Noonecandoubt，thattheconventionforthedistinctionofproperty，andforthestabilityofpossession，isofallcircumstancesthemostnecessarytotheestablishmentofhumansociety，andthataftertheagreementforthefixingandobservingofthisrule，thereremainslittleornothingtobedonetowardssettlingaperfectharmonyandconcord。Alltheotherpassions，besidesthisofinterest，areeithereasilyrestrain’d，orarenotofsuchperniciousconsequence，whenindulg’d。Vanityisrathertobeesteem’dasocialpassion，andabondofunionamongmen。Pityandlovearetobeconsider’dinthesamelight。Andastoenvyandrevenge，tho’pernicious，theyoperateonlybyintervals，andaredirectedagainstparticularpersons，whomweconsiderasoursuperiorsorenemies。Thisavidityalone，ofacquiringgoodsandpossessionsforourselvesandournearestfriends，isinsatiable，perpetual，universal，anddirectlydestructiveofsociety。Therescarceisanyone，whoisnotactuatedbyit；andthereisnoone，whohasnotreasontofearfromit，whenitactswithoutanyrestraint，andgiveswaytoitsfirstandmostnaturalmovements。Sothatuponthewhole，wearetoesteemthedifficultiesintheestablishmentofsociety，tobegreaterorless，accordingtothoseweencounterinregulatingandrestrainingthispassion。
`Tiscertain，thatnoaffectionofthehumanmindhas。bothasufficientforce，andaproperdirectiontocounterbalancetheloveofgain，andrendermenfitmembersofsociety，bymakingthemabstainfromthepossessionsofothers。Benevolencetostrangersistooweakforthispurpose；andastotheotherpassions，theyratherinflamethisavidity，whenweobserve，thatthelargerourpossessionsare，themoreabilitywehaveofgratifyingallourappetites。Thereisnopassion，therefore，capableofcontrollingtheinterestedaffection，buttheveryaffectionitself，byanalterationofitsdirection。Nowthisalterationmustnecessarilytakeplaceupontheleastreflection；since`tisevident，thatthepassionismuchbettersatisfy’dbyitsrestraint，thanbyitsliberty，andthatinpreservingsociety，wemakemuchgreateradvancesintheacquiringpossessions，thaninthesolitaryandforlorncondition，whichmustfollowuponviolenceandanuniversallicence。Thequestion，therefore，concerningthewickednessorgoodnessofhumannature，entersnotintheleastintothatotherquestionconcerningtheoriginofsociety；noristhereanythingtobeconsider’dbutthedegreesofmen’ssagacityorfolly。Forwhetherthepassionofself-interestbeesteemedviciousorvirtuous，`tisallacase；sinceitselfalonerestrainsit:Sothatifitbevirtuous，menbecomesocialbytheirvirtue；ifvicious，theirvicehasthesameeffect。
Nowas`tisbyestablishingtheruleforthestabilityofpossession，thatthispassionrestrainsitself；ifthatrulebeveryabstruse，andofdifficultinvention；societymustbeesteem’d，inamanner，accidental，andtheeffectofmanyages。Butifitbefound，thatnothingcanbemoresimpleandobviousthanthatrule；thateveryparent，inordertopreservepeaceamonghischildren，mustestablishit；andthatthesefirstrudimentsofjusticemusteverydaybeimprov’d，asthesocietyenlarges:Ifallthisappearevident，asitcertainlymust，wemayconclude，that`tisutterlyimpossibleformentoremainanyconsiderabletimeinthatsavagecondition，whichprecedessociety；butthathisveryfirststateandsituationmayjustlybeesteem’dsocial。This，however，hindersnot，butthatphilosophersmay，iftheyplease，extendtheirreasoningtothesuppos’dstateofnature；providedtheyallowittobeamerephilosophicalfiction，whichneverhad，andnevercou’dhaveanyreality。Humannaturebeingcompos’doftwoprincipalparts，whicharerequisiteinallitsactions，theaffectionsandunderstanding；`tiscertain，thattheblindmotionsoftheformer，withoutthedirectionofthelatter，incapacitatemenforsociety:Anditmaybeallow’dustoconsiderseparatelytheeffects，thatresultfromtheseparateoperationsofthesetwocomponentpartsofthemind。Thesamelibertymaybepermittedtomoral，whichisallow’dtonaturalphilosophers；and`tisveryusualwiththelattertoconsideranymotionascompoundedandconsistingoftwopartsseparatefromeachother，tho’atthesametimetheyacknowledgeittobeinitselfuncompoundedandinseparable。
Thisstateofnature，therefore，istoberegardedasamerefiction，notunlikethatofthegoldenage，whichpoetshaveinvented；onlywiththisdifference，thattheformerisdescrib’dasfullofwar，violenceandinjustice；whereasthelatterispointedouttous，asthemostcharmingandmostpeaceablecondition，thatcanpossiblybeimagin’d。Theseasons，inthatfirstageofnature，weresotemperate，ifwemaybelievethepoets，thattherewasnonecessityformentoprovidethemselveswithcloathsandhousesasasecurityagainsttheviolenceofheatandcold。Theriversflow’dwithwineandmilk:Theoaksyieldedhoney；andnaturespontaneouslyproduc’dhergreatestdelicacies。Norwerethesethechiefadvantagesofthathappyage。Thestormsandtempestswerenotaloneremov’dfromnature；butthosemorefurioustempestswereunknowntohumanbreasts，whichnowcausesuchuproar，andengendersuchconfusion。Avarice，ambition，cruelty，selfishness，wereneverheardof:Cordialaffection，compassion，sympathy，weretheonlymovements，withwhichthehumanmindwasyetacquainted。Eventhedistinctionofmineandthinewasbanish’dfromthathappyraceofmortals，andcarry’dwiththemtheverynotionsofpropertyandobligation，justiceandinjustice。
This，nodoubt，istoberegardedasanidlefiction；butyetdeservesourattention，becausenothingcanmoreevidentlyshewtheoriginofthosevirtues，whicharethesubjectsofourpresentenquiry。Ihavealreadyobserv’d，thatjusticetakesitsrisefromhumanconventions；andthattheseareintendedasaremedytosomeinconveniences，whichproceedfromtheconcurrenceofcertainqualitiesofthehumanmindwiththesituationofexternalobjects。Thequalitiesofthemindareselfishnessandlimitedgenerosity:Andthesituationofexternalobjectsistheireasychange，join’dtotheirscarcityincomparisonofthewantsanddesiresofmen。Buthoweverphilosophersmayhavebeenbewilder’dinthosespeculations，poetshavebeenguidedmoreinfallibly，byacertaintasteorcommoninstinct，whichinmostkindsofreasoninggoesfartherthananyofthatartandphilosophy，withwhichwehavebeenyetacquainted。Theyeasilyperceiv’d，ifeverymanhadatenderregardforanother，orifnaturesuppliedabundantlyallourwantsanddesires，thatthejealousyofinterest，whichjusticesupposes，couldnolongerhaveplace；norwouldtherebeanyoccasionforthosedistinctionsandlimitsofpropertyandpossession，whichatpresentareinuseamongmankind。Encreasetoasufficientdegreethebenevolenceofmen，orthebountyofnature，andyourenderjusticeuseless，bysupplyingitsplacewithmuchnoblervirtues，andmorevaluableblessings。Theselfishnessofmenisanimatedbythefewpossessionswehave，inproportiontoourwants；and`tistorestrainthisselfishness，thatmenhavebeenoblig’dtoseparatethemselvesfromthecommunity，andtodistinguishbetwixttheirowngoodsandthoseofothers。
Norneedwehaverecoursetothefictionsofpoetstolearnthis；butbesidethereasonofthething，maydiscoverthesametruthbycommonexperienceandobservation。`Tiseasytoremark，thatacordialaffectionrendersallthingscommonamongfriends；andthatmarriedpeopleinparticularmutuallylosetheirproperty，andareunacquaintedwiththemineandthine，whicharesonecessary，andyetcausesuchdisturbanceinhumansociety。Thesameeffectarisesfromanyalterationinthecircumstancesofmankind；aswhenthereissuchaplentyofanythingassatisfiesallthedesiresofmen:Inwhichcasethedistinctionofpropertyisentirelylost，andeverythingremainsincommon。Thiswemayobservewithregardtoairandwater，tho’themostvaluableofallexternalobjects；andmayeasilyconclude，thatifmenweresuppliedwitheverythinginthesameabundance，orifeveryonehadthesameaffectionandtenderregardforeveryoneasforhimself；justiceandinjusticewouldbeequallyunknownamongmankind。
Herethenisaproposition，which，Ithink，mayberegardedascertain，that`tisonlyfromtheselfishnessandconfin’dgenerosityofmen，alongwiththescantyprovisionnaturehasmadeforhiswants，thatjusticederivesitsorigin。Ifwelookbackwardweshallfind，thatthispropositionbestowsanadditionalforceonsomeofthoseobservations，whichwehavealreadymadeonthissubject。
