OfnaturalabilitiesNodistinctionismoreusualinallsystemsofethics，thanthatbetwixtnaturalabilitiesandmoralvirtues；wheretheformerareplac’donthesamefootingwithbodilyendowments，andaresuppos’dtohavenomeritormoralworthannex’dtothem。Whoeverconsidersthematteraccurately，willfind，thatadisputeuponthisheadwou’dbemerelyadisputeofwords，andthattho’thesequalitiesarenotaltogetherofthesamekind，yettheyagreeinthemostmaterialcircumstances。Theyarebothofthemequallymentalqualities:Andbothofthemequallyproducepleasure；andhaveofcourseanequaltendencytoprocuretheloveandesteemofmankind。Therearefew，whoarenotasjealousoftheircharacter，withregardtosenseandknowledge，astohonourandcourage；andmuchmorethanwithregardtotemperanceandsobriety。Menareevenafraidofpassingforgoodnatur’d；lestthatshou’dbetakenforwantofunderstanding:Andoftenboastofmoredebauchesthantheyhavebeenreallyengag’din，togivethemselvesairsoffireandspirit。Inshort，thefigureamanmakesintheworld，thereceptionhemeetswithincompany，theesteempaidhimbyhisacquaintance；alltheseadvantagesdependalmostasmuchuponhisgoodsenseandjudgment，asuponanyotherpartofhischaracter。Letamanhavethebestintentionsintheworld，andbethefarthestfromallinjusticeandviolence，hewillneverbeabletomakehimselfbemuchregarded。withoutamoderateshare，atleast，ofpartsandunderstanding。Sincethennaturalabilities，tho’，perhaps，inferior，yetareonthesamefooting，bothastotheircausesandeffects，withthosequalitieswhichwecallmoralvirtues，whyshou’dwemakeanydistinctionbetwixtthem？
Tho’werefusetonaturalabilitiesthetitleofvirtues，wemustallow，thattheyprocuretheloveandesteemofmankind；thattheygiveanewlustretotheothervirtues；andthatamanpossess’dofthemismuchmoreintitledtoourgood-willandservices，thanoneentirelyvoidofthem。Itmay，indeed，bepretended。thatthesentimentofapprobation，whichthosequalitiesproduce，besidesitsbeinginferior，isalsosomewhatdifferentfromthat，whichattendstheothervirtues。Butthis，inmyopinion，isnotasufficientreasonforexcludingthemfromthecatalogueofvirtues。Eachofthevirtues，evenbenevolence，justice，gratitude。integrity，excitesadifferentsentimentorfeelinginthespectator。ThecharactersofCaesarandCato，asdrawnbySallust，arebothofthemvirtuous，inthestrictestsenseoftheword；butinadifferentway:Norarethesentimentsentirelythesame，whicharisefromthem。Theoneproduceslove；theotheresteem:Theoneisamiable；theotherawful:Wecouldwishtomeetwiththeonecharacterinafriend；theothercharacterwewou’dbeambitiousofinourselves。Inlikemanner，theapprobation。whichattendsnaturalabilities，maybesomewhatdifferenttothefeelingfromthat，whicharisesfromtheothervirtues，withoutmakingthementirelyofadifferentspecies。Andindeedwemayobserve，thatthenaturalabilities，nomorethantheothervirtues，producenot，allofthem，thesamekindofapprobation。Goodsenseandgeniusbegetesteem:Witandhumourexcitelove。(21)
Those，whorepresentthedistinctionbetwixtnaturalabilitiesandmoralvirtuesasverymaterial，maysay，thattheformerareentirelyinvoluntary，andhavethereforenomeritattendingthem，ashavingnodependanceonlibertyandfree-will。ButtothisIanswer，first，thatmanyofthosequalities，whichallmoralists，especiallytheantients，comprehendunderthetitleofmoralvirtues，areequallyinvoluntaryandnecessary，withthequalitiesofthejudgmentandimagination。Ofthisnatureareconstancy，fortitude，magnanimity；and，inshort，allthequalitieswhichformthegreatman。Imightsaythesame，insomedegree，oftheothers；itbeingalmostimpossibleforthemindtochangeitscharacterinanyconsiderablearticle，orcureitselfofapassionateorsplenetictemper，whentheyarenaturaltoit。Thegreaterdegreethereisoftheseblameablequalities，themorevicioustheybecome，andyettheyarethelessvoluntary。Secondly，Iwou’dhaveanyonegivemeareason，whyvirtueandvicemaynotbeinvoluntary，aswellasbeautyanddeformity。Thesemoraldistinctionsarisefromthenaturaldistinctionsofpainandpleasure；andwhenwereceivethosefeelingsfromthegeneralconsiderationofanyqualityorcharacter，wedenominateitviciousorvirtuous。NowIbelievenoonewillassert，thataqualitycanneverproducepleasureorpaintothepersonwhoconsidersit，unlessitbeperfectlyvoluntaryinthepersonwhopossessesit。Thirdly，Astofree-will，wehaveshewnthatithasnoplacewithregardtotheactions，nomorethanthequalitiesofmen。Itisnotajustconsequence，thatwhatisvoluntaryisfree。Ouractionsaremorevoluntarythanourjudgments；butwehavenotmorelibertyintheonethanintheother。
Buttho’thisdistinctionbetwixtvoluntaryandinvoluntarybenotsufficienttojustifythedistinctionbetwixtnaturalabilitiesandmoralvirtues，yettheformerdistinctionwillaffordusaplausiblereason，whymoralistshaveinventedthelatter。Menhaveobserv’d，thattho’naturalabilitiesandmoralqualitiesbeinthemainonthesamefooting，thereis，however，thisdifferencebetwixtthem，thattheformerarealmostinvariablebyanyartorindustry；whilethelatter，oratleast，theactions，thatproceedfromthem，maybechang’dbythemotivesofrewardsandpunishments，praiseandblame。Hencelegislators，anddivines，andmoralists，haveprincipallyappliedthemselvestotheregulatingthesevoluntaryactions，andhaveendeavour’dtoproduceadditionalmotives，forbeingvirtuousinthatparticular。Theyknew，thattopunishamanforfolly，orexhorthimtobeprudentandsagacious，wou’dhavebutlittleeffect；tho’thesamepunishmentsandexhortations，withregardtojusticeandinjustice，mighthaveaconsiderableinfluence。Butasmen，incommonlifeandconversation，donotcarrythoseendsinview，butnaturallypraiseorblamewhateverpleasesordispleasesthem，theydonotseemmuchtoregardthisdistinction，butconsiderprudenceunderthecharacterofvirtueaswellasbenevolence，andpenetrationaswellasjustice。Nay，wefind，thatallmoralists，whosejudgmentisnotpervertedbyastrictadherencetoasystem，enterintothesamewayofthinking；andthattheantientmoralistsinparticularmadenoscrupleofplacingprudenceattheheadofthecardinalvirtues。Thereisasentimentofesteemandapprobation，whichmaybeexcited，insomedegree，byanyfacultyofthemind，initsperfectstateandcondition；andtoaccountforthissentimentisthebusinessofPhilosophers。ItbelongstoGrammarianstoexaminewhatqualitiesareentitledtothedenominationofvirtue；norwilltheyfind，upontrial，thatthisissoeasyatask，asatfirstsighttheymaybeapttoimagine。
Theprincipalreasonwhynaturalabilitiesareesteem’d，isbecauseoftheirtendencytobeusefultotheperson，whoispossess’dofthem。’Tisimpossibletoexecuteanydesignwithsuccess，whereitisnotconductedwithprudenceanddiscretion；norwillthegoodnessofourintentionsalonesufficetoprocureusahappyissuetoourenterprizes。Menaresuperiortobeastsprincipallybythesuperiorityoftheirreason；andtheyarethedegreesofthesamefaculty，whichsetsuchaninfinitedifferencebetwixtonemanandanother。Alltheadvantagesofartareowingtohumanreason；andwherefortuneisnotverycapricious，themostconsiderablepartoftheseadvantagesmustfalltotheshareoftheprudentandsagacious。
Whenitisask’d，whetheraquickoraslowapprehensionbemostvaluable？whetherone，thatatfirstviewpenetratesintoasubject，butcanperformnothinguponstudy；oracontrarycharacter，whichmustworkouteverythingbydintofapplication？whetheraclearhead，oracopiousinvention？whetheraprofoundgenius，orasurejudgment？inshort，whatcharacter，orpeculiarunderstanding，ismoreexcellentthananother？Tisevidentwecananswernoneofthesequestions，withoutconsideringwhichofthosequalitiescapacitatesamanbestfortheworld，andcarrieshimfarthestinanyofhisundertakings。
Therearemanyotherqualitiesofthemind，whosemeritisderiv’dfromthesameorigin，industry，perseverance，patience，activity，vigilance，application，constancy，withothervirtuesofthatkind，which`twillbeeasytorecollect，areesteem’dvaluableuponnootheraccount，thantheiradvantageintheconductoflife。Tisthesamecasewithtemperance，frugality，economy，resolution:Asontheotherhand，prodigality，luxury，irresolution，uncertainty，arevicious，merelybecausetheydrawruinuponus，andincapacitateusforbusinessandaction。
Aswisdomandgood-sensearevalued，becausetheyareusefultothepersonpossess’dofthem；sowitandeloquencearevalued，becausetheyareimmediatelyagreeabletoothers。Ontheotherhand，goodhumourislov’dandesteem’d，becauseitisimmediatelyagreeabletothepersonhimself。`Tisevident，thattheconversationofamanofwitisverysatisfactory；asachearfulgood-humour’dcompaniondiffusesajoyoverthewholecompany，fromasympathywithhisgaiety。Thesequalities，therefore，beingagreeable，theynaturallybegetloveandesteem，andanswertoallthecharactersofvirtue。
`Tisdifficulttotell，onmanyoccasions，whatitisthatrendersoneman’sconversationsoagreeableandentertaining，andanother’ssoinsipidanddistasteful。Asconversationisatranscriptofthemindaswellasbooks，thesamequalities，whichrendertheonevaluable，mustgiveusanesteemfortheother。Thisweshallconsiderafterwards。Inthemeantimeitmaybeaffirm’dingeneral，thatallthemeritamanmayderivefromhisconversation(which，nodoubt，maybeveryconsiderable)arisesfromnothingbutthepleasureitconveystothosewhoarepresent。
