4
Comparisonsofthingstogethershouldthereforebeconductedinthemannerprescribed。Thesamecommonplacerulesareusefulalsoforshowingthatanythingissimplydesirableorobjectionable：forwehaveonlytosubtracttheexcessofonethingoveranother。Forifwhatismorepreciousbemoredesirable，thenalsowhatispreciousisdesirable；andifwhatismoreusefulbemoredesirable，thenalsowhatisusefulisdesirable。Likewise，also，inthecaseofotherthingswhichadmitofcomparisonsofthatkind。Forinsomecasesintheverycourseofcomparingthethingstogetherweatonceassertalsothateachofthem，ortheoneofthem，isdesirable，e。g。
wheneverwecalltheonegood’bynature’andtheother’notbynature’：fordearlywhatisgoodbynatureisdesirable。
5
Thecommonplacerulesrelatingtocomparativedegreesandamountsoughttobetakeninthemostgeneralpossibleform：forwhensotakentheyarelikelytobeusefulinalargernumberofinstances。Itispossibletorendersomeoftheactualrulesgivenabovemoreuniversalbyaslightalterationoftheexpression，e。g。thatwhatbynatureexhibitssuchandsuchaqualityexhibitsthatqualityinagreaterdegreethanwhatexhibitsitnotbynature。Also，ifonethingdoes，andanotherdoesnot，impartsuchandsuchaqualitytothatwhichpossessesit，ortowhichitbelongs，thenwhicheverdoesimpartitisofthatqualityingreaterdegreethantheonewhichdoesnotimpartit；andifbothimpartit，thenthatoneexhibitsitinagreaterdegreewhichimpartsitinagreaterdegree。
Moreover，ifinanycharacteronethingexceedsandanotherfallsshortofthesamestandard；also，iftheoneexceedssomethingwhichexceedsagivenstandard，whiletheotherdoesnotreachthatstandard，thenclearlythefirst—namedthingexhibitsthatcharacterinagreaterdegree。Moreover，youshouldjudgebymeansofaddition，andseeifAwhenaddedtothesamethingasBimpartstothewholesuchandsuchacharacterinamoremarkeddegreethanB，orif，whenaddedtoathingwhichexhibitsthatcharacterinalessdegree，itimpartsthatcharactertothewholeinagreaterdegree。
Likewise，also，youmayjudgebymeansofsubtraction：forathinguponwhosesubtractiontheremainderexhibitssuchandsuchacharacterinalessdegree，itselfexhibitsthatcharacterinagreaterdegree。Also，thingsexhibitsuchandsuchacharacterinagreaterdegreeifmorefreefromadmixturewiththeircontraries；e。g。
thatiswhiterwhichismorefreefromadmixturewithblack。Moreover，apartfromtherulesgivenabove，thathassuchandsuchacharacteringreaterdegreewhichadmitsinagreaterdegreeofthedefinitionpropertothegivencharacter；e。g。ifthedefinitionof’white’be’acolourwhichpiercesthevision’，thenthatiswhiterwhichisinagreaterdegreeacolourthatpiercesthevision。
6
Ifthequestionbeputinaparticularandnotinauniversalform，inthefirstplacetheuniversalconstructiveordestructivecommonplacerulesthathavebeengivenmayallbebroughtintouse。
Forindemolishingorestablishingathinguniversallywealsoshowitinparticular：forifitbetrueofall，itistruealsoofsome，andifuntrueofall，itisuntrueofsome。Especiallyhandyandofgeneralapplicationarethecommonplacerulesthataredrawnfromtheoppositesandco—ordinatesandinflexionsofathing：forpublicopiniongrantsaliketheclaimthatifallpleasurebegood，thenalsoallpainisevil，andtheclaimthatifsomepleasurebegood，thenalsosomepainisevil。Moreover，ifsomeformofsensationbenotacapacity，thenalsosomeformoffailureofsensationisnotafailureofcapacity。Also，iftheobjectofconceptionisinsomecasesanobjectofknowledge，thenalsosomeformofconceivingisknowledge。
Again，ifwhatisunjustbeinsomecasesgood，thenalsowhatisjustisinsomecasesevil；andifwhathappensjustlyisinsomecasesevil，thenalsowhathappensunjustlyisinsomecasesgood。Also，ifwhatispleasantisinsomecasesobjectionable，thenpleasureisinsomecasesanobjectionablething。Onthesameprinciple，also，ifwhatispleasantisinsomecasesbeneficial，thenpleasureisinsomecasesabeneficialthing。Thecaseisthesamealsoasregardsthethingsthatdestroy，andtheprocessesofgenerationanddestruction。Forifanythingthatdestroyspleasureorknowledgebeinsomecasesgood，thenwemaytakeitthatpleasureorknowledgeisinsomecasesanevilthing。Likewise，also，ifthedestructionofknowledgebeinsomecasesagoodthingoritsproductionanevilthing，thenknowledgewillbeinsomecasesanevilthing；e。g。ifforamantoforgethisdisgracefulconductbeagoodthing，andtorememberitbeanevilthing，thentheknowledgeofhisdisgracefulconductmaybetakentobeanevilthing。Thesameholdsalsoinothercases：inallsuchcasesthepremissandtheconclusionareequallylikelytobeaccepted。
Moreoveryoushouldjudgebymeansofgreaterorsmallerorlikedegrees：forifsomememberofanothergenusexhibitsuchandsuchacharacterinamoremarkeddegreethanyourobject，whilenomemberofthatgenusexhibitsthatcharacteratall，thenyoumaytakeitthatneitherdoestheobjectinquestionexhibitit；e。g。ifsomeformofknowledgebegoodinagreaterdegreethanpleasure，whilenoformofknowledgeisgood，thenyoumaytakeitthatpleasureisnotgoodeither。Also，youshouldjudgebyasmallerorlikedegreeinthesameway：forsoyouwillfinditpossiblebothtodemolishandtoestablishaview，exceptthatwhereasbotharepossiblebymeansoflikedegrees，bymeansofasmallerdegreeitispossibleonlytoestablish，nottooverthrow。Forifacertainformofcapacitybegoodinalikedegreetoknowledge，andacertainformofcapacitybegood，thensoalsoisknowledge；whileifnoformofcapacitybegood，thenneitherisknowledge。If，too，acertainformofcapacitybegoodinalessdegreethanknowledge，andacertainformofcapacitybegood，thensoalsoisknowledge；butifnoformofcapacitybegood，thereisnonecessitythatnoformofknowledgeeithershouldbegood。
Clearly，then，itisonlypossibletoestablishaviewbymeansofalessdegree。
Notonlybymeansofanothergenuscanyouoverthrowaview，butalsobymeansofthesame，ifyoutakethemostmarkedinstanceofthecharacterinquestion；e。g。ifitbemaintainedthatsomeformofknowledgeisgood，then，supposeittobeshownthatprudenceisnotgood，neitherwillanyotherkindbegood，seeingthatnoteventhekinduponwhichthereismostgeneralagreementisso。Moreover，youshouldgotoworkbymeansofanhypothesis；youshouldclaimthattheattribute，ifitbelongsordoesnotbelonginonecase，doessoinalikedegreeinall，e。g。thatifthesoulofmanbeimmortal，soareothersoulsaswell，whileifthisonebenotso，neitheraretheothers。If，then，itbemaintainedthatinsomeinstancetheattributebelongs，youmustshowthatinsomeinstanceitdoesnotbelong：forthenitwillfollow，byreasonofthehypothesis，thatitdoesnotbelongtoanyinstanceatall。If，ontheotherhand，itbemaintainedthatitdoesnotbelonginsomeinstance，youmustshowthatitdoesbelonginsomeinstance，forinthiswayitwillfollowthatitbelongstoallinstances。Itisclearthatthemakerofthehypothesisuniversalizesthequestion，whereasitwasstatedinaparticularform：forheclaimsthatthemakerofaparticularadmissionshouldmakeauniversaladmission，inasmuchasheclaimsthatiftheattributebelongsinoneinstance，itbelongsalsoinallinstancesalike。
