiderhowthecasestandswithoursimple，perceptions。Afterthemostaccurateexamination，ofwhichIamcapable，Iventuretoaffirm，thattherulehereholdswithoutanyexception，andthateverysimpleideahasasimpleimpression，whichresemblesit，andeverysimpleimpressionacorrespondentidea。Thatideaofred，whichweforminthedark，andthatimpressionwhichstrikesoureyesinsun-shine，differonlyindegree，notinnature。Thatthecaseisthesamewithalloursimpleimpressionsandideas，’tisimpossibletoprovebyaparticularenumerationofthem。Everyonemaysatisfyhimselfinthispointbyrunningoverasmanyashepleases。Butifanyoneshoulddenythisuniversalresemblance，Iknownowayofconvincinghim，butbydesiringhimtoshewasimpleimpression，thathasnotacorrespondentidea，orasimpleidea，thathasnotacorrespondentimpression。Ifhedoesnotanswerthischallenge，as’tiscertainhecan-not，wemayfromhissilenceandourownobservationestablishourconclusion。
Thuswefind，thatallsimpleideasandimpressionsresembleeachother；andasthecomplexareformedfromthem，wemayaffirmingeneral，thatthesetwospeciesofperceptionareexactlycorrespondent。Havingdiscoveredthisrelation，whichrequiresnofartherexamination，Iamcurioustofindsomeotheroftheirqualities。Letusconsiderhow。theystandwithregardtotheirexistence，andwhichoftheimpressionsandideasarecauses，andwhicheffects。
Thefullexaminationofthisquestionisthesubjectofthepresenttreatise；andthereforeweshallherecontentourselveswithestablishingonegeneralproposition，Thatalloursimpleideasintheirfirstappearancearederiv’dfromsimpleimpressions，whicharecorrespondenttothem，andwhichtheyexactlyrepresent。
Inseekingforphenomenatoprovethisproposition，Ifindonlythoseoftwokinds；butineachkindthephenomenaareobvious，numerous，andconclusive。Ifirstmakemyselfcertain，byanew，review，ofwhatIhavealreadyasserted，thateverysimpleimpressionisattendedwithacorrespondentidea，andeverysimpleideawithacorrespondentimpression。FromthisconstantconjunctionofresemblingperceptionsIimmediatelyconclude，thatthereisagreatconnexionbetwixtourcorrespondentimpressionsandideas，andthattheexistenceoftheonehasa-considerableinfluenceuponthatoftheother。Suchaconstantconjunction，insuchaninfinitenumberofinstances，canneverarisefromchance；butclearlyprovesadependenceoftheimpressionsontheideas，oroftheideasontheimpressions。ThatImayknowonwhichsidethisdependencelies，Iconsidertheorderoftheirfirstappearance；andfindbyconstantexperience，thatthesimpleimpressionsalwaystaketheprecedenceoftheircorrespondentideas，butneverappearinthecontraryorder。Togiveachildanideaofscarletororange，ofsweetorbitter，Ipresenttheobjects，orinotherwords，conveytohimtheseimpressions；butproceednotsoabsurdly，astoendeavourtoproduce-theimpressionsbyexcitingtheideas。Ourideasupontheirappearanceproducenottheircorrespondentimpressions，nordoweperceiveanycolour，orfeelanysensationmerelyuponthinkingofthem。Ontheotherhandwefind，thatanyimpressioneitherofthemindorbodyisconstantlyfollowedbyanidea，whichresemblesit，andisonlydifferentinthedegreesofforceandliveliness，Theconstantconjunctionofourresemblingperceptions，isaconvincingproof，thattheonearethecausesoftheother；andthispriorityoftheimpressionsisanequalproof，thatourimpressionsarethecausesofourideas，notourideas。ofour，impressions。
ToconfirmthisIconsiderAnotherplainandconvincingphaenomenon；whichis，that，where-everbyanyaccidentthefaculties，whichgiverisetoanyimpressions，areobstructedintheiroperations，aswhenoneisbornblindordeaf；-notonlytheimpressionsarelost，butalsotheircorrespondentideas；sothatthereneverappearinthemindtheleasttracesofeitherofthem。Noristhisonlytrue，wheretheorgansofsensationareentirelydestroy’d，butlikewisewheretheyhaveneverbeenputinactiontoproduceaparticularimpression。Wecannotformtoourselvesajustideaofthetasteofapineapple，withouthavingactuallytastedit。
Thereishoweveronecontradictoryphaenomenon，whichmayprove，that’tisnotabsolutelyimpossibleforideastogobeforetheircorrespondentimpressions。Ibelieveitwillreadilybeallow’dthattheseveraldistinctideasofcolours，whichenterbytheeyes，orthoseofsounds，whichareconvey’dbythehearing，arereallydifferentfromeachother，tho’atthesametimeresembling。Nowifthisbetrueofdifferentcolours，itmustbenolesssoofthedifferentshadesofthesamecolour，thateachofthemproducesadistinctidea，independentoftherest。Forifthisshou’dbedeny’d，’tispossible，bythecontinualgradationofshades，torunacolourinsensiblyintowhatismostremotefromit；andifyouwillnotallowanyofthemeanstobedifferent，youcannotwithoutabsurditydenytheextremestobethesame。Supposethereforeapersontohaveenjoyedhissightforthirtyyears，andtohavebecomeperfectlywellacquaintedwithcoloursofallkinds，exceptingoneparticularshadeofblue，forinstance，whichitneverhasbeenhisfortunetomeetwith。Letallthedifferentshadesofthatcolour，exceptthatsingleone，beplac’dbeforehim，descendinggraduallyfromthedeepesttothelightest；’tisplain，thathewillperceiveablank，wherethatshadeiswanting，saidwillbesensible，thatthereisagreaterdistanceinthatplacebetwixtthecontiguouscolours，thaninanyother。NowIask，whether’tispossibleforhim，fromhisownimagination，tosupplythisdeficiency，andraiseuptohimselftheideaofthatparticularshade，tho’ithadneverbeenconveyedtohimbyhissenses？Ibelieveiherearefewbutwillbeofopinionthathecan；andthismayserveasaproof，thatthesimpleideasarenotalwaysderivedfromthecorrespondentimpressions；tho’theinstanceissoparticularandsingular，that’tisscarceworthourobserving，anddoesnotmeritthatforitaloneweshouldalterourgeneralmaxim。
Butbesidesthisexception，itmaynotbeamisstoremarkonthishead，thattheprincipleofthepriorityofimpressionstoideasmustbeunderstoodwithanotherlimitation，viz。，thatasourideasareimagesofourimpressions，sowecanformsecondaryideas，whichareimagesoftheprimary；asappearsfromthisveryreasoningconcerningthem。Thisisnot，properlyspeaking，anexceptiontotherulesomuchasanexplanationofit。Ideasproducetheimagesofthem。selvesinnewideas；butasthefirstideasaresupposedtobederivedfromimpressions，itstillremainstrue，thatalloursimpleideasproceedeithermediatelyorimmediately，fromtheircorrespondentimpressions。