Inthisview，cleanlinessisalsotoberegardedasavirtue；sinceitnaturallyrendersusagreeabletoothers，andisaveryconsiderablesourceofloveandaffection。Noonewilldeny，thatanegligenceinthisparticularisafault；andasfaultsarenothingbutsmallervices，andthisfaultcanhavenootheroriginthantheuneasysensation，whichitexcitesinothers，wemayinthisinstance，seeminglysotrivial，dearlydiscovertheoriginofthemoraldistinctionofviceandvirtueinotherinstances。
Besidesallthosequalities，whichrenderapersonlovelyorvaluable，thereisalsoacertainje-ne-sç；ai-quoiofagreeableandhandsome，thatconcurstothesameeffect。Inthiscase，aswellasinthatofwitandeloquence，wemusthaverecoursetoacertainsense，whichactswithoutreflection，andregardsnotthetendenciesofqualitiesandcharacters。Somemoralistsaccountforallthesentimentsofvirtuebythissense。Theirhypothesisisveryplausible。Nothingbutaparticularenquirycangivethepreferencetoanyotherhypothesis。Whenwefind，thatalmostallthevirtueshavesuchparticulartendencies；andalsofind，thatthesetendenciesaresufficientalonetogiveastrongsentimentofapprobation:Wecannotdoubt，afterthis，thatqualitiesareapprov’dof，inproportiontotheadvantage，whichresultsfromthem。
Thedecorumorindecorumofaquality，withregardtotheage，orcharacter，orstation，contributesalsotoitspraiseorblame。Thisdecorumdepends，inagreatmeasure，uponexperience。`Tisusualtoseemenlosetheirlevity，astheyadvanceinyears。Suchadegreeofgravity，therefore，andsuchyears，areconnectedtogetherinourthoughts。Whenweobservethemseparatedinanyperson’scharacter，thisimposesakindofviolenceonourimagination，andisdisagreeable。
Thatfacultyofthesoul，which，ofallothers，isoftheleastconsequencetothecharacter，andhastheleastvirtueorviceinitsseveraldegrees，atthesametime，thatitadmitsofagreatvarietyofdegrees，isthememory。Unlessitriseuptothatstupendousheightastosurprizeus，orsinksolowas，insomemeasure，toaffectthejudgment，wecommonlytakenonoticeofitsvariations，norevermentionthemtothepraiseordispraiseofanyperson。Tissofarfrombeingavirtuetohaveagoodmemory，thatmengenerallyaffecttocomplainofabadone；andendeavouringtopersuadetheworld，thatwhattheysayisentirelyoftheirowninvention，sacrificeittothepraiseofgeniusandjudgment。Yettoconsiderthematterabstractedly，`twou’dbedifficulttogiveareason，whythefacultyofrecallingpastideaswithtruthandclearness，shou’dnothaveasmuchmeritinit，asthefacultyofplacingourpresentideas，insuchanorder，astoformtruepropositionsandopinions。Thereasonofthedifferencecertainlymustbe，thatthememoryisexertedwithoutanysensationofpleasureorpain；andinallitsmiddlingdegreesservesalmostequallywellinbusinessandaffairs。Buttheleastvariationsinthejudgmentaresensiblyfeltintheirconsequences；whileatthesametimethatfacultyisneverexertedinanyeminentdegree，withoutanextraordinarydelightandsatisfaction。Thesympathywiththisutilityandpleasurebestowsameritontheunderstanding；andtheabsenceofitmakesusconsiderthememoryasafacultyveryindifferenttoblameorpraise。
BeforeIleavethissubjectofnaturalabilities，Imustobserve，that，perhaps，onesourceoftheesteemandaffection，whichattendsthem，isderiv’dfromtheimportanceandweight，whichtheybestowonthepersonpossess’dofthem。Hebecomesofgreaterconsequenceinlife。Hisresolutionsandactionsaffectagreaternumberofhisfellow-creatures。Bothhisfriendshipandenmityareofmoment。And`tiseasytoobserve，thatwhoeveriselevated，afterthismanner，abovetherestofmankind，mustexciteinusthesentimentsofesteemandapprobation。Whateverisimportantengagesourattention，fixesourthought，andiscontemplatedwithsatisfaction。Thehistoriesofkingdomsaremoreinterestingthandomesticstories:Thehistoriesofgreatempiresmorethanthoseofsmallcitiesandprincipalities:Andthehistoriesofwarsandrevolutionsmorethanthoseofpeaceandorder。Wesympathizewiththepersonsthatsuffer，inallthevarioussentimentswhichbelongtotheirfortunes。Themindisoccupiedbythemultitudeoftheobjects，andbythestrongpassions，thatdisplaythemselves。Andthisoccupationoragitationofthemindiscommonlyagreeableandamusing。Thesametheoryaccountsfortheesteemandregardwepaytomenofextraordinarypartsandabilities。Thegoodandillofmultitudesareconnectedwiththeiractions。Whatevertheyundertakeisimportant，andchallengesourattention。Nothingistobeover-look’danddespis’d，thatregardsthem。Andwhereanypersoncanexcitethesesentiments，hesoonacquiresouresteem；unlessothercircumstancesofhischaracterrenderhimodiousanddisagreeable。
SomefartherreflectionsconcerningthenaturalvirtuesIthasbeenobserv’d，intreatingofthepassions，thatprideandhumility，loveandhatred，areexcitedbyanyadvantagesordisadvantagesofthemind，body，orfortune；andthattheseadvantagesordisadvantageshavethateffectbyproducingaseparateimpressionofpainorpleasure。Thepainorpleasure，whicharisesfromthegeneralsurveyorviewofanyactionorqualityofthemind，constitutesitsviceorvirtue，andgivesrisetoourapprobationorblame，whichisnothingbutafainterandmoreimperceptibleloveorhatred。Wehaveassign’dfourdifferentsourcesofthispainandpleasure；andinordertojustifymorefullythathypothesis，itmayherebepropertoobserve，thattheadvantagesordisadvantagesofthebodyandoffortune，produceapainorpleasurefromtheverysameprinciples。Thetendencyofanyobjecttobeusefultothepersonpossessdofit，ortoothers；toconveypleasuretohimortoothers；allthesecircumstancesconveyanimmediatepleasuretotheperson，whoconsiderstheobject，andcommandhisloveandapprobation。
Tobeginwiththeadvantagesofthebody；wemayobserveaphaenomenon，whichmightappearsomewhattrivialandludicrous，ifanythingcou’dbetrivial，whichfortifiedaconclusionofsuchimportance，orludicrous，whichwasemploy’dinaphilosophicalreasoning。Tisageneralremark，thatthosewecallgoodwomen’smen，whohaveeithersignaliz’dthemselvesbytheiramorousexploits，orwhosemakeofbodypromisesanyextraordinaryvigourofthatkind，arewellreceivedbythefairsex，andnaturallyengagetheaffectionsevenofthose，whosevirtuepreventsanydesignofevergivingemploymenttothosetalents。Heretisevident，thattheabilityofsuchapersontogiveenjoyment，istherealsourceofthatloveandesteemhemeetswithamongthefemales；atthesametimethatthewomen，wholoveandesteemhim，havenoprospectofreceivingthatenjoymentthemselves，andcanonlybeaffectedbymeansoftheirsympathywithone，thathasacommerceoflovewithhim。Thisinstanceissingular，andmeritsourattention。
Anothersourceofthepleasurewereceivefromconsideringbodilyadvantages，istheirutilitytothepersonhimself，whoispossess’dofthem。Tiscertain，thataconsiderablepartofthebeautyofmen，aswellasofotheranimals，consistsinsuchaconformationofmembers，aswefindbyexperiencetobeattendedwithstrengthandagility，andtocapacitatethecreatureforanyactionorexercise。Broadshoulders，alankbelly，firmjoints，taperlegs；allthesearebeautifulinourspecies。becausetheyaresignsofforceandvigour，whichbeingadvantageswenaturallysympathizewith，theyconveytothebeholderashareofthatsatisfactiontheyproduceinthepossessor。
Sofarastotheutility，whichmayattendanyqualityofthebody。Astotheimmediatepleasure，`tiscertain，thatanairofhealth，aswellasofstrengthandagility，makesaconsiderablepartofbeauty；andthatasicklyairinanotherisalwaysdisagreeable，uponaccountofthatideaofpainanduneasiness，whichitconveystous。Ontheotherhand，wearepleas’dwiththeregularityofourownfeatures，tho’itbeneitherusefultoourselvesnorothers；and`tisnecessaryatadistance，tomakeitconveytousanysatisfaction。Wecommonlyconsiderourselvesasweappearintheeyesofothers，andsympathizewiththeadvantageoussentimentstheyentertainwithregardtous。
Howfartheadvantagesoffortuneproduceesteemandapprobationfromthesameprinciples，wemaysatisfyourselvesbyreflectingonourprecedentreasoningonthatsubject。Wehaveobserv’d，thatourapprobationofthose，whoarepossessdoftheadvantagesoffortune，maybeascrib’dtothreedifferentcauses。First，Tothatimmediatepleasure，whicharichmangivesus，bytheviewofthebeautifulcloaths，equipage，gardens，orhouses，whichhepossesses。Secondly，Totheadvantage，whichwehopetoreapfromhimbyhisgenerosityandliberality。Thirdly，Tothepleasureandadvantage，whichhehimselfreapsfromhispossessions，andwhichproduceanagreeablesympathyinus。Whetherweascribeouresteemoftherichandgreattooneorallofthesecauses，wemayclearlyseethetracesofthoseprinciples，whichgiverisetothesenseofviceandvirtue。Ibelievemostpeople，atfirstsight，willbeinclin’dtoascribeouresteemoftherichtoself-interest，andtheprospectofadvantage。Butas`tiscertain，thatouresteemordeferenceextendsbeyondanyprospectofadvantagetoourselves，`tisevident，thatthatsentimentmustproceedfromasympathywiththose，whoaredependentonthepersonweesteemandrespect，andwhohaveanimmediateconnexionwithhim。Weconsiderhimasapersoncapableofcontributingtothehappinessorenjoymentofhisfellow-creatures，whosesentiments，withregardtohim，wenaturallyembrace。Andthisconsiderationwillservetojustifymyhypothesisinpreferringthethirdprincipletotheothertwo，andascribingouresteemoftherichtoasympathywiththepleasureandadvantage，whichtheythemselvesreceivefromtheirpossessions。Foraseventheothertwoprinciplescannotoperatetoadueextent，oraccountforallthephaenomena，withouthavingrecoursetoasympathyofonekindorother；`tismuchmorenaturaltochusethatsympathy，whichisimmediateanddirect，thanthatwhichisremoteandindirect。Towhichwemayadd，thatwheretherichesorpowerareverygreat，andrenderthepersonconsiderableandimportantintheworld，theesteemattendingthem，may，inpart，beascrib’dtoanothersource，distinctfromthesethree，viz。theirinterestingthemindbyaprospectofthemultitude，andimportanceoftheirconsequences:Tho’，inordertoaccountfortheoperationofthisprinciple，wemustalsohaverecoursetosympathy；aswehaveobserv’dintheprecedingsection。