Iftheproblembeindefinite，itispossibletooverthrowastatementinonlyoneway；e。g。ifamanhasassertedthatpleasureisgoodorisnotgood，withoutanyfurtherdefinition。Forifhemeantthataparticularpleasureisgood，youmustshowuniversallythatnopleasureisgood，ifthepropositioninquestionistobedemolished。Andlikewise，also，ifhemeantthatsomeparticularpleasureisnotgoodyoumustshowuniversallythatallpleasureisgood：itisimpossibletodemolishitinanyotherway。Forifweshowthatsomeparticularpleasureisnotgoodorisgood，thepropositioninquestionisnotyetdemolished。Itisclear，then，thatitispossibletodemolishanindefinitestatementinonewayonly，whereasitcanbeestablishedintwoways：forwhetherweshowuniversallythatallpleasureisgood，orwhetherweshowthataparticularpleasureisgood，thepropositioninquestionwillhavebeenproved。Likewise，also，supposingwearerequiredtoarguethatsomeparticularpleasureisnotgood，ifweshowthatnopleasureisgoodorthataparticularpleasureisnotgood，weshallhaveproducedanargumentinbothways，bothuniversallyandinparticular，toshowthatsomeparticularpleasureisnotgood。If，ontheotherhand，thestatementmadebedefinite，itwillbepossibletodemolishitintwoways；e。g。ifitbemaintainedthatitisanattributeofsomeparticularpleasuretobegood，whileofsomeitisnot：forwhetheritbeshownthatallpleasure，orthatnopleasure，isgood，thepropositioninquestionwillhavebeendemolished。If，however，hehasstatedthatonlyonesinglepleasureisgood，itispossibletodemolishitinthreeways：forbyshowingthatallpleasure，orthatnopleasure，orthatmorethanonepleasure，isgood，weshallhavedemolishedthestatementinquestion。Ifthestatementbemadestillmoredefinite，e。g。thatprudencealoneofthevirtuesisknowledge，therearefourwaysofdemolishingit：forifitbeshownthatallvirtueisknowledge，orthatnovirtueisso，orthatsomeothervirtue（e。g。justice）isso，orthatprudenceitselfisnotknowledge，thepropositioninquestionwillhavebeendemolished。
Itisusefulalsototakealookatindividualinstances，incaseswheresomeattributehasbeensaidtobelongornottobelong，asinthecaseofuniversalquestions。Moreover，youshouldtakeaglanceamonggenera，dividingthembytheirspeciesuntilyoucometothosethatarenotfurtherdivisible，ashasbeensaidbefore：’forwhethertheattributeisfoundtobelonginallcasesorinnone，youshould，afteradducingseveralinstances，claimthatheshouldeitheradmityourpointuniversally，orelsebringanobjectionshowinginwhatcaseitdoesnothold。Moreover，incaseswhereitispossibletomaketheaccidentdefiniteeitherspecificallyornumerically，youshouldlookandseewhetherperhapsnoneofthembelongs，showinge。g。thattimeisnotmoved，noryetamovement，byenumeratinghowmanyspeciesthereareofmovement：forifnoneofthesebelongtotime，clearlyitdoesnotmove，noryetisamovement。
Likewise，also，youcanshowthatthesoulisnotanumber，bydividingallnumbersintoeitheroddoreven：forthen，ifthesoulbeneitheroddnoreven，clearlyitisnotanumber。
InregardthentoAccident，youshouldsettoworkbymeanslikethese，andinthismanner。
BookIV
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NEXTwemustgoontoexaminequestionsrelatingtoGenusandProperty。Theseareelementsinthequestionsthatrelatetodefinitions，butdialecticiansseldomaddresstheirinquiriestothesebythemselves。If，then，agenusbesuggestedforsomethingthatis，firsttakealookatallobjectswhichbelongtothesamegenusasthethingmentioned，andseewhetherthegenussuggestedisnotpredicatedofoneofthem，ashappensinthecaseofanaccident：e。g。if’good’belaiddowntobethegenusof’pleasure’，seewhethersomeparticularpleasurebenotgood：for，ifso，clearlygood’isnotthegenusofpleasure：forthegenusispredicatedofallthemembersofthesamespecies。Secondly，seewhetheritbepredicatednotinthecategoryofessence，butasanaccident，as’white’ispredicatedof’snow’，or’self—moved’ofthesoul。For’snow’isnotakindof’white’，andtherefore’white’isnotthegenusofsnow，noristhesoulakindof’movingobject’：itsmotionisanaccidentofit，asitoftenisofananimaltowalkortobewalking。Moreover，’moving’doesnotseemtoindicatetheessence，butratherastateofdoingorofhavingsomethingdonetoit。Likewise，also，’white’：
foritindicatesnottheessenceofsnow，butacertainqualityofit。
Sothatneitherofthemispredicatedinthecategoryof’essence’。
EspeciallyyoushouldtakealookatthedefinitionofAccident，andseewhetheritfitsthegenusmentioned，as（e。g。）isalsothecaseintheinstancesjustgiven。Foritispossibleforathingtobeandnottobeself—moved，andlikewise，also，forittobeandnottobewhite。Sothatneitheroftheseattributesisthegenusbutanaccident，sinceweweresayingthatanaccidentisanattributewhichcanbelongtoathingandalsonotbelong。
Moreover，seewhetherthegenusandthespeciesbenotfoundinthesamedivision，buttheonebeasubstancewhiletheotherisaquality，ortheonebearelativewhiletheotherisaquality，as（e。g。）’slow’and’swan’areeachasubstance，while’white’isnotasubstancebutaquality，sothat’white’isnotthegenuseitherof’snow’orof’swan’。Again，knowledge’isarelative，while’good’and’noble’areeachaquality，sothatgood，ornoble，isnotthegenusofknowledge。Forthegeneraofrelativesoughtthemselvesalsotoberelatives，asisthecasewith’double’：formultiple’，whichisthegenusof’double’，isitselfalsoarelative。Tospeakgenerally，thegenusoughttofallunderthesamedivisionasthespecies：forifthespeciesbeasubstance，sotooshouldbethegenus，andifthespeciesbeaquality，sotoothegenusshouldbeaquality；e。g。ifwhitebeaquality，sotooshouldcolourbe。Likewise，also，inothercases。
Again，seewhetheritbenecessaryorpossibleforthegenustopartakeoftheobjectwhichhasbeenplacedinthegenus。’Topartake’
isdefinedas’toadmitthedefinitionofthatwhichispartaken。