First，wemayconcludefromit，thataregardtopublicinterest，orastrongextensivebenevolence，isnotourfirstandoriginalmotivefortheobservationoftherulesofjustice；since`tisallow’d，thatifmenwereendow’dwithsuchabenevolence，theseruleswouldneverhavebeendreamtof。
Secondly，wemayconcludefromthesameprinciple，thatthesenseofjusticeisnotfoundedonreason，oronthediscoveryofcertainconnexionsandrelationsofideas，whichareeternal，immutable，anduniversallyobligatory。Forsinceitisconfest，thatsuchanalterationasthatabove-mention’d，inthetemperandcircumstancesofmankind，wou’dentirelyalterourdutiesandobligations，`tisnecessaryuponthecommonsystem，thatthesenseofvirtueisderiv’dfromreason，toshewthechangewhichthismustproduceintherelationsandideas。But`tisevident，thattheonlycause，whytheextensivegenerosityofman，andtheperfectabundanceofeverything，wou’ddestroytheveryideaofjustice，isbecausetheyrenderituseless；andthat，ontheotherhand，hisconfin’dbenevolence，andhisnecessitouscondition，giverisetothatvirtue，onlybymakingitrequisitetothepublickinterest，andtothatofeveryindividual。Twasthereforeaconcernforourown，andthepublickinterest，whichmadeusestablishthelawsofjustice；andnothingcanbemorecertain，thanthatitisnotanyrelationofideas，whichgivesusthisconcern，butourimpressionsandsentiments，withoutwhicheverythinginnatureisperfectlyindifferenttous，andcanneverintheleastaffectus。Thesenseofjustice，therefore，isnotfoundedonourideas，butonourimpressions。
Thirdly，wemayfartherconfirmtheforegoingproposition，thatthoseimpressions，whichgiverisetothissenseofjustice，arenotnaturaltothemindofman，butarisefromartificeandhumanconventions。Forsinceanyconsiderablealterationoftemperandcircumstancesdestroysequallyjusticeandinjustice；andsincesuchanalterationhasaneffectonlybychangingourownandthepublickinterest；itfollows，thatthefirstestablishmentoftherulesofjusticedependsonthesedifferentinterests。Butifmenpursu’dthepublickinterestnaturally，andwithaheartyaffection，theywou’dneverhavedream’dofrestrainingeachotherbytheserules；andiftheypursu’dtheirowninterest，withoutanyprecaution，theywou’drunhead-longintoeverykindofinjusticeandviolence。Theserules，therefore，areartificial，andseektheirendinanobliqueandindirectmanner；noristheinterest，whichgivesrisetothem，ofakindthatcou’dbepursu’dbythenaturalandinartificialpassionsofmen。
Tomakethismoreevident，consider，thattho’therulesofjusticeareestablish’dmerelybyinterest，theirconnexionwithinterestissomewhatsingular，andisdifferentfromwhatmaybeobserv’donotheroccasions。Asingleactofjusticeisfrequentlycontrarytopublicinterest；andwereittostandalone，withoutbeingfollow’dbyotheracts，may，initself，beveryprejudicialtosociety。Whenamanofmerit，ofabeneficentdisposition，restoresagreatfortunetoamiser，oraseditiousbigot，hehasactedjustlyandlaudably，butthepublicisarealsufferer。Noriseverysingleactofjustice，consider’dapart，moreconducivetoprivateinterest，thantopublic；and`tiseasilyconceiv’dhowamanmayimpoverishhimselfbyasignalinstanceofintegrity，andhavereasontowish，thatwithregardtothatsingleact，thelawsofjusticewereforamomentsuspendedintheuniverse。Buthoweversingleactsofjusticemaybecontrary，eithertopublicorprivateinterest，`tiscertain，thatthewholeplanorschemeishighlyconducive，orindeedabsolutelyrequisite，bothtothesupportofsociety，andthewell-beingofeveryindividual。Tisimpossibletoseparatethegoodfromtheill。Propertymustbestable，andmustbefix’dbygeneralrules。Tho’inoneinstancethepublicbeasufferer，thismomentaryillisamplycompensatedbythesteadyprosecutionoftherule，andbythepeaceandorder，whichitestablishesinsociety。Andeveneveryindividualpersonmustfindhimselfagainer，onballancingtheaccount；since，withoutjustice。societymustimmediatelydissolve，andeveryonemustfallintothatsavageandsolitarycondition，whichisinfinitelyworsethantheworstsituationthatcanpossiblybesuppos’dinsociety。Whenthereforemenhavehadexperienceenoughtoobserve，thatwhatevermaybetheconsequenceofanysingleactofjustice，perform’dbyasingleperson，yetthewholesystemofactions，concurr’dinbythewholesociety，isinfinitelyadvantageoustothewhole，andtoeverypart；itisnotlongbeforejusticeandpropertytakeplace。Everymemberofsocietyissensibleofthisinterest:Everyoneexpressesthissensetohisfellows，alongwiththeresolutionhehastakenofsquaringhisactionsbyit，onconditionthatotherswilldothesame。Nomoreisrequisitetoinduceanyoneofthemtoperformanactofjustice，whohasthefirstopportunity。Thisbecomesanexampletoothers。Andthusjusticeestablishesitselfbyakindofconventionoragreement；thatis，byasenseofinterest，suppos’dtobecommontoall，andwhereeverysingleactisperform’dinexpectationthatothersaretoperformthelike。Withoutsuchaconvention，noonewou’deverhavedream’d，thattherewassuchavirtueasjustice，orhavebeeninduc’dtoconformhisactionstoit。Takinganysingleact，myjusticemaybeperniciousineveryrespect；and`tisonlyuponthesupposition。thatothersaretoimitatemyexample，thatIcanbeinduc’dtoembracethatvirtue；sincenothingbutthiscombinationcanrenderjusticeadvantageous，oraffordmeanymotivestoconformmyselftoitsrules。
Wecomenowtothesecondquestionwepropos’d，viz。Whyweannextheideaofvirtuetojustice，andofvicetoinjustice。Thisquestionwillnotdetainuslongaftertheprinciples，whichwehavealreadyestablish’d，Allwecansayofitatpresentwillbedispatch’dinafewwords:Andforfarthersatisfaction，thereadermustwaittillwecometothethirdpartofthisbook。Thenaturalobligationtojustice，viz，interest，hasbeenfullyexplain’d；butastothemoralobligation，orthesentimentofrightandwrong，`twillfirstberequisitetoexaminethenaturalvirtues，beforewecangiveafullandsatisfactoryaccountofit。Aftermenhavefoundbyexperience，thattheirselfishnessandconfin’dgenerosity，actingattheirliberty，totallyincapacitatethemforsociety；andatthesametimehaveobserv’d，thatsocietyisnecessarytothesatisfactionofthoseverypassions，theyarenaturallyinduc’dtolaythemselvesundertherestraintofsuchrules，asmayrendertheircommercemoresafeandcommodious。Totheimpositionthen，andobservanceoftheserules，bothingeneral，andineveryparticularinstance，theyareatfirstinduc’donlybyaregardtointerest；andthismotive，onthefirstformationofsociety，issufficientlystrongandforcible。Butwhensocietyhasbecomenumerous，andhasencreas’dtoatribeornation，thisinterestismoreremote；nordomensoreadilyperceive，thatdisorderandconfusionfollowuponeverybreachoftheserules，asinamorenarrowandcontractedsociety。Buttho’inourownactionswemayfrequentlylosesightofthatinterest，whichwehaveinmaintainingorder，andmayfollowalesserandmorepresentinterest，weneverfailtoobservetheprejudicewereceive，eithermediatelyorimmediately，fromtheinjusticeofothers；asnotbeinginthatcaseeitherblindedbypassion，orbyass’dbyanycontrarytemptation。Naywhentheinjusticeissodistantfromus，asnowaytoaffectourinterest，itstilldispleasesus；becauseweconsideritasprejudicialtohumansociety，andpernicioustoeveryonethatapproachesthepersonguiltyofit。Wepartake’oftheiruneasinessbysympathy；andaseverything，whichgivesuneasinessinhumanactions，uponthegeneralsurvey，iscall’dVice，andwhateverproducessatisfaction，inthesamemanner，isdenominatedVirtue；thisisthereasonwhythesenseofmoralgoodandevilfollowsuponjusticeandinjustice。Andtho’thissense，inthepresentcase，bederiv’donlyfromcontemplatingtheactionsofothers，yetwefailnottoextenditeventoourownactions。Thegeneralrulereachesbeyondthoseinstances，fromwhichitarose；whileatthesametimewenaturallysympathizewithothersinthesentimentstheyentertainofus。Thusself-interestistheoriginalmotivetotheestablishmentofjustice:butasympathywithpublicinterestisthesourceofthemoralapprobation，whichattendsthatvirtue。
