OftheAntientPhilosophy。
Severalmoralistshaverecommendeditasanexcellentmethodofbecomingacquaintedwithourownhearts，andknowingourprogressinvirtue，torecollectourdreamsinamorning，andexaminethemwiththesamerigour，thatwewou’dourmostseriousandmostdeliberateactions。Ourcharacteristhesamethroughout，saythey，andappearsbestwhereartifice，fear，andpolicyhavenoplace，andmencanneitherbehypocriteswiththemselvesnorothers。Thegenerosity，orbasenessofourtemper，ourmeeknessorcruelty，ourcourageorpusilanimity，influencethefictionsoftheimaginationwiththemostunboundedliberty，anddiscoverthemselvesinthemostglaringcolours。Inlikemanner，Iampersuaded，theremightbeseveralusefuldiscoveriesmadefromacriticismofthefictionsoftheantientphilosophy，concerningsubstances，andsubstantialform，andaccidents，andoccultqualities；which，howeverunreasonableandcapricious，haveaveryintimateconnexionwiththeprinciplesofhumannature。
’Tisconfestbythemostjudiciousphilosophers，thatourideasofbodiesarenothingbutcollectionsform’dbythemindoftheideasoftheseveraldistinctsensiblequalities，ofwhichobjectsarecompos’d，andwhichwefindtohaveaconstantunionwitheachother。Buthoweverthesequalitiesmayinthemselvesbeentirelydistinct，’tiscertainwecommonlyregardthecompound，whichtheyform，asONEthing，andascontinuingtheSAMEunderveryconsiderablealterations。Theacknowledg’dcompositionisevidentlycontrarytothissupposedsimplicity，andthevariationtotheidentity。Itmay，therefore，beworthwhiletoconsiderthecauses，whichmakeusalmostuniversallyfallintosuchevidentcontradictions，aswellasthemeansbywhichweendeavourtoconcealthem。
’Tisevident，thatastheideasoftheseveraldistinct，successivequalitiesofobjectsare-unitedtogetherbyaverycloserelation，themind，inlookingalongthesuccession，mustbecarry’dfromonepartofittoanotherbyaneasytransition，andwillnomoreperceivethechange，thanifitcontemplatedthesameunchangeableobject。Thiseasytransitionistheeffect，orratheressenceofrelation；Iandastheimaginationreadilytakesoneideaforanother，wheretheirinfluenceonthemindissimilar；henceitproceeds。，thatanysuchsuccessionofrelatedqualitiesisreadilyconsider’dasonecontinu’dobject，existingwithoutanyvariation。Thesmoothanduninterruptedprogressofthethought，beingalikeinbothcases，readilydeceivesthemind，andmakesusascribeanidentitytothechangeablesuccessionofconnectedqualities。
Butwhenwealterourmethodofconsideringthesuccession，andinsteadoftraceingitgraduallythro’thesuccessivepointsoftime，surveyatonceAnytwodistinctperiodsofitsduration，andcomparethedifferentconditionsofthesuccessivequalities；inthatcasethevariations，whichwereinsensiblewhentheyarosegradually，donowappearofconsequence，andseementirelytodestroytheidentity。Bythismeanstherearisesakindofcontrarietyinourmethodofthinking，fromthedifferentpointsofview，inwhichwesurveytheobject，andfromthenearnessorremotenessofthoseinstantsoftime，whichwecomparetogether。Whenwegraduallyfollowanobjectinitssuccessivechanges，thesmoothprogressofthethoughtmakesusascribetnidentitytothesuccession；because’tisbyasimilaractofthemindweconsideranunchangeableobject。Whenwecompareitssituationafteraconsiderablechangetheprogressofthethoughtis。broke；andconsequentlywearepresentedwiththeideaofdiversity:Inordertoreconcilewhichcontradictionstheimaginationisapttofeignsomethingunknownandinvisible，whichitsupposestocontinuethesameunderallthesevariations；andthisunintelligiblesomethingitcallsasubstance，ororiginalandfirstmatter。
Weentertainalikenotionwithregardtothesimplicityofsubstances，andfromlikecauses。Supposeanobjectperfectlysimpleandindivisibletobepresented，alongwithanotherobject，whoseco-existentpartsareconnectedtogetherbyastrongrelation，’tisevidenttheactionsofthemind，inconsideringthesetwoobjects，arenotverydifferent。Theimaginationconceivesthesimpleobjectatonce，withfacility，byasingleeffortofthought，withoutchangeorvariation。Theconnexionofpartsinthecompoundobjecthasalmostthesameeffect，andsounitestheobjectwithinitself，thatthefancyfeelsnotthetransitioninpassingfromoneparttoanother。Hencethecolour，taste，figure，solidity，andotherqualities，combin’dinapeachormelon，areconceiv’dtoformonething；andthatonaccountoftheircloserelation，whichmakesthemaffectthethoughtinthe’samemanner，asifperfectlyuncompounded。Butthemindrestsnothere。Wheneveritviewstheobjectinanotherlight，itfindsthatallthesequalitiesaredifferent，anddistinguishable，andseparablefromeachother；whichviewofthingsbeingdestructiveofitsprimaryandmorenaturalnotions，obligestheimaginationtofeignanunknownsomething，ororiginalsubstanceandmatter，asaprincipleofunionorcohesionamongthesequalities，andaswhatmaygivethecompoundobjectatitletobecall’donething，notwithstandingitsdiversityandcomposition。
Theperipateticphilosophyassertstheoriginalmattertobeperfectlyhomogeneousinallbodies，andconsidersfire，water，earth，andair，asoftheverysamesubstance；onaccountoftheirgradualrevolutionsandchangesintoeachother。Atthesametimeitassignstoeachofthesespeciesofobjectsadistinctsubstantialform，whichitsupposestobethesourceofallthosedifferentqualitiestheypossess，andtobeanewfoundationofsimplicityandidentitytoeachparticularspecies。Alldependsonourmannerofviewingtheobjects。Whenwelookalongtheinsensiblechangesofbodies，wesupposeallofthemtobeofthesamesubstanceoressence。Whenweconsidertheirsensibledifferences，weattributetoeachofthemasubstantialandessentialdifference。Andinordertoindulgeourselvesinboththesewaysofconsideringourobjects，wesupposeallbodiestohaveatonceasubstanceandasubstantialform。
Thenotionofaccidentsisanunavoidableconsequenceofthismethodofthinkingwithregardtosubstancesandsubstantialforms；norcanweforbearlookinguponcolours，sounds，tastes，figures，andotherpropertiesofbodies，asexistences，whichcannotsubsistapart，butrequireasubjectofinhesiontosustainandsupportthem。Forhavingneverdiscover’danyofthesesensiblequalities，where，forthereasonsabove-mention’d，wedidnotlikewisefancyasubstancetoexist；thesamehabit，whichmakesusinferaconnexionbetwixtcauseandeffect，makesushereinferadependenceofeveryqualityontheunknownsubstance。Thecustomofimaginingadependencehasthesameeffectasthecustomofobservingitwou’dhave。Thisconceit，however，isnomorereasonablethananyoftheforegoing。Everyqualitybeingadistinctthingfromanother，maybeconceiv’dtoexistapart，andmayexistapart，notonlyfromeveryotherquality，butfromthatunintelligiblechimeraofasubstance。
Butthesephilosopherscarrytheirfictionsstillfartherintheirsentimentsconcerningoccultqualities，andbothsupposeasubstancesupporting，whichtheydonotunderstand，andanaccidentsupported，ofwhichtheyhaveasimperfectanidea。Thewholesystem，therefore，isentirelyincomprehensible，andyetisderiv’dfromprinciplesasnaturalasanyoftheseabove-explain’d。
Inconsideringthissubjectwemayobserveagradationofthreeopinions，thatriseaboveeachother，accordingasthepersons，whoformthem，acquirenewdegreesofreasonandknowledge。Theseopinionsarethatofthevulgar，thatofafalsephilosophy，andthatofthetrue；whereweshallfinduponenquiry，thatthetruephilosophyapproachesnearertothesentimentsofthevulgar，thantothoseofamistakenknowledge。’Tisnatural。formen，intheircommonandcare，lesswayofthinking，toimaginetheyperceiveaconnexionbetwixtsuchobjectsastheyhaveconstantlyfoundunitedtogether；andbecausecustomhasrender’ditdifficulttoseparatetheideas，theyareapttofancysuchaseparationtobeinitselfimpossibleandabsurd。Butphilosophers，whoabstractfromtheeffectsofcustom，andcomparetheideasofobjects，immediatelyperceivethefalshoodofthesevulgarsentiments，anddiscoverthatthereisnoknownconnexionamongobjects。Everydifferentobjectappearstothementirelydistinctandseparate；andtheyperceive，that’tisnotfromaviewofthenatureandqualitiesofobjectsweinferonefromanother，butonlywheninseveralinstancesweobservethemtohavebeenconstantlyconjoin’d。Butthesephilosophers，insteadofdrawingajustinferencefromthisobservation，andconcluding，thatwehavenoideaofpoweroragency，separatefromthemind，andbelongingtocauses；Isay，insteadofdrawingthisconclusion，theyfrequentlysearchforthequalities，inwhichthisagencyconsists，andaredispleasedwitheverysystem，whichtheirreasonsuggeststothem，inordertoexplainit。Theyhavesufficientforceofgeniustofreethemfromthevulgarerror，thatthereisanaturalandperceivableconnexionbetwixttheseveralsensiblequalitiesand。actionsofmatter；butnotsufficienttokeepthemfromeverseekingforthisconnexioninmatter，orcauses。Hadtheyfallenuponthejustconclusion，theywou’dhavereturn’dbacktothesituationofthevulgar，andwou’dhaveregardedallthesedisquisitionswithindolenceandindifference。Atpresenttheyseemtobeinaverylamentablecondition，andsuchasthepoetshavegivenusbutafaintnotionofintheirdescriptionsofthepunishmentofSisyphusandTantalus。Forwhatcanbeimagin’dmoretormenting，thantoseekwitheagerness，whatforeverfliesus；andseekforitinaplace，where’tisimpossibleitcaneverexist？
Butasnatureseemstohaveobserv’dakindofjusticeandcompensationineverything，shehasnotneglectedphilosophersmorethantherestofthecreation；buthasreserv’dthemaconsolationamidalltheirdisappointmentsandafflictions。Thisconsolationprincipallyconsistsintheirinventionofthewords:facultyandoccultquality。Foritbeingusual，afterthefrequentuseofterms，whicharereallysignificantandintelligible，toomittheidea，whichwewou’dexpressbythem，andtopreserveonlythecustom，bywhichwerecaltheideaatpleasure；soitnaturallyhappens，thatafterthefrequentuseofterms，whicharewhollyinsignificantandunintelligible，wefancythemtobeonthesamefootingwiththeprecedent，andtohaveasecretmeaning，whichwemightdiscoverbyreflection。Theresemblanceoftheirappearancedeceivesthemind，asisusual，andmakesusimagineathoroughresemblanceandconformity。Bythismeansthesephilosopherssetthemselvesatease，andarriveatlast，byanillusion，atthesameindifference，whichthepeopleattainbytheirstupidity，andtruephilosophersbytheirmoderatescepticism。Theyneedonlysay，thatanyphenomenon，whichpuzzlesthem，arisesfromafacultyoranoccultquality，andthereisanendofalldisputeandenquiryuponthematter。
