Inordertothiswemustfirstshewthecorrespondenceofpassionsinmenandanimals，andafterwardscomparethecauses，whichproducethesepassions。
Tisplain，thatalmostineveryspeciesofcreatures，butespeciallyofthenoblerkind，therearemanyevidentmarksofprideandhumility。Theveryportandgaitofaswan，orturkey，orpeacockshowthehighideahehasentertain’dofhimself，andhiscontemptofallothers。Thisisthemoreremarkable，thatinthetwolastspeciesofanimals，thepridealwaysattendsthebeauty，andisdiscover’dinthemaleonly。Thevanityandemulationofnightingalesinsinginghavebeencommonlyremark’d；aslikewisethatofhorsesinswiftness，ofhoundsinsagacityandsmell，ofthebullandcockinstrength，andofeveryotheranimalinhisparticularexcellency。Addtothis，thateveryspeciesofcreatures，whichapproachsooftentoman，astofamiliarizethemselveswithhim，showanevidentprideinhisapprobation，andarepleas’dwithhispraisesandcaresses，independentofeveryotherconsideration。Noraretheythecaressesofeveryonewithoutdistinction，whichgivethemthisvanity，butthoseprincipallyofthepersonstheyknowandlove；inthesamemannerasthatpassionisexcitedinmankind。Alltheseareevidentproofs，thatprideandhumilityarenotmerelyhumanpassions，butextendthemselvesoverthewholeanimalcreation。
Thecausesofthesepassionsarelikewisemuchthesameinbeastsasinus，makingajustallowanceforoursuperiorknowledgeandunderstanding。Thusanimalshavelittleornosenseofvirtueorvice；theyquicklylosesightoftherelationsofblood；andareincapableofthatofrightandproperty:Forwhichreasonthecausesoftheirprideandhumilitymustliesolelyinthebody，andcanneverbeplac’deitherinthemindorexternalobjects。Butsofarasregardsthebody，thesamequalitiescauseprideintheanimalasinthehumankind；and`tisonbeauty，strength，swiftnessorsomeotherusefuloragreeablequalitythatthispassionisalwaysfounded。
Thenextquestionis，whether，sincethosepassionsarethesame，andarisefromthesamecausesthro’thewholecreation，themanner，inwhichthecausesoperate，bealsothesame。Accordingtoallrulesofanalogy，thisisjustlytobeexpected；andifwefindupontrial，thattheexplicationofthesephaenomena，whichwemakeuseofinonespecies，willnotapplytotherest，wemaypresumethatthatexplication，howeverspecious，isinrealitywithoutfoundation。
Inordertodecidethisquestion，letusconsider，thatthereisevidentlythesamerelationofideas，andderiv’dfromthesamecauses，inthemindsofanimalsasinthoseofmen。Adog，thathashidabone，oftenforgetstheplace；butwhenbroughttoit，histhoughtpasseseasilytowhatheformerlyconceal’d，bymeansofthecontiguity，whichproducesarelationamonghisideas。Inlikemanner，whenhehasbeenheartilybeatinanyplace，hewilltrembleonhisapproachtoit，eventho’hediscovernosignsofanypresentdanger。Theeffectsofresemblancearenotsoremarkable；butasthatrelationmakesaconsiderableingredientincausation，ofwhichallanimalsshewsoevidentajudgment，wemayconcludethatthethreerelationsofresemblance，contiguityandcausationoperateinthesamemanneruponbeastsasuponhumancreatures。
Therearealsoinstancesoftherelationofimpressions，sufficienttoconvinceus，thatthereisanunionofcertainaffectionswitheachotherintheinferiorspeciesofcreaturesaswellasinthesuperior，andthattheirmindsarefrequentlyconvey’dthro’aseriesofconnectedemotions。Adog，whenelevatedwithjoy，runsnaturallyintoloveandkindness，whetherofhismasterorofthesex。Inlikemanner，whenfullofpainandsorrow，hebecomesquarrelsomeandillnatur’d；andthatpassion；whichatfirstwasgrief，isbythesmallestoccasionconvertedintoanger。
Thusalltheinternalprinciples，thatarenecessaryinustoproduceeitherprideorhumility，arecommcmtoallcreaturn；andsincethecauses，whichexcitethesepassions，arelikewisethesame，wemayjustlyconclude，thatthesecausesoperateafterthesamemannerthro’thewholeanimalcreation。MyhypothesisIssosimple，andsupposessolittlereflectionandjudgment，that`tisapplicabletoeverysensiblecreature；whichmustnotonlybeallow’dtobeaconvincingproofofitsveracity，but，Iamconfident，willbefoundanobjectiontoeveryothersystem。
PARTIIOfloveandhatredSECT。IOftheobjectandcausesofloveandhatred`Tisaltogetherimpossibletogiveanydefinitionofthepassionsofloveandhatred；andthatbecausetheyproducemerelyasimpleimpression，withoutanymixtureorcomposition。Twou’dbeasunnecessarytoattemptanydescriptionofthem，drawnfromtheirnature，origin，causesandobjects；andthatbothbecausethesearethesubjectsofourpresentenquiry，andbecausethesepassionsofthemselvesaresufficientlyknownfromourcommonfeelingandexperience。Thiswehavealreadyobserv’dconcerningprideandhumility，andhererepeatitconcerningloveandhatred；andindeedthereissogreataresemblancebetwixtthesetwosetsofpassions，thatweshallbeoblig’dtobeginwithakindofabridgmentofourreasoningsconcerningtheformer，inordertoexplainthelatter。
Astheimmediateobjectofprideandhumilityisselforthatidenticalperson，ofwhosethoughts，actions，andsensationsweareintimatelyconscious；sotheobjectofloveandhatredissomeotherperson，ofwhosethoughts，actions，andsensationswearenotconscious。Thisissufficientlyevidentfromexperience。Ourloveandhatredarealwaysdirectedtosomesensiblebeingexternaltous；andwhenwetalkofself-love，`tisnotinapropersense，norhasthesensationitproducesanythingincommonwiththattenderemotionwhichisexcitedbyafriendormistress。`Tisthesamecasewithhatred。Wemaybemortifiedbyourownfaultsandfollies；butneverfeelanyangerorhatred。exceptfromtheinjuriesofothers。
Buttho’theobjectofloveandhatredbealwayssomeotherperson，`tisplainthattheobjectisnot，properlyspeaking，thecauseofthesepassions，oralonesufficienttoexcitethem。Forsinceloveandhatredaredirectlycontraryintheirsensation，andhavethesameobjectincommon，ifthatobjectwerealsotheircause，itwou’dproducetheseoppositepassionsinanequaldegree；andastheymust，fromtheveryfirstmoment，destroyeachother，noneofthemwou’deverbeabletomakeitsappearance。Theremust，therefore，besomecausedifferentfromtheobject。
Ifweconsiderthecausesofloveandhatred，weshallfindtheyareverymuchdiversify’d，andhavenotmanythingsincommon。Thevirtue，knowledge，wit，goodsense，goodhumourofanyperson，produceloveandesteem；astheoppositequalities，hatredandcontempt。Thesamepassionsarisefrombodilyaccomplishments，suchasbeauty，force，swiftness，dexterity；andfromtheircontraries；aslikewisefromtheexternaladvantagesanddisadvantagesoffamily，possession，cloaths，nationandclimate。Thereisnotoneoftheseobjects，butwhatbyitsdifferentqualitiesmayproduceloveandesteem，orhatredandcontemptFromtheviewofthesecauseswemayderiveanewdistinctionbetwixtthequalitythatoperates，andthesubjectonwhichitisplac’d。Aprince，thatispossess’dofastatelypalace，commandstheesteemofthepeopleuponthataccount；andthatfirst，bythebeautyofthepalace，andsecondly，bytherelationofproperty，whichconnectsitwithhim。Theremovalofeitherofthesedestroysthepassion；whichevidentlyprovesthatthecauseIsacompoundedone。
Twou’dbetedioustotracethepassionsofloveandhatred，thro’alltheobservationswhichwehaveform’dconcerningprideandhumility，andwhichareequallyapplicabletobothsetsofpassions。Twillbesufficienttoremarkingeneral，thattheobjectofloveandhatredisevidentlysomethinkingperson；andthatthesensationoftheformerpassionisalwaysagreeable，andofthelatteruneasy。Wemayalsosupposewithsomeshewofprobability，thatthecauseofboththesepassionsisalwaysrelatedtoathinkingbeing，andthatthecauseoftheformerproduceaseparatepleasure，andofthelatteraseparateuneasiness。
Oneofthesesuppositions，viz，thatthecauseofloveandhatredmustberelatedtoapersonorthinkingbeing，inordertoproducethesepassions，isnotonlyprobable，buttooevidenttobecontested。Virtueandvice，whenconsider’dintheabstract；beautyanddeformity，whenplac’doninanimateobjects；povertyandricheswhenbelongingtoathirdperson，excitenodegreeofloveorhatred，esteemorcontempttowardsthose，whohavenorelationtothem。Apersonlookingoutatawindow，seesmeinthestreet，andbeyondme-abeautifulpalace，withwhichIhavenoconcern:Ibelievenonewillpretend，thatthispersonwillpaymethesamerespect，asifIwereownerofthepalace。