Tho’thisprogressofthesentimentsbenatural，andevennecessary，`tiscertain，thatitishereforwardedbytheartificeofpoliticians，who，inordertogovernmenmoreeasily，andpreservepeaceinhumansociety，haveendeavour’dtoproduceanesteemforjustice，andanabhorrenceofinjustice。This，nodoubt，musthaveitseffect；butnothingcanbemoreevident，thanthatthematterhasbeencarry’dtoofarbycertainwritersonmorals，whoseemtohaveemploy’dtheirutmosteffortstoextirpateallsenseofvirtuefromamongmankind。Anyartificeofpoliticiansmayassistnatureintheproducingofthosesentiments，whichshesuggeststous，andmayevenonsomeoccasions，producealoneanapprobationoresteemforanyparticularaction；but`tisimpossibleitshouldbethesolecauseofthedistinctionwemakebetwixtviceandvirtue。Forifnaturedidnotaidusinthisparticular，`twou’dbeinvainforpoliticianstotalkofhonourableordishonourable，praiseworthyorblameable。Thesewordswou’dbeperfectlyunintelligible，andwou’dnomorehaveanyideaannex’dtothem，thaniftheywereofatongueperfectlyunknowntous。Theutmostpoliticianscanperform，is，toextendthenaturalsentimentsbeyondtheiroriginalbounds；butstillnaturemustfurnishthematerials，andgiveussomenotionofmoraldistinctions。
Aspublickpraiseandblameencreaseouresteemforjustice；soprivateeducationandinstructioncontributetothesameeffect。Forasparentseasilyobserve，thatamanisthemoreuseful，bothtohimselfandothers，thegreaterdegreeofprobityandhonourheisendow’dwith；andthatthoseprincipleshavegreaterforce，whencustomandeducationassistinterestandreflection:Forthesereasonstheyareinduc’dtoinculcateontheirchildren，fromtheirearliestinfancy，theprinciplesofprobity，andteachthemtoregardtheobservanceofthoserules，bywhichsocietyismaintain’d，asworthyandhonourable，andtheirviolationasbaseandinfamous。Bythismeansthesentimentsofhonourmaytakerootintheirtenderminds，andacquiresuchfirmnessandsolidity，thattheymayfalllittleshortofthoseprinciples，whicharethemostessentialtoournatures，andthemostdeeplyradicatedinourinternalconstitution。
Whatfarthercontributestoencreasetheirsolidity，istheinterestofourreputation，aftertheopinion，thatameritordemeritattendsjusticeorinjustice，isoncefirmlyestablish’damongmankind。Thereisnothing，whichtouchesusmorenearlythanourreputation，andnothingonwhichourreputationmoredependsthanourconduct，withrelationtothepropertyofothers。Forthisreason，everyone，whohasanyregardtohischaracter，orwhointendstoliveongoodtermswithmankind，mustfixaninviolablelawtohimself，never，byanytemptation，tobeinduc’dtoviolatethoseprinciples，whichareessentialtoamanofprobityandhonour。
IshallmakeonlyoneobservationbeforeIleavethissubject，viz，thattho’Iassert，thatinthestateofnature，orthatimaginarystate，whichprecededsociety，therebeneitherjusticenorinjustice，yetIassertnot，thatitwasallowable，insuchastate，toviolatethepropertyofothers。Ionlymaintain，thattherewasnosuchthingasproperty；andconsequentlycou’dbenosuchthingasjusticeorinjustice。Ishallhaveoccasiontomakeasimilarreflectionwithregardtopromises，whenIcometotreatofthem；andIhopethisreflection，whendulyweigh’d，willsufficetoremoveallodiumfromtheforegoingopinions，withregardtojusticeandinjustice。
Oftherules，whichdeterminepropertyTho’theestablishmentoftherule，concerningthestabilityofpossession，benotonlyuseful，butevenabsolutelynecessarytohumansociety，itcanneverservetoanypurpose，whileitremainsinsuchgeneralterms。Somemethodmustbeshewn，bywhichwemaydistinguishwhatparticulargoodsaretobeassign’dtoeachparticularperson，whiletherestofmankindareexcludedfromtheirpossessionandenjoyment。Ournextbusiness，then，mustbetodiscoverthereasonswhichmodifythisgeneralrule，andfitittothecommonuseandpracticeoftheworld。
`Tisobvious，thatthosereasonsarenotderiv’dfromanyutilityoradvantage，whicheithertheparticularpersonorthepublicmayreapfromhisenjoymentofanyparticulargoods，beyondwhatwou’dresultfromthepossessionofthembyanyotherperson。Twerebetter，nodoubt，thateveryonewerepossess’dofwhatismostsuitabletohim，andproperforhisuse:Butbesides，thatthisrelationoffitnessmaybecommontoseveralatonce，`tisliabletosomanycontroversies，andmenaresopartialandpassionateinjudgingofthesecontroversies，thatsuchalooseanduncertainrulewou’dbeabsolutelyincompatiblewiththepeaceofhumansociety。Theconventionconcerningthestabilityofpossessionisenter’dinto，inordertocutoffalloccasionsofdiscordandcontention；andthisendwou’dneverbeattain’d，wereweallow’dtoapplythisruledifferentlyineveryparticularcase，accordingtoeveryparticularutility，whichmightbediscover’dinsuchanapplication。Justice，inherdecisions，neverregardsthefitnessorunfitnessofobjectstoparticularpersons，butconductsherselfbymoreextensiveviews。Whetheramanbegenerous，oramiser，heisequallywellreceiv’dbyher，andobtainswiththesamefacilityadecisioninhisfavours，evenforwhatisentirelyuselesstohim。
Itfollowstherefore，thatthegeneralrule，thatpossessionmustbestable，isnotapply’dbyparticularjudgments，butbyothergeneralrules，whichmustextendtothewholesociety，andbeinflexibleeitherbyspiteorfavour。Toillustratethis，Iproposethefollowinginstance。Ifirstconsidermenintheirsavageandsolitarycondition；andsuppose，thatbeingsensibleofthemiseryofthatstate，andforeseeingtheadvantagesthatwou’dresultfromsociety，theyseekeachother’scompany，andmakeanofferofmutualprotectionandassistance。Ialsosuppose，thattheyareendow’dwithsuchsagacityasimmediatelytoperceive，thatthechiefimpedimenttothisprojectofsocietyandpartnershipliesintheavidityandselfishnessoftheirnaturaltemper；toremedywhich，theyenterintoaconventionforthestabilityofpossession，andformutualrestraintandforbearance。Iamsensible，thatthismethodofproceedingisnotaltogethernatural；butbesidesthatIhereonlysupposethosereflectionstobeform’datonce，whichinfactariseinsensiblyandbydegrees；besidesthis，Isay，`tisverypossible，thatseveralpersons，beingbydifferentaccidentsseparatedfromthesocieties，towhichtheyformerlybelong’d，maybeoblig’dtoformanewsocietyamongthemselves；inwhichcasetheyareentirelyinthesituationabove-mention’d。
’Tisevident，then，thattheirfirstdifficulty，inthissituation，afterthegeneralconventionfortheestablishmentofsociety，andfortheconstancyofpossession，is，howtoseparatetheirpossessions，andassigntoeachhisparticularportion，whichhemustforthefutureinalterablyenjoy。Thisdifficultywillnotdetainthemlong；butitmustimmediatelyoccurtothem，asthemostnaturalexpedient，thateveryonecontinuetoenjoywhatheisatpresentmasterof，andthatpropertyorconstantpossessionbeconjoin’dtotheimmediatepossession。Suchistheeffectofcustom，thatitnotonlyreconcilesustoanythingwehavelongenjoy’d。butevengivesusanaffectionforit，andmakesuspreferittootherobjects，whichmaybemorevaluable，butarelessknowntous。Whathaslonglainunderoureye，andhasoftenbeenemploy’dtoouradvantage，thatwearealwaysthemostunwillingtopartwith；butcaneasilylivewithoutpossessions，whichweneverhaveenjoy’d，andarenotaccustom’dto。Tisevident，therefore，thatmenwou’deasilyacquiesceinthisexpedient，thateveryonecontinuetoenjoywhatheisatpresentpossessedof；andthisisthereason，whytheywou’dsonaturallyagreeinpreferringit。(5)
Butwemayobserve，thattho’theruleoftheassignmentofpropertytothepresentpossessorbenatural，andbythatmeansuseful，yetitsutilityextendsnotbeyondthefirstformationofsociety；norwou’danythingbemorepernicious，thantheconstantobservanceofit；bywhichrestitutionwou’dbeexcluded，andeveryinjusticewou’dbeauthoriz’dandrewarded。Wemust，therefore，seekforsomeothercircumstance，thatmaygiverisetopropertyaftersocietyisonceestablish’d；andofthiskind，Ifindfourmostconsiderable，viz。Occupation，Prescription，Accession，andSuccession。Weshallbrieflyexamineeachofthese，beginningwithOccupation。
Thepossessionofallexternalgoodsischangeableanduncertain；whichisoneofthemostconsiderableimpedimentstotheestablishmentofsociety，andisthereasonwhy，byuniversalagreement，expressortacite，menrestrainthemselvesbywhatwenowcalltherulesofjusticeandequity。Themiseryofthecondition，whichprecedesthisrestraint，isthecausewhywesubmittothatremedyasquicklyaspossible；andthisaffordsusaneasyreason，whyweannextheideaofpropertytothefirstpossession，ortooccupation。Menareunwillingtoleavepropertyinsuspense，evenfortheshortesttime，oropentheleastdoortoviolenceanddisorder。Towhichwemayadd，thatthefirstpossessionalwaysengagestheattentionmost；anddidweneglectit，therewou’dbenocolourofreasonforassigningpropertytoanysucceedingpossession。(6)