Clearly，therefore，thespeciespartakeofthegenera，butnotthegeneraofthespecies：forthespeciesadmitsthedefinitionofthegenus，whereasthegenusdoesnotadmitthatofthespecies。Youmustlook，therefore，andseewhetherthegenusrenderedpartakesorcanpossiblypartakeofthespecies，e。g。ifanyoneweretorenderanythingasgenusof’being’orof’unity’：forthentheresultwillbethatthegenuspartakesofthespecies：forofeverythingthatis，’being’and’unity’arepredicated，andthereforetheirdefinitionaswell。
Moreover，seeiftherebeanythingofwhichthespeciesrenderedistrue，whilethegenusisnotso，e。g。supposing’being’or’objectofknowledge’werestatedtobethegenusof’objectofopinion’。For’objectofopinion’willbeapredicateofwhatdoesnotexist；formanythingswhichdonotexistareobjectsofopinion；
whereasthat’being’or’objectofknowledge’isnotpredicatedofwhatdoesnotexistisclear。Sothatneither’being’nor’objectofknowledge’isthegenusof’objectofopinion’：foroftheobjectsofwhichthespeciesispredicated，thegenusoughttobepredicatedaswell。
Again，seewhethertheobjectplacedinthegenusbequiteunabletopartakeofanyofitsspecies：foritisimpossiblethatitshouldpartakeofthegenusifitdonotpartakeofanyofitsspecies，exceptitbeoneofthespeciesreachedbythefirstdivision：thesedopartakeofthegenusalone。If，therefore，’Motion’bestatedasthegenusofpleasure，youshouldlookandseeifpleasurebeneitherlocomotionnoralteration，noranyoftherestofthegivenmodesofmotion：forclearlyyoumaythentakeitthatitdoesnotpartakeofanyofthespecies，andthereforenotofthegenuseither，sincewhatpartakesofthegenusmustnecessarilypartakeofoneofthespeciesaswell：sothatpleasurecouldnotbeaspeciesofMotion，noryetbeoneoftheindividualphenomenacomprisedundertheterm’motion’。Forindividualsaswellpartakeinthegenusandthespecies，as（e。g。）anindividualmanpartakesofboth’man’and’animal’。
Moreover，seeifthetermplacedinthegenushasawiderdenotationthanthegenus，as（e。g。）’objectofopinion’has，ascomparedwith’being’：forbothwhatisandwhatisnotareobjectsofopinion，sothat’objectofopinion’couldnotbeaspeciesofbeing：forthegenusisalwaysofwiderdenotationthanthespecies。Again，seeifthespeciesanditsgenushaveanequaldenotation；suppose，forinstance，thatoftheattributeswhichgowitheverything，oneweretobestatedasaspeciesandtheotherasitsgenus，asforexampleBeingandUnity：foreverythinghasbeingandunity，sothatneitheristhegenusoftheother，sincetheirdenotationisequal。
Likewise，also，ifthe’first’ofaseriesandthe’beginning’weretobeplacedoneundertheother：forthebeginningisfirstandthefirstisthebeginning，sothateitherbothexpressionsareidenticaloratanyrateneitheristhegenusoftheother。Theelementaryprincipleinregardtoallsuchcasesisthatthegenushasawiderdenotationthanthespeciesanditsdifferentia：forthedifferentiaaswellhasanarrowerdenotationthanthegenus。
Seealsowhetherthegenusmentionedfails，ormightbegenerallythoughttofail，toapplytosomeobjectwhichisnotspecificallydifferentfromthethinginquestion；or，ifyourargumentbeconstructive，whetheritdoessoapply。Forallthingsthatarenotspecificallydifferenthavethesamegenus。If，therefore，itbeshowntoapplytoone，thenclearlyitappliestoall，andifitfailstoapplytoone，clearlyitfailstoapplytoany；e。g。ifanyonewhoassumes’indivisiblelines’weretosaythatthe’indivisible’istheirgenus。Fortheaforesaidtermisnotthegenusofdivisiblelines，andthesedonotdifferasregardstheirspeciesfromindivisible：forstraightlinesareneverdifferentfromeachotherasregardstheirspecies。
2
Lookandsee，also，iftherebeanyothergenusofthegivenspecieswhichneitherembracesthegenusrenderednoryetfallsunderit，e。g。
supposeanyoneweretolaydownthat’knowledge’isthegenusofjustice。Forvirtueisitsgenusaswell，andneitherofthesegeneraembracestheremainingone，sothatknowledgecouldnotbethegenusofjustice：foritisgenerallyacceptedthatwheneveronespeciesfallsundertwogenera，theoneisembracedbytheother。
Yetaprincipleofthiskindgivesrisetoadifficultyinsomecases。
Forsomepeopleholdthatprudenceisbothvirtueandknowledge，andthatneitherofitsgeneraisembracedbytheother：althoughcertainlynoteverybodyadmitsthatprudenceisknowledge。If，however，anyoneweretoadmitthetruthofthisassertion，yetitwouldstillbegenerallyagreedtobenecessarythatthegeneraofthesameobjectmustatanyratebesubordinateeithertheonetotheotherorbothtothesame，asactuallyisthecasewithvirtueandknowledge。Forbothfallunderthesamegenus；foreachofthemisastateandadisposition。Youshouldlook，therefore，andseewhetherneitherofthesethingsistrueofthegenusrendered；forifthegenerabesubordinateneithertheonetotheothernorbothtothesame，thenwhatisrenderedcouldnotbethetruegenus。
Look，also，atthegenusofthegenusrendered，andsocontinuallyatthenexthighergenus，andseewhetherallarepredicatedofthespecies，andpredicatedinthecategoryofessence：forallthehighergenerashouldbepredicatedofthespeciesinthecategoryofessence。
If，then，therebeanywhereadiscrepancy，clearlywhatisrenderedisnotthetruegenus。[Again，seewhethereitherthegenusitself，oroneofitshighergenera，partakesofthespecies：forthehighergenusdoesnotpartakeofanyofthelower。]If，then，youareoverthrowingaview，followtheruleasgiven：ifestablishingone，then—supposethatwhathasbeennamedasgenusbeadmittedtobelongtothespecies，onlyitbedisputedwhetheritbelongsasgenus—itisenoughtoshowthatoneofitshighergeneraispredicatedofthespeciesinthecategoryofessence。Forifoneofthembepredicatedinthecategoryofessence，allofthem，bothhigherandlowerthanthisone，ifpredicatedatallofthespecies，willbepredicatedofitinthecategoryofessence：sothatwhathasbeenrenderedasgenusisalsopredicatedinthecategoryofessence。Thepremissthatwhenonegenusispredicatedinthecategoryofessence，alltherest，ifpredicatedatall，willbepredicatedinthecategoryofessence，shouldbesecuredbyinduction。Supposing，however，thatitbedisputedwhetherwhathasbeenrenderedasgenusbelongsatall，itisnotenoughtoshowthatoneofthehighergeneraispredicatedofthespeciesinthecategoryofessence：e。g。ifanyonehasrendered’locomotion’asthegenusofwalking，itisnotenoughtoshowthatwalkingis’motion’inordertoshowthatitis’locomotion’，seeingthatthereareotherformsofmotionaswell；butonemustshowinadditionthatwalkingdoesnotpartakeofanyofthespeciesofmotionproducedbythesamedivisionexceptlocomotion。Forofnecessitywhatpartakesofthegenuspartakesalsoofoneofthespeciesproducedbythefirstdivisionofthegenus。If，therefore，walkingdoesnotpartakeeitherofincreaseordecreaseoroftheotherkindsofmotion，clearlyitwouldpartakeoflocomotion，sothatlocomotionwouldbethegenusofwalking。