’Tisnotsoevidentatfirstsight，thatarelationofimpressionsisrequisitetothesepassions，andthatbecauseinthetransitiontheoneimpressionissomuchconfoundedwiththeother，thattheybecomeinamannerundistinguishable。Butasinprideandhumility，wehaveeasilybeenabletomaketheseparation，andtoprove，thateverycauseofthesepassions，producesaseparatepainorpleasure，Imighthereobservethesamemethodwiththesamesuccess，inexaminingparticularlytheseveralcausesofloveandhatred。ButasIhastenafullanddecisiveproofofthesesystems，Idelaythisexaminationforamoment:Andinthemeantimeshallendeavourtoconverttomypresentpurposeallmyreaaoningsconcerningprideandhumility，byanargumentthatisfoundedonunquestionableexTherearefewpersons，thataresatisfy’dwiththeirowncharacter，orgenius，orfortune，whoarenordesirousofshewingthemselvestotheworld，andofacquiringtheloveandapprobationofmankind。Now`tisevident，thattheverysamequalitiesandcircumstances，whicharethecausesofprideorself-esteem，arealsothecausesofvanityorthedesireofreputation；andthatwealwaysputtoviewthoseparticularswithwhichinourselveswearebestsatisfy’d。Butifloveandesteemwerenotproduc’dbythesamequalitiesaspride，accordingasthesequalitiesarerelatedtoourselvesorothers，thismethodofproceedingwou’dbeveryabsurd，norcou’dmenexpectacorrespondenceinthesentimentsofeveryotherperson，withthosethemselveshaveentertain’d。’Tistrue，fewcanformexactsystemsofthepassions，ormakereflectionsontheirgeneralnatureandresemblances。Butwithoutsuchaprogressinphilosophy，wearenotsubjecttomanymistakesinthisparticular，butaresufficientlyguidedbycommonexperience，aswellasbyakindofpresentation；whichtellsuswhatwilloperateonothers，bywhatwefeelimmediatelyinourselves。Sincethenthesamequalitiesthatproduceprideorhumility，causeloveorhatred；alltheargumentsthathavebeenemploy’dtoprove，thatthecausesoftheformerpassionsexciteapainorpleasureindependentofthepassion，willbeapplicablewithequalevidencetothecausesofthelatter。
SECT。IIExperimentstoconfirmthissystemUpondulyweighingthesearguments，noonewillmakeanyscrupletoassenttothatcondusionIdrawfromthem，concerningthetransitionalongrelatedimpressionsandideas，especiallyas`tisaprinciple，initself，soeasyandnatural。Butthatwemayplacethissystembeyonddoubtbothwithregardtoloveandhatred，prideandhumility，`twillbepropertomakesomenewexperimentsuponallthesepassions，aswellastorecalafewoftheseobservations，whichIhaveformerlytouch’dupon。
Inordertomaketheseexperiments，letussupposeIammcompanywithaperson，whomIformerlyregardedwithoutanysentimentseitheroffriendshiporenmity。HereIhavethenaturalandultimateobjectofallthesefourpassionsplac’dbeforeme。Myselfamtheproperobjectofprideorhumility；theotherpersonofloveorhatred。
Regardnowwithattentionthenatureofthesepassions，andtheirsituationwithrespecttoeachother。`Tisevidentherearefouraffections，plac’d，asitwere，inasquareorregularconnexionwith，anddistancefromeachother。Thepassionsofprideandhumility，aswellasthoseofloveandhatred，areconnectedtogetherbytheidentityoftheirobject，whichtothefirstsetofpassionsisself，tothesecondsomeotherperson。Thesetwolinesofcommunicationorconnexionformtwooppositesidesofthesquare。Again，prideandloveareagreeablepassions；hatredandhumilityuneasy。Thissimilitudeofsensationbetwixtprideandlove，andthatbetwixthumilityandhatredformanewconnexion，andmaybeconsider’dastheothertwosidesofthesquare。Uponthewhole，prideisconnectedwithhumility，lovewithhatred，bytheirobjectsorideas:Pridewithlove，humilitywithhatred，bytheirsensationsorimpressions。
Isaythen，thatnothingcanproduceanyofthesepassionswithoutbearingitadoublerelation，viz，ofideastotheobjectofthepassion，andofsensationtothepassionitself。Thiswemustprovebyourexperiments。FirstExperiment。Toproceedwiththegreaterorderintheseexperiments，letusfirstsuppose，thatbeingplac’dinthesituationabove-mentioned，viz，incompanywithsomeotherperson，thereisanobjectpresented，thathasnorelationeitherofimpressionsorideastoanyofthesepassions。Thussupposeweregardtogetheranordinarystone，orothercommonobject，belongingtoneitherofus，andcausingofitselfnoemotion，orindependentpainandpleasure:`Tisevidentsuchanobjectwillproducenoneofthesefourpassions。Letustryituponeachofthemsuccessively。Letusapplyittolove，tohatred，tohumility，topride；noneofthemeverarisesinthesmallestdegreeimaginable。Letuschangetheobject，asoftasweplease；providedstillwechooseone，thathasneitherofthesetworelations。Letusrepeattheexperimentinallthedispositions，ofwhichthemindissusceptible。Noobject，inthevastvarietyofnature，will，inanydisposition，produceanypassionwithouttheserelations。
SecondExperiment。Sinceanobject，thatwantsboththeserelationscanneverproduceanypassion，letusbestowonitonlyoneoftheserelations；andseewhatwillfollow。Thussuppose，Iregardastoneoranycommonobject，thatbelongseithertomeormycompanion，andbythatmeansacquiresarelationofideastotheobjectofthepassions:Tisplain，thattoconsiderthematterapriori，noemotionofanykindcanreasonablybeexpected。Forbesides，thatarelationofideasoperatessecretlyandcalmlyonthemind，itbestowsanequalimpulsetowardstheoppositepassionsofprideandhumility，loveandhatred，accordingastheobjectbelongstoourselvesorothers；whichoppositionofthepassionsmustdestroyboth，andleavethemindperfectlyfreefromanyaffectionoremotion。Thisreasoningaprioriisconfirm’dbyexperience。Notrivialorvulgarobject，thatcausesnotapainorpleasure，independentofthepassion，willever，byitspropertyorotherrelationseithertoourselvesorothers，beabletoproducetheaffectionsofprideorhumility，loveorhatred。
ThirdExperiment。`Tisevident，therefore，thatarelationofideasisnotablealonetogiverisetotheseaffections。Letusnowremovethisrelation，andinitssteadplacearelationofimpressions，bypresentinganobject，whichisagreeableordisagreeable，buthasnorelationeithertoourselforcompanion；andletusobservetheconsequences。Toconsiderthematterfirstapriori，asintheprecedingexperiment；wemayconclude，thattheobjectwillhaveasmall，butanuncertainconnexionwiththesepassions。Forbesides，thatthisrelationisnotacoldandimperceptibleone，ithasnottheinconvenienceoftherelationofideas，nordirectsuswithequalforcetotwocontrarypassions，whichbytheiroppositiondestroyeachother。Butifweconsider，ontheotherhand，thatthistransitionfromthesensationtotheaffectionisnotforwardedbyanyprinciple，thatproducesatransitionofideas；but，onthecontrary，thattho’theoneimpressionbeeasilytransfus’dintotheother，yetthechangeofobjectsissuppos’dcontrarytoalltheprinciples，thatcauseatransitionofthatkind；wemayfromthenceinfer，thatnothingwilleverbeasteadyordurablecauseofanypassion，thatisconnectedwiththepassionmerelybyarelationofimpressions。Whatourreasonwou’dconcludefromanalogy，afterbalancingthesearguments，wou’dbe，thatanobject，whichproducespleasureoruneasiness，buthasnomannerofconnexioneitherwithourselvesorothers，maygivesuchaturntothedisposition，asthatmaynaturallyfallintoprideorlove，humilityorhatred，andsearchforotherobjects，uponwhichbyadoublerelation，itcanfoundtheseaffections；butthatanobject，whichhasonlyoneoftheserelations，tho’themostadvantageousone，cannevergiverisetoanyconstantandestablish’dpassion。
Mostfortunatelyallthisreasoningisfoundtobeexactlyconformabletoexperience，andthephaenomenaofthepassions。’SupposeIweretravellingwithacompanionthro’acountry，towhichwearebothutterstrangers；`tisevident，thatiftheprospectsbebeautiful，theroadsagreeable，andtheinnscommodious，thismayputmeintogoodhumourbothwithmyselfandfellow-traveller。Butaswesuppose，thatthiscountryhasnorelationeithertomyselforfriend。itcanneverbetheimmediatecauseofprideorlove；andthereforeifIfoundnotthepassiononsomeotherobject，thatbearseitherofusacloserrelation，myemotionsarerathertobeconsiderdastheoverflowingsofanelevateorhumanedisposition，thanasanestablish’dpassion。Thecaseisthesamewheretheobjectproducesuneasiness。
FourthExperiment。Havingfound，thatneitheranobjectwithoutanyrelationofideasorimpressions，noranobject，thathasonlyonerelation，canevercauseprideorhumility，loveorhatred；reasonalonemayconvinceus，withoutanyfartherexperiment，thatwhateverhasadoublerelationmustnecessarilyexcitethesepassions；since`tisevidenttheymusthavesomecause。Buttoleaveaslittleroomfordoubtaspossible，letusrenewourexperiments，andseewhethertheeventinthiscaseanswersourexpectation。Ichooseanobject，suchasvirtue，thatcausesaseparatesatisfaction:OnthisobjectIbestowarelationtoself；andfind，thatfromthisdispositionofaffairs，thereimmediatelyarisesapassion。Butwhatpassion？Thatveryoneofpride，towhichthisobjectbearsadoublerelation。Itsideaisrelatedtothatofself，theobjectofthepassion:Thesensationitcausesresemblesthesensationofthepassion。ThatImaybesureIamnotmistakeninthisexperiment，Iremovefirstonerelation；thenanother；andfind，thateachremovaldestroysthepassion，andleavestheobjectperfectlyindifferent。ButIamnotcontentwiththis。Imakeastillfarthertrial；andinsteadofremovingtherelation，Ionlychangeitforoneofadifferentkind。Isupposethevirtuetobelongtomycompanion，nottomyself；andobservewhatfollowsfromthisalteration。Iimmediatelyperceivetheaffectionswheeltoabout，andleavingpride，wherethereisonlyonerelation，viz，ofimpressions，falltothesideoflove，wheretheyareattractedbyadoublerelationofimpressionsandideas。Byrepeatingthesameexperiment，inchanginganewtherelationofideas，Ibringtheaffectionsbacktopride；andbyanewrepetitionIagainplacethematloveorkindness。Beingfullyconvinc’doftheinfluenceofthisrelation，Itrytheeffectsoftheother；andbychangingvirtueforvice，convertthepleasantimpression，whicharisesfromtheformer，intothedisagreeableone，whichproceedsfromthelatter。Theeffectstillanswersexpectation。Vice，whenplac’donanother，excites，bymeansofitsdoublerelations，thepassionofhatred，insteadoflove，whichforthesamereasonarisesfromvirtue。Tocontinuetheexperiment，Ichangeanewtherelationofideas，andsupposethevicetobelongtomyself。Whatfollows？Whatisusual。Asubsequentchangeofthepassionfromhatredtohumility。ThishumilityIconvertintopridebyanewchangeoftheimpression；andfindafterallthatIhavecompleatedtheround，andhavebythesechangesbroughtbackthepassiontothatverysituation，inwhichIfirstfoundit。