Thereremainsnothing，buttodetermineexactly，whatismeantbypossession；andthisisnotsoeasyasmayatfirstsightbeimagin’d。Wearesaidtobeinpossessionofanything，notonlywhenweimmediatelytouchit，butalsowhenwearesosituatedwithrespecttoit，astohaveitinourpowertouseit；andmaymove，alter，ordestroyit，accordingtoourpresentpleasureoradvantage。Thisrelation，then，isaspeciesofcauseandeffect；andaspropertyisnothingbutastablepossession，deriv’dfromtherulesofjustice，ortheconventionsofmen，`tistobeconsider’dasthesamespeciesofrelation。Butherewemayobserve，thatasthepowerofusinganyobjectbecomesmoreorlesscertain，accordingastheinterruptionswemaymeetwitharemoreorlessprobable；andasthisprobabilitymayincreasebyinsensibledegrees；`tisinmanycasesimpossibletodeterminewhenpossessionbeginsorends；noristhereanycertainstandard，bywhichwecandecidesuchcontroversies。Awildboar，thatfallsintooursnares，isdeem’dtobeinourpossession，ifitbeimpossibleforhimtoescape。Butwhatdowemeanbyimpossible？Howdoweseparatethisimpossibilityfromanimprobability？Andhowdistinguishthatexactlyfromaprobability？Markthepreciselimitsoftheoneandtheother，andshewthestandard，bywhichwemaydecidealldisputesthatmayarise，and，aswefindbyexperience，frequentlydoariseuponthissubject。(7)
Butsuchdisputesmaynotonlyariseconcerningtherealexistenceofpropertyandpossession，butalsoconcerningtheirextent；andthesedisputesareoftensusceptibleofnodecision，orcanbedecidedbynootherfacultythantheimagination。Apersonwholandsontheshoreofasmallisland，thatisdesartanduncultivated，isdeem’ditspossessorfromtheveryfirstmoment，andacquiresthepropertyofthewhole；becausetheobjectisthereboundedandcircumscrib’dinthefancy，andatthesametimeisproportion’dtothenewpossessor。Thesamepersonlandingonadesartisland，aslargeasGreatBritain，extendshispropertynofartherthanhisimmediatepossession；tho’anumerouscolonyareesteem’dtheproprietorsofthewholefromtheinstantoftheirdebarkment。
Butitoftenhappens，thatthetitleoffirstpossessionbecomesobscurethro’time；andthat`tisimpossibletodeterminemanycontroversies，whichmayariseconcerningit。Inthatcaselongpossessionorprescriptionnaturallytakesplace，andgivesapersonasufficientpropertyinanythingheenjoys。Thenatureofhumansocietyadmitsnotofanygreataccuracy；norcanwealwaysremounttothefirstoriginofthings，inordertodeterminetheirpresentcondition。Anyconsiderablespaceoftimesetsobjectsatsuchadistance，thattheyseem，inamanner，tolosetheirreality，andhaveaslittleinfluenceonthemind，asiftheyneverhadbeeninbeing。Aman’stitle，thatisclearandcertainatpresent，willseemobscureanddoubtfulfiftyyearshence，eventho’thefacts，onwhichitisfounded，shou’dbeprov’dwiththegreatestevidenceandcertainty。Thesamefactshavenotthesameinfluenceaftersolonganintervaloftime。Andthismaybereceiv’dasaconvincingargumentforourprecedingdoctrinewithregardtopropertyandjustice。Possessionduringalongtractoftimeconveysatitletoanyobject。Butas`tiscertain，that，howevereverythingbeproduc’dintime，thereisnothingrealthatisproducedbytime；itfollows，thatpropertybeingproduc’dbytime，isnotanythingrealintheobjects，butistheoff-springofthesentiments，onwhichalonetimeisfoundtohaveanyinfluence。(8)
Weacquirethepropertyofobjectsbyaccession，whentheyareconnectedinanintimatemannerwithobjectsthatarealreadyourproperty，andatthesametimeareinferiortothem。Thusthefruitsofourgarden，theoffspringofourcattle，andtheworkofourslaves，areallofthemesteem’dourproperty，evenbeforepossession。Whereobjectsareconnectedtogetherintheimagination，theyareapttobeputonthesamefooting，andarecommonlysuppos’dtobeendow’dwiththesamequalities。Wereadilypassfromonetotheother，andmakenodifferenceinourjudgmentsconcerningthem；especiallyifthelatterbeinferiortotheformer。(9)
Therightofsuccessionisaverynaturalone，fromthepresum’dconsentoftheparentornearrelation，andfromthegeneralinterestofmankind，whichrequires，thatmen’spossessionsshou’dpasstothose，whoaredearesttothem，inordertorenderthemmoreindustriousandfrugal。Perhapsthesecausesaresecondedbytheinfluenceofrelation，ortheassociationofideas，bywhichwearenaturallydirectedtoconsiderthesonaftertheparent’sdecease，andascribetohimatitletohisfather’spossessions。Thosegoodsmustbecomethepropertyofsomebody:Butofwhomisthequestion。Here`tisevidentthepersonschildrennaturallypresentthemselvestothemind；andbeingalready。connectedtothosepossessionsbymeansoftheirdeceas’dparent，weareapttoconnectthemstillfartherbytherelationofproperty。Ofthistherearemanyparallelinstances。(10)
OfthetransferenceofpropertybyconsentHoweveruseful，orevennecessary，thestabilityofpossessionmaybetohumansociety，`tisattendedwithveryconsiderableinconveniences。Therelationoffitnessorsuitablenessoughtnevertoenterintoconsideration，indistributingthepropertiesofmankind；butwemustgovernourselvesbyrules，whicharemoregeneralintheirapplication，andmorefreefromdoubtanduncertainty。Ofthiskindispresentpossessionuponthefirstestablishmentofsociety；andafterwardsoccupation，prescription，accession，andsuccession。Asthesedependverymuchonchance，theymustfrequentlyprovecontradictorybothtomen’swantsanddesires；。andpersonsandpossessionsmustoftenbeveryilladjusted。Thisisagrandinconvenience，whichcallsforaremedy。Toapplyonedirectly，andalloweverymantoseizebyviolencewhathejudgestobefitforhim，wou’ddestroysociety；andthereforetherulesofjusticeseeksomemediumbetwixtarigidstability，andthischangeableanduncertainadjustment。Butthereisnomediumbetterthanthatobviousone，thatpossessionandpropertyshou’dalwaysbestable，exceptwhentheproprietorconsentstobestowthemonsomeotherperson。Thisrulecanhavenoillconsequence，inoccasioningwarsanddissentions；sincetheproprietor’sconsent，whoaloneisconcern’d，istakenalonginthealienation:Anditmayservetomanygoodpurposesinadjustingpropertytopersons。Differentpartsoftheearthproducedifferentcommodities；andnotonlyso，butdifferentmenbotharebynaturefittedfordifferentemployments，andattaintogreaterperfectioninanyone，whentheyconfinethemselvestoitalone。Allthisrequiresamutualexchangeandcommerce；forwhichreasonthetranslationofpropertybyconsentisfoundedonalawofnature，aswellasitsstabilitywithoutsuchaconsent。
Sofarisdetermin’dbyaplainutilityandinterest。Butperhaps`tisfrommoretrivialreasons，thatdelivery，orasensibletransferenceoftheobjectiscommonlyrequir’dbycivillaws，andalsobythelawsofnature，accordingtomostauthors，asarequisitecircumstanceinthetranslationofproperty。Thepropertyofanobject，whentakenforsomethingreal，withoutanyreferencetomorality，orthesentimentsofthemind，isaqualityperfectlyinsensible，andeveninconceivable；norcanweformanydistinctnotion，eitherofitsstabilityortranslation。Thisimperfectionofourideasislesssensiblyfeltwithregardtoitsstability，asitengageslessourattention，andiseasilypastoverbythemind，withoutanyscrupulousexamination。Butasthetranslationofpropertyfromonepersontoanotherisamoreremarkableevent，thedefectofourideasbecomesmoresensibleonthatoccasion，andobligesustoturnourselvesoneverysideinsearchofsomeremedy。Nowasnothingmoreenlivensanyideathanapresentimpression，andarelationbetwixtthatimpressionandtheidea；`tisnaturalforustoseeksomefalselightfromthisquarter。Inordertoaidtheimaginationinconceivingthetransferenceofproperty，wetakethesensibleobject，andactuallytransferitspossessiontotheperson，onwhomwewou’dbestowtheproperty。Thesuppos’dresemblanceoftheactions，andthepresenceofthissensibledelivery，deceivethemind，andmakeitfancy，thatitconceivesthemysterioustransitionoftheproperty。Andthatthisexplicationofthematterisjust，appearshence，thatmenhaveinventedasymbolicaldelivery，tosatisfythefancy，wheretherealoneisimpracticable。Thusthegivingthekeysofagranaryisunderstoodtobethedeliveryofthecorncontain’dinit:Thegivingofstoneandearthrepresentsthedeliveryofamannor。Thisisakindofsuperstitiouspracticeincivillaws，andinthelawsofnature，resemblingtheRomancatholicsuperstitionsinreligion。AstheRomancatholicsrepresenttheinconceivablemysteriesoftheChristianreligion，andrenderthemmorepresenttothemind，byataper，orhabit，orgrimace，whichissuppos’dtoresemblethem；solawyersandmoralistshaverunintolikeinventionsforthesamereason，andhaveendeavour’dbythosemeanstosatisfythemselvesconcerningthetransferenceofpropertybyconsent。