ThisthenisthefirstprincipleIestablishinthescienceofhumannature；noroughtwetodespiseitbecauseofthesimplicityofitsappearance。For’tisremarkable，thatthepresentquestionconcerningtheprecedencyofourimpressionsorideas，isthesamewithwhathasmadesomuchnoiseinotherterms，whenithasbeendisputedwhethertherebeanyinnateideas，orwhetherallideasbederivedfromsensationandreflexion。Wemayobserve，thatinordertoprovetheideasofextensionandcolournottobeinnate，philosophersdonothingbutshewthattheyareconveyedbyoursenses。Toprovetheideasofpassionanddesirenottobeinnate，theyobservethatwehaveaprecedingexperienceoftheseemotionsinourselves。，Nowifwecarefullyexaminethesearguments，weshallfindthattheyprovenothingbutthatideasareprecededbyothermorelivelyperceptions，fromwhichthearederived，andwhichtheyrepresent。Ihopethisclearstatingofthequestionwillremovealldisputesconcerningit，andwinrenderthisprincipleofmoreuseinourreasonings，thanitseemshithertotohavebeen。
DivisionoftheSubject。
Sinceitappears，thatoursimpleimpressionsarepriortotheircorrespondentideas，andthattheexceptionsareveryrare，methodseemstorequireweshouldexamineourimpressions，beforeweconsiderourideas。Impressionswaybedividedintotwokinds，thoseOfSENSATIONandthoseofREFLEXION。Thefirstkindarisesinthesouloriginally，fromunknowncauses。Thesecondisderivedinagreatmeasurefromourideas，andthatinthefollowingorder。Animpressionfirststrikesuponthesenses，andmakesusperceiveheatorcold，thirstorhunger，pleasureorpainofsomekindorother。Ofthisimpressionthereisacopytakenbythemind，whichremainsaftertheimpressionceases；andthiswecallanidea。Thisideaofpleasureorpain，whenitreturnsuponthesoul，producesthenewimpressionsofdesireandaversion，hopeandfear，whichmayproperlybecalledimpressionsofreflexion，becausederivedfromit。Theseagainarecopiedbythememoryandimagination，andbecomeideas；whichperhapsintheirturngiverisetootherimpressionsandideas。Sothattheimpressionsofreflexionareonlyantecedenttotheircorrespondentideas；butposteriortothoseofsensation，andderiv’dfromthem。Theexaminationofoursensationsbelongsmoretoanatomistsandnaturalphilosophersthantomoral；andthereforeshallnotatpresentbeenter’dupon。Andastheimpressionsofreflexion，viz。passions，desires，andemotions，whichprincipallydeserveourattention，arisemostlyfromideas，’twillbenecessarytoreversethatmethod，whichatfirstsightseemsmostnatural；andinordertoexplainthenatureandprinciplesofthehumanmind，giveaparticularaccountofideas，beforeweproceedtoimpressions。ForthisreasonIhaveherechosentobeginwithideas。
OftheIdeasoftheMemoryandImagination。
Wefindbyexperience，thatwhenanyimpressionbasbeenpresentwiththemind，itagainmakesitsappearancethereasanidea；andthisitmaydoaftertwodifferentways:eitherwheninitsnewappearanceitretainsaconsiderabledegreeofitsfirstvivacity，andissomewhatintermediatebetwixtanimpressionandanidea:orwhenitentirelylosesthatvivacity，andisaperfectidea。Thefaculty，bywhichwerepeatourimpressionsinthefirstmanner，iscalledtheMEMORY，andtheothertheIMAGINATION。’Tisevidentatfirstsight，thattheideasofthememoryaremuchmorelivelyandstrongthanthoseoftheimagination，andthattheformerfacultypaintsitsobjectsinmoredistinctcolours，thananywhichareemploy’dbythelatter。Whenwerememberanypastevent，theideaofitflowsinuponthemindinaforciblemanner；whereasintheimaginationtheperceptionisfaintandlanguid，andcannotwithoutdifficultybepreserv’dbythemindsteddyanduniformforanyconsiderabletime。Herethenisasensibledifferencebetwixtonespeciesofideasandanother。Butofthismorefullyhereafter。(2)
Thereisanotherdifferencebetwixtthesetwokindsofideas，which:-snolessevident，namelythattho’neithertheideas，ofthememorynorimagination，neitherthelivelynorfaintideascanmaketheirappearanceinthemind，unlesstheircorrespondentimpressionshavegonebeforetopreparethewayforthem，yettheimaginationisnotrestrain’dtothesameorderandformwiththeoriginalimpressions；whilethememoryisinamannerty’ddowninthatrespect，withoutanypowerofvariation。
’Tisevident，thatthememorypreservestheoriginalform，inwhichitsobjectswerepresented，andthatwhere-everwedepartfromitinrecollectinganything，itproceedsfromsomedefectorimperfectioninthatfaculty。Anhistorianmay，perhaps，forthemoreconvenientCarryingonofhisnarration，relateaneventbeforeanother，towhichitwasinfactposterior；butthenhetakesnoticeofthisdisorder，ifhebeexact；andbythatmeansreplacestheideainitsdueposition。’Tisthesamecaseinourrecollectionofthoseplacesandpersons，withwhichwewereformerlyacquainted。Thechiefexerciseofthememoryisnottopreservethesimpleideas，buttheirorderandposition。Inshort，thisprincipleissupportedbysuchanumberofcommonandvulgarphaenomena，thatwemayspareourselvesthetroubleofinsistingonitanyfarther。
Thesameevidencefollowsusinoursecondprinciple，ofthelibertyoftheimaginationtotransposeandchangeitsideas。Thefableswemeetwithinpoemsandromancesputthisentirelyoutofthequestion。Naturethereistotallyconfounded，andnothingmentionedbutwingedhorses，fierydragons，andmonstrousgiants。Norwillthislibertyofthefancyappearstrange，whenweconsider，thatallourideasarecopy’dfromourimpressions，’andthattherearenotanytwoimpressionswhichareperfectlyinseparable。Nottomention，thatthisisanevidentconsequenceofthedivisionofideasintosimpleandcomplex。Where-evertheimaginationperceivesadifferenceamongideas，itcaneasilyproduceaseparation。
OftheConnexionorAssociationofIdeas。
Asallsimpleideasmaybeseparatedbytheimagination，andmaybeunitedagaininwhatformitpleases，nothingwou’dbemoreunaccountablethantheoperationsofthatfaculty，wereitnotguidedbysomeuniversalprinciples，whichrenderit，insomemeasure，uniformwithitselfinalltimesandplaces。Wereideasentirelylooseandunconnected，chancealonewou’djointhem；and’tisimpossiblethesamesimpleideasshouldfallregularlyintocomplexones(astheyCommonlydo)withoutsomebondofunionamongthem，someassociatingquality，bywhichoneideanaturallyintroducesanother。Thisunitingprincipleamongideasisnottobeconsider’dasaninseparableconnexion；forthathasbeenalreadyexcludedfromtheimagination:Noryetarewetoconclude，thatwithoutitthemindcannotjointwoideas；fornothingismorefreethanthatfaculty:butweareonlytoregarditasagentleforce，whichcommonlyprevails，andisthecausewhy，amongotherthings，languagessonearlycorrespondtoeachother；natureinamannerpointingouttoeveryonethosesimpleideas，whicharemostpropertobeunitedinacomplexone。Thequalities，fromwhichthisassociationarises，andbywhichthemindisafterthismannerconvey’dfromoneideatoanother，arethree，viz。RESEMBLANCE。，CONTIGUITYintimeorplace，andCAUSEandEFFECT。