Again，lookamongthethingsofwhichthegivenspeciesispredicatedasgenus，andseeifwhatisrenderedasitsgenusbealsopredicatedinthecategoryofessenceoftheverythingsofwhichthespeciesissopredicated，andlikewiseifallthegenerahigherthanthisgenusaresopredicatedaswell。Foriftherebeanywhereadiscrepancy，clearlywhathasbeenrenderedisnotthetruegenus：
forhaditbeenthegenus，thenboththegenerahigherthanit，andititself，wouldallhavebeenpredicatedinthecategoryofessenceofthoseobjectsofwhichthespeciestooispredicatedinthecategoryofessence。If，then，youareoverthrowingaview，itisusefultoseewhetherthegenusfailstobepredicatedinthecategoryofessenceofthosethingsofwhichthespeciestooispredicated。Ifestablishingaview，itisusefultoseewhetheritispredicatedinthecategoryofessence：forifso，theresultwillbethatthegenusandthespecieswillbepredicatedofthesameobjectinthecategoryofessence，sothatthesameobjectfallsundertwogenera：thegeneramustthereforeofnecessitybesubordinateonetotheother，andthereforeifitbeshownthattheonewewishtoestablishasgenusisnotsubordinatetothespecies，clearlythespecieswouldbesubordinatetoit，sothatyoumaytakeitasshownthatitisthegenus。
Look，also，atthedefinitionsofthegenera，andseewhethertheyapplybothtothegivenspeciesandtotheobjectswhichpartakeofthespecies。Forofnecessitythedefinitionsofitsgeneramustbepredicatedofthespeciesandoftheobjectswhichpartakeofthespecies：if，then，therebeanywhereadiscrepancy，clearlywhathasbeenrenderedisnotthegenus。
Again，seeifhehasrenderedthedifferentiaasthegenus，e。g。
’immortal’asthegenusof’God’。For’immortal’isadifferentiaof’livingbeing’，seeingthatoflivingbeingssomearemortalandothersimmortal。Clearly，then，abadmistakehasbeenmade；forthedifferentiaofathingisneveritsgenus。Andthatthisistrueisclear：forathing’sdifferentianeversignifiesitsessence，butrathersomequality，asdo’walking’and’biped’。
Also，seewhetherhehasplacedthedifferentiainsidethegenus，e。g。bytaking’odd’asanumber’。For’odd’isadifferentiaofnumber，notaspecies。Noristhedifferentiagenerallythoughttopartakeofthegenus：forwhatpartakesofthegenusisalwayseitheraspeciesoranindividual，whereasthedifferentiaisneitheraspeciesnoranindividual。Clearly，therefore，thedifferentiadoesnotpartakeofthegenus，sothat’odd’tooisnospeciesbutadifferentia，seeingthatitdoesnotpartakeofthegenus。
Moreover，seewhetherhehasplacedthegenusinsidethespecies，e。g。bytaking’contact’tobea’juncture’，or’mixture’a’fusion’，or，asinPlato’sdefinition，’’locomotion’tobethesameas’carriage’。Forthereisnonecessitythatcontactshouldbejuncture：rather，conversely，juncturemustbecontact：forwhatisincontactisnotalwaysjoined，thoughwhatisjoinedisalwaysincontact。Likewise，also，intheremaininginstances：formixtureisnotalwaysa’fusion’（fortomixdrythingsdoesnotfusethem），norislocomotionalways’carriage’。Forwalkingisnotgenerallythoughttobecarriage：for’carriage’ismostlyusedofthingsthatchangeoneplaceforanotherinvoluntarily，ashappensinthecaseofinanimatethings。Clearly，also，thespecies，intheinstancesgiven，hasawiderdenotationthanthegenus，whereasitoughttobeviceversa。
Again，seewhetherhehasplacedthedifferentiainsidethespecies，bytaking（e。g。）’immortal’tobe’agod’。Fortheresultwillbethatthespecieshasanequalorwiderdenotation：andthiscannotbe，foralwaysthedifferentiahasanequalorawiderdenotationthanthespecies。Moreover，seewhetherhehasplacedthegenusinsidethedifferentia，bymaking’colour’（e。g。）tobeathingthat’pierces’，or’number’athingthatis’odd’。Also，seeifhehasmentionedthegenusasdifferentia：foritispossibleforamantobringforwardastatementofthiskindaswell，e。g。that’mixture’isthedifferentiaof’fusion’，orthatchangeofplace’
isthedifferentiaof’carriage’。Allsuchcasesshouldbeexaminedbymeansofthesameprinciples：fortheydependuponcommonrules：forthegenusshouldhaveawiderdenotationthatitsdifferentia，andalsoshouldnotpartakeofitsdifferentia；whereas，ifitberenderedinthismanner，neitheroftheaforesaidrequirementscanbesatisfied：forthegenuswillbothhaveanarrowerdenotationthanitsdifferentia，andwillpartakeofit。
Again，ifnodifferentiabelongingtothegenusbepredicatedofthegivenspecies，neitherwillthegenusbepredicatedofit；e。g。of’soul’neither’odd’nor’even’ispredicated：neitherthereforeis’number’。Moreover，seewhetherthespeciesisnaturallypriorandabolishesthegenusalongwithitself：forthecontraryisthegeneralview。Moreover，ifitbepossibleforthegenusstated，orforitsdifferentia，tobeabsentfromtheallegedspecies，e。g。for’movement’tobeabsentfromthe’soul’，or’truthandfalsehood’from’opinion’，thenneitherofthetermsstatedcouldbeitsgenusoritsdifferentia：forthegeneralviewisthatthegenusandthedifferentiaaccompanythespecies，aslongasitexists。
3
Lookandsee，also，ifwhatisplacedinthegenuspartakesorcouldpossiblypartakeofanycontraryofthegenus：forinthatcasethesamethingwillatthesametimepartakeofcontrarythings，seeingthatthegenusisneverabsentfromit，whileitpartakes，orcanpossiblypartake，ofthecontrarygenusaswell。Moreover，seewhetherthespeciessharesinanycharacterwhichitisutterlyimpossibleforanymemberofthegenustohave。Thus（e。g。）ifthesoulhasashareinlife，whileitisimpossibleforanynumbertolive，thenthesoulcouldnotbeaspeciesofnumber。
Youshouldlookandsee，also，ifthespeciesbeahomonymofthegenus，andemployasyourelementaryprinciplesthosealreadystatedfordealingwithhomonymity：forthegenusandthespeciesaresynonymous。
Seeingthatofeverygenusthereismorethanonespecies，lookandseeifitbeimpossiblethatthereshouldbeanotherspeciesthanthegivenonebelongingtothegenusstated：forifthereshouldbenone，thenclearlywhathasbeenstatedcouldnotbeagenusatall。
Lookandsee，also，ifhehasrenderedasgenusametaphoricalexpression，describing（e。g。’temperance’asa’harmony’：a’harmony’：
foragenusisalwayspredicatedofitsspeciesinitsliteralsense，whereas’harmony’ispredicatedoftemperancenotinaliteralsensebutmetaphorically：foraharmonyalwaysconsistsinnotes。