Butamongalltheinstances，whereinthePeripateticshaveshewntheywereguidedbyeverytrivialpropensityoftheimagination，nooneismore-remarkablethantheirsympathies，antipathies，andhorrorsofavacuum。Thereisaveryremarkableinclinationinhumannature，tobestowonexternalobjectsthesameemotions，whichitobservesinitself；andtofindeverywherethoseideas，whicharemostpresenttoit。Thisinclination，’tistrue，issuppressedbyalittlereflection，andonlytakesplaceinchildren，poets，andtheantientphilosophers。Itappearsinchildren，bytheirdesireofbeatingthestones，whichhurtthem:Inpoets，bytheirreadinesstopersonifyeverything:Andintheantientphilosophers，bythesefictionsofsympathyandantipathy。Wemustpardonchildren，becauseoftheirage；poets，becausetheyprofesstofollowimplicitlythesuggestionsoftheirfancy:Butwhatexcuseshallwefindtojustifyourphilosophersinsosignalaweakness？
OftheModernPhilosophy。
Buthereitmaybeobjected，thattheimagination，accordingtomyownconfession，beingtheultimatejudgeofallsystemsofphilosophy，Iamunjustinblamingtheantientphilosophersformakinguseofthatfaculty，andallowingthemselvestobeentirelyguidedbyitintheirreasonings。Inordertojustifymyself，Imustdistinguishintheimaginationbetwixttheprincipleswhicharepermanent，irresistible，anduniversal；suchasthecustomarytransitionfromcausestoeffects，andfromeffectstocauses:Andtheprinciples，whicharechangeable，weak，andirregular；suchasthoseIhavejustnowtakennoticeof。Theformerarethefoundationofallourthoughtsandactions，sothatupontheirremovalhumannaturemustimmediatelyperishandgotoruin。Thelatterareneitherunavoidabletomankind，nornecessary，orsomuchasusefulintheconductoflife；butonthecontraryareobserv’donlytotakeplaceinweakminds，andbeingoppositetotheotherprinciplesofcustomandreasoning，mayeasilybesubvertedbyaduecontrastandopposition。Forthisreasontheformerarereceivedbyphilosophy，andthelatterrejected。Onewhoconcludessomebodytobenearhim，whenhehearsanarticulatevoiceinthedark，reasonsjustlyandnaturally；tho’thatconclusionbederiv’dfromnothingbutcustom，whichinfixesandinlivenstheideaofahumancreature，onaccountofhisusualconjunctionwiththepresentimpression。Butone，whoistormentedheknowsnotwhy，withtheapprehensionofspectresinthedark，may，perhaps，besaidtoreason，andtoreasonnaturallytoo:Butthenitmustbeinthesamesense，thatamaladyissaidtobenatural；asarisingfromnaturalcauses，tho’itbecontrarytohealth，themostagreeableandmostnaturalsituationofman。
Theopinionsoftheantientphilosophers，theirfictionsofsubstanceandaccident，andtheirreasoningsconcerningsubstantialformsandoccultqualities，arelikethespectresinthedark，andarederiv’dfromprinciples，which，howevercommon，areneitheruniversalnorunavoidableinhumannature。Themodernphilosophypretendstobeentirelyfreefromthisdefect，andtoariseonlyfromthesolid，permanent，andconsistentprinciplesoftheimagination。Uponwhatgroundsthispretensionisfoundedmustnowbethesubjectofourenquiry。
Thefundamentalprincipleofthatphilosophyistheopinionconcerningcolours，sounds，tastes，smells，heatandcold；whichitassertstobenothingbutimpressionsinthemind，deriv’dfromtheoperationofexternalobjects，andwithoutanyresemblancetothequalitiesoftheobjects。Uponexamination，Ifindonlyoneofthereasonscommonlyproduc’dforthisopiniontobesatisfactory，viz。thatderiv’dfromthevariationsofthoseimpressions，evenwhiletheexternalobject，toallappearance，continuesthesame。Thesevariationsdependuponseveralcircumstances。Uponthedifferentsituationsofourhealth:Amaninamaladyfeelsadisagreeabletasteinmeats，whichbeforepleas’dhimthemost。UponthedifferentcomplexionsandconstitutionsofmenThatseemsbittertoone，whichissweettoanother。Uponthedifferenceoftheirexternalsituationandposition:Coloursreflectedfromthecloudschangeaccordingtothedistanceoftheclouds，andaccordingtotheangletheymakewiththeeyeandluminousbody。Fire。alsocommunicatesthesensationofpleasureatonedistance，andthatofpainatanother。Instancesofthiskindareverynumerousandfrequent。
Theconclusiondrawnfromthem，islikewiseassatisfactoryascanpossiblybeimagin’d。’Tiscertain，thatwhendifferentimpressionsofthesamesensearisefromanyobject，everyoneoftheseimpressionshasnotaresemblingqualityexistentintheobject。Forasthesameobjectcannot，atthesametime，beendow’dwithdifferentqualitiesofthesamesense，andasthesamequalitycannotresembleimpressionsentirelydifferent；itevidentlyfollows，thatmanyofourimpressionshavenoexternalmodelorarchetype。Nowfromlikeeffectswepresumelikecauses。Manyoftheimpressionsofcolour，sound，&；c。areconfesttobenothingbutinternalexistences，andtoarisefromcauses，whichnowaysresemblethem。Theseimpressionsareinappearancenothingdifferentfromtheotherimpressionsofcolour，sound，&；c。Weconclude，therefore，thattheyare，allofthem，deriv’dfromalikeorigin。
Thisprinciplebeingonceadmitted，alltheotherdoctrinesofthatphilosophyseemtofollowbyaneasyconsequence。Forupontheremovalofsounds，colours，beat，cold，andothersensiblequalities，fromtherankofcontinu’dindependentexistences，wearereduc’dmerelytowhatarecalledprimaryqualities，astheonlyrealones。，ofwhichwehaveanyadequatenotion。Theseprimaryqualitiesareextensionandsolidity，withtheirdifferentmixturesandmodifications；figure，motion，gravity，andcohesion。Thegeneration，encrease，decay，andcorruptionofanimalsandvegetables，arenothingbutchangesoffigureandmotion；asalsotheoperationsofallbodiesoneachother；offire，oflight，water，air，earth，andofalltheelementsandpowersofnature。Onefigureandmotionproducesanotherfigureandmotion；nordoesthereremainin。thematerialuniverseanyotherprinciple，eitheractiveorpassive，ofwhichwecanformthemostdistantidea。
IbelievemanyobjectionsmightbemadetothissystemButatpresentIshallconfinemyselftoone，whichisinmyopinionverydecisive。Iassert，thatinsteadofexplainingtheoperationsofexternalobjectsbyitsmeans，weutterlyannihilatealltheseobjects，andreduceourselvestotheopinionsofthemostextravagantscepticismconcerningthem。Ifcolours，sounds，tastes，andsmellsbemerelyperceptions，nothingwecanconceiveispossestofareal，continu’d，andindependentexistence；notevenmotion，extensionandsolidity，whicharetheprimaryqualitieschieflyinsistedon。’
Tobeginwiththeexaminationofmotion；’tisevidentthisisaqualityaltogetherinconceivablealone，andwithoutareferencetosomeotherobject。Theideaofmotionnecessarilysupposesthatofabodymoving。Nowwhatisourideaofthemovingbody，withoutwhichmotionisincomprehensible？Itmustresolveitselfintotheideaofextensionorofsolidity；andconsequentlytherealityofmotiondependsuponthatoftheseotherqualities。
Thisopinion，whichisuniversallyacknowledg’dconcerningmotion，Ihaveprov’dtobetruewithregardtoextension；andhaveshewnthat’tisimpossibletoconceiveextension，butascompos’dofparts，endow’dwithcolourorsolidity。Theideaofextensionisacompoundidea；butasitisnotcompoundedofaninfinitenumberofpartsorinferiorideas，itmustatlastresolveitselfintosuchasareperfectlysimpleandindivisible。Thesesimpleandindivisibleparts，notbeingideasofextension，mustbenonentities，unlessconceiv’dascolour’dorsolid。Colourisexcludedfromanyrealexistence。Thereality，therefore，ofourideaofextensiondependsupontherealityofthatofsolidity，norcantheformerbejustwhilethelatterischimerical。Letus，then，lendourattentiontotheexaminationoftheideaofsolidity。
Theideaofsolidityisthatoftwoobjects，whichbeingimpell’dbytheutmostforce，cannotpenetrateeachother；butstillmaintainaseparateanddistinctexistence。Solidity，therefore，isperfectlyincomprehensiblealone，andwithouttheconceptionofsomebodies，whicharesolid，andmaintainthisseparateanddistinctexistence。Nowwhatideahaveweofthesebodies？Theideasofcolours，sounds，andothersecondaryqualitiesareexcluded。Theideaofmotiondependsonthatofextension，andtheideaofextensiononthatofsolidity。’Tisimpossible，therefore，thattheideaofsoliditycandependoneitherofthem。Forthatwou’dbetoruninacircle，andmakeoneideadependonanother，whileatthesametimethelatterdependsontheformer。Ourmodernphilosophy，therefore，leavesusnojustnorsatisfactoryideaofsolidity；norconsequentlyofmatter。
Thisargumentwillappearentirelyconclusivetoeveryonethatcomprehendsit；butbecauseitmayseemabstruseandintricatetothegeneralityofreaders，Ihopetobeexcus’d，ifIendeavourtorenderitmoreobviousbysomevariationoftheexpression。Inordertoformanideaofsolidity，wemustconceivetwobodiespressingoneachotherwithoutanypenetration；and’tisimpossibletoarriveatthisidea，whenweconfineourselvestooneobject，muchmorewithoutconceivingany。Twonon-entitiescannotexcludeeachotherfromtheirplaces；becausethey-neverpossessanyplace，norcanbeendow’dwithanyquality。NowIask，whatideadoweformofthesebodiesorobjects，towhichwesupposesoliditytobelong？Tosay，thatweconceivethemmerelyassolid，istorunonininfinitum。Toaffirm，thatwepaintthemouttoourselvesasextended，eitherresolvesallintoafalseidea，orreturnsinacircle。Extensionmustnecessarilybeconsideredeitherascolour’d，whichisafalseidea；Iorassolid，whichbringsusbacktothefirstquestion。Wemaymakethesameobservationconcerningmobilityandfigure；anduponthewholemustconclude，thataftertheexclusionofcolours，sounds，heatandcoldfromtherankofexternalexistences，thereremainsnothing，whichcanaffordusajustandconstituentideaofbody。
Addtothis，that，properlyspeaking，solidityorimpenetrabilityisnothing，butanimpossibilityofannihilation，as(39)hasbeenalreadyobserv’d:Forwhichreason’tisthemorenecessaryforustoformsomedistinctideaofthatobject，whoseannihilationwesupposeimpossible。Animpossibilityofbeingannihilatedcannotexist，andcanneverbeconceivedtoexist，byitself:butnecessarilyrequiressomeobjectorrealexistence，towhichitmaybelong。Nowthedifficultystillremains，howtoformanideaofthisobjectorexistence，withouthavingrecoursetothesecondaryandsensiblequalities。
