Ifwewantanotherparalleltotheseaffections，wemayconsiderthepassionofgaming，whichaffordsapleasurefromthesameprinciplesashuntingandphilosophy。Ithasbeenremark’d，thatthepleasureofgamingarisesnotfrominterestalone；sincemanyleaveasuregainforthisentertainment:Neitherisitderiv’dfromthegamealone；sincethesamepersonshavenosatisfaction，whentheyplayfornothing:Butproceedsfromboththesecausesunited，tho’separatelytheyhavenoeffect。`Tishere，asincertainchymicalpreparations，wherethemixtureoftwoclearandtransparentliquidsproducesathird，whichisopaqueandcolour’d……
Theinterest，whichwehaveinanygame，engagesourattention，withoutwhichwecanhavenoenjoyment，eitherinthatorinanyotheraction。Ourattentionbeingonceengag’d，thedifficulty，variety，andsuddenreversesoffortune，stillfartherinterestus；and`tisfromthatconcernoursatisfactionarises。Humanlifeissotiresomeascene，andmengenerallyareofsuchindolentdispositions，thatwhateveramusesthem，tho’byapassionmixtwithpain，doesinthemaingivethemasensiblepleasure。Andthispleasureishereencreas’dbythenatureoftheobjects，whichbeingsensible，andofanarrowcompass，areenter’dintowithfacility，andareagreeabletotheimagination。
Thesametheory，thataccountsfortheloveoftruthinmathematicsandalgebra。maybeextendedtomorals，politics，naturalphilosophy，andotherstudies，whereweconsidernottheotherabstractrelationsofideas，buttheirrealconnexionsandexistence。Butbesidetheloveofknowledge，whichdisplaysitselfinthesciences，thereisacertaincuriosityimplantedinhumannature，whichisapassionderiv’dfromaquitedifferentprinciple。Somepeoplehaveaninsatiabledesireofknowingtheactionsandcircumstancesoftheirneighbours，tho’theirinterestbenowayconcern’dinthem，andtheymustentirelydependonothersfortheirinformation；inwhichcasethereisnoroomforstudyorapplication。Letussearchforthereasonofthisphaenomenon。
Ithasbeenprov’datlarge，thattheinfluenceofbeliefisatoncetoinlivenandinfixanyideaintheimagination，andpreventallkindofhesitationanduncertaintyaboutit。Boththesecircumstancesareadvantageous。Bythevivacityoftheideaweinterestthefancy，andproduce，tho’inalesserdegree，thesamepleasure，whicharisesfromamoderatepassion。Asthevivacityoftheideagivespleasure，soitscertaintypreventsuneasiness，byfixingoneparticularideainthemind，andkeepingitfromwaveringinthechoiceofitsobjects。`Tisaqualityofhumannature，whichisconspicuousonmanyoccasions，andiscommonbothtothemindandbody，thattoosuddenandviolentachangeisunpleasanttous，andthathoweveranyobjectsmayinthemselvesbeindifferent，yettheiralterationgivesuneasiness。As`tisthenatureofdoubttocauseavariationinthethought，andtransportussuddenlyfromoneideatoanother，itmustofconsequencebetheoccasionofpain。Thispainchieflytakesplace，whereinterest，relation，orthegreatnessandnoveltyofanyeventinterestsusinit。`Tisnoteverymatteroffact，ofwhichwehaveacuriositytobeinform’d；neitheraretheysuchonlyaswehaveaninteresttoknow。`Tissufficientiftheideastrikesonuswithsuchforce，andconcernsussonearly，astogiveusanuneasinessinitsinstabilityandinconstancy。Astranger，whenhearrivesfirstatanytown，maybeentirelyindifferentaboutknowingthehistoryandadventuresoftheinhabitants；butashebecomesfartheracquaintedwiththem，andhasliv’danyconsiderabletimeamongthem，heacquiresthesamecuriosityasthenatives。Whenwearereadingthehistoryofanation，wemayhaveanardentdesireofclearingupanydoubtordifficulty，thatoccursinit；butbecomecarelessinsuchresearches，whentheideasoftheseeventsare，inagreatmeasure，obliterated。
NOTES:
1。BookI。PartI。Sect。2。
2。PartII。Sec。4。
3。PartII。Sect，2，4。PartIII。Sect。2。
5。PartII。Sect。4。
6。BookI，PartIII。Sect。10。
7。FirstExperiment。
8。SecondandThirdExperiments9。FourthExperiment。
10。SixthExperiment。
11。SeventhandEighthExperiments。
12。Topreventallambiguity，Imustobserve，thatwhereIopposetheimaginationtothememory，Imeaningeneralthefacultythatpresentsourfainterideas。Inallotherplaces，andparticularlywhenitisoppos’dtotheunderstanding，Iunderstandthesamefaculty，excludingonlyourdemonstrativeandprobablereasonings。
13。BookI。PartIII。Sect。15。
14。Mons。Rollin[CharlesRollin，HistoireAncienne。(Paris1730-38)]。
BOOKIII
OFMORALS
OfvirtueandviceingeneralSECT。I
Moraldistinctionsnotderiv’dfromreasonThereisaninconveniencewhichattendsallabstrusereasoning。thatitmaysilence，withoutconvincinganantagonist，andrequiresthesameintensestudytomakeussensibleofitsforce，thatwasatfirstrequisiteforitsinvention。Whenweleaveourcloset，andengageinthecommonaffairsoflife，itsconclusionsseemtovanish，likethephantomsofthenightontheappearanceofthemorning；and`tisdifficultforustoretaineventhatconviction，whichwehadattain’dwithdifficulty。Thisisstillmoreconspicuousinalongchainofreasoning，wherewemustpreservetotheendtheevidenceofthefirstpropositions，andwhereweoftenlosesightofailthemostreceiv’dmaxims，eitherofphilosophyorcommonlife。Iamnot，however，withouthopes，thatthepresentsystemofphilosophywillacquirenewforceasitadvances；andthatourreasoningsconcerningmoralswillcorroboratewhateverhasbeensaidconcerningtheunderstandingandthepassions。Moralityisasubjectthatinterestsusaboveallothers:Wefancythepeaceofsocietytobeatstakeineverydecisionconcerningit；and`tisevident，thatthisconcernmustmakeourspeculationsappearmorerealandsolid，thanwherethesubjectis，inagreatmeasure，indifferenttous。Whataffectsus，weconcludecanneverbeachimera；andasourpassionisengag’dontheonesideortheother，wenaturallythinkthatthequestionlieswithinhumancomprehension；which，inothercasesofthisnature，weareapttoentertainsomedoubtof。WithoutthisadvantageInevershouldhaveventur’duponathirdvolumeofsuchabstrusephilosophy，inanage，whereinthegreatestpartofmenseemagreedtoconvertreadingintoanamusement，andtorejecteverythingthatrequiresanyconsiderabledegreeofattentiontobecomprehended。
Ithasbeenobserv’d，thatnothingiseverpresenttothemindbutitsperceptions；andthatalltheactionsofseeing，hearing，judging，loving，hating，andthinking，fallunderthisdenomination。Themindcanneverexertitselfinanyaction，whichwemaynotcomprehendunderthetermofperception；andconsequentlythattermisnolessapplicabletothosejudgments，bywhichwedistinguishmoralgoodandevil，thantoeveryotheroperationofthemind。Toapproveofonecharacter，tocondemnanother，areonlysomanydifferentperceptions。
Nowasperceptionsresolvethemselvesintotwokinds，viz。impressionsandideas，thisdistinctiongivesrisetoaquestion，withwhichweshallopenupourpresentenquiryconcerningmorals。Whether`tisbymeansofourideasorimpressionswedistinguishbetwixtviceandvirtue，andpronounceanactionblameableorpraiseworthy？Thiswillimmediatelycutoffallloosediscoursesanddeclamations，andreduceustosomethingpreciseandexactonthepresentsubject。
Thosewhoaffirmthatvirtueisnothingbutaconformitytoreason；thatthereareeternalfitnessesandunfitnessesofthings，whicharethesametoeveryrationalbeingthatconsidersthem；thattheimmutablemeasuresofrightandwrongimposeanobligation，notonlyonhumancreatures，butalsoontheDeityhimself:Allthesesystemsconcurintheopinion，thatmorality，liketruth，isdiscern’dmerelybyideas，andbytheirjuxta-positionandcomparison。Inorder，therefore，tojudgeofthesesystems，weneedonlyconsider，whetheritbepossible，fromreasonalone，todistinguishbetwixtmoralgoodandevil，orwhethertheremustconcursomeotherprinciplestoenableustomakethatdistinction，Ifmoralityhadnaturallynoinfluenceonhumanpassionsandactions，`twereinvaintotakesuchpainstoinculcateit；andnothingwou’dbemorefruitlessthanthatmultitudeofrulesandprecepts，withwhichallmoralistsabound。Philosophyiscommonlydividedintospeculativeandpractical；andasmoralityisalwayscomprehendedunderthelatterdivision，`tissupposedtoinfluenceourpassionsandactions，andtogobeyondthecalmandindolentjudgmentsoftheunderstanding。Andthisisconfirm’dbycommonexperience，whichinformsus，thatmenareoftengovern’dbytheirduties，andaredeter’dfromsomeactionsbytheopinionofinjustice，andimpell’dtoothersbythatofobligation。
Sincemorals，therefore，haveaninfluenceontheactionsandaffections，itfollows，thattheycannotbederiv’dfromreason；andthatbecausereasonalone，aswehavealreadyprov’d，canneverhaveanysuchinfluence。Moralsexcitepassions，andproduceorpreventactions。Reasonofitselfisutterlyimpotentinthisparticular。Therulesofmorality。therefore，arenotconclusionsofourreason。