OftheobligationofpromisesThattheruleofmorality，whichenjoinstheperformanceofpromises，isnotnatural，willsufficientlyappearfromthesetwopropositions，whichIproceedtoprove，viz，thatapromisewou’dnotbeintelligible，beforehumanconventionshadestablish’dit；andthatevenifitwereintelligible，itwou’dnotbeattendedwithanymoralobligation。
Isay，first，thatapromiseisnotintelligiblenaturally，norantecedenttohumanconventions；andthataman，unacquaintedwithsociety，couldneverenterintoanyengagementswithanother，eventho’theycouldperceiveeachother’sthoughtsbyintuition。Ifpromisesbenaturalandintelligible，theremustbesomeactofthemindattendingthesewords，Ipromise；andonthisactofthemindmusttheobligationdepend。Letus，therefore，runoverallthefacultiesofthesoul，andseewhichofthemisexertedinourpromises。
Theactofthemind，exprestbyapromise，isnotaresolutiontoperformanything:Forthataloneneverimposesanyobligation。Norisitadesireofsuchaperformance:Forwemaybindourselveswithoutsuchadesire，orevenwithanaversion，declar’dandavow’d。Neitherisitthewillingofthataction，whichwepromisetoperform:Forapromisealwaysregardssomefuturetime，andthewillhasaninfluenceonlyonpresentactions。Itfollows，therefore，thatsincetheactofthemind，whichentersintoapromise，andproducesitsobligation，isneithertheresolving，desiring，norwillinganyparticularperformance，itmustnecessarilybethewillingofthatobligation，whicharisesfromthepromise。Noristhisonlyaconclusionofphilosophy；butisentirelyconformabletoourcommonwaysofthinkingandofexpressingourselves，whenwesaythatweareboundbyourownconsent，andthattheobligationarisesfromourmerewillandpleasure。Theonlyquestionthenis，whethertherebenotamanifestabsurdityinsupposingthisactofthemind，andsuchanabsurdityasnomancou’dfallinto，whoseideasarenotconfoundedwithprejudiceandthefallacioususeoflanguage。
Allmoralitydependsuponoursentiments；andwhenanyaction，orqualityofthemind，pleasesusafteracertainmanner，wesayitisvirtuous；andwhentheneglect，ornonperformanceofit，displeasesusafteralikemanner，wesaythatwelieunderanobligationtoperformit。Achangeoftheobligationsupposesachangeofthesentiment；andacreationofanewobligationsupposessomenewsentimenttoarise。But`tiscertainwecannaturallynomorechangeourownsentiments，thanthemotionsoftheheavens；norbyasingleactofourwill，thatis，byapromise，renderanyactionagreeableordisagreeable，moralorimmoral；which，withoutthatact，wou’dhaveproduc’dcontraryimpressions，orhavebeenendow’dwithdifferentqualities。Itwou’dbeabsurd，therefore，towillanynewobligation，thatis，anynewsentimentofpainorpleasure；norisitpossible，thatmencou’dnaturallyfallintosogrossanabsurdity。Apromise，therefore，isnaturallysomethingaltogetherunintelligible，noristhereanyactofthemindbelongingtoit。(11)
But，secondly，iftherewasanyactofthemindbelongingtoit，itcouldnotnaturallyproduceanyobligation。Thisappearsevidentlyfromtheforegoingreasoning。Apromisecreatesanewobligation。Anewobligationsupposesnewsentimentstoarise。Thewillnevercreatesnewsentiments。Therecouldnotnaturally，therefore，ariseanyobligationfromapromise，evensupposingthemindcouldfallintotheabsurdityofwillingthatobligation。
Thesametruthmaybeprov’dstillmoreevidentlybythatreasoning，whichprov’djusticeingeneraltobeanartificialvirtue。Noactioncanberequir’dofusasourduty，unlesstherebeimplantedinhumannaturesomeactuatingpassionormotive，capableofproducingtheaction。Thismotivecannotbethesenseofduty。Asenseofdutysupposesanantecedentobligation:Andwhereanactionisnotrequir’dbyanynaturalpassion，itcannotberequir’dbyanynaturalobligation；sinceitmaybeomittedwithoutprovinganydefectorimperfectioninthemindandtemper，andconsequentlywithoutanyvice。Now`tisevidentwehavenomotiveleadingustotheperformanceofpromises，distinctfromasenseofduty。Ifwethought，thatpromiseshadnomoralobligation，wenevershou’dfeelanyinclinationtoobservethem。Thisisnotthecasewiththenaturalvirtues。Tho’therewasnoobligationtorelievethemiserable，ourhumanitywou’dleadustoit；andwhenweomitthatduty，theimmoralityoftheomissionarisesfromitsbeingaproof，thatwewantthenaturalsentimentsofhumanity。Afatherknowsittobehisdutytotakecareofhischildren:Buthehasalsoanaturalinclinationtoit。Andifnohumancreaturehadthatindination，noonecou’dlieunderanysuchobligation。Butasthereisnaturallynoinclinationtoobservepromises，distinctfromasenseoftheirobligation；itfollows，thatfidelityisnonaturalvirtue，andthatpromiseshavenoforce，antecedenttohumanconventions，Ifanyonedissentfromthis，hemustgivearegularproofofthesetwopropositions，viz。thatthereisapeculiaractofthemind，annexttopromises；andthatconsequenttothisactofthemind，therearisesaninclinationtoperform，distinctfromasenseofduty。Ipresume，thatitisimpossibletoproveeitherofthesetwopoints；andthereforeIventuretoconcludethatpromisesarehumaninventions，foundedonthenecessitiesandinterestsofsociety。
Inordertodiscoverthesenecessitiesandinterests，wemustconsiderthesamequalitiesofhumannature，whichwehavealreadyfoundtogiverisetotheprecedinglawsofsociety。Menbeingnaturallyselfish，orendow’donlywithaconfin’dgenerosity，theyarenoteasilyinduc’dtoperformanyactionfortheinterestofstrangers，exceptwithaviewtosomereciprocaladvantage，whichtheyhadnohopeofobtainingbutbysuchaperformance。Nowasitfrequentlyhappens，thatthesemutualperformancescannotbefinish’datthesameinstant，`tisnecessary，thatonepartybecontentedtoremaininuncertainty，anddependuponthegratitudeoftheotherforareturnofkindness。Butsomuchcorruptionisthereamongmen，that，generallyspeaking，thisbecomesbutaslendersecurity；andasthebenefactorisheresuppos’dtobestowhisfavourswithaviewtoself-interest，thisbothtakesofffromtheobligation，andsetsanexampletoselfishness，whichisthetruemotherofingratitude。Werewe，therefore，tofollowthenaturalcourseofourpassionsandinclinations，weshou’dperformbutfewactionsfortheadvantageofothers，fromdistinterestedviews；becausewearenaturallyverylimitedinourkindnessandaffection:Andweshou’dperformasfewofthatkind，outofaregardtointerest；becausewecannotdependupontheirgratitude。Herethenisthemutualcommerceofgoodofficesinamannerlostamongmankind，andeveryonereduc’dtohisownskillandindustryforhiswell-beingandsubsistence。Theinventionofthelawofnature，concerningthestabilityofpossession，hasalreadyrender’dmentolerabletoeachother；thatofthetransferenceofpropertyandpossessionbyconsenthasbeguntorenderthemmutuallyadvantageous:Butstilltheselawsofnature，howeverstrictlyobserv’d，arenotsufficienttorenderthemsoserviceabletoeachother，asbynaturetheyarefittedtobecome。Tho’possessionbestable，menmayoftenreapbutsmalladvantagefromit，whiletheyarepossess’dofagreaterquantityofanyspeciesofgoodsthantheyhaveoccasionfor，andatthesametimesufferbythewantofothers。Thetransferenceofproperty，whichistheproperremedyforthisinconvenience，cannotremedyitentirely；becauseitcanonlytakeplacewithregardtosuchobjectsasarepresentandindividual，butnottosuchasareabsentorgeneral。Onecannottransferthepropertyofaparticularhouse，twentyleaguesdistant；becausetheconsentcannotbeattendedwithdelivery，whichisarequisitecircumstance。Neithercanonetransferthepropertyoftenbushelsofcorn，orfivehogsheadsofwine，bythemereexpressionandconsent；becausetheseareonlygeneralterms，andhavenodirectrelationtoanyparticularheapofcorn，orbarrelsofwine。Besides，thecommerceofmankindisnotconfin’dtothebarterofcommodities，butmayextendtoservicesandactions，whichwemayexchangetoourmutualinterestandadvantage。Yourcornisripeto-day；minewillbesotomorrow。`Tisprofitableforusboth，thatIshou’dlabourwithyouto-day，andthatyoushou’daidmeto-morrow。Ihavenokindnessforyou，andknowyouhaveaslittleforme。Iwillnot，therefore，takeanypainsuponyouraccount；andshou’dIlabourwithyouuponmyownaccount，inexpectationofareturn，IknowIshou’dbedisappointed，andthatIshou’dinvaindependuponyourgratitude。HerethenIleaveyoutolabouralone:Youtreatmeinthesamemanner。Theseasonschange；andbothofusloseourharvestsforwantofmutualconfidenceandsecurity。