Ibelieveitwillnotbeverynecessarytoprove，thatthesequalitiesproduceanassociationamongideas，andupontheappearanceofoneideanaturallyintroduceanother。’Tisplain，thatinthecourseofourthinking，andintheconstantrevolutionofourideas，ourimaginationrunseasilyfromoneideatoanyotherthatresemblesit，andthatthisqualityaloneistothefancyasufficientbondandassociation。’Tislikewiseevidentthatasthesenses，inchangingtheirobjects，arenecessitatedtochangethemregularly，andtakethemastheyliecontiguoustoeachother，theimaginationmustbylongcustomacquirethesamemethodofthinking，andrunalongthepartsofspaceandtimeinconceivingitsobjects。Astotheconnexion，thatismadebytherelationofcauseandeffect，weshallhaveoccasionafterwardstoexamineittothebottom，andthereforeshallnotatpresentinsistuponit。’Tissufficienttoobserve，thatthereisnorelation，whichproducesastrongerconnexioninthefancy，andmakesoneideamorereadilyrecallanother，thantherelationofcauseandeffectbetwixttheirobjects。
Thatwemayunderstandthefullextentoftheserelations，wemustconsider，thattwoobjectsareconnectedtogetherintheimagination，notonlywhentheoneisimmediatelyresembling，contiguousto，orthecauseoftheother，butalsowhenthereisinterposedbetwixtthemathirdobject，whichbearstobothofthemanyoftheserelations。Thismaybecarriedontoagreatlength；tho’atthesametimewemayobserve，thateachremoveconsiderablyweakenstherelation。Cousinsinthefourthdegreeareconnectedbycausation，ifImaybeallowedtousethatterm；butnotsocloselyasbrothers，muchlessaschildandparent。Ingeneralwemayobserve，thatalltherelationsofblooddependuponcauseandeffect，andareesteemednearorremote，accordingtothenumberofconnectingcausesinterpos’dbetwixtthepersons。
Ofthethreerelationsabove-mention’dthisofcausationisthemostextensive。Twoobjectsmaybeconsideredasplac’dinthisrelation，aswellwhenoneisthecauseofanyoftheactionsormotionsoftheother，aswhentheformeristhecauseoftheexistenceofthelatter。Forasthatactionormotionisnothingbuttheobjectitself，consider’dinacertainlight，andastheobjectcontinuesthesameinallitsdifferentsituations，’tiseasytoimaginehowsuchaninfluenceofobjectsupononeanothermayconnectthemintheimagination。
Wemaycarrythisfarther，andremark，notonlythattwoobjectsareconnectedbytherelationofcauseandeffect，whentheoneproducesamotionoranyactionintheother，butalsowhenithasapowerofproducingit。Andthiswemayobservetobethesourceofalltherelation，；ofinterestandduty，bywhichmeninfluenceeachotherinsociety，andareplac’dinthetiesofgovernmentandsubordination。Amasterissuch-a-oneasbyhissituation，arisingeitherfromforceoragreement，hasapowerofdirectingincertainparticularstheactionsofanother，whomwecallservant。Ajudgeisone，whoinalldisputedcasescanfixbyhisopinionthepossessionorpropertyofanythingbetwixtanymembersofthesociety。Whenapersonispossess’dofanypower，thereisnomorerequiredtoconvertitintoaction，buttheexertionofthewill；andthatineverycaseisconsideredaspossible，andinmanyasprobable；especiallyinthecaseofauthority，wheretheobedienceofthesubjectisapleasureandadvantagetothesuperior。
Thesearethereforetheprinciplesofunionorcohesionamongoursimpleideas，andintheimaginationsupplytheplaceofthatinseparableconnexion，bywhichtheyareunitedinourmemory。HereisakindofATTRACTION，whichinthementalworldwillbefoundtohaveasextraordinaryeffectsasinthenatural，andtoshewitselfinasmanyandasvariousforms。Itseffectsareeverywhereconspicuous；butastoitscauses，theyaremostlyunknown，andmustberesolv’dintooriginalqualitiesofhumannature，whichIpretendnottoexplain。Nothingismorerequisiteforatruephilosopher，thantorestraintheintemperatedesireofsearchingintocauses，andhavingestablishedanydoctrineuponasufficientnumberofexperiments，restcontentedwiththat，whenheseesafartherexaminationwouldleadhimintoobscureanduncertainspeculations。Inthatcasehisenquirywou’dbemuchbetteremploy’dinexaminingtheeffectsthanthecausesofhisprinciple。
Amongsttheeffectsofthisunionorassociationofideas，therearenonemoreremarkable，thanthosecomplexideas，whicharethecommonsubjectsofourthoughtsandreasoning，andgenerallyarisefromsomeprincipleofunionamongoursimpleideas。ThesecomplexideasmaybedividedintoRelations，Modes，andSubstances。Weshallbrieflyexamineeachoftheseinorder，andshallsubjoinsomeconsiderationsconcerningourgeneralandparticularideas，beforeweleavethepresentsubject，whichmaybeconsider’dastheelementsofthisphilosophy。
OfRelations。
ThewordRELATIONiscommonlyusedintwosensesconsiderablydifferentfromeachother。Eitherforthatquality，bywhichtwoideasareconnectedtogetherintheimagination，andtheonenaturallyintroducestheother，afterthemannerabove-explained:orforthatparticularcircumstance，inwhich，evenuponthearbitraryunionoftwoideasinthefancy，wemaythinkpropertocomparethem。Incommonlanguagetheformerisalwaysthesense，inwhichweusetheword，relation；andtisonlyinphilosophy，thatweextendittomeananyparticularsubjectofcomparison，withoutaconnectingprinciple。Thusdistancewillbeallowedbyphilosopherstobeatruerelation，becauseweacquireanideaofitbythecomparingofobjects:Butinacommonwaywesay，thatnothingcanbemoredistantthansuchorsuchthingsfromeachother，nothingcanhavelessrelation:asifdistanceandrelationwereincompatible。’
Itmayperhapsbeesteemedanendlesstasktoenumerateallthosequalities，whichmakeobjectsadmitofcomparison，andbywhichtheideasofphilosophicalrelationareproduced。Butifwediligentlyconsiderthem，weshallfindthatwithoutdifficultytheymaybecompriz’dundersevengeneralheads，whichmaybeconsideredasthesourcesofallphilosophicalrelation。
(1)Thefirstisresemblance:Andthisisarelation，withoutwhichnophilosophicalrelationcanexist；sincenoobjectswilladmitofcomparison，butwhathavesomedegreeofresemblance。Buttho’resemblancebenecessarytoallphilosophicalrelation，itdoesnotfollow，thatitalwaysproducesaconnexionorassociationofideas。Whenaqualitybecomesverygeneral，andiscommontoagreatmanyindividuals，itleadsnottheminddirectlytoanyoneofthem；butbypresentingatoncetoogreatachoice，doestherebypreventtheimaginationfromfixingonanysingleobject。