Noone，Ibelieve，willdenythejustnessofthisinference；noristhereanyothermeansofevadingit，thanbydenyingthatprinciple，onwhichitisfounded。Aslongasitisallow’d，thatreasonhasnoinfluenceonourpassionsandaction。，`tisinvaintopretend，thatmoralityisdiscover’donlybyadeductionofreason。Anactiveprinciplecanneverbefoundedonaninactive；andifreasonbeinactiveinitself，itmustremainsoinallitsshapesandappearances，whetheritexertsitselfinnaturalormoralsubjects，whetheritconsidersthepowersofexternalbodies，ortheactionsofrationalbeings。
Itwouldbetedioustorepeatallthearguments，bywhichIhaveprov’d，(1)thatreasonisperfectlyinert，andcannevereitherpreventorproduceanyactionoraffection。`Twillbeeasytorecollectwhathasbeensaiduponthatsubject。Ishallonlyrecalonthisoccasiononeofthesearguments，whichIshallendeavourtorenderstillmoreconclusive，andmoreapplicabletothepresentsubject。
Reasonisthediscoveryoftruthorfalshood。Truthorfalshoodconsistsinanagreementordisagreementeithertotherealrelationsofideas，ortorealexistenceandmatteroffact。Whatever，therefore，isnotsusceptibleofthisagreementordisagreement，isincapableofbeingtrueorfalse，andcanneverbeanobjectofourreason。Now`tisevidentourpassions，volitions，andactions，arenotsusceptibleofanysuchagreementordisagreement；beingoriginalfactsandrealities，compleatinthemselves，andimplyingnoreferencetootherpassions，volitions，andactions。Tisimpossible，therefore，theycanbepronouncedeithertrueorfalse，andbeeithercontraryorconformabletoreason。
Thisargumentisofdoubleadvantagetoourpresentpurpose。Foritprovesdirectly，thatactionsdonotderivetheirmeritfromaconformitytoreason，northeirblamefromacontrarietytoit；anditprovesthesametruthmoreindirectly，byshewingus，thatasreasoncanneverimmediatelypreventorproduceanyactionbycontradictingorapprovingofit，itcannotbethesourceofmoralgoodandevil，whicharefoundtohavethatinfluence。Actionsmaybelaudableorblameable；buttheycannotbereasonable:Laudableorblameable，therefore，arenotthesamewithreasonableorunreasonable。Themeritanddemeritofactionsfrequentlycontradict，andsometimescontroulournaturalpropensities。Butreasonhasnosuchinfluence。Moraldistinctions，therefore，arenottheoffspringofreason。Reasoniswhollyinactive，andcanneverbethesourceofsoactiveaprincipleasconscience，orasenseofmorals。
Butperhapsitmaybesaid，thattho’nowilloractioncanbeimmediatelycontradictorytoreason，yetwemayfindsuchacontradictioninsomeoftheattendantsoftheaction，thatis，initscausesoreffects。Theactionmaycauseajudgment，ormaybeobliquelycaus’dbyone，whenthejudgmentconcurswithapassion；andbyanabusivewayofspeaking，whichphilosophywillscarceallowof，thesamecontrarietymay，uponthataccount，beascrib’dtotheaction。Howfarthistruthorfaishoodmaybethesourceofmorals，`twillnowbepropertoconsider。
Ithasbeenobserv’d，thatreason，inastrictandphilosophicalsense，canhaveinfluenceonourconductonlyaftertwoways:Eitherwhenitexcitesapassionbyinformingusoftheexistenceofsomethingwhichisaproperobjectofit；orwhenitdiscoverstheconnexionofcausesandeffects，soastoaffordusmeansofexertinganypassion。Thesearetheonlykindsofjudgment，whichcanaccompanyouractions，orcanbesaidtoproducetheminanymanner；anditmustbeallow’d，thatthesejudgmentsmayoftenbefalseanderroneous。Apersonmaybeaffectedwithpassion，bysupposingapainorpleasuretolieinanobject，whichhasnotendencytoproduceeitherofthesesensations，orwhichproducesthecontrarytowhatisimagin’d。Apersonmayalsotakefalsemeasuresfortheattaininghisend，andmayretard，byhisfoolishconduct，insteadofforwardingtheexecutionofanyproject。Thesefalsejudgmentsmaybethoughttoaffectthepassionsandactions，whichareconnectedwiththem，andmaybesaidtorenderthemunreasonable，inafigurativeandimproperwayofspeaking。Buttho’thisbeacknowledg’d，`tiseasytoobserve，thattheseerrorsaresofarfrombeingthesourceofallimmorality，thattheyarecommonlyveryinnocent，anddrawnomannerofguiltuponthepersonwhoissounfortunateastofailintothem。Theyextendnotbeyondamistakeoffact，whichmoralistshavenotgenerallysuppos’dcriminal，asbeingperfectlyinvoluntary。Iammoretobelamentedthanblam’d，ifIammistakenwithregardtotheinfluenceofobjectsinproducingpainorpleasure，orifIknownotthepropermeansofsatisfyingmydesires。Noonecaneverregardsucherrorsasadefectinmymoralcharacter。Afruit，forinstance，thatisreallydisagreeable，appearstomeatadistance，andthro’mistakeIfancyittobepleasantanddelicious。Hereisoneerror。Ichoosecertainmeansofreachingthisfruit，whicharenotproperformyend。Hereisaseconderror；noristhereanythirdone，whichcaneverpossiblyenterintoourreasoningsconcerningactions。Iask，therefore，ifaman，inthissituation，andguiltyofthesetwoerrors，istoberegardedasviciousandcriminal，howeverunavoidabletheymighthavebeen？Orifitbepossibletoimagine，thatsucherrorsarethesourcesofallimmorality？
Andhereitmaybepropertoobserve，thatifmoraldistinctionsbederiv’dfromthetruthorfalshoodofthosejudgments，theymusttakeplacewhereverweformthejudgments；norwilltherebeanydifference，whetherthequestionbeconcerninganappleorakingdom，orwhethertheerrorbeavoidableorunavoidable。Forastheveryessenceofmoralityissuppos’dtoconsistinanagreementordisagreementtoreason，theothercircumstancesareentirelyarbitrary，andcannevereitherbestowonanyactionthecharacterofvirtuousorvicious，ordepriveitofthatcharacter。Towhichwemayadd，thatthisagreementordisagreement，notadmittingofdegrees，allvirtuesandviceswou’dofcoursebeequal。
Shou’ditbepretended，thattho’amistakeoffactbenotcriminal，yetamistakeofrightoftenis；andthatthismaybethesourceofimmorality:Iwouldanswer，that`tisimpossiblesuchamistakecaneverbetheoriginalsourceofimmorality，sinceitsupposesarealrightandwrong；thatis，arealdistinctioninmorals，independentofthesejudgments。Amistake，therefore，ofrightmaybecomeaspeciesofimmorality；but`tisonlyasecondaryone，andisfoundedonsomeother，antecedenttoit。
Astothosejudgmentswhicharetheeffectsofouractions，andwhich，whenfalse，giveoccasiontopronouncetheactionscontrarytotruthandreason；wemayobserve，thatouractionsnevercauseanyjudgment，eithertrueorfalse，inourselves，andthat`tisonlyonotherstheyhavesuchaninfluence。`Tiscertain，thatanaction，onmanyoccasions，maygiverisetofalseconclusionsinothers；andthataperson，whothro’awindowseesanylewdbehaviourofminewithmyneighbour’swife，maybesosimpleastoimaginesheiscertainlymyown。Inthisrespectmyactionresemblessomewhatalyeorfalshood；onlywiththisdifference，whichismaterial，thatIperformnottheactionwithanyintentionofgivingrisetoafalsejudgmentinanother，butmerelytosatisfymylustandpassion。Itcauses，however，amistakeandfalsejudgmentbyaccident；andthefalshoodofitseffectsmaybeascribed，bysomeoddfigurativewayofspeaking，totheactionitself。ButstillIcanseenopretextofreasonforasserting，thatthetendencytocausesuchanerroristhefirstspringororiginalsourceofallimmorality。(2)
Thusuponthewhole，`tisimpossible，thatthedistinctionbetwixtmoralgoodandevil，canbemadetoreason；sincethatdistinctionhasaninfluenceuponouractions，ofwhichreasonaloneisincapable。Reasonandjudgmentmay，indeed，bethemediatecauseofanaction，byprompting，orbydirectingapassion:Butitisnotpretended，thatajudgmentofthiskind，eitherinitstruthorfalshood，isattendedwithvirtueorvice。Andastothejudgments，whicharecausedbyourjudgments，theycanstilllessbestowthosemoralqualitiesontheactions，whicharetheircauses。
Buttobemoreparticular，andtoshew，thatthoseeternalimmutablefitnessesandunfitnessesofthingscannotbedefendedbysoundphilosophy，wemayweighthefollowingconsiderations。
Ifthethoughtandunderstandingwerealonecapableoffixingtheboundariesofrightandwrong，thecharacterofvirtuousandviciouseithermustlieinsomerelationsofobjects，ormustbeamatteroffact，whichisdiscoveredbyourreasoning。Thisconsequenceisevident。Astheoperationsofhumanunderstandingdividethemselvesintotwokinds，thecomparingofideas，andtheinferringofmatteroffact；werevirtuediscover’dbytheunderstanding；itmustbeanobjectofoneoftheseoperations，noristhereanythirdoperationoftheunderstanding。whichcandiscoverit。Therehasbeenanopinionveryindustriouslypropagatedbycertainphilosophers，thatmoralityissusceptibleofdemonstration；andtho’noonehaseverbeenabletoadvanceasinglestepinthosedemonstrations；yet`tistakenforgranted，thatthissciencemaybebroughttoanequalcertaintywithgeometryoralgebra。Uponthissupposition。viceandvirtuemustconsistinsomerelations；since`tisallow’donallhands，thatnomatteroffactiscapableofbeingdemonstrated。Letus，therefore，beginwithexaminingthishypothesis，andendeavour，ifpossible，tofixthosemoralqualities，whichhavebeensolongtheobjectsofourfruitlessresearches。Pointoutdistinctlytherelations，whichconstitutemoralityorobligation，thatwemayknowwhereintheyconsist，andafterwhatmannerwemustjudgeofthem。
