Allthepleasuresandpainsofthemindwere，accordingtoEpicurus，ultimatelyderivedfromthoseofthebody。Themindwashappywhenitthoughtofthepastpleasuresofthebody，andhopedforotherstocome:anditwasmiserablewhenitthoughtofthepainswhichthebodyhadformerlyendured，anddreadedthesameorgreaterthereafter。
Butthepleasuresandpainsofthemind，thoughultimatelyderivedfromthoseofthebody，werevastlygreaterthantheiroriginals。Thebodyfeltonlythesensationofthepresentinstant，whereasthemindfeltalsothepastandthefuture，theonebyremembrance，theotherbyanticipation，andconsequentlybothsufferedandenjoyedmuchmore。Whenweareunderthegreatestbodilypain，heobserved，weshallalwaysfind，ifweattendtoit，thatitisnotthesufferingofthepresentinstantwhichchieflytormentsus，buteithertheagonizingremembranceofthepast，ortheyetmorehorribledreadofthefuture。Thepainofeachinstant，consideredbyitself，andcutofffromallthatgoesbeforeandallthatcomesafterit，isatrifle，notworththeregarding。YetthisisallwhichtheboDycaneverbesaidtosuffer。Inthesamemanner，whenweenjoythegreatestpleasure，weshallalwaysfindthatthebodilysensation，thesensationofthepresentinstant，makesbutasmallpartofourhappiness，thatourenjoymentchieflyariseseitherfromthecheerfulrecollectionofthepast，orthestillmorejoyousanticipationofthefuture，andthatthemindalwayscontributesbymuchthelargestshareoftheentertainment。
Sinceourhappinessandmisery，therefore，dependedchieflyonthemind，ifthispartofournaturewaswelldisposed，ifourthoughtsandopinionswereastheyshouldbe，itwasoflittleimportanceinwhatmannerourbodywasaffected。Thoughundergreatbodilypain，wemightstillenjoyaconsiderableshareofhappiness，ifourreasonandjudgmentmaintainedtheirsuperiority。Wemightentertainourselveswiththeremembranceofpast，andwiththehopesoffuturepleasure；wemightsoftentherigourofourpains，byrecollectingwhatitwaswhich，eveninthissituation，wewereunderanynecessityofsuffering。Thatthiswasmerelythebodilysensation，thepainofthepresentinstant，whichbyitselfcouldneverbeverygreat。Thatwhateveragonywesufferedfromthedreadofitscontinuance，wastheeffectofanopinionofthemind，whichmightbecorrectedbyjustersentiments；byconsideringthat，ifourpainswereviolent，theywouldprobablybeofshortduration；andthatiftheywereoflongcontinuance，theywouldprobablybemoderate，andadmitofmanyintervalsofease；andthat，atanyrate，deathwasalwaysathandandwithincalltodeliverus，whichas，accordingtohim，itputanendtoallsensation，eitherofpainorpleasure，couldnotberegardedasanevil。Whenweare，saidhe，deathisnot；andwhendeathis，wearenot；deaththereforecanbenothingtous。
Iftheactualsensationofpositivepainwasinitselfsolittletobefeared，thatofpleasurewasstilllesstobedesired。Naturallythesensationofpleasurewasmuchlesspungentthanthatofpain。If，therefore，thislastcouldtakesoverylittlefromthehappinessofawell-disposedmind，theothercouldaddscarceanythingtoit。Whenthebodywasfreefrompainandthemindfromfearandanxiety，thesuperaddedsensationofbodilypleasurecouldbeofverylittleimportance；andthoughitmightdiversifycouldnotproperlybesaidtoincreasethehappinessofthesituation。
Ineaseofbody，therefore，andinsecurityortranquillityofmind，consisted，accordingtoEpicurus，themostperfectstateofhumannature，themostcompletehappinesswhichmanwascapableofenjoying。Toobtainthisgreatendofnaturaldesirewasthesoleobjectofallthevirtues，which，accordingtohim，werenotdesirableupontheirownaccount，butuponaccountoftheirtendencytobringaboutthissituation。