Buttomakethematterstillmorecertain，Ialtertheobject；andinsteadofviceandvirtue，makethetrialuponbeautyanddeformity，richesandpoverty，powerandservitude。Eachoftheseobjectsrunsthecircleofthepassionsinthesamemanner，byachangeoftheirrelations:Andinwhateverorderweproceed，whetherthro’pride，love，hatred，humility，orthro’humility，hatred，love，pride，theexperimentisnotintheleastdiversify’d。Esteemandcontempt，indeed，ariseonsomeoccasionsinsteadofloveandhatred；buttheseareatthebottomthesamepassions，onlydiversify’dbysomecauses，whichweshallexplainafterwards。
FifthExperiment。Togivegreaterauthoritytotheseexperiments，letuschangethesituationofaffairsasmuchaspossible，andplacethepassionsandobjectsinallthedifferentpositions，ofwhichtheyaresusceptible。Letussuppose，besidetherelationsabove-mention’d，thattheperson，alongwithwhomImakealltheseexperiments，iscloselyconnectedwithmeeitherbybloodorfriendship。Heis，weshallsuppose，mysonorbrother，orisunitedtomebyalongandfamiliaracquaintance。Letusnextsuppose，thatthecauseofthepassionacquiresadoublerelationofimpressionsandideastothisperson；andletusseewhattheeffectsareofallthesecomplicatedattractionsandrelations。
Beforeweconsiderwhattheyareinfact，letusdeterminewhat。theyoughttobe，conformabletomyhypothesis。`Tisplain，that，accordingastheimpressioniseitherpleasantoruneasy，thepassionofloveorhatredmustarisetowardstheperson，whoisthusconnectedtothecauseoftheimpressionbythesedoublerelations，whichIhaveallalongrequir’d。Thevirtueofabrothermustmakemelovehim；ashisviceorinfamymustexcitethecontrarypassion。Buttojudgeonlyfromthesituationofaffairs，Ishou’dnotexpect，thattheaffectionswou’drestthere，andnevertransfusethemselvesintoanyotherimpression。Asthereishereaperson，whobymeansofadoublerelationistheobjectofmypassion，theverysamereasoningleadsmetothinkthepassionwillbecarry’dfarther。Thepersonhasarelationofideastomyself，accordingtothesupposition；thepassion，ofwhichheistheobject，bybeingeitheragreeableoruneasy，hasarelationofimpressionstoprideorhumility。`Tisevident，then，thatoneofthesepassionsmustarisefromtheloveorhatred。
ThisisthereasoningIforminconformitytomyhypothesis；andampleas’dtofindupontrialthateverythinganswersexactlytomyexpectation。Thevirtueorviceofasonorbrothernotonlyexcitesloveorhatred，butbyanewtransition，fromsimilarcauses，givesrisetoprideorhumility。Nothingcausesgreatervanitythananyshiningqualityinourrelations；asnothingmortifiesusmorethantheirviceorinfamy。Thisexactconformityofexperiencetoourreasoningisaconvincingproofofthesolidityofthathypothesis，uponwhichwereason。
SixthExperiment。Thisevidencewillbestillaugmented，ifwereversetheexperiment，andpreservingstillthesamerelations，beginonlywithadifferentpassion。Suppose，thatinsteadofthevirtueorviceofasonorbrother，whichcausesfirstloveorhatred，andafterwardsprideorhumility，weplacethesegoodorbadqualitiesonourselves，withoutanyimmediateconnexionwiththeperson，whoisrelatedtous:Experienceshewsus，thatbythischangeofsituationthewholechainisbroke，andthatthemindisnotconvey’dfromonepassiontoanother，asintheprecedinginstance。Weneverloveorhateasonorbrotherforthevirtueorvicewediscerninourselves；tho’`tisevidentthesamequalitiesinhimgiveusaverysensibleprideorhumility。Thetransitionfromprideorhumilitytoloveorhatredisnotsonaturalasfromloveorhatredtoprideorhumility。Thismayatfirstsightbeesteem’dcontrarytomyhypothesis；sincetherelationsofimpressionsandideasareinbothcasespreciselythesame。Prideandhumilityareimpressionsrelatedtoloveandhatred。Myselfamrelatedtotheperson。Itshou’d，therefore，beexpected，thatlikecausesmustproducelikeeffects，andaperfecttransitionarisefromthedoublerelation，asinallothercases。Thisdifficultywemayeasilysolvebythefollowingreflections。
Tisevident，thatasweareatalltimesintimatelyconsciousofourselves，oursentimentsandpassions，theirideasmuststrikeuponuswithgreatervivacitythantheideasofthesentimentsandpassionsofanyotherperson。Buteverything，thatstrikesuponuswithvivacity，andappearsinafullandstronglight，forcesitself，inamanner，intoourconsideration，andbecomespresenttothemindonthesmallesthintandmosttrivialrelation。Forthesamereason，whenitisoncepresent，itengagestheattention，andkeepsitfromwanderingtootherobjects，howeverstrongmaybetheirrelationtoourfirstobject。Theimaginationpasseseasilyfromobscuretolivelyideas，butwithdifficultyfromlivelytoobscure。Intheonecasetherelationisaidedbyanotherprinciple:Intheothercase，`tisoppos’dbyit。
NowIhaveobserv’d，thatthosetwofacultiesofthemind，theimaginationandpassions，assisteachotherintheiroperationswhentheirpropensitiesaresimilar，andwhentheyactuponthesameobject。Themindhasalwaysapropensitytopassfromapassiontoanyotherrelatedtoit；andthispropensityisforwardedwhentheobjectoftheonepassionisrelatedtothatoftheother。Thetwoimpulsesconcurwitheachother，andrenderthewholetransitionmoresmoothandeasy。Butifitshou’dhappen，thatwhiletherelationofideas，strictlyspeaking，continuesthesame，itsinfluence，incausingatransitionoftheimagination，shou’dnolongertakeplace，`tisevidentitsinfluenceonthepassionsmustalsocease，asbeingdependententirelyonthattransition。Thisisthereasonwhyprideorhumilityisnottransfus’dintoloveorhatredwiththesameease，thatthelatterpassionsarechang’dintotheformer。IfapersonbemybrotherIamhislikewise:buttho’therelationsbereciprocaltheyhaveverydifferenteffectsontheimagination。Thepassageissmoothandopenfromtheconsiderationofanypersonrelatedtoustothatofourself，ofwhomweareeverymomentconscious。Butwhentheaffectionsareoncedirectedtoourself。thefancypassesnotwiththesamefacilityfromthatobjecttoanyotherperson，howcloselysoeverconnectedwithus。Thiseasyordifficulttransitionoftheimaginationoperatesuponthepassions，andfacilitatesorretardstheirtransition，whichisaclearproof，thatthesetwofacultiesofthepassionsandimaginationareconnectedtogether，andthattherelationsofideashaveaninfluenceupontheaffections。Besidesinnumerableexperimentsthatprovethis，weherefind，thatevenwhentherelationremains；ifbyanyparticularcircumstanceitsusualeffectuponthefancyinproducinganassociationortransitionofideas，isprevented；itsusualeffectuponthepassions，inconveyingusfromonetoanother，isinlikemannerprevented。
Somemay，perhaps，findacontradictionbetwixtthisphaenomenonandthatofsympathy，wherethemindpasseseasilyfromtheideaofourselvestothatofanyotherobjectrelatedtous。Butthisdifficultywillvanish，ifweconsiderthatinsympathyourownpersonisnottheobjectofanypassion，noristhereanything，thatfixesourattentiononourselves；asinthepresentcase，wherewearesuppos’dtobeactuatedwithprideorhumility。Ourself，independentoftheperceptionofeveryotherobject，isinrealitynothing:Forwhichreasonwemustturnourviewtoexternalobjects；and`tisnaturalforustoconsiderwithmostattentionsuchasliecontiguoustous，orresembleus。Butwhenselfistheobjectofapassion，`tisnotnaturaltoquittheconsiderationofit，tillthepassionbeexhausted:inwhichcasethedoublerelationsofimpressionsandideascannolongeroperate。
SeventhExperiment。Toputthiswholereasoningtoafarthertrial，letusmakeanewexperiment；andaswehavealreadyseentheeffectsofrelatedpassionsandideas，letusheresupposeanidentityofpassions`alongwitharelationofideas；andletusconsidertheeffectsofthisnewsituation。`Tisevidentatransitionofthepassionsfromtheoneobjecttotheotherishereinallreasontobeexpected；sincetherelationofideasissuppos’dstilltocontinue，andidentityofimpressionsmustproduceastrongerconnexion，thanthemostperfectresemblance，thatcanbeimagin’d。Ifadoublerelation，therefore，ofimpressionsandideasisabletoproduceatransitionfromonetotheother，muchmoreanidentityofimpressionswitharelationofideas。Accordinglywefind，thatwhenweeitherloveorhateanyperson，thepassionsseldomcontinuewithintheirfirstbounds；butextendthemselvestowardsallthecontiguousobjects，andcomprehendthefriendsandrelationsofhimweloveorhate。Nothingismorenaturalthantobearakindnesstoonebrotheronaccountofourfriendshipforanother，withoutanyfartherexaminationofhischaracter。Aquarrelwithonepersongivesusahatredforthewholefamily，tho’entirelyinnocentofthat，whichdispleasesus。Instancesofthiskindareeverywheretobemetwith。