Ifyouassert，thatviceandvirtueconsistinrelationssusceptibleofcertaintyanddemonstration，youmustconfineyourselftothosefourrelations，whichaloneadmitofthatdegreeofevidence；andinthatcaseyourunintoabsurdities，fromwhichyouwillneverbeabletoextricateyourself。Forasyoumaketheveryessenceofmoralitytolieintherelations，andasthereisnooneoftheserelationsbutwhatisapplicable，notonlytoanirrational，butalsotoaninanimateobject；itfollows，thatevensuchobjectsmustbesusceptibleofmeritordemerit。Resemblance，contrariety，degreesinquality，andproportionsinquantityandnumber；alltheserelationsbelongasproperlytomatter，astoouractions，passions，andvolitions。Tisunquestionable，therefore，thatmoralityliesnotinanyoftheserelations，northesenseofitintheirdiscovery。(3)
Shou’ditbeasserted，thatthesenseofmoralityconsistsinthediscoveryofsomerelation，distinctfromthese，andthatourenumerationwasnotcompleat，whenwecomprehendedalldemonstrablerelationsunderfourgeneralheads:TothisIknownotwhattoreply，tillsomeonebesogoodastopointouttomethisnewrelation。`Tisimpossibletorefuteasystem，whichhasneveryetbeenexplain’d。Insuchamanneroffightinginthedark，amanloseshisblowsintheair，andoftenplacesthemwheretheenemyisnotpresent。
Imust，therefore，onthisoccasion，restcontentedwithrequiringthetwofollowingconditionsofanyonethatwou’dundertaketoclearupthissystem。First，Asmoralgoodandevilbelongonlytotheactionsofthemind，andarederiv’dfromoursituationwithregardtoexternalobjects，therelations，fromwhichthesemoraldistinctionsarise，mustlieonlybetwixtinternalactions，andexternalobjects，andmustnotbeapplicableeithertointernalactions，comparedamongthemselves，ortoexternalobjects，whenplacedinoppositiontootherexternalobjects。Forasmoralityissupposedtoattendcertainrelations，iftheserelationscou’dbelongtointernalactionsconsider’dsingly，itwou’dfollow，thatwemightbeguiltyofcrimesinourselves，andindependentofoursituation，withrespecttotheuniverse:Andinlikemanner，ifthesemoralrelationscou’dbeapply’dtoexternalobjects，itwou’dfollow，thateveninanimatebeingswou’dbesusceptibleofmoralbeautyanddeformity。Nowitseemsdifficulttoimagine，thatanyrelationcanbediscover’dbetwixtourpassions，volitionsandactions，comparedtoexternalobjects，whichrelationmightnotbelongeithertothesepassionsandvolitions，ortotheseexternalobjects，compar’damongthemselves。Butitwillbestillmoredifficulttofulfilthesecondcondition，requisitetojustifythissystem。Accordingtotheprinciplesofthosewhomaintainanabstractrationaldifferencebetwixtmoralgoodandevil，andanaturalfitnessandunfitnessofthings，`tisnotonlysuppos’d，thattheserelations，beingeternalandimmutable，arethesame，whenconsider’dbyeveryrationalcreature，buttheireffectsarealsosuppos’dtobenecessarilythesame；and`tisconcludedtheyhavenoless，orratheragreater，influenceindirectingthewillofthedeity，thaningoverningtherationalandvirtuousofourownspecies。Thesetwoparticularsareevidentlydistinct。Tisonethingtoknowvirtue，andanothertoconformthewilltoit。Inorder，therefore，toprove，thatthemeasuresofrightandwrongareeternallaws，obligatoryoneveryrationalmind，`tisnotsufficienttoshewtherelationsuponwhichtheyarefounded:Wemustalsopointouttheconnexionbetwixttherelationandthewill；andmustprovethatthisconnexionissonecessary，thatineverywell-disposedmind，itmusttakeplaceandhaveitsinfluence；tho’thedifferencebetwixtthesemindsbeinotherrespectsimmenseandinfinite。NowbesideswhatIhavealreadyprov’d，thateveninhumannaturenorelationcaneveraloneproduceanyaction:besidesthis，Isay，ithasbeenshewn，intreatingoftheunderstanding，thatthereisnoconnexionofcauseandeffect，suchasthisissuppos’dtobe，whichisdiscoverableotherwisethanbyexperience，andofwhichwecanpretendtohaveanysecuritybythesimpleconsiderationoftheobjects。Allbeingsintheuniverse，consider’dinthemselves，appearentirelylooseandindependentofeachother。Tisonlybyexperiencewelearntheirinfluenceandconnexion；andthisinfluenceweoughtnevertoextendbeyondexperience。
Thusitwillbeimpossibletofulfilthefirstconditionrequiredtothesystemofeternalmeasuresofrightandwrong；becauseitisimpossibletoshewthoserelations，uponwhichsuchadistinctionmaybefounded:And`tisasimpossibletofulfilthesecondcondition；becausewecannotproveapriori，thattheserelations，iftheyreallyexistedandwereperceiv’d，wou’dbeuniversallyforcibleandobligatory。
Buttomakethesegeneralreflectionsmoredearandconvincing，wemayillustratethembysomeparticularinstances，whereinthischaracterofmoralgoodorevilisthemostuniversallyacknowledged。Ofallcrimesthathumancreaturesarecapableofcommitting，themosthorridandunnaturalisingratitude，especiallywhenitiscommittedagainstparents，andappearsinthemoreflagrantinstancesofwoundsanddeath。Thisisacknowledg’dbyallmankind，philosophersaswellasthepeople；thequestiononlyarisesamongphilosophers，whethertheguiltormoraldeformityofthisactionbediscover’dbydemonstrativereasoning，orbefeltbyaninternalsense，andbymeansofsomesentiment，whichthereflectingonsuchanactionnaturallyoccasions。Thisquestionwillsoonbedecidedagainsttheformeropinion，ifwecanshewthesamerelationsinotherobjects，withoutthenotionofanyguiltoriniquityattendingthem。Reasonorscienceisnothingbutthecomparingofideas，andthediscoveryoftheirrelations；andifthesamerelationshavedifferentcharacters，itmustevidentlyfollow，thatthosecharactersarenotdiscover’dmerelybyreason。Toputtheaffair，therefore，tothistrial，letuschuseanyinanimateobject，suchasanoakorelm；andletussuppose，thatbythedroppingofitsseed，itproducesasaplingbelowit，whichspringingupbydegrees，atlastovertopsanddestroystheparenttree:Iask，ifinthisinstancetherebewantinganyrelation，whichisdiscoverableinparricideoringratitude？Isnottheonetreethecauseoftheother’sexistence；andthelatterthecauseofthedestructionoftheformer，inthesamemanneraswhenachildmurdershisparent？Tisnotsufficienttoreply，thatachoiceorwilliswanting。Forinthecaseofparricide，awilldoesnotgiverisetoanydifferentrelations，butisonlythecausefromwhichtheactionisderiv’d；andconsequentlyproducesthesamerelations，thatintheoakorelmarisefromsomeotherprinciples。`Tisawillorchoice，thatdeterminesamantokillhisparent；andtheyarethelawsofmatterandmotion，thatdetermineasaplingtodestroytheoak，fromwhichitsprung。Herethenthesamerelationshavedifferentcauses；butstilltherelationsarethesame:Andastheirdiscoveryisnotinbothcasesattendedwithanotionofimmorality，itfollows，thatthatnotiondoesnotarisefromsuchadiscovery。
Buttochuseaninstance，stillmoreresembling；Iwouldfainaskanyone，whyincestinthehumanspeciesiscriminal，andwhytheverysameaction，andthesamerelationsinanimalshavenotthesmallestmoralturpitudeanddeformity？Ifitbeanswer’d，thatthisactionisinnocentinanimals，becausetheyhavenotreasonsufficienttodiscoveritsturpitude；butthatman，beingendow’dwiththatfacultywhichoughttorestrainhimtohisduty，thesameactioninstantlybecomescriminaltohim；shouldthisbesaid，Iwouldreply，thatthisisevidentlyarguinginacircle。Forbeforereasoncanperceivethisturpitude，theturpitudemustexist；andconsequentlyisindependentofthedecisionsofourreason，andistheirobjectmoreproperlythantheireffect。Accordingtothissystem，then，everyanimal，thathassense，andappetite，andwill；thatis，everyanimalmustbesusceptibleofallthesamevirtuesandvices，forwhichweascribepraiseandblametohumancreatures。Allthedifferenceis，thatoursuperiorreasonmayservetodiscovertheviceorvirtue，andbythatmeansmayaugmenttheblameorpraise:Butstillthisdiscoverysupposesaseparatebeinginthesemoraldistinctions，andabeing，whichdependsonlyonthewillandappetite，andwhich，bothinthoughtandreality，maybedistinguish’dfromthereason。Animalsaresusceptibleofthesamerelations，withrespecttoeachother，asthehumanspecies，andthereforewou’dalsobesusceptibleofthesamemorality，iftheessenceofmoralityconsistedintheserelations。Theirwantofasufficientdegreeofreasonmayhinderthemfromperceivingthedutiesandobligationsofmorality，butcanneverhinderthesedutiesfromexisting；sincetheymustantecedentlyexist，inordertotheirbeingperceiv’d。Reasonmustfindthem，andcanneverproducethem。Thisargumentdeservestobeweigh’d，asbeing，inmyopinion，entirelydecisive。