Allthisistheeffectofthenaturalandinherentprinciplesandpassionsofhumannature；andasthesepassionsandprinciplesareinalterable，itmaybethought，thatourconduct，whichdependsonthem，mustbesotoo，andthat`twou’dbeinvain，eitherformoralistsorpoliticians，totamperwithus，orattempttochangetheusualcourseofouractions，withaviewtopublicinterest。Andindeed，didthesuccessoftheirdesignsdependupontheirsuccessincorrectingtheselfishnessandingratitudeofmen，theywou’dnevermakeanyprogress，unlessaidedbyomnipotence，whichisaloneabletonew-mouldthehumanmind，andchangeitscharacterinsuchfundamentalarticles。Alltheycanpretendto，is，togiveanewdirectiontothosenaturalpassions，andteachusthatwecanbettersatisfyourappetitesinanobliqueandartificialmanner，thanbytheirheadlongandimpetuousmotion。HenceIlearntodoaservicetoanother，withoutbearinghimanyrealkindness；becauseIforsee，thathewillreturnmyservice，inexpectationofanotherofthesamekind，andinordertomaintainthesamecorrespondenceofgoodofficeswithmeorwithothers。Andaccordingly，afterIhaveserv’dhim，andheisinpossessionoftheadvantagearisingfrommyaction，heisinduc’dtoperformhispart，asforeseeingtheconsequencesofhisrefusal。
Buttho’thisself-interestedcommerceofmanbeginstotakeplace，andtopredominateinsociety，itdoesnotentirelyabolishthemoregenerousandnobleintercourseoffriendshipandgoodoffices。ImaystilldoservicestosuchpersonsasIlove，andammoreparticularlyacquaintedwith1withoutanyprospectofadvantage；andtheymaymakemeareturninthesamemanner，withoutanyviewbutthatofrecompensingmypastservices。Inorder，therefore，todistinguishthosetwodifferentsortsofcommerce，theinterestedandthedisinterested，thereisacertainformofwordsinventedfortheformer，bywhichwebindourselvestotheperformanceofanyaction。Thisformofwordsconstituteswhatwecallapromise，whichisthesanctionoftheinterestedcommerceofmankind。Whenamansayshepromisesanything，heineffectexpressesaresolutionofperformingit；andalongwiththat，bymakinguseofthisformofwords，subjectshimselftothepenaltyofneverbeingtrustedagainincaseoffailure。Aresolutionisthenaturalactofthemind，whichpromisesexpress:Butweretherenomorethanaresolutioninthecase，promiseswou’donlydeclareourformermotives，andwou’dnotcreateanynewmotiveorobligation。Theyaretheconventionsofmen，whichcreateanewmotive，whenexperiencehastaughtus，thathumanaffairswou’dbeconductedmuchmoreformutualadvantage，weretherecertainsymbolsorsignsinstituted，bywhichwemightgiveeach，othersecurityofourconductinanyparticularincident，Afterthesesignsareinstituted，whoeverusesthemisimmediatelyboundbyhisinteresttoexecutehisengagements，andmustneverexpecttobetrustedanymore，ifherefusetoperformwhathepromis’d。
Noristhatknowledge，whichisrequisitetomakemankindsensibleofthisinterestintheinstitutionandobservanceofpromises，tobeesteem’dsuperiortothecapacityofhumannature，howeversavageanduncultivated。Thereneedsbutaverylittlepracticeoftheworld，tomakeusperceivealltheseconsequencesandadvantages。Theshortestexperienceofsocietydiscoversthemtoeverymortal；andwheneachindividualperceivesthesamesenseofinterestinallhisfellows，heimmediatelyperformshispartofanycontract，asbeingassur’d，thattheywillnotbewantingintheirs。Allofthem，byconcert，enterintoaschemeofactions，calculatedforcommonbenefit，andagreetobetruetotheirword；noristhereanythingrequisitetoformthisconcertorconvention，butthateveryonehaveasenseofinterestinthefaithfulfulfillingofengagements，andexpressthatsensetoothermembersofthesociety。Thisimmediatelycausesthatinteresttooperateuponthem；andinterestisthefirstobligationtotheperformanceofpromises。
Afterwardsasentimentofmoralsconcurswithinterest，andbecomesanewobligationuponmankind。Thissentimentofmorality，intheperformanceofpromises，arisesfromthesameprinciplesasthatintheabstinencefromthepropertyofothers。Publicinterest，education，andtheartificesofpoliticians，havethesameeffectinbothcases。Thedifficulties，thatoccurtous，insupposingamoralobligationtoattendpromises，weeithersurmountorelude。Forinstance；theexpressionofaresolutionisnotcommonlysuppos’dtobeobligatory；andwecannotreadilyconceivehowthemakinguseofacertainformofwordsshou’dbeabletocauseanymaterialdifference。Here，therefore，wefeignanewactofthemind，whichwecallthewillinganobligation；andonthiswesupposethemoralitytodepend。Butwehaveprov’dalready，thatthereisnosuchactofthemind，andconsequentlythatpromisesimposenonaturalobligation。
Toconfirmthis，wemaysubjoinsomeotherreflectionsconcerningthatwill，whichissuppos’dtoenterintoapromise，andtocauseitsobligation。Tisevident，thatthewillaloneisneversuppos’dtocausetheobligation，butmustbeexpress’dbywordsorsigns，inordertoimposeatyeuponanyman。Theexpressionbeingoncebroughtinassubservienttothewill，soonbecomestheprincipalpartofthepromise；norwillamanbelessboundbyhisword，tho’hesecretlygiveadifferentdirectiontohisintention，andwith-holdhimselfbothfromaresolution，andfromwillinganobligation。Buttho’theexpressionmakesonmostoccasionsthewholeofthepromise，yetitdoesnotalwaysso；andone，whoshou’dmakeuseofanyexpression，ofwhichheknowsnotthemeaning，andwhichheuseswithoutanyintentionofbindinghimself，wou’dnotcertainlybeboundbyit。Nay，tho’heknowsitsmeaning，yetifheusesitinjestonly，andwithsuchsignsasshewevidentlyhehasnoseriousintentionofbindinghimself，hewou’dnotlieunderanyobligationofperformance；but`tisnecessary，thatthewordsbeaperfectexpressionofthewill，withoutanycontrarysigns。Nay，eventhiswemustnotcarrysofarastoimagine，thatone，whom，byourquicknessofunderstanding，weconjecture，fromcertainsigns，tohaveanintentionofdeceivingus，isnotboundbyhisexpressionorverbalpromise，ifweacceptofit；butmustlimitthisconclusiontothosecases，wherethesignsareofadifferentkindfromthoseofdeceit。Allthesecontradictionsareeasilyaccountedfor，iftheobligationofpromisesbemerelyahumaninventionfortheconvenienceofsociety；butwillneverbeexplain’d，ifitbesomethingrealandnatural，arisingfromanyactionofthemindorbody。
Ishallfartherobserve，thatsinceeverynewpromiseimposesanewobligationofmoralityonthepersonwhopromises，andsincethisnewobligationarisesfromhiswill；`tisoneofthemostmysteriousandincomprehensibleoperationsthatcanpossiblybeimagin’d，andmayevenbecompar’dtotransubstantiation，orholyorders，(12)whereacertainformofwords，alongwithacertainintention，changesentirelythenatureofanexternalobject，andevenofahumannature。Buttho’thesemysteriesbesofaralike，`tisveryremarkable，thattheydifferwidelyinotherparticulars，andthatthisdifferencemayberegardedasastrongproofofthedifferenceoftheirorigins。Astheobligationofpromisesisaninventionfortheinterestofsociety，`tiswarp’dintoasmanydifferentformsasthatinterestrequires，andevenrunsintodirectcontradictions，ratherthanlosesightofitsobject。Butasthoseothermonstrousdoctinesaremerepriestlyinventions，andhavenopublicinterestinview，theyarelessdisturb’dintheirprogressbynewobstacles；anditmustbeown’d，that，afterthefirstabsurdity，theyfollowmoredirectlythecurrentofreasonandgoodsense。Theologiansclearlyperceiv’d，thattheexternalformofwords，beingmeresound，requireanintentiontomakethemhaveanyefficacy；andthatthisintentionbeingonceconsider’dasarequisitecircumstance，itsabsencemustequallypreventtheeffect，whetheravow’dorconceal’d，whethersincereordeceitful。Accordinglytheyhavecommonlydetermin’d，thattheintentionofthepriestmakesthesacrament，andthatwhenhesecretlywithdrawshisintention，heishighlycriminalinhimself；butstilldestroysthebaptism，orcommunion，orholyorders。Theterribleconsequencesofthisdoctrinewerenotabletohinderitstakingplace；astheinconvenienceofasimilardoctrine，withregardtopromises，havepreventedthatdoctrinefromestablishingitself。Menarealwaysmoreconcern’daboutthepresentlifethanthefuture；andareapttothinkthesmallestevil，whichregardstheformer，moreimportantthanthegreatest，whichregardsthelatter。