Thereisonlyonedifficultyinthisexperiment，whichitwillbenecessarytoaccountfor，beforeweproceedanyfarther。Tisevident，thattho’allpassionspasseasilyfromoneobjecttoanotherrelatedtoit，yetthistransitionismadewithgreaterfacility，wherethemoreconsiderableobjectisfirstpresented，andthelesserfollowsit，thanwherethisorderisrevers’d，andthelessertakestheprecedence。Thus`tismorenaturalforustolovethesonuponaccountofthefather，thanthefatheruponaccountoftheson；theservantforthemaster，thanthemasterfortheservant；thesubjectfortheprince，thantheprinceforthesubject。Inlikemannerwemorereadilycontractahatredagainstawholefamily，whereourfirstquarreliswiththeheadofit，thanwherewearedispleas’dwithason，orservant，orsomeinferiormember。Inshort，ourpassions，likeotherobjects，descendwithgreaterfacilitythantheyascend。
Thatwemaycomprehend，whereinconsiststhedifficultyofexplainingthisphaenomenon，wemustconsider，thattheverysamereason，whichdeterminestheimaginationtopassfromremotetocontiguousobjects，withmorefacilitythanfromcontiguoustoremote，causesitlikewisetochangewithmoreease，thelessforthegreater，thanthegreaterfortheless。Whateverhasthegreatestinfluenceismosttakennoticeof；andwhateverismosttakennoticeof，presentsitselfmostreadilytotheimagination。Wearemoreapttoover-lookinanysubject，whatistrivial，thanwhatappearsofconsiderablemoment；butespeciallyifthelattertakestheprecedence，andfirstengagesourattention。ThusifanyaccidentmakesusconsidertheSatellitesofJupiter，ourfancyisnaturallydetermin’dtoformtheideaofthatplanet；butifwefirstreflectontheprincipalplanet，`tismorenaturalforustooverlookitsattendants。Thementionoftheprovincesofanyempireconveysourthoughttotheseatoftheempire；butthefancyreturnsnotwiththesamefacilitytotheconsiderationoftheprovinces。Theideaoftheservantmakesusthinkofthemaster；thatofthesubjectcarriesourviewtotheprince。Butthesamerelationhasnotanequalinfluenceinconveyingusbackagain。AndonthisisfoundedthatreproachofCorneliatohersons，thattheyoughttobeasham’dsheshou’dbemoreknownbythetitleofthedaughterofScipiothanbythatofthemotheroftheGracchi。Thiswas，inotherwords，exhortingthemtorenderthemselvesasillustriousandfamousastheirgrandfather，otherwisetheimaginationofthepeople，passingfromherwhowasintermediate，andplac’dinanequalrelationtoboth，wou’dalwaysleavethem，anddenominateherbywhatwasmoreconsiderableandofgreatermoment。Onthesameprincipleisfoundedthatcommoncustomofmakingwivesbearthenameoftheirhusbands，ratherthanhusbandsthatoftheirwives；asalsotheceremonyofgivingtheprecedencytothose，whomwehonourandrespect。Wemightfindmanyotherinstancestoconfirmthisprinciple，wereitnotalreadysufficientlyevident。
Nowsincethefancyfindsthesamefacilityinpassingfromthelessertothegreater，asfromremotetocontiguous，whydoesnotthiseasytransitionofideasassistthetransitionofpassionsintheformercase，aswellasinthelatter？Thevirtuesofafriendorbrotherproducefirstlove，andthenpride；becauseinthatcasetheimaginationpassesfromremotetocontiguous，accordingtoitspropensity。Ourownvirtuesproducenotfirstpride，andthenlovetoafriendorbrother；becausethepassageinthatcasewou’dbefromcontiguoustoremote，contrarytoitspropensity。Buttheloveorhatredofaninferiorcausesnotreadilyanypassiontothesuperior，tho’thatbethenaturalpropensityoftheimagination:Whiletheloveorhatredofasuperior，causesapassiontotheinferior，contrarytoitspropensity。Inshort，thesamefacilityoftransitionoperatesnotinthesamemanneruponsuperiorandinferiorasuponcontiguousandremote。Thesetwophaenomenaappearcontradictory，andrequiresomeattentiontobereconcil’d。
Asthetransitionofideasisheremadecontrarytothenaturalpropensityoftheimagination，thatfacultymustbeoverpower’dbysomestrongerprincipleofanotherkind；andasthereisnothingeverpresenttothemindbutimpressionsandideas，thisprinciplemustnecessarilylieintheimpressions。Nowithasbeenobserv’d，thatimpressionsorpassionsareconnectedonlybytheirresemblance，andthatwhereanytwopassionsplacethemindinthesameorinsimilardispositions，itverynaturallypassesfromtheonetotheother:Asonthecontrary，arepugnanceinthedispositionsproducesadifficultyinthetransitionofthepassions。But`tisobservable，thatthisrepugnancemayarisefromadifferenceofdegreeaswellasofkind；nordoweexperienceagreaterdifficultyinpassingsuddenlyfromasmalldegreeoflovetoasmalldegreeofhatred，thanfromasmalltoagreatdegreeofeitheroftheseaffections。Aman，whencalmoronlymoderatelyagitated，issodifferent，ineveryrespect，fromhimself，whendisturbedwithaviolentpassion，thatnotwopersonscanbemoreunlike；norisiteasytopassfromtheoneextremetotheother，withoutaconsiderableintervalbetwixtthem。
Thedifficultyisnotless，ifitbenotrathergreater，inpassingfromthestrongpassiontotheweak，thaninpassingfromtheweaktothestrong，providedtheonepassionuponitsappearancedestroystheother，andtheydonotbothofthemexistatonce。Butthecaseisentirelyalter’d，whenthepassionsunitetogether，andactuatethemindatthesametime。Aweakpassion，whenaddedtoastrong，makesnotsoconsiderableachangeinthedisposition，asastrongwhenaddedtoaweak；forwhichreasonthereisacloserconnexionbetwixtthegreatdegreeandthesmall，thanbetwixtthesmalldegreeandthegreat。
Thedegreeofanypassiondependsuponthenatureofitsobject；andanaffectiondirectedtoaperson，whoisconsiderableinoureyes，fillsandpossessesthemindmuchmorethanone，whichhasforitsobjectapersonweesteemoflessconsequence。Herethenthecontradictionbetwixtthepropensitiesoftheimaginationandpassiondisplaysitself。Whenweturnourthoughttoagreatandasmallobject，theimaginationfindsmorefacilityinpassingfromthesmalltothegreat，thanfromthegreattothesmall；buttheaffectionsfindagreaterdifficulty:Andastheaffectionsareamorepowerfulprinciplethantheimagination，nowondertheyprevailoverit，anddrawthe’mindtotheirside。Inspiteofthedifficultyofpassingfromtheideaofgreattothatoflittle，apassiondirectedtotheformer，producesalwaysasimilarpassiontowardsthelatter；whenthegreatandlittlearerelatedtogether。Theideaoftheservantconveysourthoughtmostreadilytothemaster；butthehatredorloveofthemasterproduceswithgreaterfacilityangerorgood-willtotheservant。Thestrongestpassioninthiscasetakestheprecedence；andtheadditionoftheweakermakingnoconsiderablechangeonthedisposition，thepassageisbythatmeansrender’dmoreeasyandnaturalbetwixtthem。
Asintheforegoingexperimentwefound，thatarelationofideas，which，byanyparticularcircumstance，ceasestoproduceitsusualeffectoffacilitatingthetransitionofideas，ceaseslikewisetooperateonthepassions；sointhepresentexperimentwefindthesamepropertyoftheimpressions。Twodifferentdegreesofthesamepassionaresurelyrelatedtogether；butifthesmallerbefirstpresent，ithaslittleornotendencytointroducethegreater；andthatbecausetheadditionofthegreattothelittle，producesamoresensiblealterationonthetemper，thantheadditionofthelittletothegreat。Thesephaenomena，whendulyweigh’d，willbefoundconvincingproofsofthishypothesis。
Andtheseproofswillbeconfirm’d，ifweconsiderthemannerinwhichthemindherereconcilesthecontradiction，Ihaveobserv’dbetwixtthepassionsandtheimagination。Thefancypasseswithmorefacilityfromthelesstothegreater，thanfromthegreatertotheless:Butonthecontraryaviolentpassionproducesmoreeasilyafeeble，thanthatdoesaviolent。Inthisoppositionthepassionintheendprevailsovertheimagination；but`tiscommonlybycomplyingwithit，andbyseekinganotherquality，whichmaycounter-ballancethatprinciple，fromwhencetheoppositionarises。Whenwelovethefatherormasterofafamily，welittlethinkofhischildrenorservants。Butwhenthesearepresentwithus，orwhenitliesanywaysinourpowertoservethem，thenearnessandcontiguityinthiscaseencreasestheirmagnitude，oratleastremovesthatopposition，whichthefancymakestothetransitionoftheaffections。Iftheimaginationfindsadifficultyinpassingfromgreatertoless，itfindsanequalfacilityinpassingfromremotetocontiguous，whichbringsthemattertoanequality，andleavesthewayopenfromtheonepassiontotheother。