Itmaynotbeamiss，onthisoccasion，toremarktheflexibilityofoursentiments，andtheseveralchangestheysoreadilyreceivefromtheobjects，withwhichtheyareconjoin’d。Allthesentimentsofapprobation，whichattendanyparticularspeciesofobjects，haveagreatresemblancetoeachother，tho’deriv’dfromdifferentsources；and，ontheotherhand，thosesentiments，whendirectedtodifferentobjects，aredifferenttothefeeling，tho’deriv’dfromthesamesource。Thusthebeautyofallvisibleobjectscausesapleasureprettymuchthesame，tho’itbesometimesderiv’dfromthemerespeciesandappearanceoftheobjects；sometimesfromsympathy，andanideaoftheirutility。Inlikemanner，wheneverwesurveytheactionsandcharactersofmen，withoutanyparticularinterestinthem，thepleasure，orpain，whicharisesfromthesurvey(withsomeminutedifferences)is，inthemain，ofthesamekind，tho’perhapstherebeagreatdiversityinthecauses，fromwhichitisderiv’d。Ontheotherhand，aconvenienthouse，andavirtuouscharacter，causenotthesamefeelingofapprobation；eventho’thesourceofourapprobationbethesame，andflowfromsympathyandanideaoftheirutility。Thereissomethingveryinexplicableinthisvariationofourfeelings；but`tiswhatwehaveexperienceofwithregardtoallourpassionsandsentiments。
ConclusionofthisbookThusuponthewholeIamhopeful，thatnothingiswantingtoanaccurateproofofthissystemofethics。Wearecertain，thatsympathyisaverypowerfulprincipleinhumannature。Wearealsocertain，thatithasagreatinfluenceonoursenseofbeauty，whenweregardexternalobjects，aswellaswhenwejudgeofmorals。Wefind，thatithasforcesufficienttogiveusthestrongestsentimentsofapprobation，whenitoperatesalone，withouttheconcurrenceofanyotherprinciple；asinthecasesofjustice，allegiance，chastity，andgood-manners。Wemayobserve，thatallthecircumstancesrequisiteforitsoperationarefoundinmostofthevirtues；whichhave，forthemostpart，atendencytothegoodofsociety，ortothatofthepersonpossess’dofthem。Ifwecompareallthesecircumstances，weshallnotdoubt，thatsympathyisthechiefsourceofmoraldistinctions；especiallywhenwereflect，thatnoobjectioncanberais’dagainstthishypothesisinonecase，whichwillnotextendtoallcases。Justiceiscertainlyapprov’doffornootherreason，thanbecauseithasatendencytothepublicgood:Andthepublicgoodisindifferenttous，exceptsofarassympathyinterestsusinit。Wemaypresumethelikewithregardtoalltheothervirtues，whichhavealiketendencytothepublicgood。Theymustderivealltheirmeritfromoursympathywiththose，whoreapanyadvantagefromthem:Asthevirtues，whichhaveatendencytothegoodofthepersonpossess’dofthem，derivetheirmeritfromoursympathywithhim。
Mostpeoplewillreadilyallow，thattheusefulqualitiesofthemindarevirtuous，becauseoftheirutility。Thiswayofthinkingissonatural，andoccursonsomanyoccasions，thatfewwillmakeanyscrupleofadmittingit。Nowthisbeingonceadmitted，theforceofsympathymustnecessarilybeacknowledg’d。Virtueisconsider’dasmeanstoanend。Meanstoanendareonlyvaluedsofarastheendisvalued。Butthehappinessofstrangersaffectsusbysympathyalone。Tothatprinciple，therefore，wearetoascribethesentimentofapprobation，whicharisesfromthesurveyofallthosevirtues，thatareusefultosociety，ortothepersonpossess’dofthem。Theseformthemostconsiderablepartofmorality。
Wereitproperinsuchasubjecttobribethereader’sassent，oremployanythingbutsolidargument，wearehereabundantlysuppliedwithtopicstoengagetheaffections。Allloversofvirtue(andsuchweallareinspeculation，howeverwemaydegenerateinpractice)mustcertainlybepleas’dtoseemoraldistinctionsderiv’dfromsonobleasource，whichgivesusajustnotionbothofthegenerosityandcapacityofhumannature。Itrequiresbutverylittleknowledgeofhumanaffairstoperceive，thatasenseofmoralsisaprincipleinherentinthesoul，andoneofthemostpowerfulthatentersintothecomposition。Butthissensemustcertainlyacquirenewforce，whenreflectingonitself，itapprovesofthoseprinciples，fromwhenceitisderiv’d，andfindsnothingbutwhatisgreatandgoodinitsriseandorigin。Thosewhoresolvethesenseofmoralsintooriginalinstinctsofthehumanmind，maydefendthecauseofvirtuewithsufficientauthority；butwanttheadvantage，whichthosepossess，whoaccountforthatsensebyanextensivesympathywithmankind。Accordingtotheirsystem，notonlyvirtuemustbeapprov’dof，butalsothesenseofvirtue:Andnotonlythatsense，butalsotheprinciples，fromwhenceitisderiv’d。Sothatnothingispresentedonanyside，butwhatislaudableandgood。
Thisobservationmaybeextendedtojustice，andtheothervirtuesofthatkind。Tho’justicebeartificial，thesenseofitsmoralityisnatural。Tisthecombinationofmen，inasystemofconduct，whichrendersanyactofjusticebeneficialtosociety。Butwhenonceithasthattendency，wenaturallyapproveofit；andifwedidnotso，`tisimpossibleanycombinationorconventioncou’deverproducethatsentiment。
Mostoftheinventionsofmenaresubjecttochange。Theydependuponhumourandcaprice。Theyhaveavogueforatime，andthensinkintooblivion。Itmay，perhaps，beapprehended，thatifjusticewereallow’dtobeahumaninvention，itmustbeplac’donthesamefooting。Butthecasesarewidelydifferent。Theinterest，onwhichjusticeisfounded，isthegreatestimaginable，andextendstoalltimesandplaces。Itcannotpossiblybeserv’dbyanyotherinvention。Itisobvious，anddiscoversitselfontheveryfirstformationofsociety。Allthesecausesrendertherulesofjusticestedfastandimmutable；atleast，asimmutableashumannature。Andiftheywerefoundedonoriginalinstincts，cou’dtheyhaveanygreaterstability？
Thesamesystemmayhelpustoformajustnotionofthehappiness，aswellasofthedignityofvirtue，andmayinteresteveryprincipleofournatureintheembracingandcherishingthatnoblequality。Whoindeeddoesnotfeelanaccessionofalacrityinhispursuitsofknowledgeandabilityofeverykind，whenheconsiders，thatbesidestheadvantage，whichimmediatelyresultfromtheseacquisitions，theyalsogivehimanewlustreintheeyesofmankind，andareuniversallyattendedwithesteemandapprobation？Andwhocanthinkanyadvantagesoffortuneasufficientcompensationfortheleastbreachofthesocialvirtues，whenheconsiders，thatnotonlyhischaracterwithregardtoothers，butalsohispeaceandinwardsatisfactionentirelydependuponhisstrictobservanceofthem；andthatamindwillneverbeabletobearitsownsurvey，thathas’beenwantinginitsparttomankindandsociety？ButIforbearinsistingonthissubject。Suchreflectionsrequireaworka-part，verydifferentfromthegeniusofthepresent。Theanatomistoughtnevertoemulatethepainter；norinhisaccuratedissectionsandportraituresofthesmallerpartsofthehumanbody，pretendtogivehisfiguresanygracefulandengagingattitudeorexpression。Thereisevensomethinghideous，oratleastminuteintheviewsofthings，whichhepresents；and`tisnecessarytheobjectsshou’dbesetmoreatadistance，andbemorecover’dupfromsight，tomakethemengagingtotheeyeandimagination。Ananatomist，however，isadmirablyfittedtogiveadvicetoapainter；and`tisevenimpracticabletoexcelinthelatterart，withouttheassistanceoftheformer。Wemusthaveanexactknowledgeoftheparts，theirsituationandconnexion，beforewecandesignwithanyeleganceorcorrectness。Andthusthemostabstractspeculationsconcerninghumannature，howevercoldandunentertaining，becomesubservienttopracticalmorality；andmayrenderthislattersciencemorecorrectinitsprecepts，andmorepersuasiveinitsexhortations。
APPENDIX
ThereisnothingIwou’dmorewillinglylayholdof，thananopportunityofconfessingmyerrors；andshou’desteemsuchareturntotruthandreasontobemorehonourablethanthemostunerringjudgment。Aman，whoisfreefrommistakes，canpretendtonopraises，exceptfromthejustnessofhisunderstanding:Butaman，whocorrectshismistakes，shewsatoncethejustnessofhisunderstanding，andthecandourandingenuityofhistemper。Ihavenotyetbeensofortunateastodiscoveranyveryconsiderablemistakesinthereasoningsdeliver’dintheprecedingvolumes，exceptononearticle:ButIhavefoundbyexperience，thatsomeofmyexpressionshavenotbeensowellchosen，astoguardagainstallmistakesinthereaders；and`tischieflytoremedythisdefect，Ihavesubjoin’dthefollowingappendix。