Normustweomitonthisoccasionouraccustomedmethodofexaminingideasbyconsideringthoseimpressions，fromwhichtheyarederiv’d。Theimpressions，whichenterbythesightandhearing，thesmellandtaste，areaffirm’dbymodernphilosophytobewithoutanyresemblingobjects；andconsequentlytheideaofsolidity，whichissuppos’dtobereal，canneverbederiv’dfromanyofthesesenses。Thereremains，therefore，thefeelingastheonlysense，thatcanconveytheimpression，whichisoriginaltotheideaofsolidity；andindeedwenaturallyimagine，thatwefeelthesolidityofbodies，andneedbuttouchanyobjectinordertoperceivethisquality。Butthismethodofthinkingismorepopularthanphilosophical；aswillappearfromthefollowingreflections。
First，’Tiseasytoobserve，thattho’bodiesarefeltbymeansoftheirsolidity，yetthefeelingisaquitedifferentthingfromthesolidity；andthattheyhavenottheleastresemblancetoeachother。Aman，whohasthepalseyinonehand，hasasperfectanideaofimpenetrability，whenheobservesthathandtobesupportedbythetable，aswhenhefeelsthesametablewiththeotherhand。Anobject，thatpressesuponanyofourmembers，meetswithresistance；andthatresistance，bythemotionitgivestothenervesandanimalspirits，conveysacertainsensationtothemind；butitdoesnotfollow，thatthesensation，motion，andresistanceareanywaysresembling。
Secondly，Theimpressionsoftoucharesimpleimpressions，exceptwhenconsideredwithregardtotheirextension；whichmakesnothingtothepresentpurpose:AndfromthissimplicityIinfer，thattheyneitherrepresentsolidity，noranyrealobject。Forletusputtwocases，viz。thatofaman，whopressesastone，oranysolidbody，withhishand，andthatoftwostones，whichpresseachother；’twillreadilybeallow’d，thatthesetwocasesarenotineveryrespectalike，butthatintheformerthereisconjoin’dwiththesolidity，afeelingorsensation，ofwhichthereisnoappearanceinthelatter。Inorder，therefore，tomakethesetwocasesalike，’tisnecessarytoremovesomepartoftheimpression，whichthemanfeelsbyhishand，ororganofsensation；andthatbeingimpossibleinasimpleimpression，obligesustoremovethewhole，andprovesthatthiswholeimpressionhasnoarchetypeormodelinexternalobjects。Towhichwemayadd，thatsoliditynecessarilysupposestwobodies，alongwithcontiguityandimpulse；whichbeingacompoundobject，canneverberepresentedbyasimpleimpression。Nottomention，thattho’soliditycontinuesalwaysinvariablythesame，theimpressionsoftouchchangeeverymomentuponus；whichisaclearproofthatthelatterarenotrepresentationsoftheformer。
Thusthereisadirectandtotaloppositionbetwixtourreasonandoursenses；ormoreproperlyspeaking，betwixtthoseconclusionsweformfromcauseandeffect，andthosethatpersuadeusofthecontinu’dandindependentexistenceofbody。Whenwereasonfromcauseandeffect，weconclude，thatneithercolour，sound，taste，norsmellhaveacontinu’dandindependentexistence。Whenweexcludethesesensiblequalitiesthereremainsnothingintheuniverse，whichhassuchanexistence。
OftheImmaterialityoftheSoul。
Havingfoundsuchcontradictionsanddifficultiesineverysystemconcerningexternalobjects，andintheideaofmatter，whichwefancysoclearanddeterminate，Weshallnaturallyexpectstillgreaterdifficultiesandcontradictionsineveryhypothesisconcerningourinternalperceptions，andthenatureofthemind，whichweareapttoimaginesomuchmoreobscure，anduncertain。Butinthisweshou’ddeceiveourselves。Theintellectualworld，tho’involv’dininfiniteobscurities，isnotperplex’dwithanysuchcontradictions，asthosewehavediscoveredinthenatural。Whatisknownconcerningit，agreeswithitself；andwhatisunknown，wemustbecontentedtoleaveso。
’Tistrue，wou’dwehearkentocertainphilosophers，theypromisetodiminishourignorance；butIamafraid’tisatthehazardofrunningusintocontradictions，fromwhichthesubjectisofitselfexempted。Thesephilosophersarethecuriousreasonersconcerningthematerialorimmaterialsubstances，inwhichtheysupposeourperceptionstoinhere。Inordertoputastoptotheseendlesscavilsonbothsides，Iknownobettermethod，thantoaskthesephilosophersinafewwords，Whattheymeanbysubstanceandinhesion？Andaftertheyhaveanswer’dthisquestion，’twillthenbereasonable，andnottillthen，toenterseriouslyintothedispute。
Thisquestionwehavefoundimpossibletobeanswer’dwithregardtomatterandbody:Butbesidesthatinthecaseofthemind，itlaboursunderallthesamedifficulties，’tisburthen’dwithsomeadditionalones，whicharepeculiartothatsubject。Aseveryideaisderiv’dfromaprecedentimpression，hadweanyideaofthesubstanceofourminds，wemustalsohaveanimpressionofit；whichisverydifficult，ifnotimpossible，tobeconceiv’d。Forhowcananimpressionrepresentasubstance，otherwisethanbyresemblingit？Andhowcananimpressionresembleasubstance，since，accordingtothisphilosophy，itisnotasubstance，andhasnoneofthepeculiarqualitiesorcharacteristicsofasubstance？
Butleavingthequestionofwhatmayormaynotbe，forthatotherwhatactuallyis，Idesirethosephilosophers，whopretendthatwehaveanideaofthesubstanceofourminds，topointouttheimpressionthatproducesit，andtelldistinctlyafterwhatmannerthatimpressionoperates，andfromwhatobjectitisderiv’d。Isitanimpressionofsensationorofreflection？Isitpleasant，orpainful，orindifferent？IDoesitattendusatalltimes，ordoesitonlyreturnatintervals？Ifatintervals，atwhattimesprincipallydoesitreturn，andbywhatcausesisitproduced？
Ifinsteadofansweringthesequestions，anyoneshou’devadethedifficulty，bysaying，thatthedefinitionofasubstanceissomethingwhichmayexistbyitself；andthatthisdefinitionoughttosatisfyus:Shou’dthisbesaid，Ishou’dobserve，thatthisdefinitionagreestoeverything，thatcanpossiblybeconceiv’d；andneverwillservetodistinguishsubstancefromaccident，orthesoulfromitsperceptions。ForthusIreason。Whateverisclearlyconceiv’dmayexist；andwhateverisclearlyconceiv’d，afteranymanner，mayexistafterthesamemanner。Thisisoneprinciple，whichhasbeenalreadyacknowledged。Again，everything，whichisdifferent，isdistinguishable，andeverythingwhichisdistinguishable，isseparablebytheimagination。Thisisanotherprinciple。Myconclusionfrombothis，thatsinceallourperceptionsaredifferentfromeachother，andfromeverythingelseintheuniverse，theyarealsodistinctandseparable，andmaybeconsideredasseparatelyexistent，andmayexistseparately，andhavenoneedofanythingelsetosupporttheirexistence。’Theyare，therefore，substances，asfarasthisdefinitionexplainsasubstance。
Thusneitherbyconsideringthefirstoriginofideas，norbymeansofadefinitionareweabletoarriveatanysatisfactorynotionofsubstance；whichseemstomeasufficientreasonforabandoningutterlythatdisputeconcerningthematerialityandimmaterialityofthesoul，andmakesmeabsolutelycondemneventhequestionitself。Wehavenoperfectideaofanythingbutofaperception。Asubstanceisentirelydifferentfromaperception。Wehave，therefore，noideaofasubstance。Inhesioninsomethingissuppos’dtoberequisitetosupporttheexistenceofourperceptions。Nothingappearsrequisitetosupporttheexistenceofaperception。Wehave，therefore，noideaofinhesion。Whatpossibilitythenofansweringthatquestion，Whetherperceptionsinhereinamaterialorimmaterialsubstance，whenwedonotsomuchasunderstandthemeaningofthequestion？
Thereisoneargumentcommonlyemploy’dfortheimmaterialityofthesoul，whichseemstomeremarkable。Whateverisextendedconsistsofparts；andwhateverconsistsofpartsisdivisible，ifnotinreality，atleastintheimagination。But’tisimpossibleanythingdivisiblecanbeconjoin’dtoathoughtorperception，whichisabeingaltogetherinseparableandindivisible。Forsupposingsuchaconjunction，wou’dtheindivisiblethoughtexistontheleftorontherighthandofthisextendeddivisiblebody？Onthesurfaceorinthemiddle？Ontheback-orfore-sideofit？Ifitbeconjoin’dwiththeextension，itmustexistsomewherewithinitsdimensions。Ifitexistwithinitsdimensions，itmusteitherexistinoneparticularpart；andthenthatparticularpartisindivisible，andtheperceptionisconjoinedonlywithit，notwiththeextension:Orifthethoughtexistsineverypart，itmustalsobeextended，andseparable，anddivisible，aswellasthebody；whichisutterlyabsurdandcontradictory。Forcananyoneconceiveapassionofayardinlength，afootinbreadth，andaninchinthickness？Thought，therefore，andextensionarequalitieswhollyincompatible，andnevercanincorporatetogetherintoonesubject。
Thisargumentaffectsnotthequestionconcerningthesubstanceofthesoul，butonlythatconcerningitslocalconjunctionwithmatter；andthereforeitmaynotbeimpropertoconsideringeneralwhatobjectsare，orarenotsusceptibleofalocalconjunction。Thisisacuriousquestion，andmayleadustosomediscoveriesofconsiderablemoment。
Thefirstnotionofspaceandextensionisderiv’dsolelyfromthesensesofsightandfeeling；noristhereanything，butwhatiscolour’dortangible，thathaspartsdispos’daftersuchamanner，astoconveythatidea。Whenwediminishorencreasearelish，’tisnotafterthesamemannerthatwediminishorencreaseanyvisibleobject；andwhenseveralsoundsstrikeourhearingatonce，customandreflectionalonemakeusformanideaofthedegreesofthedistanceandcontiguityofthosebodies，fromwhichtheyarederiv’d。Whatevermarkstheplaceofitsexistenceeithermustbeextended，ormustbeamathematicalpoint，withoutpartsorcomposition。Whatisextendedmusthaveaparticularfigure，assquare，round，triangular；noneofwhichwillagreetoadesire，orindeedtoanyimpressionoridea，except-othesetwosensesabove-mention’d。Neitheroughtadesire，tho’indivisible，tobeconsideredasamathematicalpoint。Forinthatcase’twou’dbepossible，bytheadditionofothers，tomaketwo，three，fourdesires，andthesedispos’dandsituatedinsuchamanner，astohaveadeterminatelength，breadthandthickness；whichisevidentlyabsurd。