EighthExperiment。Ihaveobserv’dthatthetransitionfromloveorhatredtoprideorhumility，ismoreeasythanfromprideorhumilitytoloveorhatred；andthatthedifficulty，whichtheimaginationfindsinpassingfromcontiguoustoremote，isthecausewhywescarcehaveanyinstanceofthelattertransitionoftheaffections。Imust，however，makeoneexception，viz，whentheverycauseoftheprideandhumilityisplac’dinsomeotherperson。Forinthatcasetheimaginationisnecessitatedtoconsidertheperson，norcanitpossiblyconfineitsviewtoourselves。Thusnothingmorereadilyproduceskindnessandaffectiontoanyperson，thanhisapprobationofourconductandcharacter:Asontheotherhand，nothinginspiresuswithastrongerhatred，thanhisblameorcontempt。Here`tisevident，thattheoriginalpassionisprideorhumility，whoseobjectisself；andthatthispassionistransfus’dintoloveorhatred，whoseobjectissomeotherperson，notwithstandingtheruleIhavealreadyestablish’d，thattheimaginationpasseswithdifficultyfromcontiguoustoremote。Butthetransitioninthiscaseisnotmademerelyonaccountoftherelationbetwixtourselvesandtheperson；butbecausethatverypersonistherealcauseofourfirstpassion，andofconsequenceisintimatelyconnectedwithit。`Tishisapprobationthatproducespride；anddisapprobation，humility。Nowonder，then，theimaginationreturnsbackagainattendedwiththerelatedpassionsofloveandhatred。Thisisnotacontradiction，butanexceptiontotherule；andanexceptionthatarisesfromthesamereasonwiththeruleitself。
Suchanexceptionasthisis，therefore，ratheraconfirmationoftherule。Andindeed，ifweconsideralltheeightexperimentsIhaveexplain’d，weshallfindthatthesameprincipleappearsinallofthem，andthat`tisbymeansofatransitionarisingfromadoublerelationofimpressionsandideas，prideandhumility，loveandhatredareproduc’d。Anobjectwithout(7)arelation，or(8)withbutone，neverproduceseitherofthesepassions；and`tis(9)foundthatthepassionalwaysvariesinconformitytotherelation。Naywemayobserve，thatwheretherelation，byanyparticularcircumstance，hasnotitsusualeffectofproducingatransitioneitherof(10)ideasorofimpressions，itceasestooperateuponthepassions，andgivesriseneithertopridenorlove，humilitynorhatred。Thisrulewefindstilltoholdgood(11)evenundertheappearanceofitscontrary；andasrelationisfrequentlyexperienc’dtohavenoeffect；whichuponexaminationisfoundtoproceedfromsomeparticularcircumstance，thatpreventsthetransition；soevenininstances，wherethatcircumstance，tho’present，preventsnotthetransition，`tisfoundtoarisefromsomeothercircumstance，whichcounter-balancesit。Thusnotonlythevariationsresolvethemselvesintothegeneralprinciple，buteventhevariationsofthesevariations。
Difficultiessolv’dAftersomanyandsuchundeniableproofsdrawnfromdailyexperienceandobservation，itmayseemsuperfluoustoenterintoaparticularexaminationofallthecausesofloveandhatred。Ishall，therefore，employthesequelofthispart，First，Inremovingsomedifficulties，concerningparticularcausesofthesepassions。Secondly，Inexaminingthecompoundaffections，whicharisefromthemixtureofloveandhatredwithotheremotions。
Nothingismoreevident，thanthatanypersonacquiresourkindness，orisexpos’dtoourill-will，inproportiontothepleasureoruneasinesswereceivefromhim，andthatthepassionskeeppaceexactlywiththesensationsinalltheirchangesandvariations。Whoevercanfindthemeanseitherbyhisservices，hisbeauty，orhisflattery，torenderhimselfusefuloragreeabletous，issureofouraffections:Asontheotherhand，whoeverharmsordispleasesusneverfailstoexciteourangerorhatred。Whenourownnationisatwarwithanyother，wedetestthemunderthecharacterofcruel，perfidious，unjustandviolent:Butalwaysesteemourselvesandalliesequitable，moderate，andmerciful。Ifthegeneralofourenemiesbesuccessful，`tiswithdifficultyweallowhimthefigureandcharacterofaman。Heisasorcerer:Hehasacommunicationwithdaemons；asisreportedofOliverCromwell，andtheDukeofLuxembourg:Heisbloody-minded，andtakesapleasureindeathanddestruction。Butifthesuccessbeonourside，ourcommanderhasalltheoppositegoodqualities，andisapatternofvirtue，aswellasofcourageandconduct。Histreacherywecallpolicy:Hiscrueltyisanevilinseparablefromwar。Inshort，everyoneofhisfaultsweeitherendeavourtoextenuate，ordignifyitwiththenameofthatvirtue，whichapproachesit。`Tisevidentthesamemethodofthinkingrunsthro’commonlife。
Therearesome，whoaddanothercondition，andrequirenotonlythatthepainandpleasurearisefromtheperson，butlikewisethatitariseknowingly，andwithaparticulardesignandintention。Aman，whowoundsandharmsusbyaccident，becomesnotourenemyuponthataccount，nordowethinkourselvesboundbyanytiesofgratitudetoone，whodoesusanyserviceafterthesamemanner。Bytheintentionwejudgeoftheactions，andaccordingasthatisgoodorbad，theybecomecausesofloveorhatred。
Butherewemustmakeadistinction。Ifthatqualityinanother，whichpleasesordispleases，beconstantandinherentinhispersonandcharacter，itwillcauseloveorhatredindependentoftheintention:Butotherwiseaknowledgeanddesignisrequisite，inordertogiverisetothesepassions。Onethatisdisagreeablebyhisdeformityorfollyistheobjectofouraversion，tho’nothingbemorecertain，thanthathehasnottheleastintentionofdispleasingusbythesequalities。Butiftheuneasinessproceednotfromaquality，butanaction，whichisproduc’dandannihilatedinamoment，`tisnecessary，inordertoproducesomerelation，andconnectthisactionsufficientlywiththeperson。thatitbederiv’dfromaparticularfore-thoughtanddesign。’Tisnotenough，thattheactionarisefromtheperson，andhavehimforitsimmediatecauseandauthor。Thisrelationaloneistoofeebleandinconstanttobeafoundationforthesepassions。Itreachesnotthesensibleandthinkingpart，andneitherproceedsfromanythingdurableinhim，norleavesanythingbehindit；butpassesinamoment，andisasifithadneverbeen。Ontheotherhand，anintentionshewscertainqualities，whichremainingaftertheactionisperform’d，connectitwiththeperson，andfacilitatethetransitionofideasfromonetotheother。Wecanneverthinkofhimwithoutreflectingonthesequalities；unlessrepentanceandachangeoflifehaveproduc’danalterationinthatrespect:Inwhichcasethepassionislikewisealter’d。Thisthereforeisonereason，whyanintentionisrequisitetoexciteeitherloveorhatred。
Butwemustfartherconsider，thatanintention，besidesitsstrengtheningtherelationofideas，isoftennecessarytoproducearelationofimpressions，andgiverisetopleasureanduneasiness。For`tisobservable，thattheprincipalpartofaninjuryisthecontemptandhatred，whichitshewsintheperson，thatinjuresus；andwithoutthat，themereharmgivesusalesssensibleuneasiness。Inlikemanner，agoodofficeisagreeable，chieflybecauseitflattersourvanity，andisaproofofthekindnessandesteemoftheperson，whoperformsit。Theremovaloftheintention，removesthemortificationintheonecase，andvanityintheother，andmustofcoursecausearemarkablediminutioninthepassionsofloveandhatred。
Igrant，thattheseeffectsoftheremovalofdesign，indiminishingtherelationsofimpressionsandideas，arenotentire，norabletoremoveeverydegreeoftheserelations。ButthenIask，iftheremovalofdesignbeableentirelytoremovethepassionofloveandhatred？Experience，Iamsure，informsusofthecontrary，noristhereanythingmorecertain，thanthatmenoftenfallintoaviolentangerforinjuries，whichtheythemselvesmustowntobeentirelyinvoluntaryandaccidental。Thisemotion，indeed，cannotbeoflongcontinuance；butstillissufficienttoshew，thatthereisanaturalconnexionbetwixtuneasinessandanger，andthattherelationofimpressionswilloperateuponaverysmallrelationofideas。Butwhentheviolenceoftheimpressionisoncealittleabated，thedefectoftherelationbeginstobebetterfelt；andasthecharacterofapersonisnowiseinterestedinsuchinjuriesasarecasualandinvoluntary，itseldomhappensthatontheiraccount，weentertainalastingenmity。
Toillustratethisdoctrinebyaparallelinstance，wemayobserve，thatnotonlytheuneasiness，whichproceedsfromanotherbyaccident，hasbutlittleforcetoexciteourpassion，butalsothatwhicharisesfromanacknowledg’dnecessityandduty。Onethathasarealdesignofharmingus，proceedingnotfromhatredandill-will，butfromjusticeandequity，drawsnotuponhimouranger，ifwebeinanydegreereasonable；notwithstandingheisboththecause，andtheknowingcauseofoursufferings。Letusexaminealittlethisphaenomenon。
Tisevidentinthefirstplace，thatthiscircumstanceisnotdecisive；andtho’itmaybeabletodiminishthepassions，`tisseldomitcanentirelyremovethem。Howfewcriminalsarethere，whohavenoill-willtotheperson，thataccusesthem，ortothejudge，thatcondemnsthem，eventho’theybeconsciousoftheirowndeserts？Inlikemannerourantagonistinalaw-suit，andourcompetitorforanyoffice，arecommonlyregardedasourenemies；tho’wemustacknowledge，ifwewou’dbutreflectamoment，thattheirmotiveisentirelyasjustifiableasourown。
Besideswemayconsider，thatwhenwereceiveharmfromanyperson，weareapttoimaginehimcriminal，and`tiswithextremedifficultyweallowofhisjusticeandinnocence。Thisisaclearproof，that，independentoftheopinionofiniquity，anyharmoruneasinesshasanaturaltendencytoexciteourhatred，andthatafterwardsweseekforreasonsuponwhichwemayjustifyandestablishthepassion。Heretheideaofinjuryproducesnotthepassion，butarisesfromit。
Norisitanywonderthatpassionshou’dproducetheopinionofinjury；sinceotherwiseitmustsufferaconsiderablediminution，whichallthepassionsavoidasmuchaspossible。Theremovalofinjurymayremovetheanger，withoutprovingthattheangerarisesonlyfromtheinjury。Theharmandthejusticearetwocontraryobjects，ofwhichtheonehasatendencytoproducehatred，andtheotherlove；and`tisaccordingtotheirdifferentdegrees，andourparticularturnofthinking，thateitheroftheobjectsprevails，andexcitesitsproperpassion。