Prudence，forexample，though，accordingtothisphilosophy，thesourceandprincipleofallthevirtues，wasnotdesirableuponitsownaccount。Thatcarefulandlaboriousandcircumspectstateofmind，everwatchfulandeverattentivetothemostdistantconsequencesofeveryaction。couldnotbeathingpleasantoragreeableforitsownsake，butuponaccountofitstendencytoprocurethegreatestgoodsandtokeepoffthegreatestevils。
Toabstainfrompleasuretoo，tocurbandrestrainournaturalpassionsforenjoyment，whichwastheofficeoftemperance，couldneverbedesirableforitsownsake。Thewholevalueofthisvirtuearosefromitsutility，fromitsenablingustopostponethepresentenjoymentforthesakeofagreatertocome，ortoavoidagreaterpainthatmightensuefromit。
Temperance，inshort，wasnothingbutprudencewithregardtopleasure。
Tosupportlabour，toendurepain，tobeexposedtodangerortodeath，thesituationswhichfortitudewouldoftenleadusinto，weresurelystilllesstheobjectsofnaturaldesire。Theywerechosenonlytoavoidgreaterevils。Wesubmittedtolabour，inordertoavoidthegreatershameandpainofpoverty，andweexposedourselvestodangerandtodeathindefenceofourlibertyandproperty，themeansandinstrumentsofpleasureandhappiness；orindefenceofourcountry，inthesafetyofwhichourownwasnecessarilycomprehended。Fortitudeenabledustodoallthischeerfully，asthebestwhich，inourpresentsituation，couldpossiblybedone，andwasinrealitynomorethanprudence，goodjudgment，andpresenceofmindinproperlyappreciatingpain，labour，anddanger，alwayschoosingthelessinordertoavoidthegreater。
Itisthesamecasewithjustice。Toabstainfromwhatisanother’swasnotdesirableonitsownaccount，anditcouldnotsurelybebetterforyou，thatIshouldpossesswhatismyown，thanthatyoushouldpossessit。Youought，however，toabstainfromwhateverbelongstome，becausebydoingotherwiseyouwillprovoketheresentmentandindicationofmankind。Thesecurityandtranquillityofyourmindwillbeentirelydestroyed。Youwillbefilledwithfearandconsternationatthethoughtofthatpunishmentwhichyouwillimaginethatmenareatalltimesreadytoinflictuponyou，andfromwhichnopower，noart，noconcealment，willever，inyourownfancy，besufficienttoprotectyou。Thatotherspeciesofjusticewhich。consistsindoingpropergoodofficestodifferentpersons，accordingtothevariousrelationsofneighbours，kinsmen，friends，benefactors，superiors，orequals，whichtheymaystandintous，isrecommendedbythesamereasons。Toactproperlyinallthesedifferentrelationsprocuresustheesteemandloveofthosewelivewith；astodootherwiseexcitestheircontemptandhatred。
Bytheonewenaturallysecure，bytheotherwenecessarilyendangerourowneaseandtranquillity，thegreatandultimateobjectsofallourdesires。Thewholevirtueofjustice，therefore，themostimportantofallthevirtues，isnomorethandiscreetandprudentconductwithregardtoourneighbours。
SuchisthedoctrineofEpicurusconcerningthenatureofvirtue。Itmayseemextraordinarythatthisphilosopher，whoisdescribedasapersonofthemostamiablemanners，shouldneverhaveobserved，that，whatevermaybethetendencyofthosevirtues，orofthecontraryvices，withregardtoourbodilyeaseandsecurity，thesentimentswhichtheynaturallyexciteinothersaretheobjectsofamuchmorepassionatedesireoraversionthanalltheirotherconsequences；thattobeamiable，toberespectable，tobetheproperobjectofesteem，isbyeverywell-disposedmindmorevaluedthanalltheeaseandsecuritywhichlove，respect，andesteemcanprocureus；that，onthecontrary，tobeodious，tobecontemptible，tobetheproperobjectofindignation，ismoredreadfulthanallthatwecansufferinourbodyfromhatred，contempt，orindignation；andthatconsequentlyourdesireoftheonecharacter，andouraversiontotheother，cannotarisefromanyregardtotheeffectswhicheitherofthemislikelytoproduceuponthebody。