’Twillnotbesurprisingafterthis，ifIdeliveramaxim，whichiscondemn’dbyseveralmetaphysicians，andisesteem’dcontrarytothemostcertainprinciplesofhumreason。Thismaximisthatanobjectmayexist，andyetbenowhere:andIassert，thatthisisnotonlypossible，butthatthegreatestpartofbeingsdoandmustexistafterthismanner。Anobjectmaybesaidtobenowhere，whenitspartsarenotsosituatedwithrespecttoeachother，astoformanyfigureorquantity；northewholewithrespecttootherbodiessoastoanswertoournotionsofcontiguityordistance。Nowthisisevidentlythecasewithallourperceptionsandobjects，exceptthoseofthesightandfeeling。Amoralreflectioncannotbeplac’dontherightoronthelefthandofapassion，-norcanasmellorsoundbeeitherofacircularorasquarefigure。Theseobjectsandperceptions，sofarfromrequiringanyparticularplace，areabsolutelyincompatiblewithit，andeventheimaginationcannotattributeittothem。Andastotheabsurdityofsupposingthemtobenowhere，wemayconsider，thatifthepassionsandsentimentsappeartotheperceptiontohaveanyparticularplace，theideaofextensionmightbederiv’dfromthem，aswellasfromthesightandtouch；contrarytowhatwehavealreadyestablish’d。Iftheyappearnottohaveanyparticularplace，theymaypossiblyexistinthesamemanner；sincewhateverweconceiveispossible。
’Twillnotnowbenecessarytoprove，thatthoseperceptions，whicharesimple，andexistnowhere，areincapableofanyconjunctioninplacewithmatterorbody，whichisextendedanddivisible；since’tisimpossibletofoundarelationbutonsomecommonquality。Itmaybebetterworthourwhiletoremark，thatthisquestionofthelocalconjunctionofobjectsdoesnotonlyoccurinmetaphysicaldisputesconcerningthenatureofthesoul，butthatevenincommonlifewehaveeverymomentoccasiontoexamineit。Thussupposingweconsiderafigatoneendofthetable，andanoliveattheother，’tisevident，thatinformingthecomplexideasofthesesubstances，oneofthemostobviousisthatoftheirdifferentrelishes；and’tisasevident，thatweincorporateandconjointhesequalitieswithsuchasarecolour’dandtangible。Thebittertasteoftheone，andsweetoftheotheraresuppos’dtolieintheveryvisiblebody，andtobeseparatedfromeachotherbythewholelengthofthetable。Thisissonotableandsonaturalanillusion，thatitmaybepropertoconsidertheprinciples，fromwhichitisderiv’d。
Tho’anextendedobjectbeincapableofaconjunctioninplacewithanother，thatexistswithoutanyplaceorextension，yetaretheysusceptibleofmanyotherrelations。Thusthetasteandsmellofanyfruitareinseparablefromitsotherqualitiesofcolourandtangibility；andwhich-everofthembethecauseoreffect，’tiscertaintheyarealwaysco-existent。’Noraretheyonlyco-existentingeneral，butalsoco-temporaryintheirappearanceinthemind；and’tisupontheapplicationoftheextendedbodytooursensesweperceiveitsparticulartasteandsmell。Theserelations，then，ofcausation，andcontiguityinthetimeoftheirappearance，betwixttheextendedobjectandthequality，whichexistswithoutanyparticularplace，musthavesuchaneffectonthemind，thatupontheappearanceofoneitwillimmediatelyturnitsthoughttotheconceptionoftheother。Noristhisall。Wenotonlyturnourthoughtfromonetotheotheruponaccountoftheirrelation，butlikewiseendeavourtogivethemanewrelation，viz。thatofaconjunctioninplace，thatwemayrenderthetransitionmoreeasyandnatural。For’tisaquality，whichIshalloftenhaveoccasiontoremarkinhumannature，andshallexplainmorefullyinitsproperplace，thatwhenobjectsareunitedbyanyrelation，wehaveastrongpropensitytoaddsomenewrelationtothem，inordertocompleattheunion。Inourarrangementofbodiesweneverfailtoplacesuchasareresembling，incontiguitytoeachother，oratleastincorrespondentpointsofview:Why？butbecausewefeelasatisfactioninjoiningtherelationofcontiguitytothatofresemblance，ortheresemblanceofsituationtothatofqualities。Theeffectsthispropensityhavebeen(40)alreadyobserv’dinthatresemblance，whichwesoreadilysupposebetwixtparticularimpressionsandtheirexternalcauses。Butweshallnotfindamoreevidenteffectofit，thaninthepresentinstance，wherefromtherelationsofcausationandcontiguityintimebetwixttwoobjects，wefeignlikewisethatofaconjunctioninplace，inordertostrengthentheconnexion。
Butwhateverconfus’dnotionswemayformofanunioninplacebetwixtanextendedbody，asafig，anditsparticulartaste，’tiscertainthatuponreflectionwemustobservethisunionsomethingaltogetherunintelligibleandcontradictory。Forshou’dweaskourselvesoneobviousquestion，viz。ifthetaste，whichweconceivetobecontain’dinthecircumferenceofthebody，isineverypartofitorinoneonly，wemustquicklyfindourselvesataloss，andperceivetheimpossibilityofevergivingasatisfactoryanswer。Wecannotrely，that’tisonlyinonepart:Forexperienceconvincesus，thateveryparthasthesamerelish。Wecanaslittlereply，thatitexistsineverypart:Forthenwemustsupposeitfigur’dandextended；whichisabsurdandincomprehensible。Herethenweareinfluenc’dbytwoprinciplesdirectlycontrarytoeachother，viz。thatinclinationofourfancybywhichwearedetermin’dtoincorporatethetastewiththeextendedobject，andourreason，whichshowsustheimpossibilityofsuchanunion。Beingdividedbetwixttheseoppositeprinciples，werenounceneitheronenortheother，butinvolvethesubjectinsuchconfusionandobscurity，thatwenolongerperceivetheopposition。Wesuppose，thatthetasteexistswithinthecircumferenceofthebody，butinsuchamanner，thatitfillsthewholewithoutextension，andexistsentireineverypartwithoutseparation。Inshort，weuseinourmostfamiliarwayofthinking，thatscholasticprinciple，which，whencrudelypropos’d，appearssoshocking，oftotumintoto&；toluminqualibetparte:Whichismuchthesame，asifweshou’dsay，thatathingisinacertainplace，andyetisnotthere。
Allthisabsurdityproceedsfromourendeavouringtobestowaplaceonwhatisutterlyincapableofit；andthatendeavouragainarisesfromourinclinationtocompleatanunion，whichisfoundedoncausation。，andacontiguityoftime，byattributingtotheobjectsaconjunctioninplace。Butifeverreasonbeofsufficientforcetoovercomeprejudice，’tiscertain，thatinthepresentcaseitmustprevail。Forwehaveonlythischoiceleft，eithertosupposethatsomebeingsexistwithoutanyplace；orthattheyarefigur’dandextended；orthatwhentheyareincorporatedwithextendedobjects，thewholeisinthewhole，andthewholeineverypart。Theabsurdityofthetwolastsuppositionsprovessufficientlytheveracityofthefirst。Noristhereanyfourthopinion。Forastothesuppositionoftheirexistenceinthemannerofmathematicalpoints，itresolvesitselfintothesecondopinion，andsupposes，thatseveralpassionsmaybeplac’dinacircularfigure，andthatacertainnumberofsmells，conjoin’dwithacertainnumberofsounds，maymakeabodyoftwelvecubicinches；whichappearsridiculousuponthebarementioningofit。
Buttho’inthisviewofthingswecannotrefusetocondemnthematerialists，whoconjoinallthoughtwithextension；yetalittlereflectionwillshowusequalreasonforblamingtheirantagonists，whoconjoinallthoughtwithasimpleandindivisiblesubstance。Themostvulgarphilosophyinformsus，thatnoexternalobjectcanmakeitselfknowntothemindimmediately，andwithouttheinterpositionofanimageorperception。Thattable，whichjustnowappearstome，isonlyaperception，andallitsqualitiesarequalitiesofaperception。Nowthemostobviousofallitsqualitiesisextension。Theperceptionconsistsofparts。Thesepartsaresosituated，astoaffordusthenotionofdistanceandcontiguity；oflength，breadth，andthickness。Theterminationofthesethreedimensionsiswhatwecallfigure。Thisfigureismoveable，separable，anddivisible。Mobility，andseparabilityarethedistinguishingpropertiesofextendedobjects。Andtocutshortalldisputes，theveryideaofextensioniscopy’dfromnothingbutanimpression，andconsequentlymustperfectlyagreetoit。Tosaytheideaofextensionagreestoanything，istosayitisextended。
Thefree-thinkermaynowtriumphinhisturn；andhavingfoundthereareimpressionsandideasreallyextended，mayaskhisantagonists，howtheycanincorporateasimpleandindivisiblesubjectwithanextendedperception？AlltheargumentsofTheologiansmayhereberetorteduponthem。Istheindivisiblesubject，orimmaterialsubstance，ifyouwill，ontheleftorontherighthandoftheperception？Isitinthisparticularpart，orinthatother？Isitineverypartwithoutbeingextended？Orisitentireinanyonepartwithoutdesertingtherest？’Tisimpossibletogiveanyanswertothesequestions，butwhatwillbothbeabsurdinitself，andwillaccountfortheunionofourindivisibleperceptionswithanextendedsubstance。
Thisgivesmeanoccasiontotakea-newintoconsiderationthequestionconcerningthesubstanceofthesoul；andtho’Ihavecondemn’dthatquestionasutterlyunintelligible，yetIcannotforbearproposingsomefartherreflectionsconcerningit。Iassert，thatthedoctrineoftheimmateriality，simplicity，andindivisibilityofathinkingsubstanceisatrueatheism，andwillservetojustifyallthosesentiments，forwhichSpinozaissouniversallyinfamous。Fromthistopic，Ihopeatleasttoreaponeadvantage，thatmyadversarieswillnothaveanypretexttorenderthepresentdoctrineodiousbytheirdeclamations，whentheyseethattheycanbesoeasilyretortedonthem。
ThefundamentalprincipleoftheatheismofSpinozaisthedoctrineofthesimplicityoftheuniverse，andtheunityofthatsubstance，inwhichhesupposesboththoughtandmattertoinhere。Thereisonlyonesubstance，sayshe，intheworld；andthatsubstanceisperfectlysimpleandindivisible，andexistseverywhere，withoutanylocalpresence。Whateverwediscoverexternallybysensation；whateverwefeelinternallybyreflection；allthesearenothingbutmodificationsofthatone，simple，andnecessarilyexistentbeing，andarenotpossestofanyseparateordistinctexistence。Everypassionofthesoul；everyconfigurationofmatter，howeverdifferentandvarious，inhereinthesamesubstance，andpreserveinthemselvestheircharactersofdistinction，withoutcommunicatingthemtothatsubject，inwhichtheyinhere。Thesamesubstratum，ifImaysospeak，supportsthemostdifferentmodifications，withoutanydifferenceinitself；andvariesthem，withoutanyvariation。Neithertime，norplace，norallthediversityofnatureareabletoproduceanycompositionorchangeinitsperfectsimplicityandidentity。