OftheloveofrelationsHavinggivenareason，whyseveralactions，thatcausearealpleasureoruneasiness，excitenotanydegree，orbutasmallone，ofthepassionofloveorhatredtowardstheactors；`twillbenecessarytoshew，whereinconsiststhepleasureoruneasinessofmanyobjects，whichwefindbyexperiencetoproducethesepassions。
Accordingtotheprecedingsystemthereisalwaysrequir’dadoublerelationofimpressionsandideasbetwixtthecauseandeffect，inordertoproduceeitherloveorhatred。Buttho’thisbeuniversallytrue，`tisremarkablethatthepassionoflovemaybeexcitedbyonlyonerelationofadifferentkind，viz，betwixtourselvesandtheobject；ormoreproperlyspeaking，thatthisrelationisalwaysattendedwithboththeothers。Whoeverisunitedtousbyanyconnexionisalwayssureofashareofourlove，proportion’dtotheconnexion，withoutenquiringintohisotherqualities。Thustherelationofbloodproducesthestrongesttiethemindiscapableofintheloveofparentstotheirchildren，andalesserdegreeofthesameaffection，astherelationlessens。Norhasconsanguinityalonethiseffect，butanyotherrelationwithoutexception。Weloveourcountry-men，ourneighbours，thoseofthesametrade，profession，andevennamewithourselves。Everyoneoftheserelationsisesteem’dsometie，andgivesatitletoashareofouraffection。
Thereisanotherphaenomenon，whichisparalleltothis，viz，thatacquaintance，withoutanykindofrelation，givesrisetoloveandkindness。Whenwehavecontractedahabitudeandintimacywithanyperson；tho’infrequentinghiscompanywehavenotbeenabletodiscoveranyveryvaluablequality，ofwhichheispossess’d；yetwecannotforebearpreferringhimtostrangers，ofwhosesuperiormeritwearefullyconvinc’d。Thesetwophaenomenaoftheeffectsofrelationandacquaintancewillgivemutuallighttoeachother，andmaybebothexplain’dfromthesameprinciple。
Those，whotakeapleasureindeclaimingagainsthumannature，haveobserv’d，thatmanisaltogetherinsufficienttosupporthimself；andthatwhenyouloosenalltheholds，whichhehasofexternalobjects，heimmediatelydropsdownintothedeepestmelancholyanddespair。Fromthis，saythey，proceedsthatcontinualsearchafteramusementingaming，inhunting，inbusiness；bywhichweendeavourtoforgetourselves，andexciteourspiritsfromthelanguidstate，intowhichtheyfall，whennotsustain’dbysomebriskandlivelyemotion。TothismethodofthinkingIsofaragree，thatIownthemindtobeinsufficient，ofitself，toitsownentertainment，andthatitnaturallyseeksafterforeignobjects，whichmayproducealivelysensation，andagitatethespirits。Ontheappearanceofsuchanobjectitawakes，asitwere，fromadream:Thebloodflowswithanewtide:Theheartiselevated:Andthewholemanacquiresavigour，whichhecannotcommandinhissolitaryandcalmmoments。Hencecompanyisnaturallysorejoicing，aspresentingtheliveliestofallobjects，viz，arationalandthinkingBeinglikeourselves，whocommunicatestousalltheactionsofhismind；makesusprivytohisinmostsentimentsandaffections；andletsussee，intheveryinstantoftheirproduction，alltheemotions，whicharecaus’dbyanyobject。Everylivelyideaisagreeable，butespeciallythatofapassion，becausesuchanideabecomesakindofpassion，andgivesamoresensibleagitationtothemind，thananyotherimageorconception。
Thisbeingonceadmitted，alltherestiseasy。Forasthecompanyofstrangersisagreeabletousforashorttime，byinliveningourthought；sothecompanyofourrelationsandacquaintancemustbepeculiarlyagreeable，becauseithasthiseffectinagreaterdegree，andisofmoredurableinfluence。Whateverisrelatedtousisconceiv’dinalivelymannerbytheeasytransitionfromourselvestotherelatedobject。Customalso，oracquaintancefacilitatestheentrance，andstrengthenstheconceptionofanyobject。Thefirstcaseisparalleltoourreasoningsfromcauseandeffect；thesecondtoeducation。Andasreasoningandeducationconcuronlyinproducingalivelyandstrongideaofanyobject；soisthistheonlyparticular，whichiscommontorelationandacquaintance。Thismust，therefore，betheinfluencingquality，bywhichtheyproducealltheircommoneffects；andloveorkindnessbeingoneoftheseeffects，itmustbefromtheforceandlivelinessofconception，thatthepassionisderiv’d。Suchaconceptionispeculiarlyagreeable，andmakesushaveanaffectionateregardforeverything，thatproducesit，whentheproperobjectofkindnessandgoodwill。
`Tisobvious，thatpeopleassociatetogetheraccordingtotheirparticulartempersanddispositions，andthatmenofgaytempersnaturallylovethegay；astheseriousbearanaffectiontotheserious。Thisnotonlyhappens，wheretheyremarkthisresemblancebetwixtthemselvesandothers，butalsobythenaturalcourseofthedisposition，andbyacertainsympathy，whichalwaysarisesbetwixtsimilarcharacters。Wheretheyremarktheresemblance，itoperatesafterthemannerofarelation，byproducingaconnexionofideas。Wheretheydonotremarkit，itoperatesbysomeotherprinciple；andifthislatterprinciplebesimilartotheformer，itmustbereceiv’dasaconfirmationoftheforegoingreasoning。
Theideaofourselvesisalwaysintimatelypresenttous，andconveysasensibledegreeofvivacitytotheideaofanyotherobject，towhichwearerelated。Thislivelyideachangesbydegreesintoarealimpression；thesetwokindsofperceptionbeinginagreatmeasurethesame，anddifferingonlyintheirdegreesofforceandvivacity。Butthischangemustbeproduc’dwiththegreaterease，thatournaturaltempergivesusapropensitytothesameimpression，whichweobserveinothers，andmakesitariseuponanyslightoccasion。Inthatcaseresemblanceconvertstheideaintoanimpression，notonlybymeansoftherelation，andbytransfusingtheoriginalvivacityintotherelatedidea；butalsobypresentingsuchmaterialsastakefirefromtheleastspark。Andasinbothcasesaloveoraffectionarisesfromtheresemblance，wemaylearnthatasympathywithothersisagreeableonlybygivinganemotiontothespirits，sinceaneasysympathyandcorrespondentemotionsarealonecommontorelation，acquaintance，andresemblance。
Thegreatpropensitymenhavetopridemaybeconsider’dasanothersimilarphaenomenon。Itoftenhappens，thatafterwehaveliv’daconsiderabletimeinanycity；howeveratfirstitmightbedisagreeabletous；yetaswebecomefamiliarwiththeobjects，andcontactanacquaintance，tho’merelywiththestreetsandbuildings，theaversiondiminishesbydegrees，andatlastchangesintotheoppositepassion。Themindfindsasatisfactionandeaseintheviewofobjects，towhichitisaccustom’d，andnaturallyprefersthemtoothers，which，tho’，perhaps，inthemselvesmorevaluable，arelessknowntoit。Bythesamequalityofthemindweareseduc’dintoagoodopinionofourselves，andofallobjects，thatbelongtous。Theyappearinastrongerlight；aremoreagreeable；andconsequentlyfittersubjectsofprideandvanity，thananyother。
Itmaynotbeamiss，intreatingoftheaffectionwebearouracquaintanceandrelations，toobservesomeprettycuriousphaenomena，whichattendit。`Tiseasytoremarkincommonlife，thatchildrenesteemtheirrelationtotheirmothertobeweaken’d，inagreatmeasure，byhersecondmarriage，andnolongerregardherwiththesameeye，asifshehadcontinu’dinherstateofwidow-hood。Nordoesthishappenonly，whentheyhavefeltanyinconveniencesfromhersecondmarriage，orwhenherhusbandismuchherinferior；butevenwithoutanyoftheseconsiderations，andmerelybecauseshehasbecomepartofanotherfamily。Thisalsotakesplacewithregardtothesecondmarriageofafather；butinamuchlessdegree:And`tiscertainthetiesofbloodarenotsomuchloosen’dinthelattercaseasbythemarriageofamother。Thesetwophaenomenaareremarkableinthemselves，butmuchmoresowhencompared。
Inordertoproduceaperfectrelationbetwixttwoobjects，`tisrequisite，notonlythattheimaginationbeconvey’dfromonetotheotherbyresemblance，contiguityorcausation，butalsothatitreturnbackfromthesecondtothefirstwiththesameeaseandfacility。Atfirstsightthismayseemanecessaryandunavoidableconsequence。Ifoneobjectresembleanother，thelatterobjectmustnecessarilyresembletheformer。Ifoneobjectbethecauseofanother，thesecondobjectiseffecttoitscause。`Tisthesamecasewithcontiguity:Andthereforetherelationbeingalwaysreciprocal，itmaybethought，thatthereturnoftheimaginationfromthesecondtothefirstmustalso，ineverycase，beequallynaturalasitspassagefromthefirsttothesecond。Butuponfartherexaminationweshalleasilydiscoverourmistake。Forsupposingthesecondobject，besideitsreciprocalrelationtothefirst，tohavealsoastrongrelationtoathirdobject；inthatcasethethought，passingfromthefirstobjecttothesecond，returnsnotbackwiththesamefacility，tho’therelationcontinuesthesame；butisreadilycarry’dontothethirdobject，bymeansofthenewrelation，whichpresentsitself，andgivesanewimpulsetotheimagination。Thisnewrelation，therefore，weakensthetiebetwixtthefirstandsecondobjects。Thefancyisbyitsverynaturewaveringandinconstant；andconsidersalwaystwoobjectsasmorestronglyrelatedtogether，whereitfindsthepassageequallyeasybothingoingandreturning，thanwherethetransitioniseasyonlyinoneofthesemotions。Thedoublemotionisakindofadoubletie，andbindstheobjectstogetherintheclosestandmostintimatemanner。