Nordoesthisreasoningonlyprove，thatmoralityconsistsnotinanyrelations，thataretheobjectsofscience；butifexamin’d，willprovewithequalcertainty，thatitconsistsnotinanymatteroffact，whichcanbediscover’dbytheunderstanding。Thisisthesecondpartofourargument；andifitcanbemadeevident，wemayconclude，thatmoralityisnotanobjectofreason。Butcantherebeanydifficultyinproving，thatviceandvirtuearenotmattersoffact，whoseexistencewecaninferbyreason？Takeanyactionallow’dtobevicious:Wilfulmurder，forinstance。Examineitinalllights，andseeifyoucanfindthatmatteroffact，orrealexistence，whichyoucallvice。Inwhich-everwayyoutakeit，youfindonlycertainpassions，motives，volitionsandthoughts。Thereisnoothermatteroffactinthecase。Theviceentirelyescapesyou，aslongasyouconsidertheobject。Younevercanfindit，tillyouturnyourreflectionintoyourownbreast，andfindasentimentofdisapprobation，whicharisesinyou，towardsthisaction。Hereisamatteroffact；but`tistheobjectoffeeling，notofreason。Itliesinyourself，notintheobject。Sothatwhenyoupronounceanyactionorcharactertobevicious，youmeannothing，butthatfromtheconstitutionofyournatureyouhaveafeelingorsentimentofblamefromthecontemplationofit。Viceandvirtue，therefore，maybecompar’dtosounds，colours，heatandcold，which，accordingtomodernphilosophy，arenotqualitiesinobjects，butperceptionsinthemind:Andthisdiscoveryinmorals，likethatotherinphysics，istoberegardedasaconsiderableadvancementofthespeculativesciences；tho’，likethattoo，ithaslittleornoinfluenceonpractice。Nothingcanbemorereal，orconcernusmore，thanourownsentimentsofpleasureanduneasiness；andifthesebefavourabletovirtue，andunfavourabletovice，nomorecanberequisitetotheregulationofourconductandbehaviour。
Icannotforbearaddingtothesereasoningsanobservation，whichmay，perhaps，befoundofsomeimportance。Ineverysystemofmorality，whichIhavehithertometwith，Ihavealwaysremark’d，thattheauthorproceedsforsometimeintheordinarywayofreasoning，andestablishesthebeingofaGod，ormakesobservationsconcerninghumanaffairs；whenofasuddenIamsurpriz’dtofind，thatinsteadoftheusualcopulationsofpropositions，is，andisnot，Imeetwithnopropositionthatisnotconnectedwithanought，oranoughtnot。Thischangeisimperceptible；butis，however，ofthelastconsequence。Forasthisought，oroughtnot，expressessomenewrelationoraffirmation，`tisnecessarythatitshou’dbeobserv’dandexplain’d；andatthesametimethatareasonshouldbegiven，forwhatseemsaltogetherinconceivable，howthisnewrelationcanbeadeductionfromothers，whichareentirelydifferentfromit。Butasauthorsdonotcommonlyusethisprecaution，Ishallpresumetorecommendittothereaders；andampersuaded，thatthissmallattentionwou’dsubvertallthevulgarsystemsofmorality，andletussee，thatthedistinctionofviceandvirtueisnotfoundedmerelyontherelationsofobjects，norisperceiv’dbyreason。
Moraldistinctionsderiv’dfromamoralsenseThusthecourseoftheargumentleadsustoconclude，thatsinceviceandvirtuearenotdiscoverablemerelybyreason，orthecomparisonofideas，itmustbebymeansofsomeimpressionorsentimenttheyoccasion，thatweareabletomarkthedifferencebetwixtthem。Ourdecisionsconcerningmoralrectitudeanddepravityareevidentlyperceptions；andasallperceptionsareeitherimpressionsorideas，theexclusionoftheoneisaconvincingargumentfortheother。Morality，therefore，ismoreproperlyfeltthanjudg’dof；tho’thisfeelingorsentimentiscommonlysosoftandgentle，thatweareapttoconfounditwithanidea，accordingtoourcommoncustomoftakingallthingsforthesame，whichhaveanynearresemblancetoeachother。
Thenextquestionis，Ofwhatnaturearetheseimpressions，andafterwhatmannerdotheyoperateuponus？Herewecannotremainlonginsuspense，butmustpronouncetheimpressionarisingfromvirtue，tobeagreeable，andthatprocedingfromvicetobeuneasy。Everymomentsexperiencemustconvinceusofthis。Thereisnospectaclesofairandbeautifulasanobleandgenerousaction；noranywhichgivesusmoreabhorrencethanonethatiscruelandtreacherous。Noenjoyment。equalsthesatisfactionwereceivefromthecompanyofthoseweloveandesteem；asthegreatestofallpunishmentsistobeoblig’dtopassourliveswiththosewehateorcontemn。Averyplayorromancemayaffordusinstancesofthispleasure，whichvirtueconveystous；andpain，whicharisesfromvice。
Nowsincethedistinguishingimpressions，bywhichmoralgoodorevilisknown，arenothingbutparticularpainsorpleasures；itfollows，thatinallenquiriesconcerningthesemoraldistinctions，itwillbesufficienttoshewtheprinciples，whichmakeusfeelasatisfactionoruneasinessfromthesurveyofanycharacter，inordertosatisfyuswhythecharacterislaudableorblameable。Anaction，orsentiment，orcharacterisvirtuousorvicious；why？becauseitsviewcausesapleasureoruneasinessofaparticularkind。Ingivingareason，therefore，forthepleasureoruneasiness，wesufficientlyexplaintheviceorvirtue。Tohavethesenseofvirtue，isnothingbuttofeelasatisfactionofaparticularkindfromthecontemplationofacharacter。Theveryfeelingconstitutesourpraiseoradmiration。Wegonofarther；nordoweenquireintothecauseofthesatisfaction。Wedonotinferacharactertobevirtuous，becauseitpleases:Butinfeelingthatitpleasesaftersuchaparticularmanner，weineffectfeelthatitisvirtuous。Thecaseisthesameasinourjudgmentsconcerningallkindsofbeauty，andtastes，andsensations。Ourapprobationisimply’dintheimmediatepleasuretheyconveytous。
Ihaveobjectedtothesystem，whichestablisheseternalrationalmeasuresofrightandwrong，that`tisimpossibletoshew，intheactionsofreasonablecreatures，anyrelations，whicharenotfoundinexternalobjects；andtherefore，ifmoralityalwaysattendedtheserelations，`twerepossibleforinanimatemattertobecomevirtuousorvicious。Nowitmay，inlikemanner，beobjectedtothepresentsystem，thatifvirtueandvicebedetermin’dbypleasureandpain，thesequalitiesmust，ineverycase，arisefromthesensations；andconsequentlyanyobject，whetheranimateorinanimate，rationalorirrational，mightbecomemorallygoodorevil，provideditcanexciteasatisfactionoruneasiness。Buttho’thisobjectionseemstobetheverysame，ithasbynomeansthesameforce，intheonecaseasintheother。For，first，tisevident，thatunderthetermpleasure，wecomprehendsensations，whichareverydifferentfromeachother，andwhichhaveonlysuchadistantresemblance，asisrequisitetomakethembeexpress’dbythesameabstractterm。Agoodcompositionofmusicandabottleofgoodwineequallyproducepleasure；andwhatismore，theirgoodnessisdetermin’dmerelybythepleasure。Butshallwesayuponthataccount，thatthewineisharmonious，orthemusicofagoodflavour？Inlikemanneraninanimateobject，andthecharacterorsentimentsofanypersonmay，bothofthem，givesatisfaction；butasthesatisfactionisdifferent，thiskeepsoursentimentsconcerningthemfrombeingconfounded，andmakesusascribevirtuetotheone，andnottotheother。Noriseverysentimentofpleasureorpain，whicharisesfromcharactersandactions，ofthatpeculiarkind，whichmakesuspraiseorcondemn。Thegoodqualitiesofanenemyarehurtfultous；butmaystillcommandouresteemandrespect。`Tisonlywhenacharacterisconsideredingeneral，withoutreferencetoourparticularinterest，thatitcausessuchafeelingorsentiment，asdenominatesitmorallygoodorevil。`Tistrue，thosesentiments，frominterestandmorals，areapttobeconfounded，andnaturallyrunintooneanother。Itseldomhappens，thatwedonotthinkanenemyvicious，andcandistinguishbetwixthisoppositiontoourinterestandrealvillainyorbaseness。Butthishindersnot，butthatthesentimentsare，inthemselves，distinct；andamanoftemperandjudgmentmaypreservehimselffromtheseillusions。Inlikemanner，tho’`tiscertainamusicalvoiceisnothingbutonethatnaturallygivesaparticularkindofpleasure；yet`tisdifficultforamantobesensible，thatthevoiceofanenemyisagreeable，ortoallowittobemusical。Butapersonofafineear，whohasthecommandofhimself，canseparatethesefeelings，andgivepraisetowhatdeservesit。
Secondly，Wemaycalltoremembrancetheprecedingsystemofthepassions，inordertoremarkastillmoreconsiderabledifferenceamongourpainsandpleasures。Prideandhumility，loveandhatredareexcited，whenthereisanythingpresentedtous，thatbothbearsarelationtotheobjectofthepassion，andproducesaseparatesensationrelatedtothesensationofthepassion。Nowvirtueandviceareattendedwiththesecircumstances。Theymustnecessarilybeplac’deitherinourselvesorothers，andexciteeitherpleasureoruneasiness；andthereforemustgiverisetooneofthesefourpassions；whichclearlydistinguishesthemfromthepleasureandpainarisingfrominanimateobjects，thatoftenbearnorelationtous:Andthisis，perhaps，themostconsiderableeffectthatvirtueandvicehaveuponthehumanmind。