Wemaydrawthesameconclusion，concerningtheoriginofpromises，fromtheforce，whichissuppos’dtoinvalidateallcontracts，andtofreeusfromtheirobligation。Suchaprincipleisaproof，thatpromiseshavenonaturalobligation，andaremereartificialcontrivancesfortheconvenienceandadvantageofsociety。Ifweconsiderarightofthematter，forceisnotessentiallydifferentfromanyothermotiveofhopeorfear，whichmayinduceustoengageourword，andlayourselvesunderanyobligation。Aman，dangerouslywounded，whopromisesacompetentsumtoasurgeontocurehim，wou’dcertainlybeboundtoperformance；tho’thecasebenotsomuchdifferentfromthatofone，whopromisesasumtoarobber，astoproducesogreatadifferenceinoursentimentsofmorality，ifthesesentimentswerenotbuiltentirelyonpublicinterestandconvenience。
SECT。VI
SomefartherreflectionsconcerningjusticeandinjusticeWehavenowrunoverthethreefundamentallawsofnature，thatofthestabilityofpossession，ofitstransferencebyconsent，andoftheperformanceofpromises。Tisonthestricttobservanceofthosethreelaws，thatthepeaceandsecurityofhumansocietyentirelydepend；noristhereanypossibilityofestablishingagoodcorrespondenceamongmen，wheretheseareneglected。Societyisabsolutelynecessaryforthewell-beingofmen；andtheseareasnecessarytothesupportofsociety。Whateverrestrainttheymayimposeonthepassionsofmen，theyaretherealoffspringofthosepassions，andareonlyamoreartfulandmorerefin’dwayofsatisfyingthem。Nothingismorevigilantandinventivethanourpassions；andnothingismoreobvious，thantheconventionfortheobservanceoftheserules。Naturehas，therefore，trustedthisaffairentirelytotheconductofmen，andhasnotplac’dinthemindanypeculiaroriginalprinciples，todetermineustoasetofactions，intowhichtheotherprinciplesofourframeandconstitutionweresufficienttoleadus。Andtoconvinceusthemorefullyofthistruth，wemayherestopamoment，andfromareviewoftheprecedingreasoningsmaydrawsomenewarguments，toprovethatthoselaws，howevernecessary，areentirelyartificial，andofhumaninvention；andconsequentlythatjusticeisanartificial，andnotanaturalvirtue。
(1)ThefirstargumentIshallmakeuseofisderiv’dfromthevulgardefinitionofjustice。Justiceiscommonlydefin’dtobeaconstantandperpetualwillofgivingeveryonehisdue。Inthisdefinition`tissuppos’d，thattherearesuchthingsasrightandproperty，independentofjustice，andantecedenttoit；andthattheywou’dhavesubsisted，tho’menhadneverdreamtofpractisingsuchavirtue。Ihavealreadyobserv’d，inacursorymanner，thefallacyofthisopinion，andshallherecontinuetoopenupalittlemoredistinctlymysentimentsonthatsubject。
Ishallbeginwithobserving，thatthisquality，whichweshallcallproperty，islikemanyoftheimaginaryqualitiesoftheperipateticphilosophy，andvanishesuponamoreaccurateinspectionintothesubject，whenconsider’da-partfromourmoralsentiments。Tisevidentpropertydoesnotconsistinanyofthesensiblequalitiesoftheobject。Forthesemaycontinueinvariablythesame，whilethepropertychanges。Property，therefore，mustconsistinsomerelationoftheobject。But`tisnotinitsrelationwithregardtootherexternalandinanimateobjects。Forthesemayalsocontinueinvariablythesame，whilethepropertychanges。Thisquality，therefore，consistsintherelationsofobjectstointelligentandrationalbeings。But`tisnottheexternalandcorporealrelation，whichformstheessenceofproperty。Forthatrelationmaybethesamebetwixtinanimateobjects，orwithregardtobrutecreatures；tho’inthosecasesitformsnoproperty。Tis，therefore，insomeinternalrelation，thatthepropertyconsists；thatis，insomeinfluence，whichtheexternalrelationsoftheobjecthaveonthemindandactions。Thustheexternalrelation，whichwecalloccupationorfirstpossession，isnotofitselfimagin’dtobethepropertyoftheobject，butonlytocauseitsproperty。Now`tisevident，thisexternalrelationcausesnothinginexternalobjects，andhasonlyaninfluenceonthemind，bygivingusasenseofdutyinabstainingfromthatobject，andinrestoringittothefirstpossessor。Theseactionsareproperlywhatwecalljustice；andconsequently`tisonthatvirtuethatthenatureofpropertydepends，andnotthevirtueontheproperty。
Ifanyone，therefore，wou’dassert，thatjusticeisanaturalvirtue，andinjusticeanaturalvice，hemustassert，thatabstractingfromthenationsofproperty，andrightandobligation，acertainconductandtrainofactions，incertainexternalrelationsofobjects，hasnaturallyamoralbeautyordeformity，andcausesanoriginalpleasureoruneasiness。Thustherestoringaman’sgoodstohimisconsider’dasvirtuous，notbecausenaturehasannex’dacertainsentimentofpleasuretosuchaconduct，withregardtothepropertyofothers，butbecauseshehasannex’dthatsentimenttosuchaconduct，withregardtothoseexternalobjects，ofwhichothershavehadthefirstorlongpossession，orwhichtheyhavereceiv’dbytheconsentofthose，whohavehadfirstorlongpossession。Ifnaturehasgivenusnosuchsentiment，thereisnot，naturally，norantecedenttohumanconventions，anysuchthingasproperty。Now，tho’itseemssufficientlyevident，inthisdryandaccurateconsiderationofthepresentsubject，thatnaturehasannex’dnopleasureorsentimentofapprobationtosuchaconduct；yetthatImayleaveaslittleroomfordoubtaspossible，Ishallsubjoinafewmoreargumentstoconfirmmyopinion。
First，Ifnaturehadgivenusapleasureofthiskind，itwou’dhavebeenasevidentanddiscernibleasoneveryotheroccasion；norshou’dwehavefoundanydifficultytoperceive，thattheconsiderationofsuchactions，insuchasituation，givesacertainpleasureandsentimentofapprobation。Weshou’dnothavebeenoblig’dtohaverecoursetonotionsofpropertyinthedefinitionofjustice，andatthesametimemakeuseofthenotionsofjusticeinthedefinitionofproperty。Thisdeceitfulmethodofreasoningisaplainproof，thattherearecontain’dinthesubjectsomeobscuritiesanddifficulties，whichwearenotabletosurmount，andwhichwedesiretoevadebythisartifice。
Secondly，Thoserules，bywhichproperties，rights，andobligationsaredetermin’d，haveinthemnomarksofanaturaloriginbutmanyofartificeandcontrivance。Theyaretoonumeroustohaveproceededfromnature:Theyarechangeablebyhumanlaws:Andhaveallofthemadirectandevidenttendencytopublicgood，andthesupport，ofcivilsociety。Thislastcircumstanceisremarkableupontwoaccounts。First，because，tho’thecauseoftheestablishmentoftheselawshadbeenaregardforthepublicgood，asmuchasthepublicgoodistheirnaturaltendency，theywou’dstillhavebeenartificial，asbeingpurposelycontriv’danddirectedtoacertainend。Secondly，because，ifmenhadbeenendow’dwithsuchastrongregardforpublicgood，theywou’dneverhaverestrain’dthemselvesbytheserules；sothatthelawsofjusticearisefromnaturalprinciplesinamannerstillmoreobliqueandartificial。Tisself-lovewhichistheirrealorigin；andastheself-loveof。onepersonisnaturallycontrarytothatofanother，theseseveralinterestedpassionsareoblig’dtoadjustthemselvesaftersuchamannerastoconcurinsomesystemofconductandbehaviour。Thissystem，therefore，comprehendingtheinterestofeachindividual，isofcourseadvantageoustothepublic；tho’itbenotintendedforthatpurposebydieinventors。