Thesecondmarriageofamotherbreaksnottherelationofchildandparent；andthatrelationsufficestoconveymyimaginationfrommyselftoherwiththegreatesteaseandfacility。Butaftertheimaginationisarriv’datthispointofview，itfindsitsobjecttobesurroundedwithsomanyotherrelations，whichchallengeitsregard，thatitknowsnotwhichtoprefer，andisatalosswhatnewobjecttopitchupon。Thetiesofinterestanddutybindhertoanotherfamily，andpreventthatreturnofthefancyfromhertomyself，whichisnecessarytosupporttheunion。Thethoughthasnolongerthevibration，requisitetosetitperfectlyatease，andindulgeitsinclinationtochange。Itgoeswithfacility，butreturnswithdifficulty；andbythatinterruptionfindstherelationmuchweaken’dfromwhatitwou’dbewerethepassageopenandeasyonbothsides。
Nowtogiveareason，whythiseffectfollowsnotinthesamedegreeuponthesecondmarriageofafather:wemayreflectonwhathasbeenprov’dalready，thattho’theimaginationgoeseasilyfromtheviewofalesserobjecttothatofagreater，yetitreturnsnotwiththesamefacilityfromthegreatertotheless。Whenmyimaginationgoesfrommyselftomyfather，itpassesnotsoreadilyfromhimtohissecondwife，norconsidershimasenteringintoadifferentfamily，butascontinuingtheheadofthatfamily，ofwhichIammyselfapart。Hissuperioritypreventstheeasytransitionofthethoughtfromhimtohisspouse，butkeepsthepassagestillopenforareturntomyselfalongthesamerelationofchildandparent。Heisnotsunkinthenewrelationheacquires；sothatthedoublemotionorvibrationofthoughtisstilleasyandnatural。Bythisindulgenceofthefancyinitsinconstancy，thetieofchildandparentstillpreservesitsfullforceandinfluence。Amotherthinksnothertietoasonweaken’d，because`tisshar’dwithherhusband:Norasonhiswithaparent，because`tisshar’dwithabrother。Thethirdobjectishererelatedtothefirst，aswellastothesecond；sothattheimaginationgoesandcomesalongallofthemwiththegreatestfacility。
OfouresteemfortherichandpowerfulNothinghasagreatertendencytogiveusanesteemforanyperson，thanhispowerandriches；oracontempt，thanhispovertyandmeanness:Andasesteemandcontemptaretobeconsider’dasspeciesofloveandhatred，`twillbeproperinthisplacetoexplainthesephaenomena。
Hereithappensmostfortunately，thatthegreatestdifficultyisnottodiscoveraprinciplecapableofproducingsuchaneffect，buttochoosethechiefandpredominantamongseveral，thatpresentthemselves。Thesatisfactionwetakeintherichesofothers，andtheesteemwehaveforthepossessorsmaybeascrib’dtothreedifferentcauses。First，Totheobjectstheypossess；suchashouses，gardens，equipages；which，beingagreeableinthemselves，necessarilyproduceasentimentofpleasureineveryone；thateitherconsidersorsurveysthem。Secondly，Totheexpectationofadvantagefromtherichandpowerfulbyoursharingtheirpossessions。Thirdly，Tosympathy，whichmakesuspartakeofthesatisfactionofeveryone，thatapproachesus。Alltheseprinciplesmayconcurinproducingthepresentphaenomenon。Thequestionis，towhichofthemweoughtprincipallytoascribeit，`Tiscertain，thatthefirstprinciple，viz，thereflectiononagreeableobjects，hasagreaterinfluence，thanwhat，atfirstsight，wemaybeapttoimagine。Weseldomreflectonwhatisbeautifulorugly，agreeableordisagreeable，withoutanemotionofpleasureoruneasiness；andtho’thesesensationsappearnotmuchinourcommonindolentwayofthinking，`tiseasy，eitherinreadingorconversation，todiscoverthem。Menofwitalwaysturnthediscourseonsubjectsthatareentertainingtotheimagination；andpoetsneverpresentanyobjectsbutsuchasareofthesamenature。MrPhilipshaschosenCyderforthesubjectofanexcellentpoem。Beerwou’dnothavebeensoproper，asbeingneithersoagreeabletothetastenoreye。Buthewou’dcertainlyhavepreferr’dwinetoeitherofthem，cou’dhisnativecountryhaveaffordedhimsoagreeablealiquor。Wemaylearnfromthence，thateverything，whichisagreeabletothesenses，isalsoinsomemeasureagreeabletothefancy，andconveystothethoughtanimageofthatsatisfaction，whichitgivesbyitsrealapplicationtothebodilyorgans。
Buttho’thesereasonsmayinduceustocomprehendthisdelicacyoftheimaginationamongthecausesoftherespect，whichwepaytherichandpowerful，therearemanyotherreasons，thatmaykeepusfromregardingitasthesoleorprincipal。Forastheideasofpleasurecanhaveaninfluenceonlybymeansoftheirvivacity，whichmakesthemapproachimpressions，`tismostnaturalthoseideasshou’dhavethatinfluence，whicharefavour’dbymostcircumstances，andhaveanaturaltendencytobecomestrongandlively；suchasourideasofthepassionsandsensationsofanyhumancreature。Everyhumancreatureresemblesourselves，andbythatmeanshasanadvantageaboveanyotherobject，inoperatingontheimagination。
Besides，ifweconsiderthenatureofthatfaculty，andthegreatinfluencewhichallrelationshaveuponit，weshalleasilybepersuaded，thathowevertheideasofthepleasantwines，music，orgardens，whichtherichmanenjoys，maybecomelivelyandagreeable，thefancywillnotconfineitselftothem，butwillcarryitsviewtotherelatedobjects；andinparticular，totheperson，whopossessesthem。Andthisisthemorenatural，thatthepleasantideaorimageproduceshereapassiontowardstheperson，bymeansofhisrelationtotheobject；sothat`tisunavoidablebuthemustenterintotheoriginalconception，sincehemakestheobjectofthederivativepassion:Butifheentersintotheoriginalconception，andisconsider’dasenjoyingtheseagreeableobjects，`tissympathy，whichisproperlythecauseoftheaffection；andthethirdprincipleismorepowerfulanduniversalthanthefirst。
Addtothis，thatrichesandpoweralone，eventho’unemploy’d，naturallycauseesteemandrespect:Andconsequentlythesepassionsarisenotfromtheideaofanybeautifuloragreeableobjects。Tistrue；moneyimpliesakindofrepresentationofsuchobjects，bythepoweritaffordsofobtainingthem；andforthatreasonmaystillbeesteem’dpropertoconveythoseagreeableimages，whichmaygiverisetothepassion。Butasthisprospectisverydistant，`tismorenaturalforustotakeacontiguousobject，viz，thesatisfaction，whichthispoweraffordstheperson，whoispossestofit。Andofthisweshallbefarthersatisfy’d，ifweconsider，thatrichesrepresentthegoodsoflife，onlybymeansofthewill；whichemploysthem；andthereforeimplyintheirverynatureanideaoftheperson，andcannotbeconsider’dwithoutakindofsympathywithhissensationsandenjoyments。
Thiswemayconfirmbyareflection，whichtosomewill，perhaps，appeartoosubtileandrefin’d。Ihavealreadyobserv’d，thatpower，asdistinguish’dfromitsexercise，haseithernomeaningatall，orisnothingbutapossibilityorprobabilityofexistence；bywhichanyobjectapproachestoreality，andhasasensibleinfluenceonthemind。Ihavealsoobserv’d，thatthisapproach，byanillusionofthefancy，appearsmuchgreater，whenweourselvesarepossestofthepower，thanwhenitisenjoy’dbyanother；andthatintheformercasetheobjectsseemtotouchupontheveryvergeofreality，andconveyalmostanequalsatisfaction，asifactuallyinourpossession。NowIassert，thatwhereweesteemapersonuponaccountofhisriches，wemustenterintothissentimentoftheproprietor，andthatwithoutsuchasympathytheideaoftheagreeableobjects，whichtheygivehimthepowertoproduce，wou’dhavebutafeebleinfluenceuponus。Anavaritiousmanisrespectedforhismoney，tho’hescarceispossestofapower；thatis，therescarceisaprobabilityorevenpossibilityofhisemployingitintheacquisitionofthepleasuresandconveniencesoflife。Tohimselfalonethispowerseemsperfectandentire；andthereforewemustreceivehissentimentsbysympathy，beforewecanhaveastrongintenseideaoftheseenjoyments，oresteemhimuponaccountofthem。
Thuswehavefound，thatthefirstprinciple，viz，theagreeableideaofthoseobjects，whichrichesaffordtheenjoymentof；resolvesitselfinagreatmeasureintothethird，andbecomesasympathywiththepersonweesteemorlove。Letusnowexaminethesecondprinciple，viz，theagreeableexpectationofadvantage，andseewhatforcewemayjustlyattributetoit。
`Tisobvious，thattho’richesandauthorityundoubtedlygivetheirownerapowerofdoingusservice，yetthispowerisnottobeconsider’dasonthesamefootingwiththat，whichtheyaffordhim，ofpleasinghimself，andsatisfyinghisownappetites。Self-loveapproachesthepowerandexerciseveryneareachotherinthelattercase；butinordertoproduceasimilareffectintheformer，wemustsupposeafriendshipandgood-willtobeconjoin’dwiththeriches。Withoutthatcircumstance`tisdifficulttoconceiveonwhatwecanfoundourhopeofadvantagefromtherichesofothers，tho’thereisnothingmorecertain，thanthatwenaturallyesteemandrespecttherich，evenbeforewediscoverinthemanysuchfavourabledispositiontowardsus。