Thissystemis，nodoubt，altogetherinconsistentwiththatwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtoestablish。Itisnotdifficult，however，todiscoverfromwhatphasis，ifImaysayso，fromwhatparticularvieworaspectofnature，thisaccountofthingsderivesitsprobability。BythewisecontrivanceoftheAuthorofnature，virtueisuponallordinaryoccasions，evenwithregardtothislife，realwisdom，andthesurestandreadiestmeansofobtainingbothsafetyandadvantage。Oursuccessordisappointmentinourundertakingsmustverymuchdependuponthegoodorbadopinionwhichiscommonlyentertainedofus，anduponthegeneraldispositionofthosewelivewith，eithertoassistortoopposeus。Butthebest，thesurest，theeasiest，andthereadiestwayofobtainingtheadvantageousandofavoidingtheunfavourablejudgmentsofothers，isundoubtedlytorenderourselvestheproperobjectsoftheformerandnotofthelatter。
’Doyoudesire，’saidSocrates，’thereputationofagoodmusician？Theonlysurewayofobtainingit，istobecomeagoodmusician。Wouldyoudesireinthesamemannertobethoughtcapableofservingyourcountryeitherasageneralorasastatesman？Thebestwayinthiscasetooisreallytoacquiretheartandexperienceofwarandgovernment，andtobecomereallyfittobeageneralorastatesman。Andinthesamemannerifyouwouldbereckonedsober，temperate，just，andequitable，thebestwayofacquiringthisreputationistobecomesober，temperate，just，andequitable。Ifyoucanreallyrenderyourselfamiable，respectable，andtheproperobjectofesteem，thereisnofearofyournotsoonacquiringthelove，therespect，andesteemofthoseyoulivewith。’Sincethepracticeofvirtue，therefore，isingeneralsoadvantageous，andthatofvicesocontrarytoourinterest，theconsiderationofthoseoppositetendenciesundoubtedlystampsanadditionalbeautyandproprietyupontheone，andanewdeformityandimproprietyupontheother。
Temperance，magnanimity，justice，andbeneficence，comethustobeapprovedof，notonlyundertheirpropercharacters，butundertheadditionalcharacterofthehighestwisDomandmostrealprudence。Andinthesamemanner，thecontraryvicesofintemperance，pusillanimity，injustice，andeithermalevolenceorsordidselfishness，cometobedisapprovedof，notonlyundertheirpropercharacters，butundertheadditionalcharacterofthemostshort-sightedfollyandweakness。Epicurusappearsineveryvirtuetohaveattendedtothisspeciesofproprietyonly。
Itisthatwhichismostapttooccurtothosewhoareendeavouringtopersuadeotherstoregularityofconduct。Whenmenbytheirpractice，andperhapstoobytheirmaxims，manifestlyshowthatthenaturalbeautyofvirtueisnotliketohavemucheffectuponthem，howisitpossibletomovethembutbyrepresentingthefollyoftheirconduct，andhowmuchtheythemselvesareintheendlikelytosufferbyit？
Byrunningupallthedifferentvirtuestootothisonespeciesofpropriety，Epicurusindulgedapropensity，whichisnaturaltoallmen，butwhichphilosophersinparticularareapttocultivatewithapeculiarfondness，asthegreatmeansofdisplayingtheiringenuity，thepropensitytoaccountforallappearancesfromasfewprinciplesaspossible。Andhe，nodoubt，indulgedthispropensitystillfurther，whenhereferredalltheprimaryobjectsofnaturaldesireandaversiontothepleasuresandpainsofthebody。Thegreatpatronoftheatomicalphilosophy，whotooksomuchpleasureindeducingallthepowersandqualitiesofbodiesfromthemostobviousandfamiliar，thefigure，motion，andarrangementofthesmallpartsofmatter，feltnodoubtasimilarsatisfaction，whenheaccounted，inthesamemanner，forallthesentimentsandpassionsofthemindfromthosewhicharemostobviousandfamiliar。
ThesystemofEpicurusagreedwiththoseofPlato，Aristotle，andZeno，inmakingvirtueconsistinactinginthemostsuitablemannertoobtainthe(10*)primaryobjectsofnaturaldesire。Itdifferedfromallofthemintwootherrespects；first，intheaccountwhichitgaveofthoseprimaryobjectsofnaturaldesire；
andsecondly，intheaccountwhichitgaveoftheexcellenceofvirtue，orofthereasonwhythatqualityoughttobeesteemed。