Moreover，iftherebeanycontraryofthespecies，examineit。Theexaminationmaytakedifferentforms；firstofallseeifthecontraryaswellbefoundinthesamegenusasthespecies，supposingthegenustohavenocontrary；forcontrariesoughttobefoundinthesamegenus，iftherebenocontrarytothegenus。Supposing，ontheotherhand，thatthereisacontrarytothegenus，seeifthecontraryofthespeciesbefoundinthecontrarygenus：forofnecessitythecontraryspeciesmustbeinthecontrarygenus，iftherebeanycontrarytothegenus。Eachofthesepointsismadeplainbymeansofinduction。Again，seewhetherthecontraryofthespeciesbenotfoundinanygenusatall，butbeitselfagenus，e。g。’good’：forifthisbenotfoundinanygenus，neitherwillitscontrarybefoundinanygenus，butwillitselfbeagenus，ashappensinthecaseof’good’and’evil’：forneitheroftheseisfoundinagenus，buteachofthemisagenus。Moreover，seeifbothgenusandspeciesbecontrarytosomething，andonepairofcontrarieshaveanintermediary，butnottheother。Forifthegenerahaveanintermediary，soshouldtheirspeciesaswell，andifthespecieshave，soshouldtheirgeneraaswell，asisthecasewith（1）virtueandviceand（2）justiceandinjustice：foreachpairhasanintermediary。Anobjectiontothisisthatthereisnointermediarybetweenhealthanddisease，althoughthereisonebetweenevilandgood。Orseewhether，thoughtherebeindeedanintermediarybetweenbothpairs，i。e。bothbetweenthespeciesandbetweenthegenera，yetitbenotsimilarlyrelated，butinonecasebeamerenegationoftheextremes，whereasintheothercaseitisasubject。Forthegeneralviewisthattherelationshouldbesimilarinbothcases，asitisinthecasesofvirtueandviceandofjusticeandinjustice：
fortheintermediariesbetweenbotharemerenegations。Moreover，wheneverthegenushasnocontrary，lookandseenotmerelywhetherthecontraryofthespeciesbefoundinthesamegenus，buttheintermediateaswell：forthegenuscontainingtheextremescontainstheintermediatesaswell，as（e。g。）inthecaseofwhiteandblack：
for’colour’isthegenusbothoftheseandofalltheintermediatecoloursaswell。Anobjectionmayberaisedthat’defect’and’excess’
arefoundinthesamegenus（forbothareinthegenus’evil’），whereasmoderateamount’，theintermediatebetweenthem，isfoundnotin’evil’butin’good’。Lookandseealsowhether，whilethegenushasacontrary，thespecieshasnone；forifthegenusbecontrarytoanything，sotooisthespecies，asvirtuetoviceandjusticetoinjustice。
Likewise。also，ifoneweretolookatotherinstances，onewouldcometoseeclearlyafactlikethis。Anobjectionmayberaisedinthecaseofhealthanddisease：forhealthingeneralisthecontraryofdisease，whereasaparticulardisease，beingaspeciesofdisease，e。g。feverandophthalmiaandanyotherparticulardisease，hasnocontrary。
If，therefore，youaredemolishingaview，thereareallthesewaysinwhichyoushouldmakeyourexamination：foriftheaforesaidcharactersdonotbelongtoit，clearlywhathasbeenrenderedisnotthegenus。If，ontheotherhand，youareestablishingaview，therearethreeways：inthefirstplace，seewhetherthecontraryofthespeciesbefoundinthegenusstated，supposethegenushavenocontrary：forifthecontrarybefoundinit，clearlythespeciesinquestionisfoundinitaswell。Moreover，seeiftheintermediatespeciesisfoundinthegenusstated：forwhatevergenuscontainstheintermediatecontainstheextremesaswell。Again，ifthegenushaveacontrary，lookandseewhetheralsothecontraryspeciesisfoundinthecontrarygenus：forifso，clearlyalsothespeciesinquestionisfoundinthegenusinquestion。
Again，considerinthecaseoftheinflexionsandtheco—ordinatesofspeciesandgenus，andseewhethertheyfollowlikewise，bothindemolishingandinestablishingaview。Forwhateverattributebelongsordoesnotbelongtoonebelongsordoesnotbelongatthesametimetoall；e。g。ifjusticebeaparticularformofknowledge，thenalso’justly’is’knowingly’andthejustmanisamanofknowledge：
whereasifanyofthesethingsbenotso，thenneitherisanyoftherestofthem。
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Again，considerthecaseofthingsthatbearalikerelationtooneanother。Thus（e。g。）therelationofthepleasanttopleasureislikethatoftheusefultothegood：forineachcasetheoneproducestheother。Ifthereforepleasurebeakindof’good’，thenalsothepleasantwillbeakindof’useful’：forclearlyitmaybetakentobeproductiveofgood，seeingthatpleasureisgood。Inthesamewayalsoconsiderthecaseofprocessesofgenerationanddestruction；if（e。g。）tobuildbetobeactive，thentohavebuiltistohavebeenactive，andiftolearnbetorecollect，thenalsotohavelearntistohaverecollected，andiftobedecomposedbetobedestroyed，thentohavebeendecomposedistohavebeendestroyed，anddecompositionisakindofdestruction。Consideralsointhesamewaythecaseofthingsthatgenerateordestroy，andofthecapacitiesandusesofthings；andingeneral，bothindemolishingandinestablishinganargument，youshouldexaminethingsinthelightofanyresemblanceofwhateverdescription，asweweresayinginthecaseofgenerationanddestruction。Forifwhattendstodestroytendstodecompose，thenalsotobedestroyedistobedecomposed：andifwhattendstogeneratetendstoproduce，thentobegeneratedistobeproduced，andgenerationisproduction。Likewise，also，inthecaseofthecapacitiesandusesofthings：forifacapacitybeadisposition，thenalsotobecapableofsomethingistobedisposedtoit，andiftheuseofanythingbeanactivity，thentouseitistobeactive，andtohaveuseditistohavebeenactive。
Iftheoppositeofthespeciesbeaprivation，therearetwowaysofdemolishinganargument，firstofallbylookingtoseeiftheoppositebefoundinthegenusrendered：foreithertheprivationistobefoundabsolutelynowhereinthesamegenus，oratleastnotinthesameultimategenus：e。g。iftheultimategenuscontainingsightbesensation，thenblindnesswillnotbeasensation。Secondly，iftherebeasensation。Secondly，iftherebeaprivationopposedtobothgenusandspecies，buttheoppositeofthespeciesbenotfoundintheoppositeofthegenus，thenneithercouldthespeciesrenderedbeinthegenusrendered。If，then，youaredemolishingaview，youshouldfollowtheruleasstated；butifestablishingonethereisbutoneway：foriftheoppositespeciesbefoundintheoppositegenus，thenalsothespeciesinquestionwouldbefoundinthegenusinquestion：e。g。if’blindness’beaformof’insensibility’，then’sight’isaformof’sensation’。
Again，lookatthenegationsofthegenusandspeciesandconverttheorderofterms，accordingtothemethoddescribedinthecaseofAccident：e。g。ifthepleasantbeakindofgood，whatisnotgoodisnotpleasant。Forwerethisnosomethingnotgoodaswellwouldthenbepleasant。That，however，cannotbe，foritisimpossible，if’good’bethegenusofpleasant，thatanythingnotgoodshouldbepleasant：forofthingsofwhichthegenusisnotpredicated，noneofthespeciesispredicatedeither。Also，inestablishingaview，youshouldadoptthesamemethodofexamination：forifwhatisnotgoodbenotpleasant，thenwhatispleasantisgood，sothat’good’isthegenusof’pleasant’。