Wecanneverbeinduc’dtobelieveanymatteroffact，exceptwhereitscause，oritseffect，ispresenttous；butwhatthenatureisofthatbelief，whicharisesfromtherelationofcauseandeffect，fewhavehadthecuriositytoaskthemselves。Inmyopinion，thisdilemmaisinevitable。Eitherthebeliefissomenewidea，suchasthatofrealityorexistence，whichwejointothesimpleconceptionofanobject，oritismerelyapeculiarfeelingorsentiment。Thatitisnotanewidea，annex’dtothesimpleconception，maybeevinc’dfromthesetwoarguments。First，Wehavenoabstractideaofexistence，distinguishableandseparablefromtheideaofparticularobjects。Tisimpossible，therefore，thatthisideaofexistencecanbeannex’dtotheideaofanyobject，orformthedifferencebetwixtasimpleconceptionandbelief。Secondly，Themindhasthecommandoverallitsideas，andcanseparate，unite，mix，andvarythem，asitpleases；sothatifbeliefconsistedmerelyinanewidea，annex’dtotheconception，itwou’dbeinaman’spowertobelievewhathepleas’d。Wemay，therefore，conclude，thatbeliefconsistsmerelyinacertainfeelingorsentiment；insomething，thatdependsnotonthewill，butmustarisefromcertaindeterminatecausesandprinciples，ofwhichwearenotmasters。Whenweareconvinc’dofanymatteroffact，wedonothingbutconceiveit，alongwithacertainfeeling，differentfromwhatattendsthemerereveriesoftheimagination。Andwhenweexpressourincredulityconcerninganyfact，wemean，thattheargumentsforthefactproducenotthatfeeling。Didnotthebeliefconsistinasentimentdifferentfromourmereconception，whateverobjectswerepresentedbythewildestimagination，wou’dbeonanequalfootingwiththemostestablish’dtruthsfoundedonhistoryandexperience。Thereisnothingbutthefeeling，orsentiment，todistinguishtheonefromtheother。
This，therefore，beingregardedasanundoubtedtruth，thatbeliefisnothingbutapeculiarfeeling，differentfromthesimpleconception，thenextquestion，thatnaturallyoccurs，is，whatisthenatureofthisfeeling，orsentiment，andwhetheritbeanalogoustoanyothersentimentofthehumanmind？Thisquestionisimportant。Forifitbenotanalogoustoanyothersentiment，wemustdespairofexplainingitscauses，andmustconsideritasanoriginalprincipleofthehumanmind。Ifitbeanalogous，wemayhopetoexplainitscausesfromanalogy，andtraceituptomoregeneralprinciples。Nowthatthereisagreaterfirmnessandsolidityintheconceptions，whicharetheobjectsofconvictionandassurance，thaninthelooseandindolentreveriesofacastle-builder，everyonewillreadilyown。Theystrikeuponuswithmoreforce；theyaremorepresenttous；themindhasafirmerholdofthem，andismoreactuatedandmov’dbythem。Itacquiescesinthem；and，inamanner，fixesandreposesitselfonthem。Inshort，theyapproachnearertotheimpressions，whichareimmediatelypresenttous；andarethereforeanalogoustomanyotheroperationsofthemind。
Thereisnot，inmyopinion，anypossibilityofevadingthisconclusion，butbyasserting，thatbelief，besidethesimpleconception，consistsinsomeimpressionorfeeling，distinguishablefromtheconception。Itdoesnotmodifytheconception，andrenderitmorepresentandintense:Itisonlyannex’dtoit，afterthesamemannerthatwillanddesireareannex’dtoparticularconceptionsofgoodandpleasure。Butthefollowingconsiderationswill，Ihope，besufficienttoremovethishypothesis。First，Itisdirectlycontrarytoexperience，andourimmediateconsciousness。Allmenhaveeverallow’dreasoningtobemerelyanoperationofourthoughtsorideas；andhoweverthoseideasmaybevariedtothefeeling，thereisnothingeverentersintoourconclusionsbutideas，orourfainterconceptions。Forinstance；Ihearatpresentaperson’svoice，whomIamacquaintedwith；andthissoundcomesfromthenextroom。Thisimpressionofmysensesimmediatelyconveysmythoughtstotheperson，alongwithallthesurroundingobjects。Ipaintthemouttomyselfasexistentatpresent，withthesamequalitiesandrelations，thatIformerlyknewthempossess’dof。Theseideastakefasterholdofmymind，thantheideasofaninchantedcastle。Theyaredifferenttothefeeling；butthereisnodistinctorseparateimpressionattendingthem。TisthesamecasewhenIrecollecttheseveralincidentsofajourney，ortheeventsofanyhistory。Everyparticularfactistheretheobjectofbelief。Itsideaismodifieddifferentlyfromtheloosereveriesofacastle-builder:Butnodistinctimpressionattendseverydistinctidea，orconceptionofmatteroffact。Thisisthesubjectofplainexperience。Ifeverthisexperiencecanbedisputedonanyoccasion，`tiswhenthemindhasbeenagitatedwithdoubtsanddifficulties；andafterwards，upontakingtheobjectinanewpointofview，orbeingpresentedwithanewargument，fixesandreposesitselfinonesettledconclusionandbelief。Inthiscasethereisafeelingdistinctandseparatefromtheconception。Thepassagefromdoubtandagitationtotranquilityandrepose，conveysasatisfactionandpleasuretothemind。Buttakeanyothercase。SupposeIseethelegsandthighsofapersoninmotion，whilesomeinterpos’dobjectconcealstherestofhisbody。Here`tiscertain，theimaginationspreadsoutthewholefigure。Igivehimaheadandshoulders，andbreastandneck。ThesemembersIconceiveandbelievehimtobepossess’dof。Nothingcanbemoreevident，thanthatthiswholeoperationisperform’dbythethoughtorimaginationalone。Thetransitionisimmediate。Theideaspresentlystrikeus。Theircustomaryconnexionwiththepresentimpression，variesthemandmodifiestheminacertainmanner，butproducesnoactofthemind，distinctfromthispeculiarityofconception。Letanyoneexaminehisownmind，andhewillevidentlyfindthistobethetruth。
Secondly，Whatevermaybethecase，withregardtothisdistinctimpression，itmustbeallow’d，thatthemindhasafirmerhold，ormoresteadyconceptionofwhatittakestobematteroffact，thanoffictions。Whythenlookanyfarther，ormultiplysuppositionswithoutnecessity？
Thirdly，Wecanexplainthecausesofthefirmconception，butnotthoseofanyseparateimpression。Andnotonlyso，butthecausesofthefirmconceptionexhaustthewholesubject，andnothingislefttoproduceanyothereffect。Aninferenceconcerningamatteroffactisnothingbuttheideaofanobject，thatisfrequentlyconjoin’d，orisassociatedwithapresentimpression。Thisisthewholeofit。Everypartisrequisitetoexplain，fromanalogy，themoresteadyconception；andnothingremainscapableofproducinganydistinctimpression。
Fourthly，Theeffectsofbelief，ininfluencingthepassionsandimagination，canallbeexplain’dfromthefirmconception；andthereisnooccasiontohaverecoursetoanyotherprinciple。Thesearguments，withmanyothers，enumeratedintheforegoingvolumes，sufficientlyprove，thatbeliefonlymodifiestheideaorconception；andrendersitdifferenttothefeeling，withoutproducinganydistinctimpression。Thusuponageneralviewofthesubject，thereappeartobetwoquestionsofimportance，whichwemayventuretorecommendtotheconsiderationofphilosophers，Whethertherebeanythingtodistinguishbelieffromthesimpleconceptionbesidethefeelingofsentiment？And，Whetherthisfeelingbeanythingbutafirmerconception，orafasterhold，thatwetakeoftheobject？
If，uponimpartialenquiry，thesameconclusion，thatIhaveform’d，beassentedtobyphilosophers，thenextbusinessistoexaminetheanalogy，whichthereisbetwixtbelief，andotheractsofthemind，andfindthecauseofthefirmnessandstrengthofconception:AndthisIdonotesteemadifficulttask。Thetransitionfromapresentimpression，alwaysenlivensandstrengthensanyidea。Whenanyobjectispresented，theideaofitsusualattendantimmediatelystrikesus，assomethingrealandsolid。’Tisfelt，ratherthanconceiv’d，andapproachestheimpression，fromwhichitisderiv’d，initsforceandinfluence。ThisIhaveprov’datlarge。Icannotaddanynewarguments；tho’perhapsmyreasoningonthiswholequestion，concerningcauseandeffect，wou’dhavebeenmoreconvincing，hadthefollowingpassagesbeeninsertedintheplaces，whichIhavemark’dforthem。Ihaveaddedafewillustrationsonotherpoints，whereIthoughtitnecessary。[……](22)
Ihadentertain’dsomehopes，thathoweverdeficientourtheoryoftheintellectualworldmightbe，itwou’dbefreefromthosecontradictions，andabsurdities，whichseemtoattendeveryexplication，thathumanreasoncangiveofthematerialworld。Butuponamorestrictreviewofthesectionconcerningpersonalidentity，Ifindmyselfinvolv’dinsuchalabyrinth，that，Imustconfess，Ineitherknowhowtocorrectmyformeropinions，norhowtorenderthemconsistent。Ifthisbenotagoodgeneralreasonforscepticism，`tisatleastasufficientone(ifIwerenotalreadyabundantlysupplied)formetoentertainadiffidenceandmodestyinallmydecisions。Ishallproposetheargumentsonbothsides，beginningwiththosethatinduc’dmetodenythestrictandproperidentityandsimplicityofaselforthinkingbeing。
Whenwetalkofselforsubstance，wemusthaveanideaannex’dtotheseterms，otherwisetheyarealtogetherunintelligible。Everyideaisderiv’dfromprecedingimpressions；andwehavenoimpressionofselforsubstance，assomethingsimpleandindividual。Wehave，therefore，noideaoftheminthatsense。