Ibelievethisbriefexpositionoftheprinciplesofthatfamousatheistwillbesufficientforthepresentpurpose，andthatwithoutenteringfartherintothesegloomyandobscureregions，Ishallbeabletoshew，thatthishideoushypothesisisalmostthesamewiththatoftheimmaterialityofthesoul，whichhasbecomesopopular。Tomakethisevident，letus(41)remember，thataseveryideaisderiv’dfromaprecedingperception，’tisimpossibleourideaofaperception，andthatofanobjectorexternalexistencecaneverrepresentwhatarespecificallydifferentfromeachother。Whateverdifferencewemaysupposebetwixtthem，’tisstillincomprehensibletous；andweareoblig’deithertoconceiveanexternalobjectmerelyasarelationwithoutarelative，ortomakeittheverysamewithaperceptionorimpression。
TheconsequenceIshalldrawfromthismay，atfirstsight，appearameresophism；butupontheleastexaminationwillbefoundsolidandsatisfactory。Isaythen，thatsincewemaysuppose，butnevercanconceiveaspecificdeferencebetwixtanobjectandimpression；anyconclusionweformconcerningtheconnexionandrepugnanceofimpressions，willnotbeknowncertainlytobeapplicabletoobjects；butthatontheotherhand，whateverconclusionsofthiskindweformconcerningobjects，willmostcertainlybeapplicabletoimpressions。Thereasonisnotdifficult。Asanobjectissuppos’dtobedifferentfromanimpression，wecannotbesure，thatthecircumstance，uponwhichwefoundourreasoning，iscommontoboth，supposingweformthereasoning-upontheimpression。’Tisstillpossible，thattheobjectmaydifferfromitinthatparticular。Butwhenwefirstformourreasoningconcerningtheobject，’tisbeyonddoubt，thatthesamereasoningmustextendtotheimpression:Andthatbecausethequalityoftheobject，uponwhichtheargumentisfounded，mustatleastbeconceiv’dbythemind；andcou’dnotbeconceiv’d，unlessitwerecommontoanimpression；sincewehavenoideabutwhatisderiv’dfromthatorigin。Thuswemayestablishitasacertainmaxim，thatwecannever，byanyprinciple，butbyanirregularkind(42)ofreasoningfromexperience，discoveraconnexionorrepugnancebetwixtobjects，whichextendsnottoimpressions；tho’theinversepropositionmaynotbeequallytrue，thatallthediscoverablerelationsofimpressionsarecommontoobjects。
Toapplythistothepresentcase；therearetwodifferentsystemsofbeingpresented，towhichIsupposemyselfunder。tnecessityofassigningsomesubstance，orgroundofinhesion。Iobservefirsttheuniverseofobjectsorofbody:Thesun，moonandstars；theearth，seas，plants，animals，men，ships，houses，andotherproductionseitherofartornature。HereSpinozaappears，andtellsme，thattheseareonlymodifications；andthatthesubject，inwhichtheyinhere，issimple，incompounded，andindivisible。AfterthisIconsidertheothersystemofbeings，viz。theuniverseofthought，ormyimpressionsandideas。ThereIobserveanothersun，moonandstars；anearth，andseas，cover’dandinhabitedbyplantsandanimals；towns，houses，mountains，rivers；andinshorteverythingIcandiscoverorconceiveinthefirstsystem。Uponmyenquiringconcerningthese，Theologianspresentthemselves，andtellme，thatthesealsoaremodifications，andmodificationsofonesimple，uncompounded，andindivisiblesubstance。ImmediatelyuponwhichIamdeafen’dwiththenoiseofahundredvoices，thattreatthefirsthypothesiswithdetestationandscorn，andthesecondwithapplauseandveneration。Iturnmyattentiontothesehypothesestoseewhatmaybethereasonofsogreatapartiality；andfindthattheyhavethesamefaultofbeingunintelligible，andthatasfaraswecanunderstandthem，theyaresomuchalike，that’tisimpossibletodiscoveranyabsurdityinone，whichisnotcommontobothofthem。Wehavenoideaofanyqualityinanobject，whichdoesnotagreeto，andmaynotrepresentaqualityinanimpression；andthatbecauseallourideasarederiv’dfromourimpressions。Wecannever，therefore，findanyrepugnancebetwixtanextendedobjectasamodification，andasimpleuncompoundedessence，asitssubstance，unlessthatrepugnancetakesplaceequallybetwixttheperceptionorimpressionofthatextendedobject，andthesameuncompoundedessence。Everyideaofaqualityinanobjectpassesthro’animpression；andthereforeeveryperceivablerelation，whetherofconnexionorrepugnance，mustbecommonbothtoobjectsandimpressions。
Buttho’thisargument，consideredingeneral，seemsevidentbeyondalldoubtandcontradiction，yettomakeitmoreclearandsensible，letussurveyitindetail；andseewhetheralltheabsurdities，whichhavebeenfoundinthesystemofSpinoza，maynotlikewisebediscoveredinthatofTheologians。(43)
First，IthasbeensaidagainstSpinoza，accordingtothescholasticwayoftalking，ratherthanthinking，thatamode，notbeinganydistinctorseparateexistence，mustbetheverysamewithitssubstance，andconsequentlytheextensionoftheuniverse，mustbeinamanneridentify’dwiththat，simple，uncompoundedessence，inwhichtheuniverseissuppos’dtoinhere。Butthis，itmaybepretended，isutterlyimpossibleandinconceivableunlesstheindivisiblesubstanceexpanditself，soastocorrespondtotheextension，ortheextensioncontractitself，soastoanswertotheindivisiblesubstance。Thisargumentseemsjust，asfaraswecanunderstandit；and’tisplainnothingisrequir’d，butachangeintheterms，toapplythesameargumenttoourextendedperceptions，andthesimpleessenceofthesoul；theideasofobjectsandperceptionsbeingineveryrespectthesame，onlyattendedwiththesuppositionofadifference，thatisunknownandincomprehensible。
Secondly，Ithasbeensaid，thatwehavenoideaofsubstance，whichisnotapplicabletomatter；noranyideaofadistinctsubstance，whichisnotapplicabletoeverydistinctportionofmatter。Matter，therefore，isnotamodebutasubstance，andeachpartofmatterisnotadistinctmode，butadistinctsubstance。Ihavealreadyprov’d，thatwehavenoperfectideaofsubstance；butthattakingitforsomething，thatcanexistbyitself，’tisevidenteveryperceptionisasubstance，andeverydistinctpartofaperceptionadistinctsubstance:Andconsequentlytheonehypothesislaboursunderthesamedifficultiesinthisrespectwiththeother。
Thirdly，Ithasbeenobjectedtothesystemofonesimplesubstanceintheuniverse，thatthissubstancebeingthesupportorsubstratumofeverything，mustattheverysameinstantbemodify’dintoforms，whicharecontraryandincompatible。Theroundandsquarefiguresareincompatibleinthesamesubstanceatthesametime。Howthenisitpossible，thatthesamesubstancecanatoncebemodify’dintothatsquaretable，andintothisroundone？Iaskthesamequestionconcerningtheimpressionsofthesetables；andfindthattheanswerisnomoresatisfactoryinonecasethanintheother。
Itappears，then，thattowhateversideweturn，thesamedifficultiesfollowus，andthatwecannotadvanceonesteptowardstheestablishingthesimplicityandimmaterialityothesoul，withoutpreparingthewayforadangerousandirrecoverableatheism。’Tisthesamecase，ifinsteadocallingthoughtamodificationofthesoul，weshou’dgiveitthemoreantient，andyetmoremodishnameofanaction。Byanactionwemeanmuchthesamething，aswhatiscommonlycall’danabstractmode；thatis，something，which，properlyspeaking，isneitherdistinguishable，norseparablefromitssubstance，andisonlyconceiv’dbyadistinctionofreason，oranabstraction。Butnothingisgain’dbythischangeofthetermofmodification，forthatofaction；nordowefreeourselvesfromonesingledifficultybyitsmeans；aswillappearfromthetwofollowingreflexions。
First，Iobserve，thattheword，action，accordingtothisexplicationofit，canneverjustlybeapply’dtoanyperception，asderiv’dfromamindorthinkingsubstance。Ourperceptionsareallreallydifferent，andseparable，anddistinguishablefromeachother，andfromeverythingelse，whichwecanimagine:andtherefore’tisimpossibletoconceive，howtheycanbetheactionorabstractmodeofanysubstance。Theinstanceofmotion，whichiscommonlymadeuseoftoshewafterwhatmannerperceptiondepends，asanaction，uponitssubstance，ratherconfoundsthaninstructsus。’Motiontoallappearanceinducesnorealnoressentialchangeonthebody，butonlyvariesitsrelationtootherobjects。Butbetwixtapersoninthemorningwalkingagardenwithcompany，agreeabletohim；andapersonintheafternooninclos’dinadungeon，andfullofterror，despair，andresentment。，thereseemstobearadicaldifference，andofquiteanotherkind，thanwhatisproduc’donabodybythechangeofitssituation。Asweconcludefromthedistinctionandseparabilityoftheirideas，thatexternalobjectshaveaseparateexistencefromeachother；sowhenwemaketheseideasthemselvesourobjects，wemustdrawthesameconclusionconcerningthem，accordingtotheprecedentreasoning。Atleastitmustbeconfest，thathavingideaofthesubstanceofthesoul，’tisimpossibleforustotellhowitcanadmitofsuchdifferences，andevencontrarietiesofperceptionwithoutanyfundamentalchange；andconsequentlycannevertellinwhatsenseperceptionsareactionsofthatsubstance。Theuse，therefore，oftheword，action，unaccompany’dwithanymeaning，insteadofthatofmodification，makesnoadditiontoourknowledge，norisofanyadvantagetothedoctrineoftheimmaterialityofthesoul。
Iaddinthesecondplace，thatifitbringsanyadvantagetothatcause，itmustbringanequaltothecauseofatheism。FordoourTheologianspretendtomakeamonopolyoftheword，action，andmaynottheatheistslikewisetakepossessionofit，andaffirmthatplants，animals，men，&；c。arenothingbutparticularactionsofonesimpleuniversalsubstance，whichexertsitselffromablindandabsolutenecessity？Thisyou’llsayisutterlyabsurd。Iown’tisunintelligible；butatthesametimeassert，accordingtotheprinciplesabove-explain’d，that’tisimpossibletodiscoveranyabsurdityinthesupposition，thatallthevariousobjectsinnatureareactionsofonesimplesubstance，whichabsurditywillnotbeapplicabletoalikesuppositionconcerningimpressionsandideas。
Fromthesehypothesesconcerningthesubstanceandlocalconjunctionofourperceptions，wemaypasstoanother，whichismoreintelligiblethantheformer，andmoreimportantthanthelatter，viz。concerningthecauseofourperceptions。Matterandmotion，’tiscommonlysaidintheschools，howevervary’d，arestillmatterandmotion，andproduceonlyadifferenceinthepositionandsituationofobjects。Divideabodyasoftenasyouplease，’tisstillbody。Placeitinanyfigure，nothingeverresultsbutfigure，ortherelationofparts。Moveitinanymanner，youstillfindmotionorachangeofrelation。’Tisabsurdtoimagine，thatmotioninacircle，forinstance，shou’dbenothingbutmerelymotioninacircle；whilemotioninanotherdirection，asinanellipse，shou’dalsobeapassionormoralreflection:Thattheshockingoftwoglobularparticlesshou’dbecomeasensationofpain，andthatthemeetingoftwotriangularonesshou’daffordapleasure。Nowasthesedifferentshocks，andvariations，andmixturesaretheonlychanges，ofwhichmatterissusceptible，andastheseneveraffordusanyideaofthoughtorperception，’tisconcludedtobeimpossible，thatthoughtcaneverbecaus’dbymatter。