Itmaynowbeask’dingeneral，concerningthispainorpleasure，thatdistinguishesmoralgoodandevil，Fromwhatprinciplesisitderived，andwhencedoesitariseinthehumanmind？TothisIreply，first，that`tisabsurdtoimagine，thatineveryparticularinstance，thesesentimentsareproduc’dbyanoriginalqualityandprimaryconstitution。Forasthenumberofourdutiesis，inamanner，infinite，`tisimpossiblethatouroriginalinstinctsshouldextendtoeachofthem，andfromourveryfirstinfancyimpressonthehumanmindallthatmultitudeofprecepts，whicharecontain’dinthecompleatestsystemofethics。Suchamethodofproceedingisnotconformabletotheusualmaxims，bywhichnatureisconducted，whereafewprinciplesproduceallthatvarietyweobserveintheuniverse，andeverythingiscarry’donintheeasiestandmostsimplemanner。`Tisnecessary，therefore，toabridgetheseprimaryimpulses，andfindsomemoregeneralprinciples，uponwhichallournotionsofmoralsarefounded。
Butinthesecondplace，shoulditbeask’d，Whetherweoughttosearchfortheseprinciplesinnature，orwhetherwemustlookfortheminsomeotherorigin？Iwou’dreply，thatouranswertothisquestiondependsuponthedefinitionoftheword，Nature，thanwhichthereisnonemoreambiguousandequivocal。Ifnaturebeoppos’dtomiracles，notonlythedistinctionbetwixtviceandvirtueisnatural，butalsoeveryevent，whichhaseverhappen’dintheworld，exceptingthosemiracles，onwhichourreligionisfounded。Insaying，then，thatthesentimentsofviceandvirtuearenaturalinthissense，wemakenoveryextraordinarydiscovery。
Butnaturemayalsobeopposedtorareandunusual；andinthissenseoftheword，whichisthecommonone，theremayoftenarisedisputesconcerningwhatisnaturalorunnatural；andonemayingeneralaffirm，thatwearenotpossess’dofanyveryprecisestandard，bywhichthesedisputescanbedecided。Frequentandraredependuponthenumberofexampleswehaveobserv’d；andasthisnumbermaygraduallyencreaseordiminish，`twillbeimpossibletofixanyexactboundariesbetwixtthem。Wemayonlyaffirmonthishead，thatifevertherewasanything，whichcou’dbecall’dnaturalinthissense，thesentimentsofmoralitycertainlymay；sincethereneverwasanynationoftheworld，noranysinglepersoninanynation，whowasutterlydepriv’dofthem，andwhonever，inanyinstance，shew’dtheleastapprobationordislikeofmanners。Thesesentimentsaresorootedinourconstitutionandtemper，thatwithoutentirelyconfoundingthehumanmindbydiseaseormadness，`tisimpossibletoextirpateanddestroythem。
Butnaturemayalsobeopposedtoartifice，aswellastowhatisrareandunusual；andinthissenseitmaybedisputed，whetherthenotionsofvirtuebenaturalornot。Wereadilyforget，thatthedesigns，andprojects，andviewsofmenareprinciplesasnecessaryintheiroperationasheatandcold，moistanddry:Buttakingthemtobefreeandentirelyourown，`tisusualforustosettheminoppositiontotheotherprinciplesofnature。Shou’dit，therefore，bedemanded，whetherthesenseofvirtuebenaturalorartificial，Iamofopinion，that`tisimpossibleformeatpresenttogiveanypreciseanswertothisquestion。Perhapsitwillappearafterwards，thatoursenseofsomevirtuesisartificial，andthatofothersnatural。Thediscussionofthisquestionwillbemoreproper，whenweenteruponanexactdetailofeachparticularviceandvirtue。(4)
Meanwhileitmaynotbeamisstoobservefromthesedefinitionsofnaturalandunnatural，thatnothingcanbemoreunphilosophicalthanthosesystems，whichassert，thatvirtueisthesamewithwhatisnatural，andvicewithwhatisunnatural。Forinthefirstsenseoftheword，Nature，asopposedtomiracles，bothviceandvirtueareequallynatural；andinthesecondsense，asoppos’dtowhatisunusual，perhapsvirtuewillbefoundtobethemostunnatural。Atleastitmustbeown’d，thatheroicvirtue，beingasunusual，isaslittlenaturalasthemostbrutalbarbarity。Astothethirdsenseoftheword，`tiscertain，thatbothviceandvirtueareequallyartificial，andoutofnature。Forhoweveritmaybedisputed，whetherthenotionofameritordemeritincertainactionsbenaturalorartificial，`tisevident，thattheactionsthemselvesareartificial，andareperform’dwithacertaindesignandintention；otherwisetheycou’dneverberank’dunderanyofthesedenominations。Tisimpossible，therefore，thatthecharacterofnaturalandunnaturalcanever，inanysense，marktheboundariesofviceandvirtue。
Thuswearestillbroughtbacktoourfirstposition，thatvirtueisdistinguishedbythepleasure，andvicebythepain，thatanyaction，sentimentorcharactergivesusbythemereviewandcontemplation。Thisdecisionisverycommodious；becauseitreducesustothissimplequestion，Whyanyactionorsentimentuponthegeneralvieworsurvey，givesacertainsatisfactionoruneasiness，inordertoshewtheoriginofitsmoralrectitudeordepravity，withoutlookingforanyincomprehensiblerelationsandqualities，whichneverdidexistinnature，noreveninourimagination，byanyclearanddistinctconception。IflattermyselfIhaveexecutedagreatpartofmypresentdesignbyastateofthequestion，whichappearstomesofreefromambiguityandobscurity。
OfjusticeandinjusticeSECT。I
Justice，whetheranaturalorartificialvirtue？
Ihavealreadyhinted，thatoursenseofeverykindofvirtueisnotnatural；butthattherearesomevirtues，thatproducepleasureandapprobationbymeansofanartificeorcontrivance，whicharisesfromthecircumstancesandnecessityofmankind。OfthiskindIassertjusticetobe；andshallendeavourtodefendthisopinionbyashort，and，Ihope，convincingargument，beforeIexaminethenatureoftheartifice，fromwhichthesenseofthatvirtueisderived。
`Tisevident，thatwhenwepraiseanyactions，weregardonlythemotivesthatproducedthem，andconsidertheactionsassignsorindicationsofcertainprinciplesinthemindandtemper。Theexternalperformancehasnomerit。Wemustlookwithintofindthemoralquality。Thiswecannotdodirectly；andthereforefixourattentiononactions，asonexternalsigns。Buttheseactionsarestillconsideredassigns；andtheultimateobjectofourpraiseandapprobationisthemotive，thatproduc’dthem。
Afterthesamemanner，whenwerequireanyaction，orblameapersonfornotperformingit，wealwayssuppose，thatoneinthatsituationshou’dbeinfluenc’dbythepropermotiveofthataction，andweesteemitviciousinhimtoberegardlessofit。Ifwefind，uponenquiry，thatthevirtuousmotivewasstillpowerfuloverhisbreast，tho’check’dinitsoperationbysomecircumstancesunknowntous，weretractourblame，andhavethesameesteemforhim，asifhehadactuallyperform’dtheaction，whichwerequireofhim。
Itappears，therefore，thatallvirtuousactionsderivetheirmeritonlyfromvirtuousmotives，andareconsider’dmerelyassignsofthosemotives。FromthisprincipleIconclude，thatthefirstvirtuousmotive，whichbestowsameritonanyaction，canneverbearegardtothevirtueofthataction。butmustbesomeothernaturalmotiveorprinciple。Tosuppose，thatthemereregardtothevirtueoftheaction。maybethefirstmotive，whichproduc’dtheaction，andrender’ditvirtuous，istoreasoninacircle。Beforewecanhavesucharegard，theactionmustbereallyvirtuous；andthisvirtuemustbederiv’dfromsomevirtuousmotive:Andconsequentlythevirtuousmotivemustbedifferentfromtheregardtothevirtueoftheaction。Avirtuousmotiveisrequisitetorenderanactionvirtuous。Anactionmustbevirtuous，beforewecanhavearegardtoitsvirtue。Somevirtuousmotive，therefore，mustbeantecedenttothatregard。
Noristhismerelyametaphysicalsubtilty；butentersintoallourreasoningsincommonlife，tho’perhapswemaynotbeabletoplaceitinsuchdistinctphilosophicalterms。Weblameafatherforneglectinghischild。Why？becauseitshewsawantofnaturalaffection，whichisthedutyofeveryparent。Werenotnaturalaffectionaduty，thecareofchildrencou’dnotbeaduty；and`twereimpossiblewecou’dhavethedutyinoureyeintheattentionwegivetoouroffspring。Inthiscase，therefore，allmensupposeamotivetotheactiondistinctfromasenseofduty。
Hereisaman，thatdoesmanybenevolentactions；relievesthedistress’d，comfortstheafflicted，andextendshisbountyeventothegreateststrangers。Nocharactercanbemoreamiableandvirtuous。Weregardtheseactionsasproofsofthegreatesthumanity。Thishumanitybestowsameritontheactions。Aregardtothismeritis，therefore，asecondaryconsideration，andderiv’dfromtheantecedentprincipleofhumanity，whichismeritoriousandlaudable。
Inshort，itmaybeestablish’dasanundoubtedmaxim，thatnoactioncanbevirtuous，ormorallygood，unlesstherebeinhumannaturesomemotivetoproduceit，distinctfromthesenseofitsmorality。
Butmaynotthesenseofmoralityordutyproduceanaction，withoutanyothermotive？Ianswer，Itmay:Butthisisnoobjectiontothepresentdoctrine。Whenanyvirtuousmotiveorprincipleiscommoninhumannature，aperson，whofeelshisheartdevoidofthatmotive，mayhatehimselfuponthataccount，andmayperformtheactionwithoutthemotive，fromacertainsenseofduty，inordertoacquirebypractice，thatvirtuousprinciple，oratleast，todisguisetohimself，asmuchaspossible，hiswantofit。Amanthatreallyfeelsnogratitudeinhistemper，isstillpleas’dtoperformgratefulactions，andthinkshehas，bythatmeans，fulfill’dhisduty。Actionsareatfirstonlyconsider’dassignsofmotives:But`tisusual，inthiscase，asinallothers，tofixourattentiononthesigns，andneglect，insomemeasure，thethingsignify’d。Buttho’，onsomeoccasions，apersonmayperformanactionmerelyoutofregardtoitsmoralobligation，yetstillthissupposesinhumannaturesomedistinctprinciples，whicharecapableofproducingtheaction，andwhosemoralbeautyrenderstheactionmeritorious。