(2)Inthesecondplacewemayobserve，thatallkindsofviceandvirtueruninsensiblyintoeachother，andmayapproachbysuchimperceptibledegreesaswillmakeitverydifficult，ifnotabsolutelyimpossible，todeterminewhentheoneends，andtheotherbegins；andfromthisobservationwemayderiveanewargumentfortheforegoingprinciple。Forwhatevermaybethecase，withregardtoallkindsofviceandvirtue，`tiscertain，thatrights，andobligations，andproperty，admitofnosuchinsensiblegradation，butthatamaneitherhasafullandperfectproperty，ornoneatall；andiseitherentirelyoblig’dtoperformanyaction，orliesundernomannerofobligation。Howevercivillawsmaytalkofaperfectdominion，andofanimperfect，`tiseasytoobserve，thatthisarisesfromafiction，whichhasnofoundationinreason，andcanneverenterintoournotionsofnaturaljusticeandequity。Amanthathiresahorse，tho’butforaday，hasasfullarighttomakeuseofitforthattime，ashewhomwecallitsproprietorhastomakeuseofitanyotherday；and`wasevident，thathowevertheusemaybeboundedintimeordegree，therightitselfisnotsusceptibleofanysuchgradation，butisabsoluteandentire，sofarasitextends。Accordinglywemayobserve，thatthisrightbotharisesandperishesinaninstant；andthatamanentirelyacquiresthepropertyofanyobjectbyoccupation，ortheconsentoftheproprietor；andlosesitbyhisownconsent；withoutanyofthatinsensiblegradation，whichisremarkableinotherqualitiesandrelations，Since，therefore，thisisdiecasewithregardtoproperty，andrights，andobligations，Iask，howitstandswithregardtojusticeandinjustice？Afterwhatevermanneryouanswerthisquestion，yourunintoinextricabledifficulties。Ifyoureply，thatjusticeandinjusticeadmitofdegree，andruninsensiblyintoeachother，youexpresslycontradicttheforegoingposition，thatobligationandpropertyarenotsusceptibleofsuchagradation。Thesedependentirelyuponjusticeandinjustice，andfollowtheminalltheirvariations。Wherethejusticeisentire，thepropertyisalsoentire:Wherethejusticeisimperfect，thepropertymustalsobeimperfectAndviceversa，ifthepropertyadmitofnosuchvariations，theymustalsobeincompatiblewithjustice。Ifyouassent，therefore，tothislastproposition，andassert，thatjusticeandinjusticearenotsusceptibleofdegrees，youineffectassert，thattheyarenotnaturallyeitherviciousorvirtuous；sinceviceandvirtue，moralgoodandevil，andindeedallnaturalqualities，runinsensiblyintoeachother，andare，onmanyoccasions，undistinguishable。
Andhereitmaybeworthwhiletoobserve，thattho’abstractreasoning，andthegeneralmaximsofphilosophyandlawestablishthisposition，thatproperty，andright，andobligationadmitnotofdegrees，yetinourcommonandnegligentwayofthinking，wefindgreatdifficultytoentertainthatopinion，anddoevensecretlyembracethecontraryprinciple。Anobjectmusteitherbeinthepossessionofonepersonoranother。Anactionmusteitherbeperform’dornotThenecessitythereisofchoosingonesideinthesedilemmas，andtheimpossibilitythereoftenisoffindinganyjustmedium，obligeus，whenwereflectonthematter，toacknowledge，thatallpropertyandobligationsareentire。Butontheotherhand，whenweconsidertheoriginofpropertyandobligation，andfindthattheydependonpublicutility，andsometimesonthepropensitiesoftheimagination，whichareseldomentireonanyside；wearenaturallyinclin’dtoimagine，thatthesemoralrelationsadmitofaninsensiblegradation。Henceitis，thatinreferences，wheretheconsentofthepartiesleavetherefereesentiremastersofthesubject，theycommonlydiscoversomuchequityandjusticeonbothsides，asinducesthemtostrikeamedium，anddividethedifferencebetwixttheparties。Civiljudges，whohavenotthisliberty，butareoblig’dtogiveadecisivesentenceonsomeoneside，areoftenatalosshowtodetermine，andarenecessitatedtoproceedonthemostfrivolousreasonsintheworld。Halfrightsandobligations，whichseemsonaturalincommonlife，areperfectabsurditiesintheirtribunal；forwhichreasontheyareoftenoblig’dtotakehalfargumentsforwholeones，inordertoterminatetheaffaironewayorother。
(3)ThethirdargumentofthiskindIshallmakeuseofmaybeexplain’dthus。Ifweconsidertheordinarycourseofhumanactions，weshallfind，thatthemindrestrainsnotitselfbyanygeneralanduniversalrules；butactsonmostoccasionsasitisdetermin’dbyitspresentmotivesandinclination。Aseachactionisaparticularindividualevent，itmustproceedfromparticularprinciples，andfromourimmediatesituationwithinourselves，andwithrespecttotherestoftheuniverse。Ifonsomeoccasionsweextendourmotivesbeyondthoseverycircumstances，whichgaverisetothem，andformsomethinglikegeneralrulesforourconduct，`tiseasytoobserve，thattheserulesarenotperfectlyinflexible，butallowofmanyexceptions。Since，therefore，thisistheordinarycourseofhumanactions，wemayconclude，thatthelawsofjustice，beinguniversalandperfectlyinflexible，canneverbederiv’dfromnature，norbetheimmediateoffspringofanynaturalmotiveorinclination。Noactioncanbeeithermorallygoodorevil，unlesstherebesomenaturalpassionormotivetoimpelustoit，ordeterusfromit；and`tisevident，thatdiemoralitymustbesusceptibleofallthesamevariations，whicharenaturaltothepassion。Herearetwopersons，whodisputeforanestate；ofwhomoneisrich，afool，andabatchelor；theotherpoor，amanofsense，andhasanumerousfamily:Thefirstismyenemy；thesecondmyfriend。WhetherIbeactuatedinthisaffairbyaviewtopublicorprivateinterest，byfriendshiporenmity，Imustbeinduc’dtodomyutmosttoprocuretheestatetothelatter。Norwou’danyconsiderationoftherightandpropertyofthepersonsbeabletorestrainme，wereIactuatedonlybynaturalmotives，withoutanycombinationorconventionwithothers。Forasallpropertydependsonmorality；andasallmoralitydependsontheordinarycourseofourpassionsandactions；andastheseagainareonlydirectedbyparticularmotives；`tisevident，suchapartialconductmustbesuitabletothestrictestmorality，andcou’dneverbeaviolationofproperty。Weremen，therefore，totakethelibertyofactingwithregardtothelawsofsociety，astheydoineveryotheraffair，theywou’dconductthemselves，onmostoccasions，byparticularjudgments，andwou’dtakeintoconsiderationthecharactersandcircumstancesofthepersons，aswellasthegeneralnatureofthequestion。But`tiseasytoobserve，thatthiswou’dproduceaninfiniteconfusioninhumansociety，andthattheavidityandpartialityofmenwou’dquicklybringdisorderintotheworld，ifnotrestrain’dbysomegeneralandinflexibleprinciples。Twas，therefore，withaviewtothisinconvenience，thatmenhaveestablish’dthoseprinciples，andhaveagreedtorestrainthemselvesbygeneralrules，whichareunchangeablebyspiteandfavour，andbyparticularviewsofprivateorpublicinterest。Theserules，then，areartificiallyinventedforacertainpurpose，andarecontrarytothecommonprinciplesofhumannature，whichaccommodatethemselvestocircumstances，andhavenostatedinvariablemethodofoperation。
NordoIperceivehowIcaneasilybemistakeninthismatter。Iseeevidently，thatwhenanymanimposesonhimselfgeneralinflexiblerulesinhisconductwithothers，heconsiderscertainobjectsastheirproperty，whichhesupposestobesacredandinviolable。Butnopropositioncanbemoreevident，thanthatpropertyisperfectlyunintelligiblewithoutfirstsupposingjusticeandinjustice；andthatthesevirtuesandvicesareasunintelligible，unlesswehavemotives，independentofthemorality，toimpelustojustactions，anddeterusfromunjustones。Letthosemotives，therefore，bewhattheywill，theymustaccommodatethemselvestocircumstances，andmustadmitofallthevariations，whichhumanaffairs，intheirincessantrevolutions，aresusceptibleof。Theyareconsequentlyaveryimproperfoundationforsuchrigidinflexiblerulesasthelawsofnature；and`tisevidenttheselawscanonlybederiv’dfromhumanconventions，whenmenhaveperceiv’dthedisordersthatresultfromfollowingtheirnaturalandvariableprinciples。
Uponthewhole，then，wearetoconsiderthisdistinctionbetwixtjusticeandinjustice，ashavingtwodifferentfoundations，viz，thatofinterest，whenmenobserve，that`tisimpossibletoliveinsocietywithoutrestrainingthemselvesbycertainrules；andthatofmorality，whenthisinterestisonceobserv’dandmenreceiveapleasurefromtheviewofsuchactionsastendtothepeaceofsociety，andanuneasinessfromsuchasarecontrarytoit。`Tisthevoluntaryconventionandartificeofmen，whichmakesthefirstinteresttakeplace；andthereforethoselawsofjusticearesofartobeconsider’dasartifrial。Afterthatinterestisonceestablish’dandacknowledg’d，thesenseofmoralityintheobservanceoftheserulesfollowsnaturally，andofitself；tho’`tiscertain，thatitisalsoaugmentedbyanewartifice，andthatthepublicinstructionsofpoliticians，andtheprivateeducationofparents，contributetothegivingusasenseofhonouranddutyinthestrictregulationofouractionswithregardtothepropertiesofothers。