Fewhavebeenabletowithstandtheseemingevidenceofthisargument；andyetnothingintheworldismoreeasythantorefuteit。Weneedonlyreflectonwhathasbeenprov’datlarge，thatweareneversensibleofanyconnexionbetwixtcausesandeffects，andthat’tisonlybyourexperienceoftheirconstantconjunction，wecanarriveatanyknowledgeofthisrelation。Nowasallobjects，whicharenotcontrary，aresusceptibleofaconstantconjunction，andasnorealobjectsarecontrary；(44)Ihaveinferr’dfromtheseprinciples，thattoconsiderthematterapriori，anythingmayproduceanything，andthatweshallneverdiscoverareason，whyanyobjectmayormaynotbethecauseofanyother，howevergreat，orhoweverlittletheresemblancemaybebetwixtthem。Thisevidentlydestroystheprecedentreasoningconcerningthecauseofthoughtorperception。Fortho’thereappearnomannerofconnexionbetwixtmotionorthought，thecaseisthesamewithallothercausesandeffects。Placeonebodyofapoundweightononeendofalever，andanotherbodyofthesameweightonanotherend；youwillneverfindinthesebodiesanyprincipleofmotiondependentontheirdistancesfromthecenter，morethanofthoughtandperception。Ifyoupretend，therefore，toproveapriori，thatsuchapositionofbodiescannevercausethought；becauseturnitwhichwayyouwill，’tisnothingbutapositionofbodies；youmustbythesamecourseofreasoningconclude，thatitcanneverproducemotion；sincethereisnomoreapparentconnexionintheonecasethanintheother。Butasthislatterconclusioniscontrarytoevidentexperience，andas’tispossiblewemayhavealikeexperienceintheoperationsofthemind，andmayperceiveaconstantconjunctionofthoughtandmotion；youreasontoohastily，whenfromthemereconsiderationoftheideas，youconcludethat’tisimpossiblemotioncaneverproducethought，oradifferentpositionofpartsgiverisetoadifferentpassionorreflection。Nay’tisnotonlypossiblewemayhavesuchanexperience，but’tiscertainwehaveit；sinceeveryonemayperceive，thatthedifferentdispositionsofhisbodychangehisthoughtsandsentiments。Andshou’ditbesaid，thatthisdependsontheunionofsoulandbody；Iwou’danswer，thatwemustseparatethequestionconcerningthesubstanceofthemindfromthatconcerningthecauseofitsthought；andthatconfiningourselvestothelatterquestionwefindbythecomparingtheirideas，thatthoughtandmotionaredifferentfromeachother，andbyexperience，thattheyareconstantlyunited；whichbeingallthecircumstances，thatenterintotheideaofcauseandeffect，whenapply’dtotheoperationsofmatter，wemaycertainlyconclude，thatmotionmaybe，andactuallyis，thecauseofthoughtandperception。
Thereseemsonlythisdilemmaleftusinthepresentcase；eithertoassert，thatnothingcanbethecauseofanother，butwherethemindcanperceivetheconnexioninitsideaoftheobjects:Ortomaintain，thatallobjects，whichwefindconstantlyconjoin’d，areuponthataccounttoberegardedascausesandeffects。Ifwechoosethefirstpartofthedilemma，thesearetheconsequences。First，Weinrealityaffirm，thatthereisnosuchthingintheuniverseasacauseorproductiveprinciple，noteventhedeityhimself；sinceourideaofthatsupremeBeingisderiv’dfromparticularimpressions，noneofwhichcontainanyefficacy，norseemtohaveanyconnexionwithanyotherexistence。Astowhatmaybesaid，thattheconnexionbetwixttheideaofaninfinitelypowerfulbeing，andthatofanyeffect，whichhewills，isnecessaryandunavoidable；Ianswer，thatwehavenoideaofabeingendow’dwithanypower，muchlessofoneendow’dwithinfinitepower。Butifwewillchangeexpressions，wecanonlydefinepowerbyconnexion；andtheninsaying，thattheidea，ofaninfinitelypowerfulbeingisconnectedwiththatofeveryeffect，whichhewills，wereallydono-morethanassert，thatabeing，whosevolitionisconnectedwitheveryeffect，isconnectedwitheveryeffect:whichisanidenticalproposition，andgivesusnoinsightintothenatureofthispowerorconnexion。But，secondly，supposing，thatthedeitywerethegreatandefficaciousprinciple，whichsuppliesthedeficiencyofallcauses，thisleadsusintothegrossestimpietiesandabsurdities。Foruponthesameaccount，thatwehaverecoursetohiminnaturaloperations，andassertthatmattercannotofitselfcommunicatemotion，orproducethought，viz。becausethereisnoapparentconnexionbetwixttheseobjects；Isay，upontheverysameaccount，wemustacknowledgethatthedeityistheauthorofallourvolitionsandperceptions；sincetheyhavenomoreapparentconnexioneitherwithoneanother，orwiththesuppos’dbutunknownsubstanceofthesoul。ThisagencyofthesupremeBeingweknowtohavebeenassertedby(45)severalphilosopherswithrelationtoalltheactionsofthemind，exceptvolition，orratheraninconsiderablepartofvolition；tho’’tiseasytoperceive，thatthisexceptionisamerepretext，toavoidthedangerousconsequences。ofthatdoctrine。Ifnothingbeactivebutwhathasanapparentpower，thoughtisinnocaseanymoreactivethanmatter；andifthisinactivitymustmakeushaverecoursetoadeity，thesupremebeingistherealcauseofallouractions，badaswellasgood，viciousaswellasvirtuous。
Thuswearenecessarilyreduc’dtotheothersideofthedilemma，viz……thatallobjects，whicharefoundtobeconstantlyconjoin’d，areuponthataccountonlytoberegardedascausesandeffects。Nowasallobjects，whicharenotcontrary，aresusceptibleofaconstantconjunction，andasnorealobjectsarecontrary’:itfollows，thatforoughtwecandeterminebythemereideas，anythingmaybethecauseoreffectofanything；whichevidentlygivestheadvantagetothematerialistsabovetheirantagonists。
Topronounce，then，thefinaldecisionuponthewhole；thequestionconcerningthesubstanceofthesoulisabsolutelyunintelligible:Allourperceptionsarenotsusceptibleofalocalunion，eitherwithwhatisextendedorunextended:therebeingsomeofthemoftheonekind，andsomeoftheother:Andastheconstantconjunctionofobjectsconstitutestheveryessenceofcauseandeffect，matterandmotionmayoftenberegardedasthecausesofthought，asfaraswehaveanynotionofthatrelation。
’Tiscertainlyakindofindignitytophilosophy，whosesovereignauthorityoughteverywheretobeacknowledged，toobligeheroneveryoccasiontomakeapologiesforherconclusions，andjustifyherselftoeveryparticularartandscience，whichmaybeoffendedather。Thisputsoneinmindofakingarraing’dforhigh-treasonagainsthissubjects。Thereisonlyoneoccasion，whenphilosophywillthinkitnecessaryandevenhonourabletojustifyherself，andthatis，whenreligionmayseemtobeintheleastoffended；whoserightsareasdeartoherasherown，andareindeedthesame。Ifanyone，therefore，shou’dimaginethattheforegoingargumentsareanywaysdangeroustoreligion，Ihopethefollowingapologywillremovehisapprehensions。
Thereisnofoundationforanyconclusionapriori，eitherconcerningtheoperationsordurationofanyobject，ofwhich’tispossibleforthehumanmindtoformaconception。Anyobjectmaybeimagin’dtobecomeentirelyinactive，ortobeannihilatedinamoment；and’tisanevidentprinciple，thatwhateverwecanimagine，ispossible。Nowthisisnomoretrueofmatter，thanofspirit；ofanextendedcompoundedsubstance，thanofasimpleandunextended。Inbothcasesthemetaphysicalargumentsfortheimmortalityofthesoulareequallyinconclusive:andinbothcasesthemoralargumentsandthosederiv’dfromtheanalogyofnatureareequallystrongandconvincing。Ifmyphilosophy，therefore，makesnoadditiontotheargumentsforreligion，Ihaveatleastthesatisfactiontothinkittakesnothingfromthem，butthateverythingremainspreciselyasbefore。
SECT。VI。
OfPersonalIdentityTherearesomephilosophers。whoimagineweareeverymomentintimatelyconsciousofwhatwecallourSELF；thatwefeelitsexistenceanditscontinuanceinexistence；andarecertain，beyondtheevidenceofademonstration，bothoitsperfectidentityandsimplicity。Thestrongestsensation，themostviolentpassion，saythey，insteadofdistractingusfromthisview，onlyfixitthemoreintensely，andmakeusconsidertheirinfluenceonselfeitherbytheirpainorpleasure。Toattemptafartherproofofthisweretoweakenitsevidence；sincenoproofcanbederiv’dfromanyfact，ofwhichwearesointimatelyconscious；noristhereanything，ofwhichwecanbecertain，ifwedoubtofthis。
Unluckilyallthesepositiveassertionsarecontrarytothatveryexperience，whichispleadedforthem，norhaveweanyideaofself，afterthemanneritishereexplain’d。Forfromwhatimpressioncou’dthisideabederiv’d？Thisquestion’tisimpossibletoanswerwithoutamanifestcontradictionandabsurdity；andyet’tisaquestion，whichmustnecessarilybeanswer’d，ifwewou’dhavetheideaofselfpassforclearandintelligible，Itmustbesomeoneimpression，thatgivesrisetoeveryrealidea。Butselforpersonisnotanyoneimpression，butthattowhichourseveralimpressionsandideasaresuppos’dtohaveareference。Ifanyimpressiongivesrisetotheideaofself，thatimpressionmustcontinueinvariablythesame，thro’thewholecourseofourlives；sinceselfissuppos’dtoexistafterthatmanner。Butthereisnoimpressionconstantandinvariable。Painandpleasure，griefandjoy，passionsandsensationssucceedeachother，andneverallexistatthesametime。Itcannot，therefore。，befromanyoftheseimpressions，orfromanyother，thattheideaofselfisderiv’d；andconsequentlythereisnosuchidea。’
Butfarther，whatmustbecomeofallourparticularperceptionsuponthishypothesis？Allthesearedifferent，anddistinguishable，andseparablefromeachother，andmaybeseparatelyconsider’d，andmayexistseparately，andhavenoDeedoftinythingtosupporttheirexistence。Afterwhatmanner，therefore，dotheybelongtoself；andhowaretheyconnectedwithit？Formypart，whenIentermostintimatelyintowhatIcallmyself，Ialwaysstumbleonsomeparticularperceptionorother，ofheatorcold，lightorshade，loveorhatred，painorpleasure。Inevercancatchmyselfatanytimewithoutaperception，andnevercanobserveanythingbuttheperception。Whenmyperceptionsareremov’dforanytime，asbysoundsleep；solongamIinsensibleofmyself，andmaytrulybesaidnottoexist。Andwereallmyperceptionsremov’dbydeath，andcou’dIneitherthink，norfeel，norsee，norlove，norhateafterthedissolutionofmybody，Ishou’dbeentirelyannihilated，nordoIconceivewhatisfartherrequisitetomakemeaperfectnon-entity。Ifanyone，uponseriousandunprejudic’dreflectionthinkshehasadifferentnotionofhimself，ImustconfessIcallreasonnolongerwithhim。AllIcanallowhimis，thathemaybeintherightaswellasI，andthatweareessentiallydifferentinthisparticular。Hemay，perhaps，perceivesomethingsimpleandcontinu’d，whichhecallshimself；tho’Iamcertainthereisnosuchprincipleinme。