(2)Identitymaybeesteem’dasecondspeciesofrelation。ThisrelationIhereconsiderasapply’dinitsstrictestsensetoconstantandunchangeableobjects；withoutexaminingthenatureandfoundationofpersonalidentity，whichshallfinditsplaceafterwards。Ofallrelationsthemostuniversalisthatofidentity，beingcommontoeverybeingwhoseexistencehasanyduration。
(3)AfteridentitythemostuniversalandcomprehensiverelationsarethoseofSpaceandTime，whicharethesourcesofaninfinitenumberofcomparisons，suchasdistant，contiguous，above，below，before，after，etc。
(4)Allthoseobjects，whichadmitofquantity，ornumber，maybecompar’dinthatparticular；whichisanotherveryfertilesourceofrelation。
(5)Whenanytwoobjectspossessthesamequalityincommon，thedegrees，inwhichtheypossessit，formafifthspeciesofrelation。Thusoftwoobjects，whicharebothheavy，theonemaybeeitherofgreater，orlessweightthantheother。Twocolours，thatareofthesamekind，mayyetbeofdifferentshades，andinthatrespectadmitofcomparison。
(6)Therelationofcontrarietymayatfirstsightberegardedasanexceptiontotherule，thatnorelationofanykindcansubsistwithoutsomedegreeofresemblance。Butletusconsider，thatnotwoideasareinthemselvescontrary，exceptthoseofexistenceandnon-existence，whichareplainlyresembling，asimplyingbothofthemanideaoftheobject；tho’thelatterexcludestheobjectfromalltimesandplaces，inwhichitissupposednottoexist。
(7)Allotherobjects，suchasfireandwater，heatandcold，areonlyfoundtobecontraryfromexperience，andfromthecontrarietyoftheircausesoreffects；whichrelationofcauseandeffectisaseventhphilosophicalrelation，aswellasanaturalone。Theresemblanceimpliedinthisrelation，shallbeexplain’dafterwards。
Itmightnaturallybeexpected，thatIshouldjoindifferencetotheotherrelations。ButthatIconsiderratherasanegationofrelation，thanasanythingrealorpositive。Differenceisoftwokindsasoppos’deithertoidentityorresemblance。Thefirstiscall’dadifferenceofnumber；theotherofkind。
SECT。VI。
OfModesandSubstancesIwou’dfainaskthosephilosophers，whofoundsomuchoftheirreasoningsonthedistinctionofsubstanceandaccident，andimaginewehaveclearideasofeach。，whethertheideaofsubstancebederiv’dfromtheimpressionsofsensationprofreflection？Ifitbeconvey’dtousbyoursenses，Iask，whichofthem；andafterwhatmanner？Ifitbeperceiv’dbytheeyes，itmustbeacolour；ifbytheears，asound；ifbythepalate，ataste；andsooftheothersenses。ButIbelievenonewillassert，thatsubstanceiseitheracolour，orsound，orataste。Theidea，ofsubstancemustthereforebederiv’dfromanimpressionofreflection，ifitreallyexist。Buttheimpressionsofreflectionresolvethemselvesintoourpassionsandemotions:noneofwhichcanpossiblyrepresentasubstance。Wehavethereforenoideaofsubstance，distinctfromthatofacollectionofparticularqualities，norhaveweanyothermeaningwhenweeithertalkorreasonconcerningit。’
Theideaofasubstanceaswellasthatofamode，isnothingbutacollectionofSimpleideas，thatareunitedbytheimagination，andhaveaparticularnameassignedthem，bywhichweareabletorecall，eithertoourselvesorothers，thatcollection。Butthedifferencebetwixttheseideasconsistsinthis，thattheparticularqualities，whichformasubstance，arecommonlyrefer’dtoanunknownsomething，inwhichtheyaresupposedtoinhere；orgrantingthisfictionshouldnottakeplace，areatleastsupposedtobecloselyandinseparablyconnectedbytherelationsofcontiguityandcausation。Theeffectofthisis，thatwhatevernewsimplequalitywediscovertohavethesameconnexionwiththerest，weimmediatelycomprehenditamongthem，eventho’itdidnotenterintothefirstconceptionofthesubstance。Thusourideaofgoldmayatfirstbeayellowcolour，weight，malleableness，fusibility；butuponthediscoveryofitsdissolubilityinaquaregia，wejointhattotheotherqualities，andsupposeittobelongtothesubstanceasmuchasifitsideahadfromthebeginningmadeapartofthecompoundone。Theprincipalofunionbeingregardedasthechiefpartofthecomplexidea，givesentrancetowhateverqualityafterwardsoccurs，andisequallycomprehendedbyit，asaretheothers，whichfirstpresentedthemselves。themselves。
Thatthiscannottakeplaceinmodes，isevidentfromconsideringtheirmature。The。simpleideasofwhichmodesareformed，eitherrepresentqualities，whicharenotunitedbycontiguityandcausation，butaredispers’dindifferentsubjects；oriftheybeallunitedtogether，theunitingprincipleisnotregardedasthefoundationofthecomplexidea。Theideaofadanceisaninstanceofthefirstkindofmodes；thatofbeautyofthesecond。Thereasonisobvious，whysuchcomplexideascannotreceiveany’newidea，withoutchangingthename，whichdistinguishesthemode。
OfAbstractIdeas。
Averymaterialquestionhasbeenstartedconcerningabstractorgeneralideas，whethertheybegeneralorparticularinthemind’sconceptionofthem。Agreatphilosopher(3)hasdisputedthereceiv’dopinioninthisparticular，andhasasserted，thatallgeneralideasarenothingbutparticularones，annexedtoacertainterm，whichgivesthemamoreextensivesignification，andmakesthemrecalluponoccasionotherindividuals，whicharesimilartothem。AsIlookuponthistobeoneofthegreatestandmostvaluablediscoveriesthathasbeenmadeoflateyearsintherepublicofletters，Ishaghereendeavourtoconfirmitbysomearguments，whichIhopewillputitbeyondalldoubtandcontroversy。
’Tisevident，thatinformingmostofourgeneralideas，ifnotallofthem，weabstractfromeveryparticulardegreeofquantityandquality，andthatanobjectceasesnottobeofanyparticularspeciesonaccountofeverysmallalterationinitsextension，durationandotherproperties。Itmaythereforebethought，thathereisaplaindilemma，thatdecidesconcerningthenatureofthoseabstractideas，whichhaveaffordedsomuchspeculationtophilosophers。Theabstractideaofamanrepresentsmenofallsizesandallqualities；which’tisconcludeditcannotdo，buteitherbyrepresentingatonceallpossiblesizesandallpossiblequalities，orby，representingnoparticularoneatall。Nowithavingbeenesteemedabsurdtodefendtheformerproposition，asimplyinganinfinitecapacityinthemind，ithasbeencommonlyinfer’dinfavouroftheletter:andourabstractideashavebeensuppos’dtorepresentnoparticulardegreeeitherofquantityorquality。Butthatthisinferenceiserroneous，Ishallendeavourtomakeappear，first，byproving，that’tisutterlyimpossibletoconceiveanyquantityorquality，withoutformingaprecisenotionofitsdegrees:Andsecondlybyshowing，thattho’thecapacityofthemindbenotinfinite，yetwecanatonceformanotionofallpossibledegreesofquantityandquality，insuchamanneratleast，as，howeverimperfect，mayserveallthepurposesofreflectionandconversation。