Whateverisdistinct，isdistinguishable；andwhateverisdistinguishable，isseparablebythethoughtorimagination。Allperceptionsaredistinct。Theyare，therefore，distinguishable，andseparable，andmaybeconceiv’dasseparatelyexistent，andmayexistseparately，withoutanycontradictionorabsurdity。
WhenIviewthistableandthatchimney，nothingispresenttomebutparticularperceptions，whichareofalikenaturewithalltheotherperceptions。Thisisthedoctrineofphilosophers。Butthistable，whichispresenttome，andthechimney，mayanddoexistseparately。Thisisthedoctrineofthevulgar，andimpliesnocontradiction。Thereisnocontradiction，therefore，inextendingthesamedoctrinetoalltheperceptions。
Ingeneral，thefollowingreasoningseemssatisfactory。Allideasareborrow’dfromprecedingperceptions。Ourideasofobjects，therefore，arederiv’dfromthatsource。Consequentlynopropositioncanbeintelligibleorconsistentwithregardtoobjects，whichisnotsowithregardtoperceptions。But`tisintelligibleandconsistenttosay，thatobjectsexistdistinctandindependent，withoutanycommonsimplesubstanceorsubjectofinhesion。Thisproposition，therefore，canneverbeabsurdwithregardtoperceptions。
WhenIturnmyreflectiononmyself，Inevercanperceivethisselfwithoutsomeoneormoreperceptions；norcanIeverperceiveanythingbuttheperceptions。Tisthecompositionofthese，therefore，whichformstheself。Wecanconceiveathinkingbeingtohaveeithermanyorfewperceptions。Supposethemindtobereduc’devenbelowthelifeofanoyster。Supposeittohaveonlyoneperception，asofthirstorhunger。Consideritinthatsituation。Doyouconceiveanythingbutmerelythatperception？Haveyouanynotionofselforsubstance？Ifnot，theadditionofotherperceptionscannevergiveyouthatnotion。
Theannihilation，whichsomepeoplesupposetofollowupondeath，andwhichentirelydestroysthisself，isnothingbutanextinctionofallparticularperceptions；loveandhatred，painandpleasure，thoughtandsensation。Thesethereforemustbethesamewithself；sincetheonecannotsurvivetheother。
Isselfthesamewithsubstance？Ifitbe，howcanthatquestionhaveplace，concerningthesubsistenceofself，underachangeofsubstance？Iftheybedistinct，whatisthedifferencebetwixtthem？Formypart，Ihaveanotionofneither，whenconceiv’ddistinctfromparticularperceptions。
Philosophersbegintobereconcil’dtotheprinciple，thatwehavenoideaofexternalsubstance，distinctfromtheideasofparticularqualities。Thismustpavethewayforalikeprinciplewithregardtothemind，thatwehavenonotionofit，distinctfromtheparticularperceptions。
SofarIseemtobeattendedwithsufficientevidence。Buthavingthusloosen’dallourparticularperceptions，when(23)Iproceedtoexplaintheprincipleofconnexion，whichbindsthemtogether，andmakesusattributetothemarealsimplicityandidentity；Iamsensible，thatmyaccountisverydefective，andthatnothingbuttheseemingevidenceoftheprecedentreasoningscou’dhaveinduc’dmetoreceiveit。Ifperceptionsaredistinctexistences，theyformawholeonlybybeingconnectedtogether。Butnoconnexionsamongdistinctexistencesareeverdiscoverablebyhumanunderstanding。Weonlyfeelaconnexionordeterminationofthethought，topassfromoneobjecttoanother。Itfollows，therefore，thatthethoughtalonefindspersonalidentity，whenreflectingonthetrainofpastperceptions，thatcomposeamind，theideasofthemarefelttobeconnectedtogether，andnaturallyintroduceeachother。Howeverextraordinarythisconclusionmayseem，itneednotsurprizeus。Mostphilosophersseeminclin’dtothink，thatpersonalidentityarisesfromconsciousness；andconsciousnessisnothingbutareflectedthoughtorperception。Thepresentphilosophy，therefore，hassofarapromisingaspect。Butallmyhopesvanish，whenIcometoexplaintheprinciples，thatuniteoursuccessiveperceptionsinourthoughtorconsciousness。Icannotdiscoveranytheory，whichgivesmesatisfactiononthishead。
Inshorttherearetwoprinciples，whichIcannotrenderconsistent；norisitinmypowertorenounceeitherofthem，viz，thatallourdistinctperceptionsaredistinctexistences，andthatthemindneverperceivesanyrealconnexionamongdistinctexistences。Didourperceptionseitherinhereinsomethingsimpleandindividual，ordidthemindperceivesomerealconnexionamongthem，therewou’dbenodifficultyinthecase。Formypart，Imustpleadtheprivilegeofasceptic，andconfess，thatthisdifficultyistoohardformyunderstanding。Ipretendnot，however，topronounce。itabsolutelyinsuperable。Others，perhaps，ormyself，uponmorematurereflections，maydiscoversomehypothesis，thatwillreconcilethosecontradictions。
Ishallalsotakethisopportunityofconfessingtwoothererrorsoflessimportance，whichmorematurereflectionhasdiscover’dtomeinmyreasoning。ThefirstmaybefoundinVol。I。page106。whereIsay，thatthedistancebetwixttwobodiesisknown，amongotherthings，bytheangles，whichtheraysoflightflowingfromthebodiesmakewitheachother。`Tiscertain，thattheseanglesarenotknowntothemind，andconsequentlycanneverdiscoverthedistance。TheseconderrormaybefoundinVol。I。page144whereIsay，thattwoideasofthesameobjectcanonlybedifferentbytheirdifferentdegreesofforceandvivacity。Ibelievethereareotherdifferencesamongideas，whichcannotproperlybecomprehendedundertheseterms。HadIsaid，thattwoideasofthesameobjectcanonlybedifferentbytheirdifferentfeeling，Ishou’dhavebeennearerthetruth。
1。BookII。PartIII。Sect3，2。OnemightthinkItwereentirelysuperfluoustoprovethis，ifalateauthor[WilliamWollaston，TheReligionofNatureDelineated(London！722)]，whohashadthegoodfortunetoobtainsomereputation，hadnotseriouslyaffirmed，thatsuchafalshoodisthefoundationofallguiltandmoraldeformity。Thatwemaydiscoverthefallacyofhishypothesis，weneedonlyconsider，thatafalseconclusionisdrawnfromanaction，onlybymeansofanobscurityofnaturalprinciples，whichmakesacausebesecretlyinterruptedInitsoperation，bycontrarycauses，andrenderstheconnexionbetwixttwoobjectsuncertainandvariable。Now，asalikeuncertaintyandvarietyofcausestakeplace，eveninnaturalobjects，andproducealikeerrorinourjudgment，ifthattendencytoproduceerrorweretheveryessenceofviceandimmorality，itshou’dfollow，thateveninanimateobjectsmightbeviciousandimmoral。
`Tisinvaintourge，thatinanimateobjectsactwithoutlibertyandchoice。Foraslibertyandchoicearenotnecessarytomakeanactionproduceinusanerroneousconclusion，theycanbe，innorespect，essentialtomorality；andIdonotreadilyperceive，uponthissystem，howtheycanevercometoberegardedbyit。Ifthetendencytocauseerrorbetheoriginofimmorality，thattendencyandimmoralitywou’dineverycasebeinseparable。
Addtothis，thatifIhadusedtheprecautionofshuttingthewindows，whileIindulg’dmyselfinthoselibertieswithmyneighbour’swife，Ishouldhavebeenguiltyofnoimmorality；andthatbecausemyaction，beingperfectlyconceal’d，wouldhavehadnotendencytoproduceanyfalseconclusion。
Forthesamereason，athief，whostealsInbyaladderatawindow，andtakesallimaginablecaretocausenodisturbance，isinnorespectcriminal。Foreitherhewillnotbeperceiv’d，orifhebe，`tisimpossiblehecanproduceanyerror，norwillanyone，fromthesecircumstances，takehimtobeotherthanwhathereallyis。
`Tiswellknown，thatthosewhoaresquint-sighted，doveryreadilycausemistakesinothers，andthatweImaginetheysaluteoraretalkingtooneperson，whiletheyaddressthemselvestoanther。Aretheytherefore，uponthataccount，immoral？
Besides，wemayeasilyobserve，thatinallthoseargumentsthereisanevidentreasoninginacircle。Apersonwhotakespossessionofanother’sgoods，andusesthemashisown，inamannerdeclaresthemtobehisown；andthisfalshoodisthesourceoftheimmoralityofinjustice。Butisproperty，orright，orobligation，intelligible，withoutanantecedentmorality？
Amanthatisungratefultohisbenefactor，inamanneraffirms，thatheneverreceivedanyfavoursfromhim。Butinwhatmanner？Isitbecause`tishisdutytobegrateful？Butthissupposes，thatthereissomeantecedentruleofdutyandmorals。Isitbecausehumannatureisgenerallygrateful，andmakesusconclude，thatamanwhodoesanyharmneverreceivedanyfavourfromthepersonheharm’d？Buthumannatureisnotsogenerallygrateful，astojustifysuchaconclusion。Orifitwere，isanexceptiontoageneralruleineverycasecriminal，fornootherreasonthanbecauseitisanexception？
Butwhatmaysufficeentirelytodestroythiswhimsicalsystemis，thatitleavesusunderthesamedifficultytogiveareasonwhytruthisvirtuousandfalshoodvicious，astoaccountforthemeritorturpitudeofanyotheraction。Ishallallow，ifyouplease，thatallimmoralityisderivedfromthissupposedfalshoodinaction，providedyoucangivemeanyplausiblereason，whysuchafalshoodisimmoral。Ifyouconsiderrightlyofthematter，youwillfindyourselfinthesamedifficultyasatthebeginning。
Thislastargumentisveryconclusive；because，iftherebenotanevidentmeritorturpitudeannex’dtothisspeciesoftruthorfalahood，Itcanneverhaveanyinfluenceuponouractions。For，whoeverthoughtofforbearinganyaction，becauseothersmightpossiblydrawfalseconclusionsfromit？Or，whoeverperform’dany，thathemightgiverisetotrueconclusions？