Ifthespeciesbearelativeterm，seewhetherthegenusbearelativetermaswell：forifthespeciesbearelativeterm，sotooisthegenus，asisthecasewith’double’and’multiple’：foreachisarelativeterm。If，ontheotherhand，thegenusbearelativeterm，thereisnonecessitythatthespeciesshouldbesoaswell：for’knowledge’isarelativeterm，butnotso’grammar’。Orpossiblynoteventhefirststatementwouldbegenerallyconsideredtrue：forvirtueisakindof’noble’andakindof’good’thing，andyet，while’virtue’isarelativeterm，’good’and’noble’arenotrelativesbutqualities。Again，seewhetherthespeciesfailstobeusedinthesamerelationwhencalledbyitsownname，andwhencalledbythenameofitsgenus：e。g。iftheterm’double’beusedtomeanthedoubleofa’half’，thenalsotheterm’multiple’oughttobeusedtomeanmultipleofa’half’。Otherwise’multiple’couldnotbethegenusof’double’。
Moreover，seewhetherthetermfailtobeusedinthesamerelationbothwhencalledbythenameofitsgenus，andalsowhencalledbythoseofallthegeneraofitsgenus。Forifthedoublebeamultipleofahalf，then’inexcessof’willalsobeusedinrelationtoa’half’：and，ingeneral，thedoublewillbecalledbythenamesofallthehighergenerainrelationtoa’half’。Anobjectionmayberaisedthatthereisnonecessityforatermtobeusedinthesamerelationwhencalledbyitsownnameandwhencalledbythatofitsgenus：for’knowledge’iscalledknowledge’ofanobject’，whereasitiscalleda’state’and’disposition’notofan’object’butofthe’soul’。
Again，seewhetherthegenusandthespeciesbeusedinthesamewayinrespectoftheinflexionstheytake，e。g。dativesandgenitivesandalltherest。Forasthespeciesisused，soshouldthegenusbeaswell，asinthecaseof’double’anditshighergenera：forwesayboth’doubleof’and’multipleof’athing。Likewise，also，inthecaseof’knowledge’：forbothknowledge’itselfanditsgenera，e。g。
’disposition’and’state’，aresaidtobe’of’something。Anobjectionmayberaisedthatinsomecasesitisnotso：forwesay’superiorto’and’contraryto’soandso，whereas’other’，whichisthegenusoftheseterms，demandsnot’to’but’than’：fortheexpressionis’otherthan’soandso。
Again，seewhethertermsusedinlikecaserelationshipsfailtoyieldalikeconstructionwhenconverted，asdo’double’and’multiple’。Foreachofthesetermstakesagenitivebothinitselfandinitsconvertedform：forwesaybothahalfof’and’afractionof’something。Thecaseisthesamealsoasregardsboth’knowledge’and’conception’：forthesetakeagenitive，andbyconversionan’objectofknowledge’andan’objectofconception’
arebothalikeusedwithadative。If，then，inanycasestheconstructionsafterconversionbenotalike，clearlytheonetermisnotthegenusoftheother。
Again，seewhetherthespeciesandthegenusfailtobeusedinrelationtoanequalnumberofthings：forthegeneralviewisthattheusesofbotharealikeandequalinnumber，asisthecasewith’present’and’grant’。Forapresent’isofsomethingortosomeone，andalsoa’grant’isofsomethingandtosomeone：and’grant’
isthegenusof’present’，fora’present’isa’grantthatneednotbereturned’。Insomecases，however，thenumberofrelationsinwhichthetermsareusedhappensnottobeequal，forwhile’double’isdoubleofsomething，wespeakof’inexcess’or’greater’insomething，aswellasoforthansomething：forwhatisinexcessorgreaterisalwaysinexcessinsomething，aswellasinexcessofsomething。Hencethetermsinquestionarenotthegeneraof’double’，inasmuchastheyarenotusedinrelationtoanequalnumberofthingswiththespecies。Orpossiblyitisnotuniversallytruethatspeciesandgenusareusedinrelationtoanequalnumberofthings。
See，also，iftheoppositeofthespecieshavetheoppositeofthegenusasitsgenus，e。g。whether，if’multiple’bethegenusof’double’，’fraction’bealsothegenusof’half’。Fortheoppositeofthegenusshouldalwaysbethegenusoftheoppositespecies。If，then，anyoneweretoassertthatknowledgeisakindofsensation，thenalsotheobjectofknowledgewillhavetobeakindofobjectofsensation，whereasitisnot：foranobjectofknowledgeisnotalwaysanobjectofsensation：forobjectsofknowledgeincludesomeoftheobjectsofintuitionaswell。Hence’objectofsensation’isnotthegenusof’objectofknowledge’：andifthisbeso，neitheris’sensation’thegenusof’knowledge’。
Seeingthatofrelativetermssomeareofnecessityfoundin，orusedof，thethingsinrelationtowhichtheyhappenatanytimetobeused（e。g。’disposition’and’state’and’balance’；forinnothingelsecantheaforesaidtermspossiblybefoundexceptinthethingsinrelationtowhichtheyareused），whileothersneednotbefoundinthethingsinrelationtowhichtheyareusedatanytime，thoughtheystillmaybe（e。g。iftheterm’objectofknowledge’beappliedtothesoul：foritisquitepossiblethattheknowledgeofitselfshouldbepossessedbythesoulitself，butitisnotnecessary，foritispossibleforthissameknowledgetobefoundinsomeoneelse），whileforothers，again，itisabsolutelyimpossiblethattheyshouldbefoundinthethingsinrelationtowhichtheyhappenatanytimetobeused（ase。g。thatthecontraryshouldbefoundinthecontraryorknowledgeintheobjectofknowledge，unlesstheobjectofknowledgehappentobeasouloraman）—youshouldlook，therefore，andseewhetherheplacesatermofonekindinsideagenusthatisnotofthatkind，e。g。supposehehassaidthat’memory’isthe’abidingofknowledge’。For’abiding’isalwaysfoundinthatwhichabides，andisusedofthat，sothattheabidingofknowledgealsowillbefoundinknowledge。Memory，then，isfoundinknowledge，seeingthatitistheabidingofknowledge。Butthisisimpossible，formemoryisalwaysfoundinthesoul。TheaforesaidcommonplaceruleiscommontothesubjectofAccidentaswell：foritisallthesametosaythat’abiding’isthegenusofmemory，ortoallegethatitisanaccidentofit。Forifinanywaywhatevermemorybetheabidingofknowledge，thesameargumentinregardtoitwillapply。
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Again，seeifhehasplacedwhatisa’state’insidethegenus’activity’，oranactivityinsidethegenus’state’，e。g。bydefining’sensation’as’movementcommunicatedthroughthebody’：
forsensationisa’state’，whereasmovementisan’activity’。
Likewise，also，ifhehassaidthatmemoryisa’statethatisretentiveofaconception’，formemoryisneverastate，butratheranactivity。