ButIcarrythisfarther，andobserve，notonlythatwerespecttherichandpowerful，wheretheyshewnoinclinationtoserveus，butalsowhenweliesomuchoutofthesphereoftheiractivity，thattheycannotevenbesuppos’dtobeendow’dwiththatpower。Prisonersofwararealwaystreatedwitharespectsuitabletotheircondition；and`tiscertainrichesgoveryfartowardsfixingtheconditionofanyperson。Ifbirthandqualityenterforashare，thisstillaffordsusanargumentofthesamekind。Forwhatisitwecallamanofbirth，butonewhoisdescendedfromalongsuccessionofrichandpowerfulancestors，andwhoacquiresouresteembyhisrelationtopersonswhomweesteem？Hisancestors，therefore，tho’dead，arerespected，insomemeasure，onaccountoftheirriches，andconsequentlywithoutanykindofexpectation。
Butnottogosofarasprisonersofwarandthedeadtofindinstancesofthisdisinterestedesteemforriches，letusobservewithalittleattentionthosephaenomenathatoccurtousincommonlifeandconversation。Aman，whoishimselfofacompetentfortune，uponcomingintoacompanyofstrangers，naturallytreatsthemwithdifferentdegreesofrespectanddeference，asheisinform’doftheirdifferentfortunesandconditions；tho’`tisimpossiblehecaneverpropose，andperhapswou’dnotacceptofanyadvantagefromthem。Atravellerisalwaysadmittedintocompany，andmeetswithcivility，inproportionashistrainandequipagespeakhimamanofgreatormoderatefortune。Inshort，thedifferentranksofmenare，inagreatmeasure，regulatedbyriches，andthatwithregardtosuperiorsaswellasinferiors，strangersaswellasacquaintance。
Thereis，indeed，ananswertothesearguments，drawnfromtheinfluenceofgeneralrules。Itmaybepretended，thatbeingaccustom’dtoexpectsuccourandprotectionfromtherichandpowerful，andtoesteemthemuponthataccount，weextendthesamesentimentstothose，whoresemblethemintheirfortune，butfromwhomwecanneverhopeforanyadvantage。Thegeneralrulestillprevails，andbygivingabenttotheimaginationdrawsalongthepassion，inthesamemannerasifitsproperobjectwererealandexistent。
Butthatthisprincipledoesnotheretakeplace，willeasilyappear，ifweconsider，thatinordertoestablishageneralrule，andextenditbeyonditsproperbounds，thereisrequir’dacertainuniformityinourexperience，andagreatsuperiorityofthoseinstances，whichareconformabletotherule，abovethecontrary。Butherethecaseisquiteotherwise。OfahundredmenofcreditandfortuneImeetwith，thereisnot，perhaps，onefromwhomIcanexpectadvantage；sothat`tisimpossibleanycustomcaneverprevailinthepresentcase。
Uponthewhole，thereremainsnothing，whichcangiveusanesteemforpowerandriches，andacontemptformeannessandpoverty，excepttheprincipleofsympathy，bywhichweenterintothesentimentsoftherichandpoor，andpartakeoftheirpleasureanduneasiness。Richesgivesatisfactiontotheirpossessor；andthissatisfactionisconvey’dtothebeholderbytheimagination，whichproducesanidearesemblingtheoriginalimpressioninforceandvivacity。Thisagreeableideaorimpressionisconnectedwithlove，whichisanagreeablepassion。Itproceedsfromathinkingconsciousbeing，whichistheveryobjectoflove。Fromthisrelationofimpressions，andidentityofideas，thepassionarises，accordingtomyhypothesis。
Thebestmethodofreconcilingustothisopinionistotakeageneralsurveyoftheuniverse，andobservetheforceofsympathythro’thewholeanimalcreation，andtheeasycommunicationofsentimentsfromonethinkingbeingtoanother。Inallcreatures，thatpreynotuponothers，andarenotagitatedwithviolentpassions，thereappearsaremarkabledesireofcompany，whichassociatesthemtogether，withoutanyadvantagestheycaneverproposetoreapfromtheirunion。Thisisstillmoreconspicuousinman，asbeingthecreatureoftheuniverse，whohasthemostardentdesireofsociety，andisfittedforitbythemostadvantages。Wecanformnowish，whichhasnotareferencetosociety。Aperfectsolitudeis，perhaps，thegreatestpunishmentwecansuffer。Everypleasurelanguisheswhenenjoy’da-partfromcompany，andeverypainbecomesmorecruelandintolerable。Whateverotherpassionswemaybeactuatedby；pride，ambition，avarice，curiosity，revengeorlust；thesouloranimatingprincipleofthemallissympathy；norwou’dtheyhaveanyforce，werewetoabstractentirelyfromthethoughtsandsentimentsofothers。Letallthepowersandelementsofnatureconspiretoserveandobeyoneman:Letthesunriseandsetathiscommand:Theseaandriversrollashepleases，andtheearthfurnishspontaneouslywhatevermaybeusefuloragreeabletohim:Hewillstillbemiserable，tillyougivehimsomeonepersonatleast，withwhomhemaysharehishappiness，andwhoseesteemandfriendshiphemayenjoy。
Thisconclusionfromageneralviewofhumannature，wemayconfirmbyparticularinstances，whereintheforceofsympathyisveryremarkable。Mostkindsofbeautyarederiv’dfromthisorigin；andtho’ourfirstobjectbesomesenselessinanimatepieceofmatter，`tisseldomwerestthere，andcarrynotourviewtoitsinfluenceonsensibleandrationalcreatures。Aman，whoshewsusanyhouseorbuilding，takesparticularcareamongotherthingstopointouttheconvenienceoftheapartments，theadvantagesoftheirsituation，andthelittleroomlostinthestairs，antichambersandpassages；andindeed`tisevident，thechiefpartofthebeautyconsistsintheseparticulars。Theobservationofconveniencegivespleasure，sinceconvenienceisabeauty。Butafterwhatmannerdoesitgivepleasure？`Tiscertainourowninterestisnotintheleastconcern’d；andasthisisabeautyofinterest，notofform，sotospeak，itmustdelightusmerelybycommunication，andbyoursympathizingwiththeproprietorofthelodging。Weenterintohisinterestbytheforceofimagination，andfeelthesamesatisfaction，thattheobjectsnaturallyoccasioninhim。
Thisobservationextendstotables，chairs，scritoires，chimneys，coaches，sadles，ploughs，andindeedtoeveryworkofart；itbeinganuniversalrule，thattheirbeautyischieflyderiv’dfromtheirutility，andfromtheirfitnessforthatpurpose，towhichtheyaredestined。Butthisisanadvantage，thatconcernsonlytheowner，noristhereanythingbutsympathy，whichcaninterestthespectator。
Tisevident，thatnothingrendersafieldmoreagreeablethanitsfertility，andthatscarceanyadvantagesofornamentorsituationwillbeabletoequalthisbeauty。Tisthesamecasewithparticulartreesandplants，aswiththefieldonwhichtheygrow。Iknownotbutaplain，overgrownwithfurzeandbroom，maybe，initself，asbeautifulasahillcover’dwithvinesorolive-trees；tho’itwillneverappearsotoone，whoisacquaintedwiththevalueofeach。Butthisisabeautymerelyofimagination，andhasnofoundationinwhatappearstothesenses。Fertilityandvaluehaveaplainreferencetouse；andthattoriches，joy，andplenty；inwhichtho’wehavenohopeofpartaking，yetweenterintothembythevivacityofthefancy，andsharethem，insomemeasure，withtheproprietor。
Thereisnoruleinpaintingmorereasonablethanthatofballancingthefigures，andplacingthemwiththegreatestexactnessontheirpropercentersofgravity。Afigure，whichisnotjustlyballanc’d，isdisagreeable；andthatbecauseitconveystheideasofitsfall，ofharm，andofpain:Whichideasarepainful，whenbysympathytheyacquireanydegreeofforceandvivacity。
Addtothis，thattheprincipalpartofpersonalbeautyisanairofhealthandvigour，andsuchaconstructionofmembersaspromisesstrengthandactivity。Thisideaofbeautycannotbeaccountedforbutbysympathy。
Ingeneralwemayremark，thatthemindsofmenaremirrorstooneanother，notonlybecausetheyreflecteachothersemotions，butalsobecausethoseraysofpassions，sentimentsandopinionsmaybeoftenreverberated，andmaydecayawaybyinsensibledegrees。Thusthepleasure，whicharichmanreceivesfromhispossessions，beingthrownuponthebeholder，causesapleasureandesteem；whichsentimentsagain，beingperceiv’dandsympathiz’dwith，encreasethepleasureofthepossessor；andbeingoncemorereflected，becomeanewfoundationforpleasureandesteeminthebeholder。Thereiscertainlyanoriginalsatisfactioninrichesderiv’dfromthatpower，whichtheybestow，ofenjoyingallthepleasuresoflife；andasthisistheirverynatureandessence，itmustbethefirstsourceofallthepassions，whicharisefromthem。Oneofthemostconsiderableofthesepassionsisthatofloveoresteeminothers，whichthereforeproceedsfromasympathywiththepleasureofthepossessor。Butthepossessorhasalsoasecondarysatisfactioninrichesarisingfromtheloveandesteemheacquiresbythem，andthissatisfactionisnothingbutasecondreflexionofthatoriginalpleasure，whichproceededfromhimself。Thissecondarysatisfactionorvanitybecomesoneoftheprincipalrecommendationsofriches，andisthechiefreason，whyweeitherdesirethemforourselves，oresteemtheminothers。Herethenisathirdreboundoftheoriginalpleasure；afterwhich`tisdifficulttodistinguishtheimagesandreflexions，byreasonoftheirfaintnessandconfusion。
SECT。VIOfbenevolenceandangerIdeasmaybecompar’dtotheextensionandsolidityofmatter，andimpressions，especiallyreflectiveones，tocolours，tastes，smellsandothersensiblequalities。Ideasneveradmitofatotalunion，butareendow’dwithakindofimpenetrability，bywhichtheyexcludeeachother，andarecapableofformingacompoundbytheirconjunction，notbytheirmixture。Ontheotherhand，impressionsandpassionsaresusceptibleofanentireunion；andlikecolours，maybeblendedsoperfectlytogether，thateachofthemmayloseitself，andcontributeonlytovarythatuniformimpression，whicharisesfromthewhole。Someofthemostcuriousphaenomenaofthehumanmindarederiv’dfromthispropertyofthepassions。