Tobeginwiththefirstproposition，thatthemindcannotformanynotionofquantityorqualitywithoutformingaprecisenotionofdegreesofeach；wemayprovethisbythethreefollowingarguments。First，Wehaveobserv’d，thatwhateverobjectsaredifferentaredistinguishable，andthatwhateverobjectsaredistinguishableareseparablebythethoughtandimagination。’Andwemayhereadd，thatthesepropositionsareequallytrueintheinverse，andthatwhateverobjectsareseparablearealsodistinguishable，andthatwhateverobjectsaredistinguishable，arealsodifferent。Forhowisitpossiblewecanseparatewhatisnotdistinguishable，ordistinguishwhatisnotdifferent？Inorderthereforetoknow，whetherabstractionimpliesaseparation，weneedonlyconsideritinthisview，andexamine，whetherallthecircumstances，whichweabstractfrominourgeneralideas，besuchasaredistinguishableanddifferentfromthose，whichweretainasessentialpartsofthem。But’tisevidentatfirstsight，thatthepreciselengthofalineisnotdifferentnordistinguishablefromthelineitself。northeprecisedegreeofanyqualityfromthequality。Theseideas，therefore，admitnomoreofseparationthantheydoofdistinctionanddifference。Theyareconsequentlyconjoinedwitheachotherintheconception；andthegeneralideaofa。line，notwithstandingallourabstractionsandrefinements，hasinitsappearanceinthemindaprecisedegreeofquantityandquality；howeveritmaybemadetorepresentothers，whichhavedifferentdegreesofboth。
Secondly，’tiscontest，thatnoobjectcanappeartothesenses；orinotherwords，thatnoimpressioncanbecomepresenttothemind，withoutbeingdeterminedinitsdegreesbothofquantityandquality。Theconfusion，inwhichimpressionsaresometimesinvolv’d，proceedsonlyfromtheirfaintnessandunsteadiness，notfromanycapacityinthemindtoreceiveanyimpression，whichinitsrealexistencehasnoparticulardegreenorproportion。Thatisacontradictioninterms；andevenimpliestheflattestofallcontradictions，viz。that’tispossibleforthesamethingbothtobeandnottobe。
Nowsinceallideasarederiv’dfromimpressions，andarenothingbutcopiesandrepresentationsofthem，whateveristrueoftheonemustbeacknowledg’dconcerningtheother。Impressionsandideasdifferonlyintheirstrengthandvivacity。Theforegoingconclusionisnotfoundedonanyparticulardegreeofvivacity。Itcannotthereforebeaffectedbyanyvariationinthatparticular。Anideaisaweakerimpression:2andasastrongimpressionmustnecessarilyhaveadeterminatequantityandquality，thecasemustbethesamewithitscopyorrepresentative。
Thirdly，’tisaprinciplegenerallyreceiv’dinphilosophythateverythinginnatureisindividual，andthat’tisutterlyabsurdtosupposeatrianglereallyexistent，whichhasnopreciseproportionofsidesandangles。Ifthisthereforebeabsurdinfactandreality，itmustalsobeabsurdinidea；sincenothingofwhichwecanformaclearanddistinctideaisabsurdandimpossible。Buttoformtheideaofanobject，andtoformanideasimply，isthesamething；thereferenceoftheideatoanobjectbeinganextraneousdenomination，ofwhichinitselfitbearsnomarkorcharacter。Nowas’tisimpossibletoformanideaofanobject，thatispossestofquantityandquality，andyetispossestofnoprecisedegreeofeither；itfollowsthatthereisanequalimpossibilityofforminganidea，thatisnotlimitedandconfin’dinboththeseparticulars。Abstractideasarethereforeinthemselvesindividual，howevertheymaybecomegeneralintheirrepresentation。Theimageinthemindisonlythatofaparticularobject，tho’theapplicationofitinourreasoningbethesame，asifitwereuniversal。
Thisapplicationofideasbeyondtheirnatureproceedsfromourcollectingalltheirpossibledegreesofquantityandqualityinsuchanimperfectmannerasmayservethepurposesoflife，whichisthesecondpropositionIpropos’dtoexplain。Whenwehavefoundaresemblance(4)amongseveralobjects，thatoftenoccurtous，weapplythesamenametoallofthem，whateverdifferenceswemayobserveinthedegreesoftheirquantityandquality，andwhateverotherdifferencesmayappearamongthem。Afterwehaveacquiredacustomofthiskind，thehearingofthatnamerevivestheideaofoneoftheseobjects，andmakestheimaginationconceiveitwithallitsparticularcircumstancesandproportions。Butasthesamewordissuppos’dtohavebeenfrequentlyappliedtootherindividuals，thataredifferentinmanyrespectsfromthatidea，whichisimmediatelypresenttothemind；thewordnotbeingabletorevivetheideaofalltheseindividuals，butonlytouchesthesoul，ifImaybeallow’dsotospeak，andrevivesthatcustom，whichwehaveacquir’dbysurveyingthem。Theyarenotreallyandinfactpresenttothemind，butonlyinpower；nordowedrawthemalloutdistinctlyintheimagination，butkeepourselvesinareadinesstosurveyanyofthem，aswemaybepromptedbyapresentdesignornecessity。Thewordraisesupanindividualidea，alongwithacertaincustom；andthatcustomproducesanyotherindividualone，forwhichwemayhaveoccasion。Butastheproductionofalltheideas，towhichthenamemaybeapply’d，isinmosteasesimpossible，weabridgethatworkbyamorepartialconsideration，andfindbutfewinconveniencestoariseinourreasoningfromthatabridgment。
Forthisisoneofthemostextraordinarycircumstancesinthepresentaffair，thatafterthemindhasproduc’danindividualidea，uponwhichwereason，theattendantcustom，reviv’dbythegeneralorabstractterm，readilysuggestsanyotherindividual，ifbychanceweformanyreasoning，thatagreesnotwithit。Thusshou’dwementionthewordtriangle，andformtheideaofaparticularequilateralonetocorrespondtoit，andshou’dweafterwardsassert，thatthethreeanglesofatriangleareequaltoeachother，theotherindividualsofascalenumandisosceles，whichweoverlookedatfirst，immediatelycrowdinuponus，andmakeusperceivethefalshoodofthisproposition，tho’itbetruewithrelationtothatidea，whichwehadform’d。Ifthemindsuggestsnotalwaystheseideasuponoccasion，itproceedsfromsomeimperfectioninitsfaculties；andsuchaoneasisoftenthesourceoffalsereasoningandsophistry。Butthisisprincipallythecasewiththoseideaswhichareabstruseandcompounded。Onotheroccasionsthecustomismoreentire，and’tisseldomwerunintosucherrors。
Naysoentireisthecustom，thattheverysameideamaybeannexttoseveraldifferentwords，andmaybeemploy’dindifferentreasonings，withoutanydangerofmistake。Thustheideaofanequilateraltriangleofaninchperpendicularmayserveusintalkingofafigure，ofarectilinearfigure，ofaregularfigure，ofatriangle，andofanequilateraltriangle。ARtheseterms，therefore，areinthiscaseattendedwiththesameidea；butastheyarewonttobeapply’dinagreaterorlessercompass，theyexcitetheirparticularhabits，andtherebykeepthemindinareadinesstoobserve，thatnoconclusionbeform’dcontrarytoanyideas，whichareusuallycompriz’dunderthem。