Theyalsomakeabadmistakewhoranka’state’withinthe’capacity’thatattendsit，e。g。bydefining’goodtemper’asthe’controlofanger’，and’courage’and’justice’as’controloffears’andof’gains’：fortheterms’courageous’and’good—tempered’areappliedtoamanwhoisimmunefrompassion，whereas’self—controlled’describesthemanwhoisexposedtopassionandnotledbyit。Quitepossibly，indeed，eachoftheformerisattendedbyacapacitysuchthat，ifhewereexposedtopassion，hewouldcontrolitandnotbeledbyit：but，forallthat，thisisnotwhatismeantbybeing’courageous’intheonecase，and’goodtempered’intheother；whatismeantisanabsoluteimmunityfromanypassionsofthatkindatall。
Sometimes，also，peoplestateanykindofattendantfeatureasthegenus，e。g。’pain’asthegenusof’anger’and’conception’asthatofconviction’。Forbothofthethingsinquestionfollowinacertainsenseuponthegivenspecies，butneitherofthemisgenustoit。
Forwhentheangrymanfeelspain，thepainbasappearedinhimearlierthantheanger：forhisangerisnotthecauseofhispain，buthispainofhisanger，sothatangeremphaticallyisnotpain。
Bythesamereasoning，neitherisconvictionconception：foritispossibletohavethesameconceptionevenwithoutbeingconvincedofit，whereasthisisimpossibleifconvictionbeaspeciesofconception：foritisimpossibleforathingstilltoremainthesameifitbeentirelytransferredoutofitsspecies，justasneithercouldthesameanimalatonetimebe，andatanothernotbe，aman。
If，ontheotherhand，anyonesaysthatamanwhohasaconceptionmustofnecessitybealsoconvincedofit，then’conception’and’conviction’willbeusedwithanequaldenotation，sothatnotevensocouldtheformerbethegenusofthelatter：forthedenotationofthegenusshouldbewider。
See，also，whetherbothnaturallycometobeanywhereinthesamething：forwhatcontainsthespeciescontainsthegenusaswell：
e。g。whatcontains’white’contains’colour’aswell，andwhatcontains’knowledgeofgrammar’contains’knowledge’aswell。If，therefore，anyonesaysthat’shame’is’fear’，orthat’anger’is’pain’，theresultwillbethatgenusandspeciesarenotfoundinthesamething：forshameisfoundinthe’reasoning’faculty，whereasfearisinthe’spirited’faculty，and’pain’isfoundinthefacultyof’desires’。（forinthispleasurealsoisfound），whereas’anger’isfoundinthe’spirited’faculty。Hencethetermsrenderedarenotthegenera，seeingthattheydonotnaturallycometobeinthesamefacultyasthespecies。Likewise，also，if’friendship’befoundinthefacultyofdesires，youmaytakeitthatitisnotaformof’wishing’：forwishingisalwaysfoundinthe’reasoning’
faculty。ThiscommonplaceruleisusefulalsoindealingwithAccident：fortheaccidentandthatofwhichitisanaccidentarebothfoundinthesamething，sothatiftheydonotappearinthesamething，clearlyitisnotanaccident。
Again，seeifthespeciespartakesofthegenusattributedonlyinsomeparticularrespect：foritisthegeneralviewthatthegenusisnotthusimpartedonlyinsomeparticularrespect：foramanisnotananimalinaparticularrespect，norisgrammarknowledgeinaparticularrespectonly。Likewisealsoinotherinstances。Look，therefore，andseeifinthecaseofanyofitsspeciesthegenusbeimpartedonlyinacertainrespect；e。g。if’animal’hasbeendescribedasan’objectofperception’orof’sight’。Forananimalisanobjectofperceptionorofsightinaparticularrespectonly；
foritisinrespectofitsbodythatitisperceivedandseen，notinrespectofitssoul，sothat—’objectofsight’and’objectofperception’couldnotbethegenusof’animal’。
Sometimesalsopeopleplacethewholeinsidethepartwithoutdetection，defining（e。g。）’animal’asan’animatebody’；whereasthepartisnotpredicatedinanysenseofthewhole，sothat’body’
couldnotbethegenusofanimal，seeingthatitisapart。
Seealsoifhehasputanythingthatisblameworthyorobjectionableintotheclass’capacity’or’capable’，e。g。bydefininga’sophist’
ora’slanderer’，ora’thief’as’onewhoiscapableofsecretlythievingotherpeople’sproperty’。Fornoneoftheaforesaidcharactersissocalledbecauseheis’capable’inoneoftheserespects：forevenGodandthegoodmanarecapableofdoingbadthings，butthatisnottheircharacter：foritisalwaysinrespectoftheirchoicethatbadmenaresocalled。Moreover，acapacityisalwaysadesirablething：foreventhecapacitiesfordoingbadthingsaredesirable，andthereforeitiswesaythatevenGodandthegoodmanpossessthem；fortheyarecapable（wesay）ofdoingevil。Sothen’capacity’canneverbethegenusofanythingblameworthy。Else，theresultwillbethatwhatisblameworthyissometimesdesirable：fortherewillbeacertainformofcapacitythatisblameworthy。
Also，seeifhehasputanythingthatispreciousordesirableforitsownsakeintotheclass’capacity’or’capable’or’productive’ofanything。Forcapacity，andwhatiscapableorproductiveofanything，isalwaysdesirableforthesakeofsomethingelse。
Orseeifhehasputanythingthatexistsintwogeneraormoreintooneofthemonly。Forsomethingsitisimpossibletoplaceinasinglegenus，e。g。the’cheat’andthe’slanderer’：forneitherhewhohasthewillwithoutthecapacity，norhewhohasthecapacitywithoutthewill，isaslandererorcheat，buthewhohasbothofthem。
Hencehemustbeputnotintoonegenus，butintoboththeaforesaidgenera。
Moreover，peoplesometimesinconverseorderrendergenusasdifferentia，anddifferentiaasgenus，defining（e。g。）astonishmentas’excessofwonderment’andconvictionas’vehemenceofconception’。
Forneither’excess’nor’vehemence’isthegenus，butthedifferentia：forastonishmentisusuallytakentobean’excessivewonderment’，andconvictiontobea’vehementconception’，sothat’wonderment’and’conception’arethegenus，while’excess’and’vehemence’arethedifferentia。Moreover，ifanyonerenders’excess’
and’vehemence’asgenera，theninanimatethingswillbeconvincedandastonished。For’vehemence’and’excess’ofathingarefoundinathingwhichisthusvehementandinexcess。If，therefore，astonishmentbeexcessofwondermenttheastonishmentwillbefoundinthewonderment，sothat’wonderment’willbeastonished！Likewise，also，convictionwillbefoundintheconception，ifitbe’vehemenceofconception’，sothattheconceptionwillbeconvinced。
Moreover，amanwhorendersananswerinthisstylewillinconsequencefindhimselfcallingvehemencevehementandexcessexcessive：forthereissuchathingasavehementconviction：ifthenconvictionbe’vehemence’，therewouldbea’vehementvehemence’。
Likewise，also，thereissuchathingasexcessiveastonishment：ifthenastonishmentbeanexcess，therewouldbean’excessiveexcess’。Whereasneitherofthesethingsisgenerallybelieved，anymorethanthatknowledgeisaknowerormotionamovingthing。