3。Asaproof，howconfus’dourwayofthinkingonthissubjectcommonlyis，wemayobserve，thatthosewhoassert，thatmoralityisdemonstrable，donotsay，thatmoralityliesintherelations，andthattherelationsaredistinguishablebyreason。Theyonlysay，thatreasoncandiscoversuchanaction，Insuchrelations，tobevirtuous，andsuchanothervicious。Itseemstheythoughtitsufficient，iftheycou’dbringtheword，Relation，intotheproposition，withouttroublingthemselveswhetheritwastothepurposeornot。Buthere，Ithink，isplainargument。Demonstrativereasondiscoversonlyrelations。Butthatreason，accordingtothishypothesis，discoversalsoviceandvirtue。Thesemoralqualities，therefore，mustberelations。Whenweblameanyaction，inanysituation，thewholecomplicatedobject，ofactionandsituation，mustformcertainrelations，whereintheessenceofviceconsists。Thishypothesisisnototherwiseintelligible。Forwhatdoesreasondiscover，whenitpronouncesanyactionvicious？Doesitdiscoverarelationoramatteroffact？Thesequestionsaredecisive，andmustnotbeeluded。
4。Inthefollowingdiscoursenaturalisalsoopposedsometimestocivil，sometimestomoral。Theoppositionwillalwaysdiscoverthesense，inwhichitistaken。
5。Noquestionsinphilosophyaremoredifficult，thanwhenanumberofcausespresentthemselvesforthesamephaenomenon，todeterminewhichistheprincipalandpredominant。Thereseldomisanyverypreciseargumenttofixourchoice，andmenmustbecontentedtobeguidedbyakindoftasteorfancy，arisingfromanalogy，andacomparisonoffamiliarinstances。Thus，inthepresentcase，thereare，nodoubt，motivesofpublicinterestformostoftherules，whichdetermineproperty；butstillIsuspect，thattheserulesareprincipallyfix’dbytheimagination，orthemorefrivolouspropertiesofourthoughtandconception。Ishallcontinuetoexplainthesecauses，leavingittothereader’schoice，whetherhewillpreferthosederiv’dfrompublickutility，orthosederiv’dfromtheimagination。Weshallbeginwiththerightofthepresentpossessor。
`Tisaquality，whichIhavealreadyobserv’dinhumannature，thatwhentwoobjectsappearinacloserelationtoeachother，themindisapttoascribetothemanyadditionalrelation，inordertocompleattheunion；andthisinclinationissostrong，asoftentomakeusrunintoerrors(suchasthatoftheconjunctionofthoughtandmatter)ifwefindthattheycanservetothatpurpose。Manyofourimpressionsareincapableofplaceorlocalposition；andyetthoseveryimpressionswesupposetohavealocalconjunctionwiththeimpressionsofsightandtouch，merelybecausetheyareconjoin’dbycausation，andarealreadyunitedintheimagination。Since，therefore，wecanfeignanewrelation，andevenanabsurdone，inordertocompleatanyunion，`twilleasilybeimagin’d，thatiftherebeanyrelations，whichdependonthemind，`twillreadilyconjointhemtoanyprecedingrelation，andunite，byanewbond，suchobjectsashavealreadyanunioninthefancy。Thusforinstance，weneverfail，inourarrangementofbodies，toplacethosewhichareresemblingincontiguitytoeachother，oratleastincorrespondentpointsofview；becausewefeelasatisfactioninjoiningtherelationofcontiguitytothatofresemblance，ortheresemblanceofsituationtothatofqualities。Andthisiseasilyaccountedforfromtheknownpropertiesofhumannature。Whenthemindisdetermin’dtojoincertainobjects，butundetermin’dinitschoiceoftheparticularobjects，Itnaturallyturnsitseyetosuchasarerelatedtogether。Theyarealreadyunitedinthemind:Theypresentthemselvesatthesametimetotheconception；andinsteadofrequiringanynewreasonfortheirconjunction，itwou’drequireaverypowerfulreasontomakeusover-lookthisnaturalaffinity。Thisweshallhaveoccasiontoexplainmorefullyafterwards，whenwecometotreatofbeauty。Inthemeantime，wemaycontentourselveswithobserving，thatthesameloveoforderanduniformity，whicharrangesthebooksinalibrary，andthechairsinaparlour，contributetotheformationofsociety，andtothewell-beingofmankind，bymodifyingthegeneralruleconcerningthestabilityofpossession。Andaspropertyformsarelationbetwixtapersonandanobject，`tisnaturaltofounditonsomeprecedingrelation；andaspropertyIsnothingbutaconstantpossession，secur’dbythelawsofsociety，`tisnaturaltoaddittothepresentpossession，whichisarelationthatresemblesit。Forthisalsohasitsinfluence。Ifitbenaturaltoconjoinallsortsofrelations，`tismoreso，toconjoinsuchrelationsasareresembling，andarerelatedtogether。
6。Somephilosophersaccountfortherightofoccupation，bysaying，thateveryonehasapropertyinhisownlabour；andwhenhejoinsthatlabourtoanything，itgiveshimthepropertyofthewhole:But，1。Thereareseveralkindsofoccupation，wherewecannotbesaidtojoinourlabourtotheobjectweacquire:Aswhenwepossessameadowbygraxingourcattleuponit。2。Thisaccountsforthematterbymeansofaccession；whichistakinganeedlesscircuit。3。Wecannotbesaidtojoinourlabourtoanythingbutinafigurativesense。Properlyspeaking。weonlymakeanalterationonitbyourlabour。Thisformsarelationbetwixtusandtheobject；andthencearisestheproperty，accordingtotheprecedingprinciples。
7。Ifweseekasolutionofthesedifficultiesinreasonandpublicinterest，wenevershallfindsatisfaction；andIfwelookforitintheimagination，`tisevident，thatthequalities，whichoperateuponthatfaculty，runsoinsensiblyandgraduallyintoeachother，that`tisimpossibletogivethemanypreciseboundsortermination。Thedifficultiesonthisheadmustencrease，whenweconsider，thatourjudgmentaltersverysensibly，accordingtothesubject，andthatthesamepowerandproximitywillbedeem’dpossessioninonecase，whichisnotesteem’dsuchinanother。Aperson，whohashuntedaharetothelastdegreeofweariness，wou’dlookuponitasaninjusticeforanothertorushinbeforehim，andseizehisprey。Butthesamepersonadvancingtopluckanapple，thathangswithinhisreach，hasnoreasontocomplain，ifanother，morealert，passeshim，andtakespossession。Whatisthereasonofthisdifference，butthatimmobility，notbeingnaturaltothehare，buttheeffectofindustry，formsinthatcaseastrongrelationwiththehunter，whichiswantingintheother？
Herethenitappears，thatacertainandinfalliblepowerofenjoyment，withouttouchorsomeothersensiblerelation，oftenproducesnotproperty:AndIfartherobserve，thatasensiblerelation，withoutanypresentpower，issometimessufficienttogiveatitletoanyobject。Thesightofathingisseldomaconsiderablerelation，andisonlyregardedassuch，whentheobjectishidden，orveryobscure；inwhichcasewefind，thattheviewaloneconveysaproperty；accordingtothatmaxim，thatevenawholecontinentbelongstothenation，whichfirstdiscover’dit。`Tishoweverremarkablethatbothinthecaseofdiscoveryandthatofpossession，thefirstdiscovererandpossessormustjointotherelationanintentionofrenderinghimselfproprietor，otherwisetherelationwillnothaveItseffect；andthatbecausetheconnexioninourfancybetwixtthepropertyandtherelationisnotsogreat，butthatitrequirestobehelp’dbysuchanintention。
Fromallthesecircumstances，`tiseasytoseehowperplex’dmanyquestionsmaybecomeconcerningtheacquisitionofpropertybyoccupation；andtheleasteffortofthoughtmaypresentuswithinstances，whicharenotsusceptibleofanyreasonabledecision。Ifwepreferexamples，whicharereal，tosuchasarefeign’d，wemayconsiderthefollowingone，whichistobemetwithInalmosteverywriter，thathastreatedofthelawsofnature。TwoGreciancolonies，leavingtheirnativecountry，insearchofnewfeats，wereinform’dthatacitynearthemwasdesertedbyitsinhabitants。Toknowthetruthofthisreport，theydispatch’datoncetwomessengers，onefromeachcolony；whofindingontheirapproach，thattheirinformationwastrue，begunaracetogetherwithanintentiontotakepossessionofthecity，eachofthemforhiscountrymen。Oneofthesemessengers，findingthathewasnotanequalmatchfortheother，launch’dhisspearatthegatesofthecity，andwassofortunateastofixittherebeforethearrivalofhiscompanion。Thisproduc’dadisputebetwixtthetwocolonies，whichofthemwastheproprietoroftheemptycityandthisdisputestillsubsistsamongphilosophers。FormypartIfindthedisputeimpossibletobedecided，andthatbecausethewholequestionhangsuponthefancy，whichinthiscaseisnotpossess’dofanypreciseordeterminatestandard，uponwhichitcangivesentence。Tomakethisevident，letusconsider，thatifthesetwopersonshadbeensimplymembersofthecolonies，andnotmessengersordeputies，theiractionswou’dnothavebeenofanyconsequence；sinceinthatcasetheirrelationtothecolonieswou’dhavebeenbutfeebleandimperfect。Addtothis，thatnothingdetermin’dthemtoruntothegatesratherthanthewalls，oranyotherpartofthecity，butthatthegates，beingthemostobviousandremarkablepart，satisfythefancybestintakingthemforthewhole；aswefindbythepoets，whofrequentlydrawtheirimagesandmetaphorsfromthem。Besideswemayconsider，thatthetouchorcontactoftheonemessengerisnotproperlypossession，nomorethanthepiercingthegateswithaspear；butonlyformsarelation；andthereisarelation，intheothercase，equallyobvious，tho’not，perhaps，ofequalforce。Whichoftheserelations，then，conveysarightandproperty，orwhetheranyofthembesufficientforthateffect，Ileavetothedecisionofsuchasarewiserthanmyself。