Beforethosehabitshavebecomeentirelyperfect，perhapsthemindmaynotbecontentwithformingtheideaofonlyoneindividual，butmayrunoverseveral，inordertomakeitselfcomprehenditsownmeaning，andthecompassofthatcollection，whichitintendstoexpressbythegeneralterm。Thatwemayfixthemeaningoftheword，figure，wemayrevolveinourmindtheideasofcircles，squares，parallelograms，trianglesofdifferentsizesandproportions，andmaynotrestononeimageoridea。Howeverthismaybe，’tiscertainthatweformtheideaofindividuals，wheneverweuseanygeneralterm；thatweseldomornevercanexhausttheseindividuals；andthatthose，whichremain，areonlyrepresentedbymeansofthathabit，bywhichwerecallthem，wheneveranypresentoccasionrequiresit。Thisthenisthenatureofourabstractideasandgeneralterms；and’tisafterthismannerweaccountfortheforegoingparadox，thatsomeideasareparticularintheirnature，butgeneralintheirrepresentation。Aparticularideabecomesgeneralbybeingannex’dtoageneralterm；thatis，toaterm，whichfromacustomaryconjunctionhasarelationtomanyotherparticularideas，andreadilyrecallsthemintheimagination。
Theonlydifficulty，thatcanremainonthissubject，mustbewithregardtothatcustom，whichsoreadilyrecallseveryparticularidea，forwhichwemayhaveoccasion，andisexcitedbyanywordorsound，towhichwecommonlyannexit。Themostpropermethod，inmyopinion，ofgivingasatisfactoryexplicationofthisactofthemind，isbyproducingotherinstances，whichareanalogoustoit，andotherprinciples，whichfacilitateitsoperation。Toexplaintheultimatecausesofourmentalactionsisimpossible。’Tissufficient，ifwecangiveanysatisfactoryaccountofthemfromexperienceandanalogy。
FirstthenIobserve，thatwhenwementionanygreatnumber，suchasathousand，themindhasgenerallynoadequateideaofit，butonlyapowerofproducingsuchanidea，byitsadequateideaofthedecimals，underwhichthenumberiscomprehended。Thisimperfection，however，inourideas，isneverfeltinourreasonings；whichseemstobeaninstanceparalleltothepresentoneofuniversalideas。
Secondly，wehaveseveralinstancesofhabits，whichmaybereviv’dbyonesingleword；aswhenaperson，whohasbyroteanyperiodsofadiscourse，oranynumberofverses，willbeputinremembranceofthewhole，whichheisatalosstorecollect，bythatsinglewordorexpression，withwhichtheybegin。
Thirdly，Ibelieveeveryone，whoexaminesthesituationofhismindinreasoning’willagreewithme，thatwedonotannexdistinctandcompleatideastoeverytermwemakeuseof，andthatintalkingofgovernment，church，negotiation，conquest，weseldomspreadoutinourmindsallthesimpleideas，ofwhichthesecomplexonesarecompos’d。’Tishoweverobservable，thatnotwithstandingthisimperfectionwemayavoidtalkingnonsenseonthesesubjects，andmayperceiveanyrepugnanceamongtheideas，aswellasifwehadafallcomprehensionofthem。Thusifinsteadofsaying，thatinwartheweakerhavealwaysrecoursetonegotiation，weshou’dsay，thattheyhavealwaysrecoursetoconquest，thecustom，whichwehaveacquir’dofattributingcertainrelationstoideas，stillfollowsthewords，andmakesusimmediatelyperceivetheabsurdityofthatproposition；inthesamemannerasoneparticularideamayserveusinreasoningconcerningotherideas，howeverdifferentfromitinseveralcircumstances。
Fourthly，Astheindividualsare-collectedtogether，saidplac’dunderageneraltermwithaviewtothatresemblance，whichtheybeartoeachother，thisrelationmustfacilitatetheirentranceintheimagination，andmakethembesuggestedmorereadilyuponoccasion。Andindeedifweconsiderthecommonprogressofthethought，eitherinreflectionorconversation，weshallfindgreatreasontobesatisfy’dinthisparticular。Nothingismoreadmirable，thanthereadiness，withwhichtheimaginationsuggestsitsideas，andpresentsthemattheveryinstant，inwhichtheybecomenecessaryoruseful。Thefancyrunsfromoneendoftheuniversetotheotherincollectingthoseideas，whichbelongtoanysubject。Onewouldthinkthewholeintellectualworldofideaswasatoncesubjectedtoourview，andthatwedidnothingbutpickoutsuchasweremostproperforourpurpose。Theremaynot，however，beanypresent，besidethoseveryideas，thatarethuscollectedbyakindofmagicalfacultyinthesoul，which，tho’itbealwaysmostperfectinthegreatestgeniuses，andisproperlywhatwecallagenius，ishoweverinexplicablebytheutmosteffortsofhumanunderstanding。
PerhapsthesefourreflectionsmayhelptoremoveandifficultiestothehypothesisIhavepropos’dconcerningabstractideas，socontrarytothat，whichhashithertoprevail’dinphilosophy，But，totellthetruthIplacemychiefconfidenceinwhatIhavealreadyprov’dconcerningtheimpossibilityofgeneralideas，accordingtothecommonmethodofexplainingthem。Wemustcertainlyseeksomenewsystemonthishead，andthereplainlyisnonebesidewhatIhavepropos’d。Ifideasbeparticularintheirnature，andatthesametimefiniteintheirnumber，’tisonlybycustomtheycanbecomegeneralintheirrepresentation，andcontainaninfinitenumberofotherideasunderthem。
BeforeIleavethissubjectIshallemploythesameprinciplestoexplainthatdistinctionofreason，whichissomuchtalk’dof，andissolittleunderstood，intheschools。Ofthiskindisthedistinctionbetwixtfigureandthebodyfigur’d；motionandthebodymov’d。Thedifficultyofexplainingthisdistinctionarisesfromtheprincipleaboveexplain’d，thatallideas，whicharedifferent，areseparable。Foritfollowsfromthence，thatifthefigurebedifferentfromthebody，theirideasmustbeseparableaswellasdistinguishable:iftheybenotdifferent，theirideascanneitherbeseparablenordistinguishable。Whatthenismeantbyadistinctionofreason，sinceitimpliesneitheradifferencenorseparation。
Toremovethisdifficultywemusthaverecoursetotheforegoingexplicationofabstractideas。’Tiscertainthatthemindwou’dneverhavedream’dofdistinguishingafigurefromthebodyfigur’d，asbeinginrealityneitherdistinguishable，nordifferent，norseparable；diditnotobserve，thateveninthissimplicitytheremightbecontain’dmanydifferentresemblancesandrelations。’Thuswhenaglobeofwhitemarbleispresented，wereceiveonlytheimpressionofawhitecolourdispos’dinacertainform，norareweabletoseparateanddistinguishthecolourfromtheform。Butobservingafterwardsaglobeofblackmarbleandacubeofwhite，andcomparingthemwithourformerobject，wefindtwoseparateresemblances，inwhatformerlyseemed，andreallyis，perfectlyinseparable。Afteralittlemorepracticeofthiskind，webegintodistinguishthefigurefromthecolourbyadistinctionofreason；thatis，weconsiderthefigureandcolourtogether，sincetheyareineffectthesameandundistinguishable；butstillviewthemindifferentaspects，accordingtotheresemblances，ofwhichtheyaresusceptible。Whenwewou’dconsideronlythefigureoftheglobeofwhitemarble，weforminrealityanideabothofthefigureandcolour，buttacitlycarryoureyetoitsresemblancewiththeglobeofblackmarble:Andinthesamemanner，whenwewou’dconsideritscolouronly，weturnourviewtoitsresemblancewiththecubeofwhitemarble。Bythismeansweaccompanyourideaswithakindofreflection，ofwhichcustomrendersus，inagreatmeasure，insensible。Aperson，whodesiresustoconsiderthefigureofaglobeofwhitemarblewithoutthinkingonitscolour，desiresanimpossibilitybuthismeaningis，thatweshou’dconsiderthefigureandcolourtogether，butstillkeepinoureyetheresemblancetotheglobeofblackmarble，orthattoanyotherglobeofwhatevercolourorsubstance。