Nowtoapplyallthistothepresentcase；Isupposeapersontohavelentmeasumofmoney，onconditionthatitberestor’dinafewdays；andalsosuppose，thataftertheexpirationofthetermagreedon，hedemandsthesum:Iask，WhatreasonormotivehaveItorestorethemoney？Itwill，perhaps，besaid，thatmyregardtojustice，andabhorrenceofvillainyandknavery，aresufficientreasonsforme，ifIhavetheleastgrainofhonesty，orsenseofdutyandobligation。Andthisanswer，nodoubt，isjustandsatisfactorytomaninhisciviliz’dstate，andwhentrain’dupaccordingtoacertaindisciplineandeducation。Butinhisrudeandmorenaturalcondition，ifyouarepleas’dtocallsuchaconditionnatural，thisanswerwou’dberejectedasperfectlyunintelligibleandsophistical。Foroneinthatsituationwou’dimmediatelyaskyou，Whereinconsiststhishonestyandjustice，whichyoufindinrestoringaloan，andabstainingfromthepropertyofothers？Itdoesnotsurelylieintheexternalaction。Itmust，thereforebeplac’dinthemotive，fromwhichtheexternalactionisderiv’d。Thismotivecanneverbearegardtothehonestyoftheaction。For`tisaplainfallacytosay，thatavirtuousmotiveisrequisitetorenderanactionhonest，andatthesametimethataregardtothehonestyisthemotiveoftheaction。Wecanneverhavearegardtothevirtueofanaction，unlesstheactionbeantecedentlyvirtuous。Noactioncanbevirtuous，butsofarasitproceedsfromavirtuousmotive。Avirtuousmotive，therefore，mustprecedetheregardtothevirtue，and`tisimpossible，thatthevirtuousmotiveandtheregardtothevirtuecanbethesame。
’Tisrequisite，then，tofindsomemotivetoactsofjusticeandhonesty，distinctfromourregardtothehonesty；andinthisliesthegreatdifficulty。Forshou’dwesay，thataconcernforourprivateinterestorreputationisthelegitimatemotivetoallhonestactions；itwou’dfollow，thatwhereverthatconcernceases，honestycannolongerhaveplace。But`tiscertain，thatself-love，whenitactsatitsliberty，insteadofengagingustohonestactions，isthesourceofallinjusticeandviolence；norcanamanevercorrectthosevices，withoutcorrectingandrestrainingthenaturalmovementsofthatappetite。
Butshou’ditbeaffirm’d，thatthereasonormotiveofsuchactionsistheregardtopublickinterest，towhichnothingismorecontrarythanexamplesofinjusticeanddishonesty；shou’dthisbesaid，Iwou’dproposethethreefollowingconsiderations，asworthyofourattention。First，publicinterestisnotnaturallyattach’dtotheobservationoftherulesofjustice；butisonlyconnectedwithit，afteranartificialconventionfortheestablishmentoftheserules，asshallbeshewnmoreatlargehereafter。Secondly，ifwesuppose，thattheloanwassecret，andthatitisnecessaryfortheinterestoftheperson，thatthemoneyberestor’dinthesamemanner(aswhenthelenderwou’dconcealhisriches)inthatcasetheexampleceases，andthepublicisnolongerinterestedintheactionsoftheborrower；tho’Isupposethereisnomoralist，whowillaffirm，thatthedutyandobligationceases。Thirdly，experiencesufficientlyproves，thatmen，intheordinaryconductoflife，looknotsofarasthepublicinterest，whentheypaytheircreditors，performtheirpromises，andabstainfromtheft，androbbery，andinjusticeofeverykind。Thatisamotivetooremoteandtoosublimetoaffectthegeneralityofmankind，andoperatewithanyforceinactionssocontrarytoprivateinterestasarefrequentlythoseofjusticeandcommonhonesty。
Ingeneral，itmaybeaffirm’d，thatthereisnosuchpassioninhumanminds，astheloveofmankind，merelyassuch，independentofpersonalqualities，ofservices，orofrelationtoourseit`Tistrue，thereisnohuman，andindeednosensible，creature，whosehappinessormiserydoesnot，insomemeasure，affectuswhenbroughtneartous，andrepresentedinlivelycolours:Butthisproceedsmerelyfromsympathy，andisnoproofofsuchanuniversalaffectiontomankind，sincethisconcernextendsitselfbeyondourownspecies。Anaffectionbetwixtthesexesisapassionevidentlyimplantedinhumannature；andthispassionnotonlyappearsinitspeculiarsymptoms，butalsoininflamingeveryotherprincipleofaffection，andraisingastrongerlovefrombeauty，wit，kindness，thanwhatwou’dotherwiseflowfromthem。Werethereanuniversalloveamongallhumancreatures，。itwou’dappearafterthesamemanner。Anydegreeofagoodqualitywou’dcauseastrongeraffectionthanthesamedegreeofabadqualitywou’dcausehatred；contrarytowhatwefindbyexperience。Men’stempersaredifferent，andsomehaveapropensitytothetender，andotherstotherougher，affections:Butinthemain，wemayaffirm，thatmaningeneral，orhumannature，isnothingbuttheobjectbothofloveandhatred，andrequiressomeothercause，whichbyadoublerelationofimpressionsandideas，mayexcitethesepassions。Invainwou’dweendeavourtoeludethishypothesis。Therearenophaenomenathatpointoutanysuchkindaffectiontomen，independentoftheirmerit，andeveryothercircumstance。Welovecompanyingeneral；but`tisasweloveanyotheramusement。AnEnglishmaninItalyisafriend:AEuropaeaninChina；andperhapsamanwou’dbebelov’dassuch，werewetomeethiminthemoon。Butthisproceedsonlyfromtherelationtoourselves；whichinthesecasesgathersforcebybeingconfinedtoafewpersons。
Ifpublicbenevolence，therefore，oraregardtotheinterestsofmankind，cannotbetheoriginalmotivetojustice，muchlesscanprivatebenevolence，oraregardtotheinterestsofthepartyconcern’d，bethismotive。Forwhatifhebemyenemy，andhasgivenmejustcausetohatehim？Whatifhebeaviciousman，anddeservesthehatredofallmankind？Whatifhebeamiser，andcanmakenouseofwhatIwou’ddeprivehimof？Whatifhebeaprofligatedebauchee，andwou’dratherreceiveharmthanbenefitfromlargepossessions？WhatifIbeinnecessity，andhaveurgentmotivestoacquiresomethingtomyfamily？Inallthesecases，theoriginalmotivetojusticewou’dfail；andconsequentlythejusticeitself，andalongwithitallproperty，tight，andobligation。
Arichmanliesunderamoralobligationtocommunicatetothoseinnecessityashareofhissuperfluities。Wereprivatebenevolencetheoriginalmotivetojustice，amanwou’dnotbeoblig’dtoleaveothersinthepossessionofmorethanheisoblig’dtogivethem。Atleastthedifferencewou’dbeveryinconsiderable。Mengenerallyfixtheiraffectionsmoreonwhattheyarepossess’dof，thanonwhattheyneverenjoy’d:Forthisreason，itwou’dbegreatercrueltytodispossessamanofanything，thannottogiveithim。Butwhowillassert，thatthisistheonlyfoundationofjustice？
Besides，wemustconsider，thatthechiefreason，whymenattachthemselvessomuchtotheirpossessionsis，thattheyconsiderthemastheirproperty，andassecur’dtotheminviolablybythelawsofsociety。Butthisisasecondaryconsideration，anddependentontheprecedingnotionsofjusticeandproperty。
Aman’spropertyissuppos’dtobefenc’dagainsteverymortal，ineverypossiblecase。Butprivatebenevolenceis，andoughttobe，weakerinsomepersons，thaninothers:Andinmany，orindeedinmostpersons，mustabsolutelyfail。Privatebenevolence，therefore，isnottheoriginalmotiveofjustice。
Fromallthisitfollows，thatwehavenorealoruniversalmotiveforobservingthelawsofequity，buttheveryequityandmeritofthatobservance；andasnoactioncanbeequitableormeritorious，whereitcannotarisefromsomeseparatemotive，thereishereanevidentsophistryandreasoninginacircle。Unless，therefore，wewillallow，thatnaturehasestablish’dasophistry，andrender’ditnecessaryandunavoidable，wemustallow，thatthesenseofjusticeandinjusticeisnotderiv’dfromnature，butarisesartificially，tho’necessarilyfromeducation，andhumanconventions。
Ishalladd，asacorollarytothisreasoning，thatsincenoactioncanbelaudableorblameable，withoutsomemotivesorimpellingpassions，distinctfromthesenseofmorals，thesedistinctpassionsmusthaveagreatinfluenceonthatsense。Tisaccordingtotheirgeneralforceinhumannature，thatweblameorpraise。Injudgingofthebeautyofanimalbodies，wealwayscarryinoureyetheoeconomyofacertainspecies；andwherethelimbsandfeaturesobservethatproportion，whichiscommontothespecies，wepronouncethemhandsomeandbeautiful。Inlikemannerwealwaysconsiderthenaturalandusualforceofthepassions，whenwedetermineconcerningviceandvirtue；andifthepassionsdepartverymuchfromthecommonmeasuresoneitherside，theyarealwaysdisapprov’dasvicious。Amannaturallyloveshischildrenbetterthanhisnephews，hisnephewsbetterthanhiscousins，hiscousinsbetterthanstrangers，whereeverythingelseisequal。Henceariseourcommonmeasuresofduty，inpreferringtheonetotheother。Oursenseofdutyalwaysfollowsthecommonandnaturalcourseofourpassions。