Sometimes，too，peoplemakethebadmistakeofputtinganaffectionintothatwhichisaffected，asitsgenus，e。g。thosewhosaythatimmortalityiseverlastinglife：forimmortalityseemstobeacertainaffectionoraccidentalfeatureoflife。Thatthissayingistruewouldappearclearifanyoneweretoadmitthatamancanpassfrombeingmortalandbecomeimmortal：fornoonewillassertthathetakesanotherlife，butthatacertainaccidentalfeatureoraffectionentersintothisoneasitis。Sothen’life’isnotthegenusofimmortality。
Again，seeiftoanaffectionhehasascribedasgenustheobjectofwhichitisanaffection，bydefining（e。g。）windas’airinmotion’。Rather，windis’amovementofair’：forthesameairpersistsbothwhenitisinmotionandwhenitisstill。Hencewindisnot’air’atall：forthentherewouldalsohavebeenwindwhentheairwasnotinmotion，seeingthatthesameairwhichformedthewindpersists。Likewise，also，inothercasesofthekind。Even，then，ifweoughtinthisinstancetoadmitthepointthatwindis’airinmotion’，yetweshouldacceptadefinitionofthekind，notaboutallthosethingsofwhichthegenusisnottrue，butonlyincaseswherethegenusrenderedisatruepredicate。Forinsomecases，e。g。’mud’or’snow’，itisnotgenerallyheldtobetrue。Forpeopletellyouthatsnowis’frozenwater’andmudisearthmixedwithmoisture’，whereassnowisnotwater，normudearth，sothatneitherofthetermsrenderedcouldbethegenus：forthegenusshouldbetrueofallitsspecies。Likewiseneitheriswine’fermentedwater’，asEmpedoclesspeaksof’waterfermentedinwood’；’foritsimplyisnotwateratall。
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Moreover，seewhetherthetermrenderedfailtobethegenusofanythingatall；forthenclearlyitalsofailstobethegenusofthespeciesmentioned。Examinethepointbyseeingwhethertheobjectsthatpartakeofthegenusfailtobespecificallydifferentfromoneanother，e。g。whiteobjects：forthesedonotdifferspecificallyfromoneanother，whereasofagenusthespeciesarealwaysdifferent，sothat’white’couldnotbethegenusofanything。
Again，seewhetherhehasnamedasgenusordifferentiasomefeaturethatgoeswitheverything：forthenumberofattributesthatfolloweverythingiscomparativelylarge：thus（e。g。）’Being’and’Unity’areamongthenumberofattributesthatfolloweverything。If，therefore，hehasrendered’Being’asagenus，clearlyitwouldbethegenusofeverything，seeingthatitispredicatedofeverything；forthegenusisneverpredicatedofanythingexceptofitsspecies。HenceUnity，interalia，willbeaspeciesofBeing。Theresult，therefore，isthatofallthingsofwhichthegenusispredicated，thespeciesispredicatedaswell，seeingthatBeingandUnityarepredicatesofabsolutelyeverything，whereasthepredicationofthespeciesoughttobeofnarrowerrange。If，ontheotherhand，hehasnamedasdifferentiasomeattributethatfollowseverything，clearlythedenotationofthedifferentiawillbeequalto，orwiderthan，thatofthegenus。Forifthegenus，too，besomeattributethatfollowseverything，thedenotationofthedifferentiawillbeequaltoitsdenotation，whileifthegenusdonotfolloweverything，itwillbestillwider。
Moreover，seeifthedescription’inherentinS’beusedofthegenusrenderedinrelationtoitsspecies，asitisusedof’white’inthecaseofsnow，thusshowingclearlythatitcouldnotbethegenus：
for’trueofS’istheonlydescriptionusedofthegenusinrelationtoitsspecies。Lookandseealsoifthegenusfailstobesynonymouswithitsspecies。Forthegenusisalwayspredicatedofitsspeciessynonymously。
Moreover，beware，wheneverbothspeciesandgenushaveacontrary，andheplacesthebetterofthecontrariesinsidetheworsegenus：fortheresultwillbethattheremainingspecieswillbefoundintheremaininggenus，seeingthatcontrariesarefoundincontrarygenera，sothatthebetterspecieswillbefoundintheworsegenusandtheworseinthebetter：whereastheusualviewisthatofthebetterspeciesthegenustooisbetter。Alsoseeifhehasplacedthespeciesinsidetheworseandnotinsidethebettergenus，whenitisatthesametimerelatedinlikemannertoboth，as（e。g。）ifhehasdefinedthe’soul’asa’formofmotion’or’aformofmovingthing’。Forthesamesoulisusuallythoughttobeaprinciplealikeofrestandofmotion，sothat，ifrestisthebetterofthetwo，thisisthegenusintowhichthesoulshouldhavebeenput。
Moreover，judgebymeansofgreaterandlessdegrees：ifoverthrowingaview，seewhetherthegenusadmitsofagreaterdegree，whereasneitherthespeciesitselfdoesso，noranytermthatiscalledafterit：e。g。ifvirtueadmitsofagreaterdegree，sotoodoesjusticeandthejustman：foronemaniscalled’morejustthananother’。If，therefore，thegenusrenderedadmitsofagreaterdegree，whereasneitherthespeciesdoessoitselfnoryetanytermcalledafterit，thenwhathasbeenrenderedcouldnotbethegenus。
Again，ifwhatismoregenerally，orasgenerally，thoughttobethegenusbenotso，clearlyneitheristhegenusrendered。Thecommonplaceruleinquestionisusefulespeciallyincaseswherethespeciesappearstohaveseveralpredicatesinthecategoryofessence，andwherenodistinctionhasbeendrawnbetweenthem，andwecannotsaywhichofthemisgenus；e。g。both’pain’andthe’conceptionofaslight’areusuallythoughttobepredicatesof’angerinthecategoryofessence：fortheangrymanisbothinpainandalsoconceivesthatheisslighted。Thesamemodeofinquirymaybeappliedalsotothecaseofthespecies，bycomparingitwithsomeotherspecies：foriftheonewhichismoregenerally，orasgenerally，thoughttobefoundinthegenusrenderedbenotfoundtherein，thenclearlyneithercouldthespeciesrenderedbefoundtherein。
Indemolishingaview，therefore，youshouldfollowtheruleasstated。Inestablishingone，ontheotherhand，thecommonplacerulethatyoushouldseeifboththegenusrenderedandthespeciesadmitofagreaterdegreewillnotserve：foreventhoughbothadmitit，itisstillpossibleforonenottobethegenusoftheother。Forboth’beautiful’and’white’admitofagreaterdegree，andneitheristhegenusoftheother。Ontheotherhand，thecomparisonofthegeneraandofthespeciesonewithanotherisofuse：e。g。supposingA
andBtohavealikeclaimtobegenus，thenifonebeagenus，soalsoistheother。Likewise，also，ifwhathaslessclaimbeagenus，soalsoiswhathasmoreclaim：e。g。if’capacity’havemoreclaimthan’virtue’tobethegenusofself—control，andvirtuebethegenus，soalsoiscapacity。Thesameobservationswillapplyalsointhecaseofthespecies。Forinstance，supposingAandBtohavealikeclaimtobeaspeciesofthegenusinquestion，theniftheonebeaspecies，soalsoistheother：andifthatwhichislessgenerallythoughttobesobeaspecies，soalsoisthatwhichismoregenerallythoughttobeso。