OFTHEIDEASOFSPACEANDTIME，SECT。I。
OftheInfiniteDivisibilityofourIdeasofSpaceandTime。
Whateverhastheairofaparadox，andiscontrarytothefirstandmostunprejudicednotionsofmankind，isoftengreedilyembrac’dbyphilosophers，asshewingthesuperiorityoftheirscience，whichcou’ddiscoveropinionssoremotefromvulgarconception。Ontheotherhand，anythingpropos’dtous，whichcausessurprizeandadmiration，givessuchasatisfactiontothemind，thatitindulgesitselfinthoseagreeableemotions，andwillneverbepersuadedthatitspleasureisentirelywithoutfoundation。Fromthesedispositionsinphilosophersandtheirdisciplesarisesthatmutualcomplaisancebetwixtthem；whiletheformerfurnishsuchplentyofstrangeandunaccountableopinions，andthelattersoreadilybelievethem。OfthismutualcomplaisanceIcannotgiveamoreevidentinstancethaninthedoctrineofinfinitedivisibility，withtheexaminationofwhichIshallbeginthissubjectoftheideasofspaceandtime。
’Tisuniversallyallow’d，thatthecapacityofthemindislimited，andcanneverattainafullandadequateconceptionofinfinity:Andtho’itwerenotallow’d，’twouldbesufficientlyevidentfromtheplainestobservationandexperience。’’Tisalsoobvious，thatwhateveriscapableofbeingdividedininfinitum，mustconsistofaninfinitenumberofparts，andthat’tisimpossibletosetanyboundstothenumberofparts，withoutsettingboundsatthesametimetothedivision。Itrequiresscarceany，inductiontoconcludefromhence，thattheidea，whichweformofanyfinitequality，isnotinfinitelydivisible，butthatbyproperdistinctionsandseparationswemayrunupthisideatoinferiorones，whichwillbeperfectlysimpleandindivisible。Inrejectingtheinfinitecapacityofthemind，wesupposeitmayarriveatanendinthedivisionofitsideas；norarethereanypossiblemeansofevadingtheevidenceofthisconclusion。
’Tisthereforecertain，thattheimaginationreachesaminimum，andmayraiseuptoitselfanidea，ofwhichitcannotconceiveanysub-division，andwhichcannotbediminishedwithoutatotalannihilation。Whenyoutellmeofthethousandthandtenthousandthpartofagrainofsand，Ihavea，distinctideaofthesenumbersandoftheirdifferentproportions；buttheimages，whichIforminmymindtorepresentthethingsthemselves，arenothingdifferentfromeachother，norinferiortothatimage，bywhichIrepresentthegrainofsanditself，whichissuppos’dsovastlytoexceedthem。Whatconsistsofpartsisdistinguishableintothem，andwhatisdistinguishableisseparable。Butwhateverwemayimagineofthething，theideaofagrainofsandisnotdistinguishable，norseparableintotwenty，muchlessintoathousand，tenthousand，oraninfinitenumberofdifferentideas。’
’Tisthesamecasewiththeimpressionsofthesensesaswiththeideasoftheimagination。Putaspotofinkuponpaper，fixyoureyeuponthatspot，andretiretosuchadistance，that，atlastyoulosesightofit；’tisplain，thatthemomentbeforeitvanish’dtheimageorimpressionwasperfectlyindivisible。’Tisnotforwantofraysoflightstrikingonoureyes，thattheminutepartsofdistantbodiesconveynotanysensibleimpression；butbecausetheyareremov’dbeyondthatdistance，atwhichtheirimpressionswerereduc’dtoaminimum，andwereincapableofanyfartherdiminution。Amicroscopeortelescope，whichrendersthemvisible，producesnotanynewraysoflight，butonlyspreadsthose，whichalwaysflow’dfromthem；andbythatmeansbothgivespartstoimpressions，whichtothenakedeyeappearsimpleanduncompounded，andadvancestoa’’minimum，whatwasformerlyimperceptible。
Wemayhencediscovertheerrorofthecommonopinion，thatthecapacityofthemindislimitedonbothsides，andthat’tisimpossiblefortheimaginationtoformanadequateidea，ofwhatgoesbeyondacertaindegreeofminutenessaswellasofgreatness。Nothingcanbemoreminute，thansomeideas，whichweforminthefancy；andimages，whichappeartothesenses；sincethereareideasandimagesperfectlysimpleandindivisible。Theonlydefectofoursensesis，thattheygiveusdisproportion’dimagesofthings，andrepresentasminuteanduncompoundedwhatisreallygreatandcompos’dofavastnumberofparts。Thismistakewearenotsensibleof:buttakingtheimpressionsofthoseminuteobjects，whichappeartothesenses，tobeequalornearlyequaltotheobjects，andfindingbyreason，thatthereareotherobjectsvastlymoreminute，wetoohastilyconclude，thattheseareinferiortoanyideaofourimaginationorimpressionofoursenses。Thishoweveriscertain，thatwecanformideas，whichshallbenogreaterthanthesmallestatomoftheanimalspiritsofaninsectathousandtimeslessthanamite:Andweoughtrathertoconclude，thatthedifficultyliesinenlargingourconceptionssomuchastoformajustnotionofamite，orevenofaninsectathousandtimeslessthanamite。Forinordertoformajustnotionoftheseanimals，wemusthaveadistinctidearepresentingeverypartofthem；，which，accordingtothesystemofinfinitedivisibility，isutterlyimpossible，and，recordingtothatofindivisiblepartsoratoms，isextremelydifficult，byreasonofthevastnumberandmultiplicityoftheseparts。
OftheInfiniteDivisibilityofSpaceandTime。
Whereverideasareadequaterepresentationsofobjects，therelations，contradictionsandagreementsoftheideasareallapplicabletotheobjects；andthiswemayingeneralobservetobethefoundationofallhumanknowledge。Butourideasareadequaterepresentationsofthemostminutepartsofextension；andthro’whateverdivisionsandsubdivisionswemaysupposethesepartstobearriv’dat，theycanneverbecomeinferiortosomeideas，whichweform。Theplainconsequenceis，thatwhateverappearsimpossibleandcontradictoryuponthecomparisonoftheseideas，mustbereallyimpossibleandcontradictory，withoutanyfartherexcuseorevasion。