Toavoidgivingoffence，Imusthereobserve，thatwhenIdenyjusticetobeanaturalvirtue，Imakeuseoftheword，natural，onlyasoppos’dtoartificial。Inanothersenseoftheword；asnoprincipleofthehumanmindismorenaturalthanasenseofvirtue；sonovirtueismorenaturalthanjustice。Mankindisaninventivespecies；andwhereaninventionisobviousandabsolutelynecessary，itmayasproperlybesaidtobenaturalasanythingthatproceedsimmediatelyfromoriginalprinciples，withouttheinterventionofthoughtorreflection。Tho’therulesofjusticebeartificial，theyarenotarbitrary。NoristheexpressionimpropertocallthemLawsofNature；ifbynaturalweunderstandwhatiscommontoanyspecies，orevenifweconfineittomeanwhatisinseparablefromthespecies。
OftheoriginofjusticeandpropertyWenowproceedtoexaminetwoquestions，viz，concerningthemanner，inwhichtherulesofjusticeareestablish’dbytheartificeofmen；andconcerningthereasons，whichdetermineustoattributetotheobservanceorneglectoftheserulesamoralbeautyanddeformity。Thesequestionswillappearafterwardstobedistinct。Weshallbeginwiththeformer。
Ofalltheanimals，withwhichthisglobeispeopled，thereisnonetowardswhomnatureseems，atfirstsight，tohaveexercis’dmorecrueltythantowardsman，inthenumberlesswantsandnecessities，withwhichshehasloadedhim，andintheslendermeans，whichsheaffordstotherelievingthesenecessities。Inothercreaturesthesetwoparticularsgenerallycompensateeachother。Ifweconsiderthelionasavoraciousandcarnivorousanimal，weshalleasilydiscoverhimtobeverynecessitous；butifweturnoureyetohismakeandtemper，hisagility，hiscourage，hisarms，andhisforce，weshallfind，thathisadvantagesholdproportionwithhiswants。Thesheepandoxaredepriv’dofalltheseadvantages；buttheirappetitesaremoderate，andtheirfoodisofeasypurchase。Inmanalone，thisunnaturalconjunctionofinfirmity，andofnecessity，maybeobserv’dinitsgreatestperfection。Notonlythefood，whichisrequir’dforhissustenance，flieshissearchandapproach，oratleastrequireshislabourtobeproduc’d，buthemustbepossess’dofcloathsandlodging，todefendhimagainsttheinjuriesoftheweather；tho’toconsiderhimonlyinhimself，heisprovidedneitherwitharms，norforce，norothernaturalabilities，whichareinanydegreeanswerabletosomanynecessities。
`Tisbysocietyaloneheisabletosupplyhisdefects，andraisehimselfuptoanequalitywithhisfellow-creatures，andevenacquireasuperiorityabovethem。Bysocietyallhisinfirmitiesarecompensated；andtho’inthatsituationhiswantsmultiplyeverymomentuponhim，yethisabilitiesarestillmoreaugmented，andleavehimineveryrespectmoresatisfiedandhappy，than`tispossibleforhim，inhissavageandsolitarycondition，evertobecome。Wheneveryindividualpersonlaboursa-part，andonlyforhimself，hisforceistoosmalltoexecuteanyconsiderablework；hislabourbeingemploy’dinsupplyingallhisdifferentnecessities，heneverattainsaperfectioninanyparticularart；andashisforceandsuccessarenotatalltimesequal，theleastfailureineitheroftheseparticularsmustbeattendedwithinevitableruinandmisery。Societyprovidesaremedyforthesethreeinconveniences。Bytheconjunctionofforces，ourpowerisaugmented:Bythepartitionofemployments，ourabilityencreases:Andbymutualsuccourwearelessexpos’dtofortuneandaccidents。`Tisbythisadditionalforce，ability，andsecurity，thatsocietybecomesadvantageous。
Butinordertoformsociety，`tisrequisitenotonlythatitbeadvantageous，butalsothatmenbesensibleoftheseadvantages；and`tisimpossible，intheirwilduncultivatedstate，thatbystudyandreflectionalone，theyshouldeverbeabletoattainthisknowledge。Mostfortunately，therefore，thereisconjoin’dtothosenecessities，whoseremediesareremoteandobscure，anothernecessity，whichhavingapresentandmoreobviousremedy，mayjustlyberegardedasthefirstandoriginalprincipleofhumansociety。Thisnecessityisnootherthanthatnaturalappetitebetwixtthesexes，whichunitesthemtogether，andpreservestheirunion，tillanewtyetakesplaceintheirconcernfortheircommonoffspring。Thisnewconcernbecomesalsoaprincipleofunionbetwixttheparentsandoffspring，andformsamorenumeroussociety；wheretheparentsgovernbytheadvantageoftheirsuperiorstrengthandwisdom，andatthesametimearerestrain’dintheexerciseoftheirauthoritybythatnaturalaffection，whichtheybeartheirchildren。Inalittletime，customandhabitoperatingonthetendermindsofthechildren，makesthemsensibleoftheadvantages，whichtheymayreapfromsociety，aswellasfashionsthembydegreesforit，byrubbingoffthoseroughcornersanduntowardaffections，whichpreventtheircoalition。
Foritmustbeconfest，thathoweverthecircumstancesofhumannaturemayrenderanunionnecessary，andhoweverthosepassionsoflustandnaturalaffectionmayseemtorenderitunavoidable；yetthereareotherparticularsinournaturaltemper，andinouroutwardcircumstances，whichareveryincommodious，andareevencontrarytotherequisiteconjunction。Amongtheformer，wemayjustlyesteemourselfishnesstobethemostconsiderable。Iamsensible，thatgenerallyspeaking，therepresentationsofthisqualityhavebeencarriedmuchtoofar；andthatthedescriptions，whichcertainphilosophersdelightsomuchtoformofmankindinthisparticular，areaswideofnatureasanyaccountsofmonsters，whichwemeetwithinfablesandromances。Sofarfromthinking，thatmenhavenoaffectionforanythingbeyondthemselves，Iamofopinion，thattho’itberaretomeetwithone，wholovesanysinglepersonbetterthanhimself；yet`tisasraretomeetwithone，inwhomallthekindaffections，takentogether，donotoverbalancealltheselfish。Consultcommonexperience:Doyounotsee，thattho’thewholeexpenceofthefamilybegenerallyunderthedirectionofthemasterofit，yettherearefewthatdonotbestowthelargestpartoftheirfortunesonthepleasuresoftheirwives，andtheeducationoftheirchildren，reservingthesmallestportionfortheirownproperuseandentertainment。Thisiswhatwemayobserveconcerningsuchashavethoseendearingties；andmaypresume，thatthecasewouldbethesamewithothers，weretheyplac’dinalikesituation。
Buttho’thisgenerositymustbeacknowledg’dtothehonourofhumannature，wemayatthesametimeremark，thatsonobleanaffection，insteadoffittingmenforlargesocieties，isalmostascontrarytothem，asthemostnarrowselfishness。Forwhileeachpersonloveshimselfbetterthananyothersingleperson，andinhislovetoothersbearsthegreatestaffectiontohisrelationsandacquaintance，thismustnecessarilyproduceanoppositonofpassions，andaconsequentoppositionofactions；whichcannotbutbedangeroustothenew-establish’dunion。
`Tishoweverworthwhiletoremark，thatthiscontrarietyofpassionswou’dbeattendedwithbutsmalldanger，diditnotconcurwithapeculiarityinouroutwardcircumstances，whichaffordsitanopportunityofexertingitself。Therearedifferentspeciesofgoods，whichwearepossess’dof；theinternalsatisfactionofourminds，theexternaladvantagesofourbody，andtheenjoymentofsuchpossessionsaswehaveacquir’dbyourindustryandgoodfortune。Weareperfectlysecureintheenjoymentofthefirst。Thesecondmayberavish’dfromus，butcanbeofnoadvantagetohimwhodeprivesusofthem。Thelastonlyarebothexpos’dtotheviolenceofothers，andmaybetransferr’dwithoutsufferinganylossoralteration；whileatthesametime，thereisnotasufficientquantityofthemtosupplyeveryone’sdesiresandnecessities。Astheimprovement，therefore，ofthesegoodsisthechiefadvantageofsociety，sotheinstabilityoftheirpossession，alongwiththeirscarcity，isthechiefimpediment。
Invainshou’dweexpecttofind，inuncultivatednature，aremedytothisinconvenience；orhopeforanyinartificialprincipleofthehumanmind，whichmightcontroulthoseareremoteandobscure，anothernecessity，whichhavingapresentandmoreobviousremedy，mayjustlyberegardedasthefirstandoriginalprincipleofhumansociety。Thisnecessityisnootherthanthatnaturalappetitebetwixtthesexes，whichunitesthemtogether，andpreservestheirunion，tillanewtyetakesplaceintheirconcernfortheircommonoffspring。Thisnewconcernbecomesalsoaprincipleofunionbetwixttheparentsandoffspring，andformsamorenumeroussociety；wheretheparentsgovernbytheadvantageoftheirsuperiorstrengthandwisdom，andatthesametimearerestrain’dintheexerciseoftheirauthoritybythatnaturalaffection，whichtheybeartheirchildren。Inalittletime，customandhabitoperatingonthetendermindsofthechildren，makesthemsensibleoftheadvantages，whichtheymayreapfromsociety，aswellasfashionsthembydegreesforit，byrubbingoffthoseroughcornersanduntowardaffections，whichpreventtheircoalition。