8。Presentpossessionisplainlyarelationbetwixtapersonandanobject；butisnotsufficienttocounter-ballancetherelationoffirstpossession，unlesstheformerbelonganduninterrupted:Inwhichcasetherelationisencreas’donthesideofthepresentpossession，bytheextentoftime，anddlminish’donthatoffirstpossession，bythedistance，Thischangeintherelationproducesaconsequentchangeintheproperty。
9。Thissourceofpropertycanneverbeexplain’dbutfromtheimaginations；andonemayaffirm，thatthecausesarehereunmix’d。Weshallproceedtoexplainthemmoreparticularly，andillustratethembyexamplesfromcommonlifeandexperience。
Ithasbeenobservedabove，thatthemindhasanaturalpropensitytojoinrelations，especiallyresemblingones，andfindsahindoffitnessanduniformityinsuchanunion。Fromthispropensityarederiv’dtheselawsofnature，thatuponthefirstformationofsociety，propertyalwaysfollowsthepresentpossession；andafterwards，thatitarisesfromfirstorfromlongpossession。Nowwemayeasilyobserve，thatrelationisnotconfin’dmerelytoonedegree；butthatfromanobject，thatisrelatedtous，weacquirearelationtoeveryotherobject，whichisrelatedtoit，andsoon，tillthethoughtlosesthechainbytoolongaprogress，Howevertherelationmayweakenbyeachremove，`tisnotimmediatelydestroy’d；butfrequentlyconnectstwoobjectsbymeansofanintermediateone，whichisrelatedtoboth。Andthisprincipleisofsuchforceastogiverisetotherightofaccession，andcausesustoacquirethepropertynotonlyofsuchobjectsasweareimmediatelypossess’dof；butalsoofsuchasarecloselyconnectedwiththem。
SupposeaGerman，aFrenchman，andaSpaniardtocomeintoaroom，wherethereareplac’duponthetablethreebottlesofwine，Rhenish，BurgundyandPort；andsupposetheyshou’dfallaquarrellingaboutthedivisionofthem；aperson，whowaschosenforumpirewou’dnaturally，toshewhisimpartiality，giveeveryonetheproductofhisowncountry:Andthisfromaprinciple，which，insomemeasure，isthesourceofthoselawsofnature，thatascribepropertytooccupation，prescriptionandaccession。
InalltheseCases，andparticularlythatofaccession，thereisfirstanaturalunionbetwixttheIdeaofthepersonandthatoftheobject，andafterwardsanewandmoralunionproduc’dbythatrightorproperty，whichweascribetotheperson。Butherethereoccursadifficulty，whichmeritsourattention，andmayaffordusanopportunityofputtingtotryalthatsingularmethodofreasoning，whichhasbeenemploy’donthepresentsubject。Ihavealreadyobserv’dthattheimaginationpasseswithgreaterfacilityfromlittletogreat，thanfromgreattolittie，andthatthetransitionofideasisalwayseasierandsmootherintheformercasethaninthelatter。Nowastherightofaccessionarisesfromtheeasytransitionofideas，bywhichrelatedobjectsareconnectedtogether，itshou’dnaturallybeimagin’d，thattherightofaccessionmustencreaseinstrength，inproportionasthetransitionofideasisperform’dwithgreaterfacility。Itmay，therefore，bethought，thatwhenwehaveacquir’dthepropertyofanysmallobject，weshallreadilyconsideranygreatobjectrelatedtoitasanaccession，andasbelongingtotheproprietorofthesmallone；sincethetransitionisinthatcaseveryeasyfromthesmallobjecttothegreatone，andshou’dconnectthemtogetherintheclosestmanner。ButInfactthecaseisalwaysfoundtobeotherwise，TheempireofGreatBritainseemstodrawalongwithitthedominionoftheOrkneys，theHebrides，theisleofMan，andtheIsleofWight；buttheauthorityoverthoselesserislandsdoesnotnaturallyimplyanytitletoGreatBritain。Inshort，asmallobjectnaturallyfollowsagreatoneasitsaccession；butagreatoneIsneversuppos’dtobelongtotheproprietorofasmallonerelatedtoit，merelyonaccountofthatpropertyandrelation。Yetinthislattercasethetransitionofideasissmootherfromtheproprietortothesmallobject，whichishisproperty，andfromthesmallobjecttothegreatone，thanintheformercasefromtheproprietortothegreatobject，andfromthegreatonetothesmall。Itmaythereforebethought，thatthesephaenomenaareobjectionstotheforegoinghypothesis，thattheascribingofpropertytoaccessionisnothingbutanaffectoftherelationsofideas，andofthesmoothtransitionoftheimagination。
`Twillbeeasytosolvethisobjection，ifweconsidertheagilityandunsteadinessoftheimagination，withthedifferentviews，inwhichitiscontinuallyplacingitsobjects。Whenweattributetoapersonapropertyintwoobjects，wedonotalwayspassfromthepersontooneobject，andfromthattotheotherrelatedtoit。Theobjectsbeingheretobeconsider’dasthepropertyoftheperson，weareapttojointhemtogether，andplacetheminthesamelight。Suppose，therefore，agreatandasmallobjecttoberelatedtogether；ifapersonbestronglyrelatedtothegreatobject，hewilllikewisebestronglyrelatedtoboththeobjects，consider’dtogether，becauseheIsrelatedtothemostconsiderablepart。Onthecontrary，ifhebeonlyrelatedtothesmallobject，hewillnotbestronglyrelatedtoboth，consider’dtogether，sincehisrelationliesonlywiththemosttrivialpart，whichisnotapttostrikeusinanygreatdegree，whenweconsiderthewhole。AndthisIsthereason，whysmallobjectsbecomeaccessionstogreatones，andnotgreattosmall。
`Tisthegeneralopinionofphilosophersandcivilians，thattheseaisincapableofbecomingthepropertyofanynation；andthatbecause`tisimpossibletotakepossessionofit，orformanysuchdistinctrelationwithit，asmaybethefoundationofproperty。Wherethisreasonceases，propertyimmediatelytakesplace。Thusthemoststrenuousadvocatesforthelibertyoftheseasuniversallyallow，thatfrithsandhaysnaturallybelongasanaccessiontotheproprietorsofthesurroundingcontinent。Thesehaveproperlynomorebondorunionwiththeland，thanthepacificoceanwou’dhave；buthavinganunioninthefancy，andbeingatthesametimeinferior，theyareofcourseregardedasanaccession。
Thepropertyofrivers，bythelawsofmostnations，andbythenaturalturnofourthought，Isattributedtotheproprietorsoftheirbanks，exceptingsuchvastriversastheRhineortheDanube，whichseemtoolargetotheimaginationtofollowasanaccessionthepropertyoftheneighbouringfields。Yeteventheseriversareconsider’dasthepropertyofthatnation，thro’whosedominionstheyrun；theideaofanationbeingofasuitablebulktocorrespondwiththem，andbearthemsucharelationinthefancy。
Theaccessions，whicharemadetolandsborderinguponrivers，followtheland，saythecivilians，provideditbemadebywhattheycallalluvion，thatis，InsensiblyandImperceptibly；whicharecircumstancesthatmightilyassisttheimaginationintheconjunction。WherethereIsanyconsiderableportiontornatoncefromonebank，andjoin’dtoanother，itbecomesnothisproperty，whoselanditfallson，tillitunitewiththeland，andtillthetreesorplantshavespreadtheirrootsintoboth。Beforethat，theimaginationdoesnotsufficientlyjointhem。
Thereareothercases，whichsomewhatresemblethisofaccession，butwhich，atthebottom，areconsiderablydifferent，andmeritourattention。OfthiskindIstheconjunctionofthepropertiesofdifferentpersons，aftersuchamannerasnottoadmitofseparation。Thequestionis，towhomtheunitedmassmustbelong。
Wherethisconjunctionisofsuchanatureastoadmitofdivision，butnotofseparation，thedecisionisnaturalandeasy。Thewholemassmustbesuppos’dtobecommonbetwixttheproprietorsoftheseveralparts，andafterwardsmustbedividedaccordingtotheproportionsoftheseparts。ButhereIcannotforbeartakingnoticeofaremarkablesubtiltyoftheRomanlaw，indistinguishingbetwixtconfusionandcommixtion。Confusionisanunionoftwobodies，suchasdifferentliquors，wherethepartsbecomeentirelyundistinguishable。Commixtionistheblendingoftwobodies，suchastwobushelsofcorn，wherethepartsremainseparateinanobviousandvisiblemanner。Asinthelattercasetheimaginationdiscoversnotsoentireanunionasintheformer，butisabletotraceandpreserveadistinctideaofthepropertyofeach；thisisthereason，whythecivillaw，tho’itestablish’danentirecommunityinthecaseofconfusion，andafterthataproportionaldivision，yetinthecaseofcommixtion，supposeseachoftheproprietorstomaintainadistinctright；howevernecessitymayatlastforcethemtosubmittothesamedivision。
QuodsifrumentumTitiifrumentotuomistumfuerit:siquidemexvoluntatevestra，communeest:quiasingulacorpora，idest，singulagrana，quaecujusquepropriafuerunt，exconsensuvestrocommunicatasunt。Quodsicasuidmistumfuerit，velTitiusidmiscueritsinetuavoluntate，nonvideturidcommuneesse；quiasingulacorporainsuasubstantiadurant。Sednecmagisistiscasibuscommunesitfrumentumquamgrexintelligituressecornmunis，sipecoraTitiituispecoribusmistafuerint。Sedsiabalterutrovestrumtotumidfrumentumretineatur，inremquidemactiopromodofrumenticujusquecornpetit。Arbitrioautemjudicis，utipseaestimetqualecujusquefrumentumfuerit。Inst。Lib。ILTit。i。？28。
(InthecasethatyourgrainwasmixedwiththatofTitius，ifitwasdonevoluntarilyonthepartofbothofyou，itiscommonproperty，inasmuchastheindividualitems，i。e。，thesinglegrains，whichwerethepeculiarpropertyofeitherofyou，werecombinedwithyourjointconsent。If，however，themixturewasaccidental，orifTitiusmixeditwithoutyourconsent，itdoesnotappearthatitiscommonproperty，Inasmuchastheseveralcomponentsretaintheiroriginalidentity。Rather，incircumstancesofthissortthegraindoesnotbecomecommonproperty，anymorethanaherdofcattleisregardedascommonproperty，IfTitiusbeastsshouldhavebecomemixedupwithyours。