Everythingcapableofbeinginfinitelydividedcontainsaninfinitenumberofparts；otherwisethedivisionwouldbestoptshortbytheindivisibleparts，whichweshouldimmediatelyarriveat。Ifthereforeanyfiniteextensionbeinfinitelydivisible，itcanbenocontradictiontosuppose，thatafiniteextensioncontainsaninfinitenumberofparts:Andviceversa，ifitbeacontradictiontosuppose，thatafiniteextensioncontainsaninfinitenumberofparts，nofiniteextensioncanbeinfinitelydivisible。Butthatthislattersuppositionisabsurd，Ieasilyconvincemyselfbytheconsiderationofmyclearideas。IfirsttaketheleastideaIcanformofapartofextension，andbeingcertainthatthereisnothingmoreminutethanthisidea，Iconclude，thatwhateverIdiscoverbyitsmeansmustbearealqualityofextension。Ithenrepeatthisideaonce，twice，thrice，&；c。，andfindthecompoundideaofextension，arisingfromitsrepetition，alwaystoaugment，andbecomedouble，triple，quadruple，&；c。，tillatlastitswellsuptoaconsiderablebulk，greaterorsmaller，inproportionasIrepeatmoreorlessthesameidea。WhenIstopintheadditionofparts，theideaofextensionceasestoaugment；andwereItocarryontheadditionininfinitum，Iclearlyperceive，thattheideaofextensionmustalsobecomeinfinite。Uponthewhole，Iconclude，thattheideaofallinfinitenumberofpartsisindividuallythesameideawiththatofaninfiniteextension；thatnofiniteextensioniscapableofcontaininganinfinitenumberofparts；andconsequentlythatnofiniteextensionisinfinitelydivisible。(5)
Imaysubjoinanotherargumentpropos’dbyanotedauthor，(6)whichseemstomeverystrongandbeautiful。’Tisevident，thatexistenceinitselfbelongsonlytounity，andisneverapplicabletonumber，butonaccountoftheunites，ofwhichthenumberiscompos’d。Twentymenmaybesaidtoexist；but’tisonlybecauseone，two，three，four，&；c。areexistent，andifyoudenytheexistenceofthelatter，thatoftheformerfallsofcourse。’Tisthereforeutterlyabsurdtosupposeanynumbertoexist，andyetdenytheexistenceofunites；andasextensionisalwaysanumber，accordingtothecommonsentimentofmetaphysicians，andneverresolvesitselfintoanyuniteorindivisiblequantity，itfollows，thatextensioncanneveratallexist。’Tisinvaintoreply，thatanydeterminatequantityofextensionisanunite；butsuch-a-oneasadmitsofaninfinitenumberoffractions，andisinexhaustibleinitssub-divisions。Forbythesamerulethesetwentymenmaybeconsider’dasanunite。Thewholeglobeoftheearth，naythewholeuniverse，maybeconsider’dasanunite，。Thattermofunityismerelyafictitiousdenomination，whichthemindmayapplytoanyquantityofobjectsitcollectstogether；norcansuchanunityanymoreexistalonethannumbercan，asbeinginrealityatruenumber。Buttheunity，whichcanexistalone，andwhoseexistenceisnecessarytothatofallnumber，isofanotherkind，andmustbeperfectlyindivisible，andincapableofbeingresolvedintoanylesserunity。
Allthisreasoningtakesplacewithregardtotime；alongwithanadditionalargument，whichitmaybepropertotakenoticeof。’Tisapropertyinseparablefromtime，andwhichinamannerconstitutesitsessence，thateachofitspartssucceedsanother，andthatnoneofthem，howevercontiguous，caneverbeco-existent。Forthesamereason，thattheyear1737cannotconcurwiththepresentyear1738everymomentmustbedistinctfrom，andposteriororantecedenttoanother。’Tiscertainthen，thattime，asitexists，mustbecompos’dofindivisiblemoments。Forifintimewecouldneverarriveatanendofdivision，andifeachmoment，asitsucceedsanother，werenotperfectlysingleandindivisible，therewouldbeaninfinitenumberofco-existentmoments，orpartsoftime；whichIbelievewillbeallow’dtobeanarrantcontradiction。
Theinfinitedivisibilityofspaceimpliesthatoftime，asisevidentfromthenatureofmotion。Ifthelatter，therefore，beimpossible，theformermustbeequallyso。
Idoubtnotbut，itwillreadilybeallow’dbythemostobstinatedefenderofthedoctrineofinfinitedivisibility，thattheseargumentsaredifficulties，andthat’tisimpossibletogiveanyanswertothemwhichwillbeperfectlyclearandsatisfactory。Butherewemayobserve，thatnothingcanbemoreabsurd，thanthiscustomofcallingadifficultywhatpretendstobeademonstration，andendeavouringbythatmeanstoeludeitsforceandevidence。’Tisnotindemonstrationsasinprobabilities，thatdifficultiescantakeplace，andoneargumentcounter-ballanceanother，anddiminishitsauthority。Ademonstration，ifjust，admitsofnooppositedifficulty；andifnotjust，’tisameresophism，andconsequentlycanneverbeadifficulty。’Tiseitherirresistible，orhasnomannerofforce。Totalkthereforeofobjectionsandreplies，andballancingofargumentsinsuchaquestionasthis，istoconfess，eitherthathumanreasonisnothingbutaplayofwords，orthatthepersonhimself，whotalksso，hasnotaCapacityequaltosuchsubjects。Demonstrationsmaybedifficulttobecomprehended，becauseofabstractednessofthesubject；butcanneverhavesuchdifficultiesaswillweakentheirauthority，whenoncetheyarecomprehended。
’Tistrue，mathematiciansarewonttosay，thattherearehereequallystrongargumentsontheothersideofthequestion，andthatthedoctrineofindivisiblepointsisalsoliabletounanswerableobjections。BeforeIexaminetheseargumentsandobjectionsindetail，Iwillheretaketheminabody，andendeavourbyashortanddecisivereasontoproveatonce，that’tisutterlyimpossibletheycanhaveanyjustfoundation。
’Tisanestablish’dmaximinmetaphysics，Thatwhateverthemindclearlyconceives，includestheideaofpossibleexistence，orinotherwords，thatnothingweimagineisabsolutelyimpossible。Wecanformtheideaofagoldenmountain，andfromthenceconcludethatsuchamountainmayactuallyexist。Wecanformnoideaofamountainwithoutavalley，andthereforeregarditasimpossible。
Now’tiscertainwehaveanideaofextension；forotherwisewhydowetalkandreasonconcerningit？’Tislikewisecertainthatthisidea，asconceiv’dbytheimagination，tho’divisibleintopartsorinferiorideas，isnotinfinitelydivisible，norconsistsofaninfinitenumberofparts:Forthatexceedsthecomprehensionofourlimitedcapacities。Herethenisanideaofextension，whichconsistsofpartsorinferiorideas，thatareperfectly，indivisible:consequentlythisideaimpliesnocontradiction:consequently’tispossibleforextensionreallytoexistconformabletoit:andconsequentlyalltheargumentsemploy’dagainstthepossibilityofmathematicalpointsaremerescholastickquibbles，andunworthyofourattention。
Theseconsequenceswemaycarryonestepfarther，andconcludethatallthepretendeddemonstrationsfortheinfinitedivisibilityofextensionareequallysophistical；since’tiscertainthesedemonstrationscannotbejustwithoutprovingtheimpossibilityofmathematicalpoints；which’tisanevidentabsurditytopretendto。