Foritmustbeconfest，thathoweverthecircumstancesofhumannaturemayrenderanunionnecessary，andhoweverthosepassionsoflustandnaturalaffectionmayseemtorenderitunavoidable；yetthereareotherparticularsinournaturaltemper，andinouroutwardcircumstances，whichareveryincommodious，andareevencontrarytotherequisiteconjunction。Amongtheformer，wemayjustlyesteemourselfishnesstobethemostconsiderable。Iamsensible，thatgenerallyspeaking，therepresentationsofthisqualityhavebeencarriedmuchtoofar；andthatthedescriptions，whichcertainphilosophersdelightsomuchtoformofmankindinthisparticular，areaswideofnatureasanyaccountsofmonsters，whichwemeetwithinfablesandromances。Sofarfromthinking，thatmenhavenoaffectionforanythingbeyondthemselves，Iamofopinion，thattho’itberaretomeetwithone，wholovesanysinglepersonbetterthanhimself；yet`tisasraretomeetwithone，inwhomallthekindaffections，takentogether，donotoverbalancealltheselfish。Consultcommonexperience:Doyounotsee，thattho’thewholeexpenceofthefamilybegenerallyunderthedirectionofthemasterofit，yettherearefewthatdonotbestowthelargestpartoftheirfortunesonthepleasuresoftheirwives，andtheeducationoftheirchildren，reservingthesmallestportionfortheirownproperuseandentertainmentThisiswhatwemayobserveconcerningsuchashavethoseendearingties；andmaypresume，thatthecasewouldbethesamewithothers，weretheyplac’dinalikesituation。
Buttho’thisgenerositymustbeacknowledg’dtothehonourofhumannature，wemayatthesametimeremark，thatsonobleanaffection，insteadoffittingmenforlargesocieties，isalmostascontrarytothem，asthemostnarrowselfishness。Forwhileeachpersonloveshimselfbetterthananyothersingleperson，andinhislovetoothersbearsthegreatestaffectiontohisrelationsandacquaintance，thismustnecessarilyproduceanoppositonofpassions，andaconsequentoppositionofactions；whichcannotbutbedangeroustothenew-establish’dunion。
’Tishoweverworthwhiletoremark，thatthiscontrarietyofpassionswou’dbeattendedwithbutsmalldanger，diditnotconcurwithapeculiarityinouroutwardcircumstances，whichaffordsitanopportunityofexertingitself。Therearedifferentspeciesofgoods，whichwearepossess’dof；theinternalsatisfactionofourminds，theexternaladvantagesofourbody，andtheenjoymentofsuchpossessionsaswehaveacquir’dbyourindustryandgoodfortune。Weareperfectlysecureintheenjoymentofthefirst。Thesecondmayberavish’dfromus，butcanbeofnoadvantagetohimwhodeprivesusofthem。Thelastonlyarebothexpos’dtotheviolenceofothers，andmaybetransferr’dwithoutsufferinganylossoralteration；whileatthesametime，thereisnotasufficientquantityofthemtosupplyeveryone’sdesiresandnecessities。Astheimprovement，therefore，ofthesegoodsisthechiefadvantageofsociety，sotheinstabilityoftheirpossession，alongwiththeirscarcity，isthechiefimpediment。
Invainshou’dweexpecttofind，inuncultivatednature，aremedytothisinconvenience；orhopeforanyinartificialprincipleofthehumanmind，whichmightcontroulthosepartialaffections，andmakeusovercomethetemptationsarisingfromourcircumstances。Theideaofjusticecanneverservetothispurpose，orbetakenforanaturalprinciple，capableofinspiringmenwithanequitableconducttowardseachother。Thatvirtue，asitisnowunderstood。wou’dneverhavebeendream’dofamongrudeandsavagemen。Forthenotionofinjuryorinjusticeimpliesanimmoralityorvicecommittedagainstsomeotherperson:Andaseveryimmoralityisderiv’dfromsomedefectorunsoundnessofthepassions，andasthisdefectmustbejudg’dof，inagreatmeasure，fromtheordinarycourseofnatureintheconstitutionofthemind；`twillbeeasytoknow，whetherwebeguiltyofanyimmorality，withregardtoothers，byconsideringthenatural，andusualforceofthoseseveralaffections，whicharedirectedtowardsthem。Nowitappears，thatintheoriginalframeofourmind，ourstrongestattentionisconfin’dtoourselves；ournextisextendedtoourrelationsandacquaintance；and`tisonlytheweakestwhichreachestostrangersandindifferentpersons。Thispartiality，then，andunequalaffection，mustnotonlyhaveaninfluenceonourbehaviourandconductinsociety，butevenonourideasofviceandvirtue；soastomakeusregardanyremarkabletransgressionofsuchadegreeofpartiality，eitherbytoogreatanenlargement，orcontractionoftheaffections，asviciousandimmoral。Thiswemayobserveinourcommonjudgmentsconcerningactions，whereweblameaperson，whoeithercentersallhisaffectionsinhisfamily，orissoregardlessofthem，as，inanyoppositionofinterest，togivethepreferencetoastranger，ormerechanceacquaintance。Fromallwhichitfollows，thatournaturaluncultivatedideasofmorality，insteadofprovidingaremedyforthepartialityofouraffections，doratherconformthemselvestothatpartiality，andgiveitanadditionalforceandinfluence。
Theremedy，then，isnotderiv’dfromnature，butfromartifice；ormoreeproperlyspeaking，natureprovidesaremedyinthejudgmentandunderstanding，forwhatisirregularandincommodiousintheaffections。Forwhenmen，fromtheirearlyeducationinsociety，havebecomesensibleoftheinfiniteadvantagesthatresultfromit，andhavebesidesacquir’danewaffectiontocompanyandconversation；andwhentheyhaveobserv’d，thattheprincipaldisturbanceinsocietyarisesfromthosegoods，whichwecallexternal，andfromtheirloosenessandeasytransitionfromonepersontoanother；theymustseekforaremedybyputtingthesegoods，asfaraspossible，onthesamefootingwiththefix’dandconstantadvantagesofthemindandbody。Thiscanbedoneafternoothermanner，thanbyaconventionenter’dintobyallthemembersofthesocietytobestowstabilityonthepossessionofthoseexternalgoods，andleaveeveryoneinthepeaceableenjoymentofwhathemayacquirebyhisfortuneandindustry。Bythismeans，everyoneknowswhathemaysafelypossess；andthepassionsalerestrain’dintheirpartialandcontradictorymotions。Norissucharestraintcontrarytothesepassions；forifso，itcou’dneverbeenter’dinto，normaintain’d；butitisonlycontrarytotheirheedlessandimpetuousmovement。Insteadofdepartingfromourowninterest，orfromthatofournearestfriends，byabstainingfromthepossessionsofothers，wecannotbetterconsultboththeseinterests，thanbysuchaconvention；becauseitisbythatmeanswemaintainsociety，whichissonecessarytotheirwell-beingandsubsistence，aswellastoourown。
Thisconventionisnotofthenatureofapromise:Forevenpromisesthemselves，asweshallseeafterwards，arisefromhumanconventions。Itisonlyageneralsenseofcommoninterest；whichsenseallthemembersofthesocietyexpresstooneanother，andwhichinducesthemtoregulatetheirconductbycertainrules。Iobserve，thatitwillbeformyinteresttoleaveanotherinthepossessionofhisgoods，providedhewillactinthesamemannerwithregardtome。Heissensibleofalikeinterestintheregulationofhisconduct。Whenthiscommonsenseofinterestismutuallyexpress’d，andisknowntoboth，itproducesasuitableresolutionandbehaviour。Andthismayproperlyenoughbecall’daconventionoragreementbetwixtus，tho’withouttheinterpositionofapromise；sincetheactionsofeachofushaveareferencetothoseoftheother，andareperform’duponthesupposition，thatsomethingistobeperform’dontheotherpart。Twomen，whopulltheoarsofaboat，doitbyanagreementorconvention，tho’theyhavenevergivenpromisestoeachother。Noristheruleconcerningthestabilityofpossessionthelessderiv’dfromhumanconventions，thatitarisesgradually，andacquiresforcebyaslowprogression，and。byourrepeatedexperienceoftheinconveniencesoftransgressingit。Onthecontrary，thisexperienceassuresusstillmore，thatthesenseofinteresthasbecomecommontoallourfellows，andgivesusaconfidenceofthefutureregularityoftheirconduct:And`tisonlyontheexpectationofthis，thatourmoderationandabstinencearefounded。Inlikemannerarelanguagesgraduallyestablish’dbyhumanconventionswithoutanypromise。Inlikemannerdogoldandsilverbecomethecommonmeasuresofexchange，andareesteem’dsufficientpaymentforwhatisofahundredtimestheirvalue。
Afterthisconvention，concerningabstinencefromthepossessionsofothers，isenter’dinto，andeveryonehasacquir’dastabilityinhispossessions，thereimmediatelyarisetheideasofjusticeandinjustice；asalsothoseofproperty，right，andobligation。Thelatterarealtogetherunintelligiblewithoutfirstunderstandingtheformer。Ourpropertyisnothingbutthosegoods，whoseconstantpossessionisestablish’dbythelawsofsociety；thatis，bythelawsofjustice。Those，therefore，whomakeuseofthewordsproperty，orright，orobligation，beforetheyhaveexplain’dtheoriginofjustice，orevenmakeuseoftheminthatexplication，areguiltyofaverygrossfallacy，andcanneverreasonuponanysolidfoundation。Aman’spropertyissomeobjectrelatedtohim。Thisrelationisnotnatural，butmoral，andfoundedonjustice。Tisverypreposterous，therefore，toimagine，thatwecanhaveanyideaofproperty，withoutfullycomprehendingthenatureofjustice，andshewingitsoriginintheartificeandcontrivanceofman。Theoriginofjusticeexplainsthatofproperty。Thesameartificegivesrisetoboth。Asourfirstandmostnaturalsentimentofmoralsisfoundedonthenatureofourpassions，andgivesthepreferencetoourselvesandfriends，abovestrangers；`tisimpossibletherecanbenaturallyanysuchthingasafix’drightorproperty，whiletheoppositepassionsofmenimpelthemincontrarydirections，andarenotrestrain’dbyanyconventionoragreement。