Butsettingasidesomemetaphysiciansofthiskind，。Imayventuretoaffirmoftherestofmankind，thattheyarenothingbutabundleorcollectionofdifferentperceptions，whichsucceedeachotherwithaninconceivablerapidity，andareinaperpetualfluxandmovement。Oureyescannotturnintheirsocketswithoutvaryingourperceptions。Ourthoughtisstillmorevariablethanoursight；andallourothersensesandfacultiescontributetothischange；noristhereanysinglepowerofthesoul，whichremainsunalterablythesame，perhapsforonemoment。Themindisa。kindoftheatre，whereseveralperceptionssuccessivelymaketheirappearance；pass，re-pass，glideaway，andmingleinaninfinitevarietyofposturesandsituations。Thereisproperlynosimplicityinitatonetime，noridentityindifferent；whatevernaturalpropensionwemayhavetoimaginethatsimplicityandidentity。Thecomparisonofthetheatremustnotmisleadus。Theyarethesuccessiveperceptionsonly，thatconstitutethemind；norhavewethemostdistantnotionoftheplace，wherethesescenesarerepresented，orofthematerials，ofwhichitiscompos’d。
Whatthengivesussogreatapropensiontoascribeanidentitytothesesuccessiveperceptions，andtosupposeourselvespossestofaninvariableanduninterruptedexistencethro’thewholecourseofourlives？Inordertoanswerthisquestion，wemustdistinguishbetwixtpersonalidentity，asitregardsourthoughtorimagination，andasitregardsourpassionsortheconcernwetakeinourselves。Thefirstisourpresentsubject；andtoexplainitperfectlywemusttakethematterprettydeep，andaccountforthatidentity，whichweattributetoplantsandanimals；therebeingagreatanalogybetwixtit，andtheidentityofaselforperson。
Wehaveadistinctideaofanobject，thatremainsinvariableanduninterruptedthro’asuppos’dvariationoftime；andthisideawecallthatofidentityorsameness。Wehavealsoadistinctideaofseveraldifferentobjectsexistinginsuccession，andconnectedtogetherbyacloserelation；andthistoanaccurateviewaffordsasperfectanotionofdiversity，asiftherewasnomannerofrelationamongtheobjects。Buttho’thesetwoideasofidentity，andasuccessionofrelatedobjectsbeinthemselvesperfectlydistinct，andevencontrary，yet’tiscertain，thatinourcommonwayofthinkingtheyaregenerallyconfoundedwitheachother。Thatactionoftheimagination，bywhichweconsidertheuninterruptedandinvariableobject，andthatbywhichwereflectonthesuccessionofrelatedobjects，arealmostthesametothefeeling，noristheremuchmoreeffortofthoughtrequir’dinthelattercasethanintheformer。Therelationfacilitatesthetransitionofthemindfromoneobjecttoanother，andrendersitspassageassmoothasifitcontemplatedonecontinu’dobject。Thisresemblanceisthecauseoftheconfusionandmistake，andmakesussubstitutethenotionofidentity，insteadofthatofrelatedobjects。Howeveratoneinstantwemayconsidertherelatedsuccessionasvariableorinterrupted，wearesurethenexttoascribetoitaperfectidentity，andregarditasenviableanduninterrupted。Ourpropensitytothismistakeissogreatfromtheresemblanceabove-mention’d，thatwefallintoitbeforeweareaware；andtho’weincessantlycorrectourselvesbyreflection，andreturntoamoreaccuratemethodofthinking，yetwecannotlongsustainourphilosophy，ortakeoffthisbiassfromtheimagination。Ourlastresourceistoyieldtoit，andboldlyassertthatthesedifferentrelatedobjectsareineffectthesame，howeverinterruptedandvariable。Inordertojustifytoourselvesthisabsurdity，weoftenfeignsomenewandunintelligibleprinciple，thatconnectstheobjectstogether，andpreventstheirinterruptionorvariation。Thuswefeignthecontinu’dexistenceoftheperceptionsofoursenses，toremovetheinterruption:andrunintothenotionofasoul，andself，andsubstance，todisguisethevariation。Butwemayfartherobserve，thatwherewedonotgiverisetosuchafiction，ourpropensiontoconfoundidentitywithrelationissogreat，thatweareapttoimagine(46)somethingunknownandmysterious，connectingtheparts，besidetheirrelation；andthisItaketobethecasewithregardtotheidentityweascribetoplantsandvegetables。Andevenwhenthisdoesnottakeplace，westillfeelapropensitytoconfoundtheseideas，tho’wea-renotablefullytosatisfyourselvesinthatparticular，norfindanythinginvariableanduninterruptedtojustifyournotionofidentity。
Thusthecontroversyconcerningidentityisnotmerelyadisputeofwords。Forwhenweattributeidentity，inanimpropersense，tovariableorinterruptedobjects，ourmistakeisnotconfin’dtotheexpression，butiscommonlyattendedwithafiction，eitherofsomethinginvariableanduninterrupted，orofsomethingmysteriousandinexplicable，oratleastwithapropensitytosuchfictions。Whatwillsufficetoprovethishypothesistothesatisfactionofeveryfairenquirer，istoshewfromdailyexperienceandobservation，thattheobjects，whicharevariableorinterrupted，andyetaresuppos’dtocontinuethesame，aresuchonlyasconsistofasuccessionofparts，connectedtogetherbyresemblance，contiguity，orcausation。Forassuchasuccessionanswersevidentlytoournotionofdiversity，itcanonlybebymistakeweascribetoitanidentity；andastherelationofparts，whichleadsusintothismistake，isreallynothingbutaquality，whichproducesanassociationofideas，andaneasytransitionoftheimaginationfromonetoanother，itcanonlybefromtheresemblance，whichthisactofthemindbearstothat，bywhichwecontemplateonecontinu’dobject，thattheerrorarises。Ourchiefbusiness，then，mustbetoprove，thatallobjects，towhichweascribeidentity，withoutobservingtheirinvariablenessanduninterruptedness，aresuchasconsistofasuccessionofrelatedobjects。
Inordertothis，supposeanymassofmatter，ofwhichthepartsarecontiguousandconnected，tobeplac’dbeforeus；’tisplainwemustattributeaperfectidentitytothismass，providedallthepartscontinueuninterruptedlyandinvariablythesame，whatevermotionorchangeofplacewemayobserveeitherinthewholeorinanyoftheparts。Butsupposingsomeverysmallorinconsiderableparttobeaddedtothemass，orsubtractedfromit；tho’thisabsolutelydestroystheidentityofthewhole，strictlyspeaking；yetasweseldomthinksoaccurately，wescruplenottopronounceamassofmatterthesame，wherewefindsotrivialanalteration。Thepassageofthethoughtfromtheobjectbeforethechangetotheobjectafterit，issosmoothandeasy，thatwescarceperceivethetransition，andareapttoimagine，that’tisnothingbutacontinu’dsurveyofthesameobject。
Thereisaveryremarkablecircumstance，thatattendsthisexperiment；whichis，thattho’thechangeofanyconsiderablepartinamassofmatterdestroystheidentityofthewhole，letwemustmeasurethegreatnessofthepart，notabsolutely，butbyitsproportiontothewhole。Theadditionordiminutionofamountainwou’dnotbesufficienttoproduceadiversityinaplanet:tho’thechangeofaveryfewincheswou’dbeabletodestroytheidentityofsomebodies。’Twillbeimpossibletoaccountforthis，butbyreflectingthatobjectsoperateuponthemind，andbreakorinterruptthecontinuityofitsactionsnotaccordingtotheirrealgreatness，butaccordingtotheirproportiontoeachother:Andtherefore，sincethisinterruptionmakesanobjectceasetoappearthesame，itmustbetheuninterruptedprogressothethought，whichconstitutestheimperfectidentity。
Thismaybeconfirm’dbyanotherphenomenon。Achangeinanyconsiderablepartofabodydestroysitsidentity；but’tisremarkable，thatwherethechangeisproduc’dgraduallyandinsensiblywearelessapttoascribetoitthesameeffect。Thereasoncanplainlybenoother，thanthatthemind，infollowingthesuccessivechangesofthebody，feelsaneasypassagefromthesurveyingitsconditioninonemomenttotheviewingofitinanother，andatnoparticulartimeperceivesanyinterruptioninitsactions。Fromwhichcontinu’dperception，itascribesacontinu’dexistenceandidentitytotheobject。
Butwhateverprecautionwemayuseinintroducingthechangesgradually，andmakingthemproportionabletothewhole，’tiscertain，thatwherethechangesareatlastobserv’dtobecomeconsiderable，wemakeascrupleofascribingidentitytosuchdifferentobjects。Thereis，however，anotherartifice，，bywhichwemayinducetheimaginationtoadvanceastepfarther；andthatis，byproducingareferenceofthepartstoeachother，andacombinationtosomecommonendorpurpose。Aship，ofwhichaconsiderableparthasbeenchang’dbyfrequentreparations，isstillconsideredasthesame；nordoesthedifferenceofthematerialshinderusfromascribinganidentitytoit。Thecommonend，inwhichthepartsconspire，isthesameunderalltheirvariations，andaffordsaneasytransitionoftheimaginationfromonesituationofthebodytoanother。
Butthisisstillmoreremarkable，whenweaddasympathyofpartstotheircommonend，andsupposethattheybeartoeachother，thereciprocalrelationofcauseandeffectinalltheiractionsandoperations。Thisisthecasewithallanimalsandvegetables；wherenotonlytheseveralpartshaveareferencetosomegeneralpurpose，butalsoamutualdependenceon，andconnexionwitheachother。Theeffectofsostrongarelationis，thattho’everyonemustallow，thatinaveryfewyearsbothvegetablesandanimalsendureatotalchange，yetwestillattributeidentitytothem，whiletheirform，size，andsubstanceareentirelyalter’d。Anoak，thatgrowsfromasmallplanttoalargetree，isstillthesameoak；tho’therebenotoneparticleofmatter，orfigureofitspartsthesame。Aninfantbecomesaman-，andissometimesfat，sometimeslean，withoutanychangeinhisidentity。