However，ifalloftheaforesaidcorniskeptbyeitherofyou，thisgivesrisetoasuittodeterminetheownershipofproperty，inrespectoftheamountofcornbelongingtoeach。Itisinthediscretionofthejudgetodeterminewhichisthecornbelongingtoeitherparty。]
Wherethepropertiesoftwopersonsareunitedaftersuchamannerasneithertoadmitofdivisionnorseparation，aswhenonebuildsahouseonanother’sground，inthatcase，thewholemustbelongtooneoftheproprietors:AndhereIassert，thatitnaturallyisconceiv’dtobelongtotheproprietorofthemostconsiderablepart。Forhoweverthecompoundobjectmayhavearelationtotwodifferentpersons，andcarryourviewatoncetobothofthem，yetasthemostconsiderablepartprincipallyengagesourattention，andbythestrictuniondrawstheinferioralongit；forthisreason，thewholebearsarelationtotheproprietorofthatpart，andisregardedashisproperty。Theonlydifficultyis，whatweshallbepleas’dtocallthemostconsiderablepart，andmostattractivetotheimagination。
Thisqualitydependsonseveraldifferentcircumstances，whichhavelittleconnexionwitheachother。Onepartofacompoundobjectmaybecomemoreconsiderablethananother，eitherbecauseitismoreconstantanddurable；becauseitisofgreatervalue；becauseitismoreobviousandremarkable；becauseitisofgreaterextent；orbecauseitsexistenceismoreseparateandindependent。`Twillbeeasytoconceive，that，asthesecircumstancesmaybeconjoin’dandoppos’dinallthedifferentways，andaccordingtoallthedifferentdegrees，whichcanbeimagin’d，therewillresultmanycases，wherethereasonsonbothsidesaresoequallyballanc’d，that`tisimpossibleforustogiveanysatisfactorydecision。Herethenistheproperbusinessofmunicipallaws，tofixwhattheprinciplesofhumannaturehaveleftundetermin’d。
Thesuperficiesyieldstothesoil，saysthecivillaw:Thewritingtothepaper:Thecanvastothepicture。Thesedecisionsdonotwellagreetogether，andareaproofofthecontrarietyofthoseprinciples，fromwhichtheyarederiv’d。
Butofallthequestionsofthiskindthemostcuriousisthat，whichforsomanyagesdividedthedisciplesofProculusandSabinus。Supposeapersonshou’dmakeacupfromthemetalofanother，orashipfromhiswood，andsupposetheproprietorofthemetalorwoodshou’ddemandhisgoods，thequestionis，whetherheacquiresatitletothecuporship。Sabinusmaintain’dtheaffirmative，andassertedthatthesubstanceormatteristhefoundationofallthequalities；thatitisincorruptibleandimmortal，andthereforesuperiortotheform，whichiscasualanddependent。Ontheotherhand，Proculusobserv’d，thattheformisthemostobviousandremarkablepart，andthatfromitbodiesaredenominatedofthisorthatparticularspecies。Towhichhemighthaveadded，thatthematterorsubstanceisinmostbodiessofluctuatinganduncertain，that`tisutterlyimpossibletotraceitinallitschanges。Formypart，Iknownotfromwhatprinciplessuchacontroversycanbecertainlydetermin’d。Ishallthereforecontentmyselfwithobserving，thatthedecisionofTrebonianseemstomeprettyingenious；thatthecupbelongstotheproprietorofthemetal，becauseitcanbebroughtbacktoitsfirstform:Butthattheshipbelongstotheauthorofitsformforacontraryreason。Buthoweveringeniousthisreasonmayseem，itplainlydependsuponthefancy，whichbythepossibilityofsuchareduction，findsacloserconnexionandrelationbetwixtacupandtheproprietorofitsmetal，thanbetwixtashipandtheproprietorofitswood，wherethesubstanceismorefix’dandunalterable。
10。Inexaminingthedifferenttitlestoauthorityingovernment，weshallmeetwithmanyreasonstoconvinceus，thattherightofsuccessiondepends，inagreatmeasureontheimagination。MeanwhileIshallrestcontentedwithobservingoneexample，whichbelongstothepresentsubject。Supposethatapersondiewithoutchildren，andthatadisputearisesamonghisrelationsconcerninghisinheritance；`tisevident，thatifhisrichesbederiv’dpartlyfromhisfather，partlyfromhismother，themostnaturalwayofdeterminingsuchadispute，is，todividehispossessions，andassigneachparttothefamily，fromwhenceitisderiv’d。Nowasthepersonissuppos’dtohavebeenoncethefullandentireproprietorofthosegoods；Iask，whatisitmakesusfindacertainequityandnaturalreasoninthispartition，exceptitbetheimagination？Hisaffectiontothesefamiliesdoesnotdependuponhispossessions；forwhichreasonhisconsentcanneverbepresum’dpreciselyforsuchapartition。Andastothepublicinterest，itseemsnottobeintheleastconcern’dontheonesideortheother。
11。Weremoralitydiscoverablebyreason，andnotbysentiment，`twou’dbestillmoreevident，thatpromisescou’dmakenoalterationuponit。Moralityissuppos’dtoconsistinrelation。Everynewimpositionofmorality，therefore，mustarisefromsomenewrelationofobjects；andconsequentlythewillcoudnotproduceimmediatelyanychangeinmorals，butcou’dhavethateffectonlybyproducingachangeupontheobjects。Butasthemoralobligationofapromiseisthepureeffectofthewill，withouttheleastchangeinanypartoftheuniverse；itfollows，thatpromiseshavenonaturalobligation。
Shou’ditbesaid，thatthisactofthewillbeingineffectanewobject，producesnewrelationsandnewduties；Iwou’danswer，thatthisisapuresophism，whichmaybedetectedbyaverymoderateshareofaccuracyandexactness。Towillanewobligation，istowillanewrelationofobjects；andtherefore，ifthisnewrelationofobjectswereform’dbythevolitionitself，weshouldineffectwillthevolition；whichisplainlyabsurdandimpossible。Thewillhasherenoobjecttowhichitcou’dtend；butmustreturnuponitselfininfinitum。Thenewobligationdependsuponnewrelations。Thenewrelationsdependuponanewvolition。Thenewvolitionhasforobjectanewobligation，andconsequentlynewrelations，andconsequentlyanewvolition；whichvolitionagainhasinviewanewobligation，relationandvolition，withoutanytermination。`Tisimpossible，therefore，wecou’deverwillanewobligation；andconsequently`tisimpossiblethewillcou’deveraccompanyapromise，orproduceanewobligationofmorality。
12。Imeansofar，asholyordersaresuppos’dtoproducetheindeliblecharacter。Inotherrespectstheyareonlyalegalqualification。
13。Firstintime，notindignityorforce。
14。Thispropositionmustholdstrictlytrue，withregardtoeveryquality，thatisdetermin’dmerelybysentiment。Inwhatsensewecantalkeitherofarightorawrongtasteinmorals，eloquence，orbeauty，shallbeconsiderdafterwards。Inthemeantime，itmaybeobserv’d，thatthereissuchanuniformityinthegeneralsentimentsofmankind，astorendersuchquestionsofbutsmallimportance。
15。Itisnothereasserted，thatpresentpossessionorconquestaresufficienttogiveatitleagainstlongpossessionandpositivelawsButonlythattheyhavesomeforce，andwillbeabletocalltheballancewherethetitlesareotherwiseequal，andwillevenbesufficientsometimestosanctifytheweakertitle。Whatdegreeofforcetheyhaveisdifficulttodetermine。Ibelieveallmoderatemenwillallow，thattheyhavegreatforceinalldisputesconcerningtherightsofprinces。
16。TopreventmistakesImustobserve，thatthiscaseofsuccessionisnotthesamewiththatofhereditarymonarchies，wherecustomhasfix’dtherightofsuccession。Thesedependupontheprincipleoflongpossessionaboveexplain’d。
17。Decentiorequuscujusastrictasuntilia；sedidemvelocior。Pulcheraspectusitathieta，cujuslacertosexercitatioexpressit；idemcertaminiparatior。Nunquamverospeciesabutilitatedividitur。Sedhocquidemdiscernere，modicijudiciiest。Quinct。lib。8。
[Ahorsewithnarrowflankslooksmorecomely；Italsomovesfaster。Anathletewhosemuscleshavebeendevelopedbytrainingpresentsahandsomeappearance；heisalsobetterpreparedforthecontest。Attractiveappearanceisinvariablyassociatedwithefficientfunctioning。Yetittakesnooutstandingpowersofjudgementtowakethisdistinction。]
18。BookII。PartII。Sect。VIII。
SuavemarimagnoturbantibusaequoraventisEterramagnumalteriusspectarelaborem；
Nonquiavexariquenquameatjucundavoluptas，Sedquibusipsemallscaressqulacerneresauv’eat。Lucret，Iwerereallyontheshore，andsawashipatadistance，[Thereissomethingpleasantinwatching，fromdryland，thegreatdifficultiesanothermanisundergoingoutonthehighsea，withthewindslashingthewaters。Thisisnotbecauseonederivesdelightfromanyman’sdistress，butbecauseitispleasurabletoperceivefromwhattroublesoneisoneselffree。]
19。BookII。PartII。Sect。X。
20。BookII。PartII。Sect。V。
21。Loveandesteemareatthebottomthesamepassions，andarisefromlikecauses。Thequalities，thatproduceboth，areagreeable，andgivepleasure。Butwherethispleasureissevereandserious；orwhereitsobjectisgreat，andmakesastrongimpression；orwhereitproducesanydegreeofhumilityandawe:Inallthesecases，thepassion，whicharisesfromthepleasure，ismoreproperlydenominatedesteemthanlove。Benevolenceattendsboth:Butisconnectedwithloveinamoreeminentdegree。
22。[IllustrativepassageshavebeenplacedwhereHumewishedthemtogo，exceptforthelongnoteonpersonalidentityprintedabove。]
23。Vol。I。page308。