Wemayalsoconsiderthetwofollowingphaenomena，whichareremarkableintheirkind。Thefirstis，thattho’wecommonlybeabletodistinguishprettyexactlybetwixtnumericalandspecificidentity，yetitsometimeshappens，thatweconfoundthem，andinourthinkingandreasoningemploytheonefortheother。Thusaman，whobearsanoise，thatisfrequentlyinterruptedandrenew’d，says，itisstillthesamenoise；tho’’tisevidentthesoundshaveonlyaspecificidentityorresemblance，andthereisnothingnumericallythesame，butthecause，whichproduc’dthem。Inlikemanneritmaybesaidwithoutbreachoftheproprietyoflanguage，thatsuchachurch，whichwasformerlyofbrick，felltoruin，andthattheparishrebuiltthesamechurchoffree-stone，andaccordingtomodernarchitecture。Hereneithertheformnormaterialsarethesame，noristhereanythingcommontothetwoobjects，buttheirrelationtotheinhabitantsoftheparish；andyetthisaloneissufficienttomakeusdenominatethemthesame。Butwemustobserve，thatinthesecasesthefirstobjectisinamannerannihilatedbeforethesecondcomesintoexistence；bywhichmeans，weareneverpresentedinanyonepointoftimewiththeideaofdifferenceandmultiplicity:andforthatreasonarelessscrupulousincallingthemthesame。
Secondly，Wemayremark，thattho’inasuccessionofrelatedobjects，itbeinamannerrequisite，thatthechangeofpartsbenotsuddennorentire，inordertopreservetheidentity，yetwheretheobjectsareintheirnaturechangeableandinconstant，weadmitofamoresuddentransition，thanwou’dotherwisebeconsistentwiththatrelation。Thusasthenatureofariverconsistsinthemotionandchangeofparts；tho’inlessthanfourandtwentyhoursthesebetotallyalter’d；thishindersnottheriverfromcontinuingthesameduringseveralages。Whatisnaturalandessentialtoanythingis，inamanner，expected；andwhatisexpectedmakeslessimpression，andappearsoflessmoment，thanwhatisunusualandextraordinary。Aconsiderablechangeoftheformerkindseemsreallylesstotheimagination，thanthemosttrivialalterationofthelatter；andbybreakinglessthecontinuityofthethought，haslessinfluenceindestroyingtheidentity。
Wenowproceedtoexplainthenatureofpersonalidentity，whichhasbecomesogreataquestionillphilosophy，especiallyoflateyearsinEngland，wherealltheabstrusersciencesarestudy’dwithapeculiarardourandapplication。Andhere’tisevident，thesamemethodofreasoningmustbecontinu’d。whichhassosuccessfullyexplain’dtheidentityofplants，andanimals，andships，andhouses，andofallthecompoundedandchangeableproductionseitherofartornature。Theidentity，whichweascribetothemindofman，isonlyafictitiousone，andofalikekindwiththatwhichweascribetovegetablesandanimalbodies。Itcannot，therefore，haveadifferentorigin，butmustproceedfromalikeoperationoftheimaginationuponlikeobjects。
Butlestthisargumentshou’dnotconvincethereader；tho’inmyopinionperfectlydecisive；lethimweighthefollowingreasoning，whichisstillcloserandmoreimmediate。’Tisevident，thattheidentity，whichweattributetothehumanmind，howeverperfectwemayimagineittobe，isnotabletoruntheseveraldifferentperceptionsintoone，andmakethemlosetheircharactersofdistinctionanddifference，whichareessentialtothem。’Tisstilltrue，thateverydistinctperception，whichentersintothecompositionofthemind，isadistinctexistence，andisdifferent，anddistinguishable，andseparablefromeveryotherperception，eithercontemporaryorsuccessive。But，as，notwithstandingthisdistinctionandseparability，wesupposethewholetrainofperceptionstobeunitedbyidentity，aquestionnaturallyarisesconcerningthisrelationofidentity；whetheritbesomethingthatreallybindsourseveralperceptionstogether，oronlyassociatestheirideasintheimagination。Thatis，inotherwords，whetherinpronouncingconcerningtheidentityofaperson，weobservesomerealbondamonghisperceptions，oronlyfeeloneamongtheideasweformofthem。Thisquestionwemighteasilydecide，ifwewou’drecollectwhathasbeenalreadyproudatlarge，thattheunderstandingneverobservesanyrealconnexionamongobjects，andthateventheunionofcauseandeffect，whenstrictlyexamin’d，resolvesitselfintoacustomaryassociationofideas。Forfromthenceitevidentlyfollows，thatidentityisnothingreallybelongingtothesedifferentperceptions，andunitingthemtogether；butismerelyaquality，whichweattributetothem，becauseoftheunionoftheirideasintheimagination，whenwereflectuponthem。Nowtheonlyqualities，whichcangiveideasanunionintheimagination，arethesethreerelationsabove-mention’d。Therearetheunitingprinciplesintheidealworld，andwithoutthemeverydistinctobjectisseparablebythemind，andmaybeseparatelyconsidered，andappearsnottohaveanymoreconnexionwithanyotherobject，thanifdisjoin’dbythegreatestdifferenceandremoteness。’Tis，therefore，onsomeofthesethreerelationsofresemblance，contiguityandcausation，thatidentitydepends；andastheveryessenceoftheserelationsconsistsintheirproducinganeasytransitionofideas；itfollows，thatournotionsofpersonalidentity，proceedentirelyfromthesmoothanduninterruptedprogressofthethoughtalongatrainofconnectedideas，accordingtotheprinciplesabove-explain’d。
Theonlyquestion，therefore，whichremains，is，bywhatrelationsthisuninterruptedprogressofourthoughtisproduc’d，whenweconsiderthesuccessiveexistenceofamindorthinkingperson。Andhere’tisevidentwemustconfineourselvestoresemblanceandcausation，andmustdropcontiguity，whichhaslittleornoinfluenceinthepresentcase。
Tobeginwithresemblance；supposewecou’dseeclearlyintothebreastofanother，andobservethatsuccessionofperceptions，whichconstituteshismindorthinkingprinciple，andsupposethathealwayspreservesthememoryofaconsiderablepartofpastperceptions；’tisevidentthatnothingcou’dmorecontributetothebestowingarelationonthissuccessionamidstallitsvariations。Forwhatisthememorybutafaculty，bywhichweraiseuptheimagesofpastperceptions？Andasanimagenecessarilyresemblesitsobject，mustnot。thefrequentplacingoftheseresemblingperceptionsinthechainofthought，conveytheimaginationmoreeasilyfromonelinktoanother，andmakethewholeseemlikethecontinuanceofoneobject？Inthisparticular，then，thememorynotonlydiscoverstheidentity，butalsocontributestoitsproduction，byproducing-therelationofresemblanceamongtheperceptions。Thecaseisthesamewhetherweconsiderourselvesorothers。
Astocausation；wemayobserve，thatthetrueideaofthehumanmind，istoconsideritasasystemofdifferentperceptionsordifferentexistences，whicharelink’dtogetherbytherelationofcauseandeffect，andmutuallyproduce，destroy，influence，andmodifyeachother。Ourimpressionsgiverisetotheircorrespondentideas；saidtheseideasintheirturnproduceotherimpressions。Onethoughtchacesanother，anddrawsafteritathird，bywhichitisexpell’dinitsturn。Inthisrespect，Icannotcomparethesoulmoreproperlytoanythingthantoarepublicorcommonwealth，inwhichtheseveralmembersareunitedbythereciprocaltiesofgovernmentandsubordination，andgiverisetootherpersons，whopropagatethesamerepublicintheincessantchangesofitsparts。Andasthesameindividualrepublicmaynotonlychangeitsmembers，butalsoitslawsandconstitutions；inlikemannerthesamepersonmayvaryhischaracteranddisposition，aswellashisimpressionsandideas，withoutlosinghisidentity。Whateverchangesheendures，hisseveralpartsarestillconnectedbytherelationofcausation。Andinthisviewouridentitywithregardtothepassionsservestocorroboratethatwithregardtotheimagination，bythemakingourdistantperceptionsinfluenceeachother，andbygivingusapresentconcernforourpastorfuturepainsorpleasures。
Asamemoryaloneacquaintsuswiththecontinuanceandextentofthissuccessionofperceptions，’tistobeconsidered，uponthataccountchiefly，asthesourceofpersonalidentity。Hadwenomemory，wenevershou’dhaveanynotionofcausation，norconsequentlyofthatchainofcausesandeffects，whichconstituteourselforperson。Buthavingonceacquir’dthisnotionofcausationfromthememory，wecanextendthesamechainofcauses，andconsequentlytheidentityofcarpersonsbeyondourmemory，andcancomprehendtimes，andcircumstances，andactions，whichwehaveentirelyforgot，butsupposeingeneraltohaveexisted。Forhowfewofourpastactionsarethere，ofwhichwehaveanymemory？Whocantellme，forinstance，whatwerehisthoughtsandactionsonthe1stofJanuary1715，the11thofMarch1719，andthe3rdofAugust1733？Orwillheaffirm，becausehehasentirelyforgottheincidentsofthesedays，thatthepresentselfisnotthesamepersonwiththeselfofthattime；andbythatmeansoverturnallthemostestablishednotionsofpersonalidentity？Inthisview，therefore，memorydoesnotsomuchproduceasdiscoverpersonalidentity，byshewingustherelationofcauseandeffectamongourdifferentperceptions。’Twillbeincumbentonthose，whoaffirmthatmemoryproducesentirelyourpersonalidentity，togiveareasonwhywecmthusextendouridentitybeyondourmemory。
Thewholeofthisdoctrineleadsustoaconclusion，whichisofgreatimportanceinthepresentaffair，viz。thatalltheniceandsubtilequestionsconcerningpersonalidentitycanneverpossiblybedecided，andaretoberegardedratherasgramaticalthanasphilosophicaldifficulties。Identitydependsontherelationsofideas；andtheserelationsproduceidentity，bymeansofthateasytransitiontheyoccasion。’Butastherelations，andtheeasinessofthetransitionmaydiminishbyinsensibledegrees，wehavenojuststandard，by。whichwecandecideanydisputeconcerningthetime，whentheyacquireorloseatitletothenameofidentity。Allthedisputesconcerningtheidentityofconnectedobjectsaremerelyverbal，exceptsofaxastherelationofparts-givesrisetosomefictionorimaginaryprincipleofunion，aswehavealreadyobserved。
WhatIhavesaidconcerningthefirstoriginanduncertaintyofournotionofidentity，asapply’dtothehumanmind，maybeextendedwithlittleornovariationtothatofsimplicity。Anobject，whosedifferentco-existentpartsareboundtogetherbyacloserelation，operatesupontheimaginationaftermuchthesamemannerasoneperfectlysimpleandindivisibleandrequiresnotamuchgreaterstretchofthoughtinordertoitsconception。Fromthissimilarityofoperationweattributeasimplicitytoit，andfeignaprincipleofunionasthesupportofthissimplicity，andthecenterofallthedifferentpartsandqualitiesoftheobject。
Thuswehavefinish’dourexaminationoftheseveralsystemsofphilosophy，bothoftheintellectualandnaturalworld；andinourmiscellaneouswayofreasoninghavebeenledintoseveraltopics；whichwilleitherillustrateandconfirmsomeprecedingpartofthisdiscourse，orpreparethewayforourfollowingopinions。’Tisnowtimetoreturntoamorecloseexaminationofoursubject，andtoproceedintheaccurateanatomyofhumannature，havingfullyexplain’dthenatureofourjudgmentandunderstandings。
